@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.357 → 0.28.358

package/dist/{claude-pair-runtime-LLUV4KX6.js → claude-pair-runtime-OLK7HT2U.js}

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ async function spawnPairSession(session) {
     return { ok: true };
   } catch {
   }
-  const { resolveClaudeBinary } = await import("./persistent-session-SZ5VHS4C.js");
+  const { resolveClaudeBinary } = await import("./persistent-session-LFCRKYPY.js");
   const claudeBin = resolveClaudeBinary();
   const pairEnv = {
     ...process.env,
@@ -373,4 +373,4 @@ export {
   startClaudePair,
   submitClaudePairCode
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=claude-pair-runtime-LLUV4KX6.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=claude-pair-runtime-OLK7HT2U.js.map

package/dist/lib/manager-worker.js

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ import {
   safeWriteJsonAtomic,
   setConfigHash,
   toOpencodeModel
-} from "../chunk-GAWEPU6C.js";
+} from "../chunk-OUHANHOH.js";
 import {
   getProjectDir as getProjectDir2,
   getReadyTasks,
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ import {
   takeZombieDetection,
   transcriptActivityAgeSeconds,
   writeEgressAllowlist
-} from "../chunk-LDIKBFDR.js";
+} from "../chunk-HTBXOXPI.js";
 import {
   reapOrphanChannelMcps
 } from "../chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
@@ -9460,7 +9460,7 @@ var agentRestartTimezoneInputs = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
 var lastVersionCheckAt = 0;
 var VERSION_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1e3;
 var lastResponsivenessProbeAt = 0;
-var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.357" : "dev";
+var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.358" : "dev";
 function resolveBrewPath(execFileSync2) {
   try {
     const out = execFileSync2("which", ["brew"], { timeout: 5e3 }).toString().trim();
@@ -10479,7 +10479,7 @@ function flushRestartedAgentDiagnostics(hostId, codeNames) {
   if (codeNames.length === 0) return;
   void (async () => {
     try {
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-SZ5VHS4C.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-LFCRKYPY.js");
       await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
         host_id: hostId,
         agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics(codeNames)
@@ -10578,7 +10578,7 @@ async function pollCycle() {
     }
     try {
       const { detectHostSecurity } = await import("../host-security-6PDFG7F5.js");
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-SZ5VHS4C.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-LFCRKYPY.js");
       const diagCodeNames = [...agentState.persistentSessionAgents];
       const agentDiagnostics = diagCodeNames.length > 0 ? collectDiagnostics(diagCodeNames) : void 0;
       let tailscaleHostname;
@@ -10733,7 +10733,7 @@ async function pollCycle() {
       const {
         collectResponsivenessProbes,
         getResponsivenessIntervalMs
-      } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-2D64EQAU.js");
+      } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-DUO2RA6D.js");
       const probeIntervalMs = getResponsivenessIntervalMs();
       if (now - lastResponsivenessProbeAt > probeIntervalMs) {
         const probeCodeNames = [...agentState.persistentSessionAgents];
@@ -10765,7 +10765,7 @@ async function pollCycle() {
           collectResponsivenessProbes,
           livePendingInboundOldestAgeSeconds,
           parkPendingInbound
-        } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-2D64EQAU.js");
+        } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-DUO2RA6D.js");
         const { getProjectDir: wedgeProjectDir } = await import("../scheduler-engine-HYOOQV4A.js");
         const wedgeNow = /* @__PURE__ */ new Date();
         const liveAgents = agentState.persistentSessionAgents;
@@ -13920,7 +13920,7 @@ async function handleRestartDoorbell(agentId, requestedAt, restartReason) {
     void api.post("/host/restart-ack", { host_id: hostId, agent_id: agentId, restart_requested_at: requestedAt }).catch((err) => log(`[restart-lane] ack failed for '${codeName}': ${err.message}`));
     void (async () => {
       try {
-        const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-SZ5VHS4C.js");
+        const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-LFCRKYPY.js");
         await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
           host_id: hostId,
           agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics([codeName])
@@ -13970,7 +13970,7 @@ async function respawnAgentAfterMcpStop(codeName, reason) {
     }
     try {
       const hostId = await getHostId();
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-SZ5VHS4C.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-LFCRKYPY.js");
       await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
         host_id: hostId,
         agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics([codeName])
@@ -14468,7 +14468,7 @@ async function processClaudePairSessions(agents) {
     killPairSession,
     pairTmuxSession,
     finalizeClaudePairOnboarding
-  } = await import("../claude-pair-runtime-LLUV4KX6.js");
+  } = await import("../claude-pair-runtime-OLK7HT2U.js");
   for (const pairId of pendingResp.cancelled_pair_ids ?? []) {
     log(`[claude-pair] sweeping orphan tmux session for pair ${pairId.slice(0, 8)}`);
     const killed = await killPairSession(pairTmuxSession(pairId));

