@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.1097 → 0.28.1098

package/dist/{chunk-EGVRUVOF.js → chunk-WQQGPPQW.js}

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ import {
   rotateDailySession,
   sessionFileExists,
   todayLocalIso
-} from "./chunk-I7XCW4G6.js";
+} from "./chunk-AVM2BBSX.js";
 import {
   classifyUnanswerablePane,
   findUsageLimitResetHint,
@@ -6113,4 +6113,4 @@ export {
   stopAllSessionsAndWait,
   getProjectDir
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-EGVRUVOF.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-WQQGPPQW.js.map

package/dist/{claude-pair-runtime-XXBIFMD5.js → claude-pair-runtime-MZXXBNGF.js}

@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ async function spawnPairSession(session) {
     return { ok: true };
   } catch {
   }
-  const { resolveClaudeBinary } = await import("./persistent-session-VGORZUKN.js");
+  const { resolveClaudeBinary } = await import("./persistent-session-WHEFQHXF.js");
   const claudeBin = resolveClaudeBinary();
   const pairEnv = {
     ...process.env,
@@ -734,4 +734,4 @@ export {
   startClaudePair,
   submitClaudePairCode
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=claude-pair-runtime-XXBIFMD5.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=claude-pair-runtime-MZXXBNGF.js.map

