@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.420 → 0.28.422

package/dist/{chunk-LLIMZG67.js → chunk-XFC7YVGS.js}

@@ -8049,6 +8049,34 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // change (ADR-0022 sensitive-flag confirm).
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "slack-scheduled-channel-guard",
+    description: 'Guard on slack.reply that refuses to let an active scheduled-task destination silently move a reply to a DIFFERENT channel than the agent named (ENG-8137). CS-1505 gave an explicit inbound_id priority over the task destination but left the no-inbound_id case treating "no inbound reference" as "no destination specified" - and `channel` is a REQUIRED argument, so every call names one. The symptom: a question asked in one channel answered in another, and a reply meant as a DM landing in a public channel. Fires only when the marker carries an EXPLICIT target, the named channel differs from it, and neither an inbound_id, an enforce binding, nor an ENG-7542 channel correction is available to arbitrate. off = never runs (today behaviour: silent retarget). shadow = count + log the would-block but STILL route as today, so the false-positive rate is measurable before anyone refuses a send. enforce = block the reply and tell the agent to retry. Read live from the heartbeat flags-cache (or the env override). NOTE: enforce is currently CLAMPED to shadow host-side and setting it here will not take effect - it stays blocked until ENG-8142 teaches the Stop hook to tell a refused reply from a delivered one, because until then a blocked send fails silently (no recovery, no re-prompt, nothing in the channel). Lifting the clamp is a code change, not a flag flip.',
+    flagType: "enum",
+    allowedValues: ["off", "shadow", "enforce"],
+    // Ships in SHADOW, not off: the counter is the whole point - the fleet metric
+    // is currently blind to this misroute, which is why it went unnoticed. shadow
+    // is a free local log line + counter (no model spend, no behaviour change), so
+    // it measures the fire rate immediately. enforce turns a misroute into a
+    // REFUSED send, which trades a confidentiality risk for an availability one -
+    // that is the audited per-org flip, taken after reading the shadow numbers and
+    // after ENG-8143 shrinks the stale-marker window that dominates the false
+    // positives.
+    defaultValue: "shadow",
+    // Enum override AGT_SLACK_SCHEDULED_CHANNEL_GUARD_MODE (off|shadow|enforce),
+    // resolved by resolveSlackScheduledChannelGuardMode in the channel-server bundle.
+    envVar: "AGT_SLACK_SCHEDULED_CHANNEL_GUARD_MODE",
+    // enforce REFUSES a send the agent asked to make - a visible availability
+    // change, so flipping toward it is deliberate (ADR-0022 sensitive-flag confirm).
+    sensitive: true,
+    // ENG-8149: the agt-cli that first carries resolveSlackScheduledChannelGuardMode
+    // (published from the ENG-8137 merge c6ff71cd). Without this the flip-reach modal
+    // reports FULL reach, because an undefined `since` means "every host can honour
+    // it" - true for flags that predate the reach work, wrong for a NEW host-read
+    // flag whose reader older hosts simply do not have. Excluded from
+    // projectDefinition, so setting it does not roll FLAGS_SCHEMA_VERSION.
+    since: "0.28.421"
+  },
   {
     key: "slack-hot-thread-guard",
     description: "Server-side hot-thread guard on the slack.reply surface (ENG-7462). Prevents an agent posting a NEW top-level Slack message when it meant to reply inside the thread it is already working in - a prompt/memory rule proved insufficient (the agent had the rule and still slipped). When a reply would otherwise post to channel ROOT (no thread_ts / message_ts / inbound_id, no active kanban card) and the agent has a recent active thread in that channel (its last bot-posted thread, from the persisted trackedThreads cache, within a freshness window), the reply is redirected into that thread. proactive:true no longer implies channel root; posting at root becomes a deliberate action (the to_channel_root flag, or the thread_ts:null sentinel). off = guard never runs, replies with no coords root exactly as today (ships dark). shadow = compute + log the would-redirect but STILL post to root (measure the fire rate before acting). enforce = apply the redirect (a soft-block: redirect + inform, never a hard rejection). Read live from the heartbeat flags-cache (or the env override); enforce is a deliberate per-org flip after a shadow soak.",
@@ -8659,6 +8687,17 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // direction - a flag-DB read error must not resurrect the mis-threading/noise the kill
     // fixes. Net-new gate, registry-only (ADR-0022); API-evaluated, no env materialization.
     defaultValue: false
+  },
+  {
+    key: "onboarding-msteams-channel",
+    description: `Offer Microsoft Teams as a selectable channel on onboarding step 3 ("which channels should your org use?", ENG-8146). OFF (default) hides the Teams option entirely: it is not rendered, not selectable, and not named in the plan-upgrade note. Turn it ON per org to restore the option for a customer who genuinely runs on Teams. Resolved SERVER-SIDE in the step-3 server component for the URL's orgId (webapp lib/feature-flags-org-server.ts), NOT via the browser public map \u2014 the client flag path evaluates at the active-org cookie, which onboarding deliberately does not pin to the org being onboarded, so a client read would resolve the wrong org for a multi-org user. Hiding the option never revokes a channel: an org that already saved msteams keeps it (step 3 carries hidden-but-saved channels through the write). Ships dark.`,
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Declared safe value is `false`: Teams hidden. `false` is also the fail-closed
+    // direction - a flag-DB read error must show the narrower channel set, never
+    // surface an option the operator has not deliberately turned on. Net-new gate,
+    // registry-only (ADR-0022). NOT `public`: it is resolved server-side only, so it
+    // must never be serialized into the browser map.
+    defaultValue: false
   }
 ];
 var REGISTRY_BY_KEY = new Map(FLAG_REGISTRY.map((definition) => [definition.key, definition]));
@@ -12706,4 +12745,4 @@ export {
   stopAllSessionsAndWait,
   getProjectDir
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-LLIMZG67.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-XFC7YVGS.js.map