package/dist/mcp/direct-chat-channel.js

@@ -34709,7 +34709,7 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "composio-hitl-mode",
-    description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls (routed to approval when hitl-approval-routing is on). Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",
+    description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls and route them to Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card). Since ENG-7828 enforce ALWAYS routes to a Human Approval card by default; set hitl-approval-routing=off to make enforce a hard block with no approval instead. Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",
     flagType: "enum",
     allowedValues: ["off", "shadow", "enforce"],
     // Declared safe value is `shadow` (resolve + audit, never block) — NOT `off`.
@@ -34728,18 +34728,23 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "hitl-approval-routing",
-    description: "Routing for HITL-blocked integration calls (ENG-6028): off = blocked calls return the terminal block, on = route them into the approval-core flow (approval_requests row + Slack approval card). Needs a block first (composio-hitl-mode=enforce, or the always-on Direct-HTTP lane). Per-org rollout; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING env var.",
+    description: "Routing for HITL-blocked integration calls (ENG-6028, ENG-7828): on (default) = route a blocked call into the Human Approval flow (an approval_requests row + an Approve/Deny card on Slack/Telegram, or a structured reply-to-approve prompt on channels with no buttons). off = kill switch: the blocked call hard-stops with an honest terminal block and NO approval is offered, for an org/agent that must never send even with approval. Needs a block first (composio-hitl-mode=enforce, or the always-on Direct-HTTP lane). ENG-7828 flipped the default from off to on so an org at enforce always produces a Human Approval card instead of a prose dead-end. Per-org rollout; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING env var.",
     flagType: "enum",
     allowedValues: ["off", "on"],
-    // Declared safe value is `off` (terminal block, no new side effects) — the
-    // most-restrictive-known state, matching the pre-flag default. A flag-DB read
-    // error degrades here.
-    defaultValue: "off",
+    // Steady-state default is `on` (ENG-7828): an org at composio-hitl-mode=enforce routes
+    // blocked calls to a Human Approval card rather than dead-ending in prose. `off` is the
+    // explicit operator kill switch (honest hard block, nothing executes) for "never send,
+    // even with approval". NOTE the split from the DB-READ-ERROR fallback:
+    // resolveHitlApprovalRoutingMode still degrades to `off` when it cannot READ the flag
+    // (the conservative direction when the value is unknown), which is distinct from this
+    // absent-override default of `on`. Either way the call is blocked; only card-vs-terminal
+    // differs, so degrading to `off` never leaks a send.
+    defaultValue: "on",
     // Migration override (ADR-0022): only injected onto the Lambdas when an operator
     // explicitly sets it (sst.config.ts) — otherwise this flag governs.
     envVar: "HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING",
-    // Turning routing on starts minting approval cards / approval_requests rows — an
-    // egress + workflow change worth an explicit confirm.
+    // Flipping this to `off` disables the Human Approval card for enforce-blocked calls
+    // (hard block instead), a policy change worth an explicit confirm.
     sensitive: true
   },
   {

