@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.147 → 0.28.148

package/dist/{chunk-POW4BZEC.js → chunk-XZGF45BJ.js}

@@ -1672,6 +1672,15 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // control with no pre-flags env gate to migrate (ADR-0022).
     defaultValue: false
   },
+  {
+    key: "skill-revision-proposals",
+    description: "Agent-proposed corrective rewrites of shared skills (ENG-6824, epic ENG-6805 P2b): when on, an agent can propose a full-body rewrite of a shared (team/org) skill via the skill_propose_revision MCP tool, anchored on an immutable base_version_id; an operator reviews a machine-derived diff and approves (conflict-guarded apply) or rejects. This is the per-org activation gate for the corrective path - off = the propose tool soft-refuses, so no proposal is created. Distinct from skill-fragments (the additive path). Approved revisions land via the existing operator-owned skill body + delivery, so there is nothing to revert when flipped off. Boolean gate; ships dark.",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Declared safe value is `false` (no proposals). Fail-safe direction: a
+    // flag-DB read error must never let an agent file rewrites of operator-owned
+    // shared skills on its own. No envVar - net-new control (ADR-0022).
+    defaultValue: false
+  },
   {
     key: "channel-quarantine-mode",
     description: "Optional-channel quarantine (ENG-5932): off = disabled, shadow = log matches only, enforce = quarantine.",
@@ -4024,6 +4033,37 @@ var OAUTH_PROVIDERS = {
     publicClient: true,
     mcpUrl: "https://mcp.granola.ai/mcp"
   },
+  "brand-ninja": {
+    // ENG-6820: Brand Ninja External-Content MCP, remote streamable-HTTP at
+    // https://ext-api.app.brandninja.ai/v1/mcp. Same shape as Granola: the
+    // server exposes RFC 8414 authorization-server metadata at
+    // /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server (values below are taken verbatim
+    // from that document, not inferred). Auth is OAuth 2.0 authorization-code
+    // with mandatory PKCE (S256) and a public client (token_endpoint_auth_method
+    // 'none') issued via Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591). The bootstrap
+    // script (packages/api/scripts/dcr-register.ts) registers a client once at
+    // deploy time against the registration_endpoint
+    // (https://ext-api.app.brandninja.ai/v1/oauth/register); OAUTH_BRAND_NINJA_CLIENT_ID
+    // is set from its output. The AS advertises the refresh_token grant, so the
+    // shared oauth-refresh cron rotates the bearer without operator action.
+    definitionId: "brand-ninja",
+    authorizeUrl: "https://prod-brandninja.auth.ap-southeast-2.amazoncognito.com/oauth2/authorize",
+    tokenUrl: "https://prod-brandninja.auth.ap-southeast-2.amazoncognito.com/oauth2/token",
+    // The resource server (ext-api.app.brandninja.ai) advertises exactly two
+    // scopes: external-api/content.write (the default content surface) and
+    // external-api/admin (read-only credential metadata, granted per account
+    // admin). Default install is least-privilege: content.write only; an
+    // operator can widen to admin out of band. No openid/offline_access in the
+    // advertised scope set, so Cognito issues the refresh_token for the code grant
+    // regardless, so requesting only the resource scope keeps consent minimal.
+    defaultScopes: ["external-api/content.write"],
+    supportsRefresh: true,
+    extraAuthorizeParams: {},
+    clientAuthMethod: "body",
+    pkce: "S256",
+    publicClient: true,
+    mcpUrl: "https://ext-api.app.brandninja.ai/v1/mcp"
+  },
   "notion-cli": {
     // Notion's public OAuth app. Tokens are workspace-scoped and long-lived —
     // Notion does not issue refresh_tokens, so `supportsRefresh: false` and
@@ -6073,4 +6113,4 @@ export {
   parseEnvIntegrations,
   probeMcpEnvSubstitution
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-POW4BZEC.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-XZGF45BJ.js.map