@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.1078 → 0.28.1080

package/dist/bin/agt.js

@@ -40,12 +40,12 @@ import {
   success,
   table,
   warn
-} from "../chunk-R5IN7H32.js";
+} from "../chunk-W4NEUOMU.js";
 import {
   getProjectDir,
   isSessionResumeDisabled,
   readDirectChatSessionState
-} from "../chunk-PJWMW6ET.js";
+} from "../chunk-SREQF7XT.js";
 import {
   AnchorSessionClient,
   CHANNEL_REGISTRY,
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ import {
   serializeManifestForSlackCli,
   sessionFileExists,
   sessionTranscriptDir
-} from "../chunk-UDJINPUK.js";
+} from "../chunk-7F2UFKYG.js";
 import "../chunk-OCMJ5E6J.js";
 import "../chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 import "../chunk-EL5MWGGH.js";
@@ -5474,7 +5474,7 @@ import { execFileSync, execSync } from "child_process";
 import { existsSync as existsSync11, realpathSync as realpathSync2 } from "fs";
 import chalk18 from "chalk";
 import ora16 from "ora";
-var cliVersion = true ? "0.28.1078" : "dev";
+var cliVersion = true ? "0.28.1080" : "dev";
 async function fetchLatestVersion() {
   const host2 = getHost();
   if (!host2) return null;
@@ -6734,7 +6734,7 @@ function handleError(err) {
 }
 
 // src/bin/agt.ts
-var cliVersion2 = true ? "0.28.1078" : "dev";
+var cliVersion2 = true ? "0.28.1080" : "dev";
 var program = new Command();
 program.name("agt").description("Augmented CLI \u2014 agent provisioning and management").version(cliVersion2).option("--json", "Emit machine-readable JSON output (suppress spinners and colors)").option("--skip-update-check", "Skip the automatic update check on startup");
 program.hook("preAction", async (thisCommand, actionCommand) => {

