@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.359 → 0.28.360

package/dist/{claude-pair-runtime-ASRAOWWQ.js → claude-pair-runtime-JX2ZYSZC.js}

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ async function spawnPairSession(session) {
     return { ok: true };
   } catch {
   }
-  const { resolveClaudeBinary } = await import("./persistent-session-R7JOZNIC.js");
+  const { resolveClaudeBinary } = await import("./persistent-session-7XG63YFS.js");
   const claudeBin = resolveClaudeBinary();
   const pairEnv = {
     ...process.env,
@@ -373,4 +373,4 @@ export {
   startClaudePair,
   submitClaudePairCode
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=claude-pair-runtime-ASRAOWWQ.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=claude-pair-runtime-JX2ZYSZC.js.map

package/dist/lib/manager-worker.js

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ import {
   safeWriteJsonAtomic,
   setConfigHash,
   toOpencodeModel
-} from "../chunk-TVFNWNSP.js";
+} from "../chunk-U62E42YH.js";
 import {
   getProjectDir as getProjectDir2,
   getReadyTasks,
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ import {
   takeZombieDetection,
   transcriptActivityAgeSeconds,
   writeEgressAllowlist
-} from "../chunk-FAGXXKWZ.js";
+} from "../chunk-Z7QR2YEJ.js";
 import {
   reapOrphanChannelMcps
 } from "../chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
@@ -9532,7 +9532,7 @@ var agentRestartTimezoneInputs = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
 var lastVersionCheckAt = 0;
 var VERSION_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1e3;
 var lastResponsivenessProbeAt = 0;
-var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.359" : "dev";
+var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.360" : "dev";
 function resolveBrewPath(execFileSync2) {
   try {
     const out = execFileSync2("which", ["brew"], { timeout: 5e3 }).toString().trim();
@@ -10551,7 +10551,7 @@ function flushRestartedAgentDiagnostics(hostId, codeNames) {
   if (codeNames.length === 0) return;
   void (async () => {
     try {
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-R7JOZNIC.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-7XG63YFS.js");
       await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
         host_id: hostId,
         agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics(codeNames)
@@ -10650,7 +10650,7 @@ async function pollCycle() {
     }
     try {
       const { detectHostSecurity } = await import("../host-security-6PDFG7F5.js");
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-R7JOZNIC.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-7XG63YFS.js");
       const diagCodeNames = [...agentState.persistentSessionAgents];
       const agentDiagnostics = diagCodeNames.length > 0 ? collectDiagnostics(diagCodeNames) : void 0;
       let tailscaleHostname;
@@ -10805,7 +10805,7 @@ async function pollCycle() {
       const {
         collectResponsivenessProbes,
         getResponsivenessIntervalMs
-      } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-7SUERVWL.js");
+      } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-JV6PRDKD.js");
       const probeIntervalMs = getResponsivenessIntervalMs();
       if (now - lastResponsivenessProbeAt > probeIntervalMs) {
         const probeCodeNames = [...agentState.persistentSessionAgents];
@@ -10837,7 +10837,7 @@ async function pollCycle() {
           collectResponsivenessProbes,
           livePendingInboundOldestAgeSeconds,
           parkPendingInbound
-        } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-7SUERVWL.js");
+        } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-JV6PRDKD.js");
         const { getProjectDir: wedgeProjectDir } = await import("../scheduler-engine-HYOOQV4A.js");
         const wedgeNow = /* @__PURE__ */ new Date();
         const liveAgents = agentState.persistentSessionAgents;
@@ -13992,7 +13992,7 @@ async function handleRestartDoorbell(agentId, requestedAt, restartReason) {
     void api.post("/host/restart-ack", { host_id: hostId, agent_id: agentId, restart_requested_at: requestedAt }).catch((err) => log(`[restart-lane] ack failed for '${codeName}': ${err.message}`));
     void (async () => {
       try {
-        const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-R7JOZNIC.js");
+        const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-7XG63YFS.js");
         await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
           host_id: hostId,
           agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics([codeName])
@@ -14042,7 +14042,7 @@ async function respawnAgentAfterMcpStop(codeName, reason) {
     }
     try {
       const hostId = await getHostId();
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-R7JOZNIC.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-7XG63YFS.js");
       await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
         host_id: hostId,
         agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics([codeName])
@@ -14540,7 +14540,7 @@ async function processClaudePairSessions(agents) {
     killPairSession,
     pairTmuxSession,
     finalizeClaudePairOnboarding
-  } = await import("../claude-pair-runtime-ASRAOWWQ.js");
+  } = await import("../claude-pair-runtime-JX2ZYSZC.js");
   for (const pairId of pendingResp.cancelled_pair_ids ?? []) {
     log(`[claude-pair] sweeping orphan tmux session for pair ${pairId.slice(0, 8)}`);
     const killed = await killPairSession(pairTmuxSession(pairId));

