@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.357 → 0.28.359

package/dist/mcp/direct-chat-channel.js

@@ -34185,6 +34185,16 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // be in the browser-exposed public map.
     public: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "opencode-live-view",
+    description: "opencode-native Live View / Diagnostics (ENG-7927): the agent Diagnostics tab renders a structured session transcript (messages + tool calls + reasoning) for opencode agents instead of the tmux pane, by polling GET /admin/agents/:id/opencode-transcript (which SSM-reads a redacted snapshot the manager writes) ~every 3s for a bounded window. Boolean gate; ships dark; when OFF the route returns feature_disabled and opencode agents show the static diagnostics snapshot. Claude Code agents are unaffected (they keep the tmux pane).",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Read client-side by the Diagnostics tab (usePublicBooleanFlag), so it must
+    // be in the browser-exposed public map. Additive viewer gate (like
+    // admin-live-pane): not sensitive.
+    public: true
+  },
   {
     key: "github-backup",
     description: "Org-level GitHub daily auto-backup (ENG-7646, ENG-7582 Part 2). Rollout kill-switch; ships dark. The enterprise ENTITLEMENT is enforced separately via plans.github_backup (getPlanForOrg); this flag only stages rollout on top of that entitlement.",
@@ -34709,7 +34719,7 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "composio-hitl-mode",
-    description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls (routed to approval when hitl-approval-routing is on). Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",
+    description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls and route them to Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card). Since ENG-7828 enforce ALWAYS routes to a Human Approval card by default; set hitl-approval-routing=off to make enforce a hard block with no approval instead. Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",
     flagType: "enum",
     allowedValues: ["off", "shadow", "enforce"],
     // Declared safe value is `shadow` (resolve + audit, never block) — NOT `off`.
@@ -34728,18 +34738,23 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "hitl-approval-routing",
-    description: "Routing for HITL-blocked integration calls (ENG-6028): off = blocked calls return the terminal block, on = route them into the approval-core flow (approval_requests row + Slack approval card). Needs a block first (composio-hitl-mode=enforce, or the always-on Direct-HTTP lane). Per-org rollout; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING env var.",
+    description: "Routing for HITL-blocked integration calls (ENG-6028, ENG-7828): on (default) = route a blocked call into the Human Approval flow (an approval_requests row + an Approve/Deny card on Slack/Telegram, or a structured reply-to-approve prompt on channels with no buttons). off = kill switch: the blocked call hard-stops with an honest terminal block and NO approval is offered, for an org/agent that must never send even with approval. Needs a block first (composio-hitl-mode=enforce, or the always-on Direct-HTTP lane). ENG-7828 flipped the default from off to on so an org at enforce always produces a Human Approval card instead of a prose dead-end. Per-org rollout; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING env var.",
     flagType: "enum",
     allowedValues: ["off", "on"],
-    // Declared safe value is `off` (terminal block, no new side effects) — the
-    // most-restrictive-known state, matching the pre-flag default. A flag-DB read
-    // error degrades here.
-    defaultValue: "off",
+    // Steady-state default is `on` (ENG-7828): an org at composio-hitl-mode=enforce routes
+    // blocked calls to a Human Approval card rather than dead-ending in prose. `off` is the
+    // explicit operator kill switch (honest hard block, nothing executes) for "never send,
+    // even with approval". NOTE the split from the DB-READ-ERROR fallback:
+    // resolveHitlApprovalRoutingMode still degrades to `off` when it cannot READ the flag
+    // (the conservative direction when the value is unknown), which is distinct from this
+    // absent-override default of `on`. Either way the call is blocked; only card-vs-terminal
+    // differs, so degrading to `off` never leaks a send.
+    defaultValue: "on",
     // Migration override (ADR-0022): only injected onto the Lambdas when an operator
     // explicitly sets it (sst.config.ts) — otherwise this flag governs.
     envVar: "HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING",
-    // Turning routing on starts minting approval cards / approval_requests rows — an
-    // egress + workflow change worth an explicit confirm.
+    // Flipping this to `off` disables the Human Approval card for enforce-blocked calls
+    // (hard block instead), a policy change worth an explicit confirm.
     sensitive: true
   },
   {