package/dist/mcp/origami.js

@@ -40472,7 +40472,7 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "composio-hitl-mode",
-    description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls (routed to approval when hitl-approval-routing is on). Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",
+    description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls and route them to Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card). Since ENG-7828 enforce ALWAYS routes to a Human Approval card by default; set hitl-approval-routing=off to make enforce a hard block with no approval instead. Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",
     flagType: "enum",
     allowedValues: ["off", "shadow", "enforce"],
     // Declared safe value is `shadow` (resolve + audit, never block) — NOT `off`.
@@ -40491,18 +40491,23 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "hitl-approval-routing",
-    description: "Routing for HITL-blocked integration calls (ENG-6028): off = blocked calls return the terminal block, on = route them into the approval-core flow (approval_requests row + Slack approval card). Needs a block first (composio-hitl-mode=enforce, or the always-on Direct-HTTP lane). Per-org rollout; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING env var.",
+    description: "Routing for HITL-blocked integration calls (ENG-6028, ENG-7828): on (default) = route a blocked call into the Human Approval flow (an approval_requests row + an Approve/Deny card on Slack/Telegram, or a structured reply-to-approve prompt on channels with no buttons). off = kill switch: the blocked call hard-stops with an honest terminal block and NO approval is offered, for an org/agent that must never send even with approval. Needs a block first (composio-hitl-mode=enforce, or the always-on Direct-HTTP lane). ENG-7828 flipped the default from off to on so an org at enforce always produces a Human Approval card instead of a prose dead-end. Per-org rollout; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING env var.",
     flagType: "enum",
     allowedValues: ["off", "on"],
-    // Declared safe value is `off` (terminal block, no new side effects) — the
-    // most-restrictive-known state, matching the pre-flag default. A flag-DB read
-    // error degrades here.
-    defaultValue: "off",
+    // Steady-state default is `on` (ENG-7828): an org at composio-hitl-mode=enforce routes
+    // blocked calls to a Human Approval card rather than dead-ending in prose. `off` is the
+    // explicit operator kill switch (honest hard block, nothing executes) for "never send,
+    // even with approval". NOTE the split from the DB-READ-ERROR fallback:
+    // resolveHitlApprovalRoutingMode still degrades to `off` when it cannot READ the flag
+    // (the conservative direction when the value is unknown), which is distinct from this
+    // absent-override default of `on`. Either way the call is blocked; only card-vs-terminal
+    // differs, so degrading to `off` never leaks a send.
+    defaultValue: "on",
     // Migration override (ADR-0022): only injected onto the Lambdas when an operator
     // explicitly sets it (sst.config.ts) — otherwise this flag governs.
     envVar: "HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING",
-    // Turning routing on starts minting approval cards / approval_requests rows — an
-    // egress + workflow change worth an explicit confirm.
+    // Flipping this to `off` disables the Human Approval card for enforce-blocked calls
+    // (hard block instead), a policy change worth an explicit confirm.
     sensitive: true
   },
   {

package/dist/mcp/slack-channel.js

@@ -34391,7 +34391,7 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "composio-hitl-mode",
-    description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls (routed to approval when hitl-approval-routing is on). Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",
+    description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls and route them to Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card). Since ENG-7828 enforce ALWAYS routes to a Human Approval card by default; set hitl-approval-routing=off to make enforce a hard block with no approval instead. Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",
     flagType: "enum",
     allowedValues: ["off", "shadow", "enforce"],
     // Declared safe value is `shadow` (resolve + audit, never block) — NOT `off`.
@@ -34410,18 +34410,23 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "hitl-approval-routing",
-    description: "Routing for HITL-blocked integration calls (ENG-6028): off = blocked calls return the terminal block, on = route them into the approval-core flow (approval_requests row + Slack approval card). Needs a block first (composio-hitl-mode=enforce, or the always-on Direct-HTTP lane). Per-org rollout; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING env var.",
+    description: "Routing for HITL-blocked integration calls (ENG-6028, ENG-7828): on (default) = route a blocked call into the Human Approval flow (an approval_requests row + an Approve/Deny card on Slack/Telegram, or a structured reply-to-approve prompt on channels with no buttons). off = kill switch: the blocked call hard-stops with an honest terminal block and NO approval is offered, for an org/agent that must never send even with approval. Needs a block first (composio-hitl-mode=enforce, or the always-on Direct-HTTP lane). ENG-7828 flipped the default from off to on so an org at enforce always produces a Human Approval card instead of a prose dead-end. Per-org rollout; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING env var.",
     flagType: "enum",
     allowedValues: ["off", "on"],
-    // Declared safe value is `off` (terminal block, no new side effects) — the
-    // most-restrictive-known state, matching the pre-flag default. A flag-DB read
-    // error degrades here.
-    defaultValue: "off",
+    // Steady-state default is `on` (ENG-7828): an org at composio-hitl-mode=enforce routes
+    // blocked calls to a Human Approval card rather than dead-ending in prose. `off` is the
+    // explicit operator kill switch (honest hard block, nothing executes) for "never send,
+    // even with approval". NOTE the split from the DB-READ-ERROR fallback:
+    // resolveHitlApprovalRoutingMode still degrades to `off` when it cannot READ the flag
+    // (the conservative direction when the value is unknown), which is distinct from this
+    // absent-override default of `on`. Either way the call is blocked; only card-vs-terminal
+    // differs, so degrading to `off` never leaks a send.
+    defaultValue: "on",
     // Migration override (ADR-0022): only injected onto the Lambdas when an operator
     // explicitly sets it (sst.config.ts) — otherwise this flag governs.
     envVar: "HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING",
-    // Turning routing on starts minting approval cards / approval_requests rows — an
-    // egress + workflow change worth an explicit confirm.
+    // Flipping this to `off` disables the Human Approval card for enforce-blocked calls
+    // (hard block instead), a policy change worth an explicit confirm.
     sensitive: true
   },
   {