package/dist/mcp/direct-chat-channel.js

@@ -34781,6 +34781,19 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "email-guard-require-approval-enabled",
+    description: "Platform enable-gate for the email-domain guardrail REQUIRE_APPROVAL stage (ENG-7939). When ON for an org, a scope at email_guard_stage=require_approval routes a send to a non-allowed domain into Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card) instead of a hard block: the rollout UI unlocks the option and the write routes accept require_approval. When OFF (default) the write routes reject require_approval and the UI shows it as not yet available, so no scope can select it. Structurally also depends on hitl-approval-routing being on (the approval broker fails closed to a hard block when routing is off). Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Declared safe value is `false` (require_approval is unselectable / inert). A flag-DB read
+    // error degrades here, so a flags outage can never start routing customer email through a
+    // half-wired approval path - the fail-closed direction. No envVar: net-new control with no
+    // pre-flags env gate to migrate (ADR-0022).
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Ungates a stage that changes how real customer email is handled (block becomes approval),
+    // so it is a deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "slack-reply-binding",
     description: "Slack reply-target binding (ENG-7396 / WS2, cross-thread reply routing): the model names which inbound it answers (inbound_id) and the server resolves the destination from its own verified record. shadow = classify + count only, routing unchanged; warn = same routing plus a tool-result note so the model self-corrects; enforce = route a bound reply to the registry thread and REJECT a reply whose target matches no inbound this process delivered. The channel server can't evaluate flags, so the manager materializes the resolved value into the AGT_SLACK_REPLY_BINDING spawn env (the operator/canary override, ADR-0022). Ships shadow.",

package/dist/mcp/origami.js

@@ -40544,6 +40544,19 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "email-guard-require-approval-enabled",
+    description: "Platform enable-gate for the email-domain guardrail REQUIRE_APPROVAL stage (ENG-7939). When ON for an org, a scope at email_guard_stage=require_approval routes a send to a non-allowed domain into Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card) instead of a hard block: the rollout UI unlocks the option and the write routes accept require_approval. When OFF (default) the write routes reject require_approval and the UI shows it as not yet available, so no scope can select it. Structurally also depends on hitl-approval-routing being on (the approval broker fails closed to a hard block when routing is off). Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Declared safe value is `false` (require_approval is unselectable / inert). A flag-DB read
+    // error degrades here, so a flags outage can never start routing customer email through a
+    // half-wired approval path - the fail-closed direction. No envVar: net-new control with no
+    // pre-flags env gate to migrate (ADR-0022).
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Ungates a stage that changes how real customer email is handled (block becomes approval),
+    // so it is a deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "slack-reply-binding",
     description: "Slack reply-target binding (ENG-7396 / WS2, cross-thread reply routing): the model names which inbound it answers (inbound_id) and the server resolves the destination from its own verified record. shadow = classify + count only, routing unchanged; warn = same routing plus a tool-result note so the model self-corrects; enforce = route a bound reply to the registry thread and REJECT a reply whose target matches no inbound this process delivered. The channel server can't evaluate flags, so the manager materializes the resolved value into the AGT_SLACK_REPLY_BINDING spawn env (the operator/canary override, ADR-0022). Ships shadow.",