package/dist/{chunk-UDJINPUK.js → chunk-7F2UFKYG.js}

@@ -1225,16 +1225,18 @@ var REQUIRE_APPROVAL_HOW = {
     `  with the request_id and act only once it is approved; if it is denied or expires, do`,
     `  not act, and tell the user. Never just say you are waiting for, or cannot reach, your`,
     `  manager without filing the request. If \`request_approval\` fails, say so and leave the`,
-    `  action undone. For an email, pass \`detail.email\` = { to, from, subject } so your`,
-    `  manager sees who it goes to.`
+    `  action undone.`
   ],
   warn: [
     `  When one of these actions is not clearly justified, ask rather than decline: call`,
     `  \`request_approval\` (it goes to your manager), end your turn, and act only once`,
-    `  \`check_approval\` says it is approved. For an email, pass \`detail.email\` =`,
-    `  { to, from, subject }.`
+    `  \`check_approval\` says it is approved.`
   ]
 };
+var REQUIRE_APPROVAL_EMAIL_DETAIL = [
+  `  For an email, pass \`detail.email\` = { to, from, subject } so your manager sees who it`,
+  `  goes to.`
+];
 var REQUIRE_APPROVAL_EMAIL_ACTION = "send_email";
 var EMAIL_REQUIRE_APPROVAL_DEF = "email.require_approval";
 function liveEmailHoldActions(guardrails) {
@@ -1245,13 +1247,34 @@ function liveEmailHoldActions(guardrails) {
   const covered = Array.isArray(raw) ? raw.filter((a) => typeof a === "string" && a.trim() !== "") : [];
   return covered.length > 0 ? covered : null;
 }
+function liveDomainHold(guardrails) {
+  const g = guardrails.find((x) => x.definitionId === EMAIL_DOMAIN_RESTRICT_DEF);
+  const config = g?.config ?? {};
+  if (!g || g.enforcement !== "enforce" || config.stage !== "require_approval" || config.approval_live !== true)
+    return null;
+  const raw = config.approval_covered_actions;
+  const covered = Array.isArray(raw) ? raw.filter((a) => typeof a === "string" && a.trim() !== "") : [];
+  return covered.length > 0 ? { covered } : null;
+}
+function requireApprovalDomainHoldException(covered) {
+  const tools = ` sent with ${covered.map((a) => `\`${a}\``).join(", ")}`;
+  return [
+    `  Except \`${REQUIRE_APPROVAL_EMAIL_ACTION}\`${tools} to a domain the Email Domain Restriction does not allow:`,
+    `  that restriction holds those sends for a human, so do not call \`request_approval\` and do`,
+    `  not decline on this guardrail's basis. Attempt the send and let that hold decide; asking`,
+    `  first would make your manager approve the same email twice. An email to an allowed domain,`,
+    `  or sent any other way, is not held: ask first with \`request_approval\`, and when you do, pass`,
+    `  \`detail.email\` = { to, from, subject } so your manager sees who it goes to.`
+  ];
+}
 function requireApprovalEmailException(covered) {
   return [
     `  Except \`${REQUIRE_APPROVAL_EMAIL_ACTION}\` with ${covered.map((a) => `\`${a}\``).join(", ")}: your organization's`,
     `  email approval hold puts every such send in front of a human, so for those do not call`,
     `  \`request_approval\` and do not decline on this guardrail's basis. Attempt the send and let`,
     `  that hold decide; asking first would make your manager approve the same email twice. Any`,
-    `  other way of sending email is not held: ask first with \`request_approval\`.`
+    `  other way of sending email is not held: ask first with \`request_approval\`, and when you`,
+    `  do, pass \`detail.email\` = { to, from, subject } so your manager sees who it goes to.`
   ];
 }
 function requireApprovalActions(config) {
@@ -1261,14 +1284,19 @@ function requireApprovalActions(config) {
   const actions = raw.filter((a) => typeof a === "string" && a.trim() !== "").map((a) => a.trim());
   return actions.length > 0 ? actions : null;
 }
-function requireApprovalHowLines(g, level, emailHold) {
+function requireApprovalHowLines(g, level, holds) {
+  const emailHold = holds.requireApproval;
+  const domainHold = emailHold === null ? holds.domain : null;
   const actions = requireApprovalActions(g.config);
   const namesEmail = actions === null || actions.includes(REQUIRE_APPROVAL_EMAIL_ACTION);
   const namesOther = actions === null || actions.some((a) => a !== REQUIRE_APPROVAL_EMAIL_ACTION);
-  const ask = namesOther || namesEmail && emailHold === null;
+  const asksAboutEmail = namesEmail && emailHold === null && domainHold === null;
+  const ask = namesOther || asksAboutEmail || namesEmail && domainHold !== null;
   return [
     ...ask ? REQUIRE_APPROVAL_HOW[level] : [],
-    ...namesEmail && emailHold !== null ? requireApprovalEmailException(emailHold) : []
+    ...asksAboutEmail ? REQUIRE_APPROVAL_EMAIL_DETAIL : [],
+    ...namesEmail && emailHold !== null ? requireApprovalEmailException(emailHold) : [],
+    ...namesEmail && domainHold !== null ? requireApprovalDomainHoldException(domainHold.covered) : []
   ];
 }
 function renderAdvisoryGuardrailBullet(g, emailHold) {
@@ -1380,7 +1408,7 @@ function buildGuardrailsSection(guardrails) {
   }
   if (advisory.length > 0) {
     blocks.push(``, `### Advisory (policy only \u2014 not enforced by the platform)`, ``, `Follow these as operator instructions, at the level each one states (it`, `replaces the refuse-by-default rule above). No platform control backs them, so`, `never say an action was blocked, held for approval, or audited on their`, `basis \u2014 if you decline, say so and why.`, ``);
-    const emailHold = liveEmailHoldActions(active);
+    const emailHold = { requireApproval: liveEmailHoldActions(active), domain: liveDomainHold(guardrails) };
     blocks.push(advisory.map((g) => renderAdvisoryGuardrailBullet(g, emailHold)).join("\n"));
   }
   if (overridden.length > 0) {
@@ -5710,6 +5738,36 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // wearing a precise number, which is the failure this field invites.
     since: "0.28.618"
   },
+  {
+    key: "block-self-serve-org-creation",