package/dist/lib/manager-worker.js

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ import {
   safeWriteJsonAtomic,
   setConfigHash,
   tripClass
-} from "../chunk-3RGBEI34.js";
+} from "../chunk-3SNPFRW3.js";
 import {
   getProjectDir as getProjectDir2,
   getReadyTasks,
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ import {
   webFetchBaselineValue,
   webFetchRestartNeeded,
   writeEgressAllowlist
-} from "../chunk-EGVRUVOF.js";
+} from "../chunk-WQQGPPQW.js";
 import {
   ACCOUNT_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_FILENAME,
   AnchorSessionClient,
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ import {
   subagentActivityAgeSeconds,
   sumTranscriptUsageInWindow,
   transcriptActivityAgeSeconds
-} from "../chunk-I7XCW4G6.js";
+} from "../chunk-AVM2BBSX.js";
 import {
   classifyUnanswerablePane,
   paneRemedy
@@ -14142,7 +14142,7 @@ var pendingDayRolloverReset = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
 var dayRolloverInboundHold = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
 var INBOUND_HOLD_EPISODE_GAP_MS = 12e4;
 async function channelInboundActivityAgeSecondsFor(codeName) {
-  const { newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-CWOTGPZC.js");
+  const { newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-WHV2OHXM.js");
   const newest = newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs(dirname11(paneLogPath(codeName)));
   if (newest === null) return null;
   return Math.max(0, Math.floor((Date.now() - newest) / 1e3));
@@ -14900,7 +14900,7 @@ var agentRestartTimezoneInputs = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
 var lastVersionCheckAt = 0;
 var VERSION_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1e3;
 var lastResponsivenessProbeAt = 0;
-var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.1097" : "dev";
+var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.1098" : "dev";
 function resolveBrewPath(execFileSync3) {
   try {
     const out = execFileSync3("which", ["brew"], { timeout: 5e3 }).toString().trim();
@@ -16517,7 +16517,7 @@ function flushRestartedAgentDiagnostics(hostId, codeNames) {
   if (codeNames.length === 0) return;
   void (async () => {
     try {
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-VGORZUKN.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-WHEFQHXF.js");
       await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
         host_id: hostId,
         agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics(codeNames, quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor, forwardedToolsFor, runtimeVersionFor)
@@ -16659,7 +16659,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
     }
     try {
       const { detectHostSecurity } = await import("../host-security-KQYYZZVW.js");
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-VGORZUKN.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-WHEFQHXF.js");
       const diagCodeNames = [...agentState.persistentSessionAgents];
       const agentDiagnostics = diagCodeNames.length > 0 ? collectDiagnostics(diagCodeNames, quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor, forwardedToolsFor, runtimeVersionFor) : void 0;
       let tailscaleHostname;
@@ -16867,7 +16867,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
         collectPanelessActivityProbes,
         getResponsivenessIntervalMs,
         occupancyQualificationClassifications
-      } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-CWOTGPZC.js");
+      } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-WHV2OHXM.js");
       const probeIntervalMs = getResponsivenessIntervalMs();
       if (now - lastResponsivenessProbeAt > probeIntervalMs) {
         const probeCodeNames = [...agentState.persistentSessionAgents];
@@ -16984,7 +16984,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
           collectResponsivenessProbes,
           livePendingInboundOldestAgeSeconds,
           parkPendingInbound
-        } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-CWOTGPZC.js");
+        } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-WHV2OHXM.js");
         const { getProjectDir: wedgeProjectDir } = await import("../scheduler-engine-M6AFZWNU.js");
         const wedgeNow = /* @__PURE__ */ new Date();
         const liveAgents = agentState.persistentSessionAgents;
@@ -17270,7 +17270,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
                 }
               }
             );
-            const { parkPendingInbound } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-CWOTGPZC.js");
+            const { parkPendingInbound } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-WHV2OHXM.js");
             const { parked, deadLettered } = parkPendingInbound(codeName, new Date(fatalNowMs));
             paneFatalStreak.delete(codeName);
             paneFatalRestarts.set(codeName, [...history, fatalNowMs]);
@@ -17301,7 +17301,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
         TRANSCRIPT_MOUNT_ESCALATION_REFRESH_MS,
         bindSourceEscalations
       } = await import("../transcript-mount-health-OHE6IVJV.js");
-      const { transcriptBindSourcesFor, ensureTranscriptBindSources } = await import("../persistent-session-VGORZUKN.js");
+      const { transcriptBindSourcesFor, ensureTranscriptBindSources } = await import("../persistent-session-WHEFQHXF.js");
       const mountConfig = resolveTranscriptMountConfig();
       const liveAgents = agentState.persistentSessionAgents;
       for (const tracked of [
@@ -17466,7 +17466,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
     }
     try {
       const { scrapeMcpFailedBannerCount } = await import("../pane-mcp-banner-scraper-VR5QGP3J.js");
-      const { probeSessionAuth } = await import("../session-auth-dead-P3AXR4PR.js");
+      const { probeSessionAuth } = await import("../session-auth-dead-H3YYJLPC.js");
       const observations = [];
       const pendingCacheCommits = [];
       const modelApiErrorReportingOn = hostFlagStore().getBoolean("model-api-error-reporting");
@@ -22038,7 +22038,7 @@ async function handleRestartDoorbell(agentId, requestedAt, restartReason) {
       try {
         const freshId = rotateSessionForWedge(codeName);
         consecutiveWedgeCycles.delete(codeName);
-        const { parkPendingInbound: parkForRestart } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-CWOTGPZC.js");
+        const { parkPendingInbound: parkForRestart } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-WHV2OHXM.js");
         const { parked, deadLettered } = parkForRestart(codeName, /* @__PURE__ */ new Date());
         const parkNote = parked > 0 ? `, ${parked} inbound parked` : "";
         const deadNote = deadLettered > 0 ? `, ${deadLettered} undeliverable dead-lettered` : "";
@@ -22081,7 +22081,7 @@ async function handleRestartDoorbell(agentId, requestedAt, restartReason) {
     void api.post("/host/restart-ack", { host_id: hostId, agent_id: agentId, restart_requested_at: requestedAt }).catch((err) => log(`[restart-lane] ack failed for '${codeName}': ${err.message}`));
     void (async () => {
       try {
-        const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-VGORZUKN.js");
+        const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-WHEFQHXF.js");
         await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
           host_id: hostId,
           agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics([codeName], quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor, forwardedToolsFor, runtimeVersionFor)
@@ -22132,7 +22132,7 @@ async function respawnAgentAfterMcpStop(codeName, reason) {
     }
     try {
       const hostId = await getHostId();
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-VGORZUKN.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-WHEFQHXF.js");
       await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
         host_id: hostId,
         agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics([codeName], quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor, forwardedToolsFor, runtimeVersionFor)
@@ -22804,7 +22804,7 @@ async function processClaudePairSessions(agents) {
     // cannot take it for itself — by the time it runs, the write it is looking
     // for may already have happened.
     snapshotPairConfig
-  } = await import("../claude-pair-runtime-XXBIFMD5.js");
+  } = await import("../claude-pair-runtime-MZXXBNGF.js");
   for (const pairId of pendingResp.cancelled_pair_ids ?? []) {
     log(`[claude-pair] sweeping orphan tmux session for pair ${pairId.slice(0, 8)}`);
     const killed = await killPairSession(pairTmuxSession(pairId));