package/dist/mcp/origami.js

@@ -39948,6 +39948,16 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // be in the browser-exposed public map.
     public: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "opencode-live-view",
+    description: "opencode-native Live View / Diagnostics (ENG-7927): the agent Diagnostics tab renders a structured session transcript (messages + tool calls + reasoning) for opencode agents instead of the tmux pane, by polling GET /admin/agents/:id/opencode-transcript (which SSM-reads a redacted snapshot the manager writes) ~every 3s for a bounded window. Boolean gate; ships dark; when OFF the route returns feature_disabled and opencode agents show the static diagnostics snapshot. Claude Code agents are unaffected (they keep the tmux pane).",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Read client-side by the Diagnostics tab (usePublicBooleanFlag), so it must
+    // be in the browser-exposed public map. Additive viewer gate (like
+    // admin-live-pane): not sensitive.
+    public: true
+  },
   {
     key: "github-backup",
     description: "Org-level GitHub daily auto-backup (ENG-7646, ENG-7582 Part 2). Rollout kill-switch; ships dark. The enterprise ENTITLEMENT is enforced separately via plans.github_backup (getPlanForOrg); this flag only stages rollout on top of that entitlement.",
@@ -40472,7 +40482,7 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "composio-hitl-mode",
-    description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls (routed to approval when hitl-approval-routing is on). Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",
+    description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls and route them to Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card). Since ENG-7828 enforce ALWAYS routes to a Human Approval card by default; set hitl-approval-routing=off to make enforce a hard block with no approval instead. Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",
     flagType: "enum",
     allowedValues: ["off", "shadow", "enforce"],
     // Declared safe value is `shadow` (resolve + audit, never block) — NOT `off`.
@@ -40491,18 +40501,23 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "hitl-approval-routing",
-    description: "Routing for HITL-blocked integration calls (ENG-6028): off = blocked calls return the terminal block, on = route them into the approval-core flow (approval_requests row + Slack approval card). Needs a block first (composio-hitl-mode=enforce, or the always-on Direct-HTTP lane). Per-org rollout; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING env var.",
+    description: "Routing for HITL-blocked integration calls (ENG-6028, ENG-7828): on (default) = route a blocked call into the Human Approval flow (an approval_requests row + an Approve/Deny card on Slack/Telegram, or a structured reply-to-approve prompt on channels with no buttons). off = kill switch: the blocked call hard-stops with an honest terminal block and NO approval is offered, for an org/agent that must never send even with approval. Needs a block first (composio-hitl-mode=enforce, or the always-on Direct-HTTP lane). ENG-7828 flipped the default from off to on so an org at enforce always produces a Human Approval card instead of a prose dead-end. Per-org rollout; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING env var.",
     flagType: "enum",
     allowedValues: ["off", "on"],
-    // Declared safe value is `off` (terminal block, no new side effects) — the
-    // most-restrictive-known state, matching the pre-flag default. A flag-DB read
-    // error degrades here.
-    defaultValue: "off",
+    // Steady-state default is `on` (ENG-7828): an org at composio-hitl-mode=enforce routes
+    // blocked calls to a Human Approval card rather than dead-ending in prose. `off` is the
+    // explicit operator kill switch (honest hard block, nothing executes) for "never send,
+    // even with approval". NOTE the split from the DB-READ-ERROR fallback:
+    // resolveHitlApprovalRoutingMode still degrades to `off` when it cannot READ the flag
+    // (the conservative direction when the value is unknown), which is distinct from this
+    // absent-override default of `on`. Either way the call is blocked; only card-vs-terminal
+    // differs, so degrading to `off` never leaks a send.
+    defaultValue: "on",
     // Migration override (ADR-0022): only injected onto the Lambdas when an operator
     // explicitly sets it (sst.config.ts) — otherwise this flag governs.
     envVar: "HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING",
-    // Turning routing on starts minting approval cards / approval_requests rows — an
-    // egress + workflow change worth an explicit confirm.
+    // Flipping this to `off` disables the Human Approval card for enforce-blocked calls
+    // (hard block instead), a policy change worth an explicit confirm.
     sensitive: true
   },
   {