package/dist/mcp/slack-channel.js

@@ -34463,6 +34463,19 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "email-guard-require-approval-enabled",
+    description: "Platform enable-gate for the email-domain guardrail REQUIRE_APPROVAL stage (ENG-7939). When ON for an org, a scope at email_guard_stage=require_approval routes a send to a non-allowed domain into Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card) instead of a hard block: the rollout UI unlocks the option and the write routes accept require_approval. When OFF (default) the write routes reject require_approval and the UI shows it as not yet available, so no scope can select it. Structurally also depends on hitl-approval-routing being on (the approval broker fails closed to a hard block when routing is off). Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Declared safe value is `false` (require_approval is unselectable / inert). A flag-DB read
+    // error degrades here, so a flags outage can never start routing customer email through a
+    // half-wired approval path - the fail-closed direction. No envVar: net-new control with no
+    // pre-flags env gate to migrate (ADR-0022).
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Ungates a stage that changes how real customer email is handled (block becomes approval),
+    // so it is a deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "slack-reply-binding",
     description: "Slack reply-target binding (ENG-7396 / WS2, cross-thread reply routing): the model names which inbound it answers (inbound_id) and the server resolves the destination from its own verified record. shadow = classify + count only, routing unchanged; warn = same routing plus a tool-result note so the model self-corrects; enforce = route a bound reply to the registry thread and REJECT a reply whose target matches no inbound this process delivered. The channel server can't evaluate flags, so the manager materializes the resolved value into the AGT_SLACK_REPLY_BINDING spawn env (the operator/canary override, ADR-0022). Ships shadow.",

package/dist/mcp/telegram-channel.js

@@ -34813,6 +34813,19 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "email-guard-require-approval-enabled",
+    description: "Platform enable-gate for the email-domain guardrail REQUIRE_APPROVAL stage (ENG-7939). When ON for an org, a scope at email_guard_stage=require_approval routes a send to a non-allowed domain into Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card) instead of a hard block: the rollout UI unlocks the option and the write routes accept require_approval. When OFF (default) the write routes reject require_approval and the UI shows it as not yet available, so no scope can select it. Structurally also depends on hitl-approval-routing being on (the approval broker fails closed to a hard block when routing is off). Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Declared safe value is `false` (require_approval is unselectable / inert). A flag-DB read
+    // error degrades here, so a flags outage can never start routing customer email through a
+    // half-wired approval path - the fail-closed direction. No envVar: net-new control with no
+    // pre-flags env gate to migrate (ADR-0022).
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Ungates a stage that changes how real customer email is handled (block becomes approval),
+    // so it is a deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "slack-reply-binding",
     description: "Slack reply-target binding (ENG-7396 / WS2, cross-thread reply routing): the model names which inbound it answers (inbound_id) and the server resolves the destination from its own verified record. shadow = classify + count only, routing unchanged; warn = same routing plus a tool-result note so the model self-corrects; enforce = route a bound reply to the registry thread and REJECT a reply whose target matches no inbound this process delivered. The channel server can't evaluate flags, so the manager materializes the resolved value into the AGT_SLACK_REPLY_BINDING spawn env (the operator/canary override, ADR-0022). Ships shadow.",

package/dist/{persistent-session-R7JOZNIC.js → persistent-session-7XG63YFS.js}

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ import {
   writeDirectChatSessionState,
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
-} from "./chunk-FAGXXKWZ.js";
+} from "./chunk-Z7QR2YEJ.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 export {
   EGRESS_BASELINE_DOMAINS,
@@ -77,4 +77,4 @@ export {
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-R7JOZNIC.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-7XG63YFS.js.map

package/dist/{responsiveness-probe-7SUERVWL.js → responsiveness-probe-JV6PRDKD.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   paneLogPath
-} from "./chunk-FAGXXKWZ.js";
+} from "./chunk-Z7QR2YEJ.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 
 // src/lib/responsiveness-probe.ts
@@ -437,4 +437,4 @@ export {
   readAndResetSlackReplyBindingClassifications,
   readAndResetSlackReplyTargetClassifications
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-7SUERVWL.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-JV6PRDKD.js.map

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@integrity-labs/agt-cli",
-  "version": "0.28.359",
+  "version": "0.28.360",
   "description": "Augmented Team CLI — agent provisioning and management",
   "type": "module",
   "engines": {