package/dist/mcp/direct-chat-channel.js

@@ -38167,6 +38167,17 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "email-guard-sole-decider",
+    description: "ENG-11190 PR1: make the email guardrail (`email.domain_restrict`) the ONLY decider for email sends. Today two gates judge every send: the email guard (by its stage) and the Composio tool-tier HITL (OUTLOOK_SEND_EMAIL / GMAIL_SEND_EMAIL resolve to `write_high_risk`, so every send is held whatever the guard says). Brad, 6 Oct (Two Tractors / Horatio): a guard set to Shadow must not still produce an approval card. When ON for an org, the tier gate stops re-deciding a registered composing email send for an agent that HAS an active email guardrail AND whose stage is in force: the guard, which already ran first in callIntegrationTool and holds or blocks by its own stage, is the verdict. A stage whose enable flag is off (Require approval or Block that is not yet enabled for the org) only observes, so it is NOT a verdict and the tier hold stays (Obi Wan on #6816). An agent with no email guardrail (or a disabled one) keeps the tier hold, so turning this on never removes the only hold an org has. Draft-sends (recipients on the stored draft) keep the tier hold in this slice. Every deferred send is still audited. Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Declared safe value is `false` (both gates, today's behaviour). A flag-DB read error
+    // degrades here, so a flags outage keeps the tier hold rather than silently loosening it.
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Turning it on lets external email go out WITHOUT the tier hold where the guard allows
+    // it (e.g. Shadow), so it is a deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "email-require-approval-enforcement",
     description: 'Enforcement gate for the `email.require_approval` guardrail (ENG-9611). That guardrail has been `default_for_new_orgs` since ~2026-05-03 and its display text promises "Require human approval before sending any email", but nothing ever read it: its only runtime path was toGuardrailForPrompt, i.e. a line in the agent CLAUDE.md. When ON for an org, a DISPATCHING email send (never a draft-create, ENG-7980) is held and routed to Human Approval regardless of recipient domain \u2014 which is what "any email" means, and is what distinguishes it from email-guard-require-approval-enabled, whose require_approval stage only intercepts a would-be DOMAIN block. Deliberately separate from the guardrail row: roughly four months of orgs already carry an inert `enforce`-level row, so reading the row alone would arm a blocking control across all of them on deploy. New orgs are no longer armed (ENG-11234). Orgs created while the ENG-9629/9675 new-org arm was live keep their org-scoped ON override until an operator flips them per org. Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.',

package/dist/mcp/index.js

@@ -30385,6 +30385,17 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "email-guard-sole-decider",
+    description: "ENG-11190 PR1: make the email guardrail (`email.domain_restrict`) the ONLY decider for email sends. Today two gates judge every send: the email guard (by its stage) and the Composio tool-tier HITL (OUTLOOK_SEND_EMAIL / GMAIL_SEND_EMAIL resolve to `write_high_risk`, so every send is held whatever the guard says). Brad, 6 Oct (Two Tractors / Horatio): a guard set to Shadow must not still produce an approval card. When ON for an org, the tier gate stops re-deciding a registered composing email send for an agent that HAS an active email guardrail AND whose stage is in force: the guard, which already ran first in callIntegrationTool and holds or blocks by its own stage, is the verdict. A stage whose enable flag is off (Require approval or Block that is not yet enabled for the org) only observes, so it is NOT a verdict and the tier hold stays (Obi Wan on #6816). An agent with no email guardrail (or a disabled one) keeps the tier hold, so turning this on never removes the only hold an org has. Draft-sends (recipients on the stored draft) keep the tier hold in this slice. Every deferred send is still audited. Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Declared safe value is `false` (both gates, today's behaviour). A flag-DB read error
+    // degrades here, so a flags outage keeps the tier hold rather than silently loosening it.
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Turning it on lets external email go out WITHOUT the tier hold where the guard allows
+    // it (e.g. Shadow), so it is a deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "email-require-approval-enforcement",
     description: 'Enforcement gate for the `email.require_approval` guardrail (ENG-9611). That guardrail has been `default_for_new_orgs` since ~2026-05-03 and its display text promises "Require human approval before sending any email", but nothing ever read it: its only runtime path was toGuardrailForPrompt, i.e. a line in the agent CLAUDE.md. When ON for an org, a DISPATCHING email send (never a draft-create, ENG-7980) is held and routed to Human Approval regardless of recipient domain \u2014 which is what "any email" means, and is what distinguishes it from email-guard-require-approval-enabled, whose require_approval stage only intercepts a would-be DOMAIN block. Deliberately separate from the guardrail row: roughly four months of orgs already carry an inert `enforce`-level row, so reading the row alone would arm a blocking control across all of them on deploy. New orgs are no longer armed (ENG-11234). Orgs created while the ENG-9629/9675 new-org arm was live keep their org-scoped ON override until an operator flips them per org. Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.',