package/dist/mcp/telegram-channel.js

@@ -34741,7 +34741,7 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "composio-hitl-mode",
-    description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls (routed to approval when hitl-approval-routing is on). Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",
+    description: "Composio managed-toolkits HITL gate (ENG-6027): off = kill switch, shadow = resolve + audit the tier decision but never block, enforce = block write_high_risk+ calls and route them to Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card). Since ENG-7828 enforce ALWAYS routes to a Human Approval card by default; set hitl-approval-routing=off to make enforce a hard block with no approval instead. Per-org rollout from the admin Feature Flags page; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide COMPOSIO_HITL_MODE env var.",
     flagType: "enum",
     allowedValues: ["off", "shadow", "enforce"],
     // Declared safe value is `shadow` (resolve + audit, never block) — NOT `off`.
@@ -34760,18 +34760,23 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "hitl-approval-routing",
-    description: "Routing for HITL-blocked integration calls (ENG-6028): off = blocked calls return the terminal block, on = route them into the approval-core flow (approval_requests row + Slack approval card). Needs a block first (composio-hitl-mode=enforce, or the always-on Direct-HTTP lane). Per-org rollout; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING env var.",
+    description: "Routing for HITL-blocked integration calls (ENG-6028, ENG-7828): on (default) = route a blocked call into the Human Approval flow (an approval_requests row + an Approve/Deny card on Slack/Telegram, or a structured reply-to-approve prompt on channels with no buttons). off = kill switch: the blocked call hard-stops with an honest terminal block and NO approval is offered, for an org/agent that must never send even with approval. Needs a block first (composio-hitl-mode=enforce, or the always-on Direct-HTTP lane). ENG-7828 flipped the default from off to on so an org at enforce always produces a Human Approval card instead of a prose dead-end. Per-org rollout; ENG-7672 migrated this off the fleet-wide HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING env var.",
     flagType: "enum",
     allowedValues: ["off", "on"],
-    // Declared safe value is `off` (terminal block, no new side effects) — the
-    // most-restrictive-known state, matching the pre-flag default. A flag-DB read
-    // error degrades here.
-    defaultValue: "off",
+    // Steady-state default is `on` (ENG-7828): an org at composio-hitl-mode=enforce routes
+    // blocked calls to a Human Approval card rather than dead-ending in prose. `off` is the
+    // explicit operator kill switch (honest hard block, nothing executes) for "never send,
+    // even with approval". NOTE the split from the DB-READ-ERROR fallback:
+    // resolveHitlApprovalRoutingMode still degrades to `off` when it cannot READ the flag
+    // (the conservative direction when the value is unknown), which is distinct from this
+    // absent-override default of `on`. Either way the call is blocked; only card-vs-terminal
+    // differs, so degrading to `off` never leaks a send.
+    defaultValue: "on",
     // Migration override (ADR-0022): only injected onto the Lambdas when an operator
     // explicitly sets it (sst.config.ts) — otherwise this flag governs.
     envVar: "HITL_APPROVAL_ROUTING",
-    // Turning routing on starts minting approval cards / approval_requests rows — an
-    // egress + workflow change worth an explicit confirm.
+    // Flipping this to `off` disables the Human Approval card for enforce-blocked calls
+    // (hard block instead), a policy change worth an explicit confirm.
     sensitive: true
   },
   {

package/dist/{persistent-session-SZ5VHS4C.js → persistent-session-LFCRKYPY.js}

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ import {
   writeDirectChatSessionState,
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
-} from "./chunk-LDIKBFDR.js";
+} from "./chunk-HTBXOXPI.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 export {
   EGRESS_BASELINE_DOMAINS,
@@ -77,4 +77,4 @@ export {
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-SZ5VHS4C.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-LFCRKYPY.js.map

package/dist/{responsiveness-probe-2D64EQAU.js → responsiveness-probe-DUO2RA6D.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   paneLogPath
-} from "./chunk-LDIKBFDR.js";
+} from "./chunk-HTBXOXPI.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 
 // src/lib/responsiveness-probe.ts
@@ -437,4 +437,4 @@ export {
   readAndResetSlackReplyBindingClassifications,
   readAndResetSlackReplyTargetClassifications
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-2D64EQAU.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-DUO2RA6D.js.map

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@integrity-labs/agt-cli",
-  "version": "0.28.357",
+  "version": "0.28.358",
   "description": "Augmented Team CLI — agent provisioning and management",
   "type": "module",
   "engines": {