package/dist/mcp/slack-channel.js

@@ -33867,6 +33867,16 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // be in the browser-exposed public map.
     public: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "opencode-live-view",
+    description: "opencode-native Live View / Diagnostics (ENG-7927): the agent Diagnostics tab renders a structured session transcript (messages + tool calls + reasoning) for opencode agents instead of the tmux pane, by polling GET /admin/agents/:id/opencode-transcript (which SSM-reads a redacted snapshot the manager writes) ~every 3s for a bounded window. Boolean gate; ships dark; when OFF the route returns feature_disabled and opencode agents show the static diagnostics snapshot. Claude Code agents are unaffected (they keep the tmux pane).",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Read client-side by the Diagnostics tab (usePublicBooleanFlag), so it must
+    // be in the browser-exposed public map. Additive viewer gate (like
+    // admin-live-pane): not sensitive.
+    public: true
+  },
   {
     key: "github-backup",
     description: "Org-level GitHub daily auto-backup (ENG-7646, ENG-7582 Part 2). Rollout kill-switch; ships dark. The enterprise ENTITLEMENT is enforced separately via plans.github_backup (getPlanForOrg); this flag only stages rollout on top of that entitlement.",
@@ -34391,7 +34401,7 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "composio-hitl-mode",
-    description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls (routed to approval when hitl-approval-routing is on). Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",
+    description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls and route them to Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card). Since ENG-7828 enforce ALWAYS routes to a Human Approval card by default; set hitl-approval-routing=off to make enforce a hard block with no approval instead. Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",
     flagType: "enum",
     allowedValues: ["off", "shadow", "enforce"],
     // Declared safe value is `shadow` (resolve + audit, never block) — NOT `off`.
@@ -34410,18 +34420,23 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "hitl-approval-routing",
-    description: "Routing for HITL-blocked integration calls (ENG-6028): off = blocked calls return the terminal block, on = route them into the approval-core flow (approval_requests row + Slack approval card). Needs a block first (composio-hitl-mode=enforce, or the always-on Direct-HTTP lane). Per-org rollout; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING env var.",
+    description: "Routing for HITL-blocked integration calls (ENG-6028, ENG-7828): on (default) = route a blocked call into the Human Approval flow (an approval_requests row + an Approve/Deny card on Slack/Telegram, or a structured reply-to-approve prompt on channels with no buttons). off = kill switch: the blocked call hard-stops with an honest terminal block and NO approval is offered, for an org/agent that must never send even with approval. Needs a block first (composio-hitl-mode=enforce, or the always-on Direct-HTTP lane). ENG-7828 flipped the default from off to on so an org at enforce always produces a Human Approval card instead of a prose dead-end. Per-org rollout; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING env var.",
     flagType: "enum",
     allowedValues: ["off", "on"],
-    // Declared safe value is `off` (terminal block, no new side effects) — the
-    // most-restrictive-known state, matching the pre-flag default. A flag-DB read
-    // error degrades here.
-    defaultValue: "off",
+    // Steady-state default is `on` (ENG-7828): an org at composio-hitl-mode=enforce routes
+    // blocked calls to a Human Approval card rather than dead-ending in prose. `off` is the
+    // explicit operator kill switch (honest hard block, nothing executes) for "never send,
+    // even with approval". NOTE the split from the DB-READ-ERROR fallback:
+    // resolveHitlApprovalRoutingMode still degrades to `off` when it cannot READ the flag
+    // (the conservative direction when the value is unknown), which is distinct from this
+    // absent-override default of `on`. Either way the call is blocked; only card-vs-terminal
+    // differs, so degrading to `off` never leaks a send.
+    defaultValue: "on",
     // Migration override (ADR-0022): only injected onto the Lambdas when an operator
     // explicitly sets it (sst.config.ts) — otherwise this flag governs.
     envVar: "HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING",
-    // Turning routing on starts minting approval cards / approval_requests rows — an
-    // egress + workflow change worth an explicit confirm.
+    // Flipping this to `off` disables the Human Approval card for enforce-blocked calls
+    // (hard block instead), a policy change worth an explicit confirm.
     sensitive: true
   },
   {