package/dist/mcp/origami.js

@@ -44331,6 +44331,17 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "email-guard-sole-decider",
+    description: "ENG-11190 PR1: make the email guardrail (`email.domain_restrict`) the ONLY decider for email sends. Today two gates judge every send: the email guard (by its stage) and the Composio tool-tier HITL (OUTLOOK_SEND_EMAIL / GMAIL_SEND_EMAIL resolve to `write_high_risk`, so every send is held whatever the guard says). Brad, 6 Oct (Two Tractors / Horatio): a guard set to Shadow must not still produce an approval card. When ON for an org, the tier gate stops re-deciding a registered composing email send for an agent that HAS an active email guardrail AND whose stage is in force: the guard, which already ran first in callIntegrationTool and holds or blocks by its own stage, is the verdict. A stage whose enable flag is off (Require approval or Block that is not yet enabled for the org) only observes, so it is NOT a verdict and the tier hold stays (Obi Wan on #6816). An agent with no email guardrail (or a disabled one) keeps the tier hold, so turning this on never removes the only hold an org has. Draft-sends (recipients on the stored draft) keep the tier hold in this slice. Every deferred send is still audited. Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Declared safe value is `false` (both gates, today's behaviour). A flag-DB read error
+    // degrades here, so a flags outage keeps the tier hold rather than silently loosening it.
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Turning it on lets external email go out WITHOUT the tier hold where the guard allows
+    // it (e.g. Shadow), so it is a deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "email-require-approval-enforcement",
     description: 'Enforcement gate for the `email.require_approval` guardrail (ENG-9611). That guardrail has been `default_for_new_orgs` since ~2026-05-03 and its display text promises "Require human approval before sending any email", but nothing ever read it: its only runtime path was toGuardrailForPrompt, i.e. a line in the agent CLAUDE.md. When ON for an org, a DISPATCHING email send (never a draft-create, ENG-7980) is held and routed to Human Approval regardless of recipient domain \u2014 which is what "any email" means, and is what distinguishes it from email-guard-require-approval-enabled, whose require_approval stage only intercepts a would-be DOMAIN block. Deliberately separate from the guardrail row: roughly four months of orgs already carry an inert `enforce`-level row, so reading the row alone would arm a blocking control across all of them on deploy. New orgs are no longer armed (ENG-11234). Orgs created while the ENG-9629/9675 new-org arm was live keep their org-scoped ON override until an operator flips them per org. Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.',

package/dist/mcp/slack-channel.js

@@ -38938,6 +38938,17 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "email-guard-sole-decider",
+    description: "ENG-11190 PR1: make the email guardrail (`email.domain_restrict`) the ONLY decider for email sends. Today two gates judge every send: the email guard (by its stage) and the Composio tool-tier HITL (OUTLOOK_SEND_EMAIL / GMAIL_SEND_EMAIL resolve to `write_high_risk`, so every send is held whatever the guard says). Brad, 6 Oct (Two Tractors / Horatio): a guard set to Shadow must not still produce an approval card. When ON for an org, the tier gate stops re-deciding a registered composing email send for an agent that HAS an active email guardrail AND whose stage is in force: the guard, which already ran first in callIntegrationTool and holds or blocks by its own stage, is the verdict. A stage whose enable flag is off (Require approval or Block that is not yet enabled for the org) only observes, so it is NOT a verdict and the tier hold stays (Obi Wan on #6816). An agent with no email guardrail (or a disabled one) keeps the tier hold, so turning this on never removes the only hold an org has. Draft-sends (recipients on the stored draft) keep the tier hold in this slice. Every deferred send is still audited. Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Declared safe value is `false` (both gates, today's behaviour). A flag-DB read error
+    // degrades here, so a flags outage keeps the tier hold rather than silently loosening it.
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Turning it on lets external email go out WITHOUT the tier hold where the guard allows
+    // it (e.g. Shadow), so it is a deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "email-require-approval-enforcement",
     description: 'Enforcement gate for the `email.require_approval` guardrail (ENG-9611). That guardrail has been `default_for_new_orgs` since ~2026-05-03 and its display text promises "Require human approval before sending any email", but nothing ever read it: its only runtime path was toGuardrailForPrompt, i.e. a line in the agent CLAUDE.md. When ON for an org, a DISPATCHING email send (never a draft-create, ENG-7980) is held and routed to Human Approval regardless of recipient domain \u2014 which is what "any email" means, and is what distinguishes it from email-guard-require-approval-enabled, whose require_approval stage only intercepts a would-be DOMAIN block. Deliberately separate from the guardrail row: roughly four months of orgs already carry an inert `enforce`-level row, so reading the row alone would arm a blocking control across all of them on deploy. New orgs are no longer armed (ENG-11234). Orgs created while the ENG-9629/9675 new-org arm was live keep their org-scoped ON override until an operator flips them per org. Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.',

