@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.420 → 0.28.421

package/dist/bin/agt.js

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ import {
   success,
   table,
   warn
-} from "../chunk-4D4VKZPK.js";
+} from "../chunk-HVVEMQWZ.js";
 import {
   AnchorSessionClient,
   CHANNEL_REGISTRY,
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ import {
   renderTemplate,
   resolveChannels,
   serializeManifestForSlackCli
-} from "../chunk-LLIMZG67.js";
+} from "../chunk-B4NX2T2H.js";
 import "../chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 
 // src/bin/agt.ts
@@ -4829,7 +4829,7 @@ import { execFileSync, execSync } from "child_process";
 import { existsSync as existsSync10, realpathSync as realpathSync2 } from "fs";
 import chalk18 from "chalk";
 import ora16 from "ora";
-var cliVersion = true ? "0.28.420" : "dev";
+var cliVersion = true ? "0.28.421" : "dev";
 async function fetchLatestVersion() {
   const host2 = getHost();
   if (!host2) return null;
@@ -6001,7 +6001,7 @@ function handleError(err) {
 }
 
 // src/bin/agt.ts
-var cliVersion2 = true ? "0.28.420" : "dev";
+var cliVersion2 = true ? "0.28.421" : "dev";
 var program = new Command();
 program.name("agt").description("Augmented CLI \u2014 agent provisioning and management").version(cliVersion2).option("--json", "Emit machine-readable JSON output (suppress spinners and colors)").option("--skip-update-check", "Skip the automatic update check on startup");
 program.hook("preAction", async (thisCommand, actionCommand) => {

package/dist/{chunk-LLIMZG67.js → chunk-B4NX2T2H.js}

@@ -8049,6 +8049,27 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // change (ADR-0022 sensitive-flag confirm).
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "slack-scheduled-channel-guard",
+    description: 'Guard on slack.reply that refuses to let an active scheduled-task destination silently move a reply to a DIFFERENT channel than the agent named (ENG-8137). CS-1505 gave an explicit inbound_id priority over the task destination but left the no-inbound_id case treating "no inbound reference" as "no destination specified" - and `channel` is a REQUIRED argument, so every call names one. The symptom: a question asked in one channel answered in another, and a reply meant as a DM landing in a public channel. Fires only when the marker carries an EXPLICIT target, the named channel differs from it, and neither an inbound_id, an enforce binding, nor an ENG-7542 channel correction is available to arbitrate. off = never runs (today behaviour: silent retarget). shadow = count + log the would-block but STILL route as today, so the false-positive rate is measurable before anyone refuses a send. enforce = block the reply and tell the agent to retry. Read live from the heartbeat flags-cache (or the env override). NOTE: enforce is currently CLAMPED to shadow host-side and setting it here will not take effect - it stays blocked until ENG-8142 teaches the Stop hook to tell a refused reply from a delivered one, because until then a blocked send fails silently (no recovery, no re-prompt, nothing in the channel). Lifting the clamp is a code change, not a flag flip.',
+    flagType: "enum",
+    allowedValues: ["off", "shadow", "enforce"],
+    // Ships in SHADOW, not off: the counter is the whole point - the fleet metric
+    // is currently blind to this misroute, which is why it went unnoticed. shadow
+    // is a free local log line + counter (no model spend, no behaviour change), so
+    // it measures the fire rate immediately. enforce turns a misroute into a
+    // REFUSED send, which trades a confidentiality risk for an availability one -
+    // that is the audited per-org flip, taken after reading the shadow numbers and
+    // after ENG-8143 shrinks the stale-marker window that dominates the false
+    // positives.
+    defaultValue: "shadow",
+    // Enum override AGT_SLACK_SCHEDULED_CHANNEL_GUARD_MODE (off|shadow|enforce),
+    // resolved by resolveSlackScheduledChannelGuardMode in the channel-server bundle.
+    envVar: "AGT_SLACK_SCHEDULED_CHANNEL_GUARD_MODE",
+    // enforce REFUSES a send the agent asked to make - a visible availability
+    // change, so flipping toward it is deliberate (ADR-0022 sensitive-flag confirm).
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "slack-hot-thread-guard",
     description: "Server-side hot-thread guard on the slack.reply surface (ENG-7462). Prevents an agent posting a NEW top-level Slack message when it meant to reply inside the thread it is already working in - a prompt/memory rule proved insufficient (the agent had the rule and still slipped). When a reply would otherwise post to channel ROOT (no thread_ts / message_ts / inbound_id, no active kanban card) and the agent has a recent active thread in that channel (its last bot-posted thread, from the persisted trackedThreads cache, within a freshness window), the reply is redirected into that thread. proactive:true no longer implies channel root; posting at root becomes a deliberate action (the to_channel_root flag, or the thread_ts:null sentinel). off = guard never runs, replies with no coords root exactly as today (ships dark). shadow = compute + log the would-redirect but STILL post to root (measure the fire rate before acting). enforce = apply the redirect (a soft-block: redirect + inform, never a hard rejection). Read live from the heartbeat flags-cache (or the env override); enforce is a deliberate per-org flip after a shadow soak.",
@@ -12706,4 +12727,4 @@ export {
   stopAllSessionsAndWait,
   getProjectDir
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-LLIMZG67.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-B4NX2T2H.js.map