package/dist/mcp/telegram-channel.js

@@ -34217,6 +34217,16 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // be in the browser-exposed public map.
     public: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "opencode-live-view",
+    description: "opencode-native Live View / Diagnostics (ENG-7927): the agent Diagnostics tab renders a structured session transcript (messages + tool calls + reasoning) for opencode agents instead of the tmux pane, by polling GET /admin/agents/:id/opencode-transcript (which SSM-reads a redacted snapshot the manager writes) ~every 3s for a bounded window. Boolean gate; ships dark; when OFF the route returns feature_disabled and opencode agents show the static diagnostics snapshot. Claude Code agents are unaffected (they keep the tmux pane).",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Read client-side by the Diagnostics tab (usePublicBooleanFlag), so it must
+    // be in the browser-exposed public map. Additive viewer gate (like
+    // admin-live-pane): not sensitive.
+    public: true
+  },
   {
     key: "github-backup",
     description: "Org-level GitHub daily auto-backup (ENG-7646, ENG-7582 Part 2). Rollout kill-switch; ships dark. The enterprise ENTITLEMENT is enforced separately via plans.github_backup (getPlanForOrg); this flag only stages rollout on top of that entitlement.",
@@ -34741,7 +34751,7 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "composio-hitl-mode",
-    description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls (routed to approval when hitl-approval-routing is on). Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",
+    description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls and route them to Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card). Since ENG-7828 enforce ALWAYS routes to a Human Approval card by default; set hitl-approval-routing=off to make enforce a hard block with no approval instead. Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",
     flagType: "enum",
     allowedValues: ["off", "shadow", "enforce"],
     // Declared safe value is `shadow` (resolve + audit, never block) — NOT `off`.
@@ -34760,18 +34770,23 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "hitl-approval-routing",
-    description: "Routing for HITL-blocked integration calls (ENG-6028): off = blocked calls return the terminal block, on = route them into the approval-core flow (approval_requests row + Slack approval card). Needs a block first (composio-hitl-mode=enforce, or the always-on Direct-HTTP lane). Per-org rollout; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING env var.",
+    description: "Routing for HITL-blocked integration calls (ENG-6028, ENG-7828): on (default) = route a blocked call into the Human Approval flow (an approval_requests row + an Approve/Deny card on Slack/Telegram, or a structured reply-to-approve prompt on channels with no buttons). off = kill switch: the blocked call hard-stops with an honest terminal block and NO approval is offered, for an org/agent that must never send even with approval. Needs a block first (composio-hitl-mode=enforce, or the always-on Direct-HTTP lane). ENG-7828 flipped the default from off to on so an org at enforce always produces a Human Approval card instead of a prose dead-end. Per-org rollout; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING env var.",
     flagType: "enum",
     allowedValues: ["off", "on"],
-    // Declared safe value is `off` (terminal block, no new side effects) — the
-    // most-restrictive-known state, matching the pre-flag default. A flag-DB read
-    // error degrades here.
-    defaultValue: "off",
+    // Steady-state default is `on` (ENG-7828): an org at composio-hitl-mode=enforce routes
+    // blocked calls to a Human Approval card rather than dead-ending in prose. `off` is the
+    // explicit operator kill switch (honest hard block, nothing executes) for "never send,
+    // even with approval". NOTE the split from the DB-READ-ERROR fallback:
+    // resolveHitlApprovalRoutingMode still degrades to `off` when it cannot READ the flag
+    // (the conservative direction when the value is unknown), which is distinct from this
+    // absent-override default of `on`. Either way the call is blocked; only card-vs-terminal
+    // differs, so degrading to `off` never leaks a send.
+    defaultValue: "on",
     // Migration override (ADR-0022): only injected onto the Lambdas when an operator
     // explicitly sets it (sst.config.ts) — otherwise this flag governs.
     envVar: "HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING",
-    // Turning routing on starts minting approval cards / approval_requests rows — an
-    // egress + workflow change worth an explicit confirm.
+    // Flipping this to `off` disables the Human Approval card for enforce-blocked calls
+    // (hard block instead), a policy change worth an explicit confirm.
     sensitive: true
   },
   {

package/dist/{persistent-session-SZ5VHS4C.js → persistent-session-R7JOZNIC.js}

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ import {
   writeDirectChatSessionState,
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
-} from "./chunk-LDIKBFDR.js";
+} from "./chunk-FAGXXKWZ.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 export {
   EGRESS_BASELINE_DOMAINS,
@@ -77,4 +77,4 @@ export {
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-SZ5VHS4C.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-R7JOZNIC.js.map

package/dist/{responsiveness-probe-2D64EQAU.js → responsiveness-probe-7SUERVWL.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   paneLogPath
-} from "./chunk-LDIKBFDR.js";
+} from "./chunk-FAGXXKWZ.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 
 // src/lib/responsiveness-probe.ts
@@ -437,4 +437,4 @@ export {
   readAndResetSlackReplyBindingClassifications,
   readAndResetSlackReplyTargetClassifications
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-2D64EQAU.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-7SUERVWL.js.map

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@integrity-labs/agt-cli",
-  "version": "0.28.357",
+  "version": "0.28.359",
   "description": "Augmented Team CLI — agent provisioning and management",
   "type": "module",
   "engines": {