package/dist/mcp/telegram-channel.js

@@ -39044,6 +39044,17 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "email-guard-sole-decider",
+    description: "ENG-11190 PR1: make the email guardrail (`email.domain_restrict`) the ONLY decider for email sends. Today two gates judge every send: the email guard (by its stage) and the Composio tool-tier HITL (OUTLOOK_SEND_EMAIL / GMAIL_SEND_EMAIL resolve to `write_high_risk`, so every send is held whatever the guard says). Brad, 6 Oct (Two Tractors / Horatio): a guard set to Shadow must not still produce an approval card. When ON for an org, the tier gate stops re-deciding a registered composing email send for an agent that HAS an active email guardrail AND whose stage is in force: the guard, which already ran first in callIntegrationTool and holds or blocks by its own stage, is the verdict. A stage whose enable flag is off (Require approval or Block that is not yet enabled for the org) only observes, so it is NOT a verdict and the tier hold stays (Obi Wan on #6816). An agent with no email guardrail (or a disabled one) keeps the tier hold, so turning this on never removes the only hold an org has. Draft-sends (recipients on the stored draft) keep the tier hold in this slice. Every deferred send is still audited. Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Declared safe value is `false` (both gates, today's behaviour). A flag-DB read error
+    // degrades here, so a flags outage keeps the tier hold rather than silently loosening it.
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Turning it on lets external email go out WITHOUT the tier hold where the guard allows
+    // it (e.g. Shadow), so it is a deliberate, audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "email-require-approval-enforcement",
     description: 'Enforcement gate for the `email.require_approval` guardrail (ENG-9611). That guardrail has been `default_for_new_orgs` since ~2026-05-03 and its display text promises "Require human approval before sending any email", but nothing ever read it: its only runtime path was toGuardrailForPrompt, i.e. a line in the agent CLAUDE.md. When ON for an org, a DISPATCHING email send (never a draft-create, ENG-7980) is held and routed to Human Approval regardless of recipient domain \u2014 which is what "any email" means, and is what distinguishes it from email-guard-require-approval-enabled, whose require_approval stage only intercepts a would-be DOMAIN block. Deliberately separate from the guardrail row: roughly four months of orgs already carry an inert `enforce`-level row, so reading the row alone would arm a blocking control across all of them on deploy. New orgs are no longer armed (ENG-11234). Orgs created while the ENG-9629/9675 new-org arm was live keep their org-scoped ON override until an operator flips them per org. Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.',

package/dist/{persistent-session-VGORZUKN.js → persistent-session-WHEFQHXF.js}

@@ -68,8 +68,8 @@ import {
   writeDirectChatSessionState,
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
-} from "./chunk-EGVRUVOF.js";
-import "./chunk-I7XCW4G6.js";
+} from "./chunk-WQQGPPQW.js";
+import "./chunk-AVM2BBSX.js";
 import "./chunk-OCMJ5E6J.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 import "./chunk-EL5MWGGH.js";
@@ -145,4 +145,4 @@ export {
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-VGORZUKN.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-WHEFQHXF.js.map

package/dist/{responsiveness-probe-CWOTGPZC.js → responsiveness-probe-WHV2OHXM.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   paneLogPath
-} from "./chunk-EGVRUVOF.js";
-import "./chunk-I7XCW4G6.js";
+} from "./chunk-WQQGPPQW.js";
+import "./chunk-AVM2BBSX.js";
 import "./chunk-OCMJ5E6J.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 import "./chunk-EL5MWGGH.js";
@@ -802,4 +802,4 @@ export {
   readAndResetSlackReplyBindingClassifications,
   readAndResetSlackReplyTargetClassifications
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-CWOTGPZC.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-WHV2OHXM.js.map

package/dist/{session-auth-dead-P3AXR4PR.js → session-auth-dead-H3YYJLPC.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   sessionTranscriptDir
-} from "./chunk-I7XCW4G6.js";
+} from "./chunk-AVM2BBSX.js";
 import "./chunk-DGUM43GV.js";
 
 // src/lib/session-auth-dead.ts
@@ -204,4 +204,4 @@ export {
   decideSessionAuthState,
   probeSessionAuth
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=session-auth-dead-P3AXR4PR.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=session-auth-dead-H3YYJLPC.js.map

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@integrity-labs/agt-cli",
-  "version": "0.28.1097",
+  "version": "0.28.1098",
   "description": "Augmented Team CLI — agent provisioning and management",
   "type": "module",
   "engines": {