@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.472 → 0.28.474

package/dist/mcp/augmented-admin.js

@@ -21781,7 +21781,7 @@ server.tool(
 );
 server.tool(
   "debug_query_audit_log",
-  'Read recent audit events to troubleshoot why/when agents bounced \u2014 primarily restart events. Defaults to the "agent.restart" action: each event returns { created_at, source, reason, actor_kind, agent_id, code_name }, where `source` is the restart trigger (agent-self-request, channel-command, maintenance-window, stale-mcp, hot-reload-mcp, mcp-presence-reaper, day-rollover, auth-tuple-change, \u2026) and `reason` is the free-text rationale when one was given (e.g. the agent\'s own words for a request_restart). Two modes: (1) pass { agent_id } to scope to ONE agent (fails closed if you\'re not authorized for its org) \u2014 use when a specific agent went quiet. (2) OMIT agent_id for a CROSS-AGENT sweep across every org you\'re authorized for (optionally narrow with { org_id }) \u2014 use to spot fleet-wide restart storms or compare agents. Filter the action with `action` (pass "all" to drop the action filter and read every event type), and bound with { since_hours?, limit? }. Cross-agent results are org-walled in SQL; unauthorized orgs are invisible.',
+  'Read recent audit events to troubleshoot why/when agents bounced \u2014 primarily restart events. Defaults to the "agent.restart" action: each event returns { created_at, source, reason, detail, actor_kind, agent_id, code_name }, where `source` is the restart trigger (agent-self-request, channel-command, maintenance-window, stale-mcp, hot-reload-mcp, mcp-presence-reaper, day-rollover, auth-tuple-change, \u2026) and `reason` is the free-text rationale when one was given (e.g. the agent\'s own words for a request_restart). `detail` (ENG-8293) is the structured "what changed?" payload, null for sources that don\'t emit one. For `auth-tuple-change` it is { auth_tuple: { changed[], unchanged[], components[] } } naming WHICH credential/identity component moved and its before/after fingerprint \u2014 the auth tuple is deliberately NOT keyed on the rotating access token, so an auth-tuple-change is always a genuine credential or identity change, and `detail.auth_tuple.changed` is how you tell which one. Comparing `components[].to` across agents answers whether a restart WAVE was one control-plane push (same new value everywhere) or coincidental per-agent rotations. Two modes: (1) pass { agent_id } to scope to ONE agent (fails closed if you\'re not authorized for its org) \u2014 use when a specific agent went quiet. (2) OMIT agent_id for a CROSS-AGENT sweep across every org you\'re authorized for (optionally narrow with { org_id }) \u2014 use to spot fleet-wide restart storms or compare agents. Filter the action with `action` (pass "all" to drop the action filter and read every event type), and bound with { since_hours?, limit? }. Cross-agent results are org-walled in SQL; unauthorized orgs are invisible.',
   queryAuditLogSchema.shape,
   async (args) => {
     try {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@integrity-labs/agt-cli",
-  "version": "0.28.472",
+  "version": "0.28.474",
   "description": "Augmented Team CLI — agent provisioning and management",
   "type": "module",
   "engines": {