+    description: "Invite-only onboarding (ENG-11305): refuse self-serve organization creation. On: the signup trigger and /auth/ensure-person create no organization for a new account, POST /organizations returns 403, and the user is told organizations are by invitation. Still allowed: accepting an invitation, and staff organization creation - NOTHING else. A company-domain signup is no longer auto-joined to any existing organization: no signal available here proves domain ownership (a slug is not a domain, and organization_email_domains.verified_at is self-asserted by any org admin), so an invitation is the only door. Existing organizations are untouched. STAGE-WIDE ONLY: it is read inside Postgres (`self_serve_org_creation_blocked`), which sees only the stage value, never an org override - there is no org yet. Turn it OFF here to reopen self-serve signup.",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Ships ARMED (ENG-11305): the block is the point, and a dark default is a
+    // control that is "Done" and never in force. This literal is duplicated as
+    // the fallback inside self_serve_org_creation_blocked() (SQL cannot see the
+    // registry); eng-11305-self-serve-org-block.test.ts asserts they agree. No
+    // envVar on purpose: TS honours env first and SQL cannot see it, so the two
+    // halves of the gate would disagree on any host that set one.
+    defaultValue: true,
+    // An org override is meaningless here (no org exists when this evaluates)
+    // and is ignored by the SQL half; stop org admins setting one that would
+    // read as if it did something.
+    platformAdminOnly: true,
+    // ADR-0022 §4, CodeRabbit on #6733. `platformAdminOnly` answers WHO may
+    // change this; it does not make changing it deliberate. Turning this flag
+    // OFF reopens self-serve organization creation fleet-wide — every new org
+    // carries the default comp subscription and can provision managed hosts —
+    // and it is a single toggle on a list of toggles, with no org-level blast
+    // radius to make anyone hesitate. `sensitive` is what forces the
+    // confirmation: `isSensitiveFlag` gates the API mutation on an explicit
+    // `confirm: true` (`routes/flags.ts:487`) and on `?confirm=true` for an
+    // override removal (`:360`), and the admin page routes it through a
+    // confirm modal rather than an inline write (`page.tsx:179`).
+    //
+    // This rolls FLAGS_SCHEMA_VERSION, which is expected: `sensitive` is part
+    // of the structural projection (`schema-version.ts:37`).
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "agent-hours-billing-enabled",
     description: "Agent-hours (utilisation) billing (ENG-7910). Per-org gate; ships dark. When on for an org, its closed billing periods are settled into org_agent_hours_settlements from the plan/override agent-hours terms, and the customer billing surface shows used-vs-included hours + projected overage. Off = no settlement written, no charge, surface hidden. Launch prices are seeded in plan_billing_terms; flip on per-org for a controlled rollout.",
@@ -7153,6 +7211,17 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // It widens who may DECIDE an approval, so it is a control, not a display toggle.
     sensitive: true
   },
+  {
+    key: "approval-unified-authority",
+    description: "One authority check for every approval ingress (ENG-11207, ADR-0124 Phase 0b): canDecide() runs inside tryDispatchApprovalCore for console, Slack (channel, alerts, Socket Mode, which also carries Telegram) and Direct Chat taps alike. off = not computed. shadow = compute the verdict and log approval_authority_would_reject (ingress, verb, org, reason) for every tap it would refuse, then decide exactly as today. enforce = reserved for the per-(org, verb) allowlist slice; until that ships it behaves as shadow. Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.",
+    flagType: "enum",
+    allowedValues: ["off", "shadow", "enforce"],
+    // Safe/default value is `off` (no computation, no extra reads on the tap path). A flag-DB read
+    // error degrades to this, so an outage can never change who may decide.
+    defaultValue: "off",
+    // Its enforce value will refuse approvals, so mutating it is worth confirming.
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "slack-reply-binding",
     description: "Slack reply-target binding (ENG-7396 / WS2, cross-thread reply routing): the model names which inbound it answers (inbound_id) and the server resolves the destination from its own verified record. shadow = classify + count only, routing unchanged; warn = same routing plus a tool-result note so the model self-corrects; enforce = route a bound reply to the registry thread and REJECT a reply whose target matches no inbound this process delivered. The channel server can't evaluate flags, so the manager materializes the resolved value into the AGT_SLACK_REPLY_BINDING spawn env (the operator/canary override, ADR-0022). Ships shadow.",
@@ -13088,6 +13157,11 @@ var QUOTA_EXHAUSTED_ERROR_PATTERNS = [
   "usage limit",
   "daily limit exceeded"
 ];
+var PROVIDER_ACCESS_BLOCKED_ERROR_PATTERNS = [
+  "api access blocked",
+  "api access has been blocked",
+  "api access is blocked"
+];
 function isReadonlyToolDescriptor(t) {
   if (!t?.name)
     return false;
@@ -13180,6 +13254,10 @@ function formatRetryWindow(seconds) {
     return `about ${Math.round(hours * 10) / 10} hours`;
   return `about ${Math.round(hours / 24 * 10) / 10} days`;
 }
+function isProviderAccessBlockedError(message) {
+  const m = message.toLowerCase();
+  return PROVIDER_ACCESS_BLOCKED_ERROR_PATTERNS.some((p2) => m.includes(p2));
+}
 function classifyToolCallFailure(text) {
   if (isAccountResolutionError(text))
     return "account";
@@ -13187,6 +13265,8 @@ function classifyToolCallFailure(text) {
     return "quota";
   if (isScopeDeficitError(text))
     return "scope";
+  if (isProviderAccessBlockedError(text))
+    return "blocked";
   if (isUpstreamAuthError(text))
     return "auth";
   if (isSiteResolutionError(text))
@@ -13339,6 +13419,13 @@ async function probeComposioMcpToolCall(config, fetchImpl = fetch) {
           details: { ...baseDetails, reason: "upstream_auth_rejected" }
         };
       }
+      if (kind === "blocked") {
+        return {
+          status: "degraded",
+          message: `Live tool call '${toolName}' reached the provider, which refused API access for this connection's account or app. The credential itself was accepted, so reconnecting alone will not fix it: check that the connecting user still has a role on the account and that the account is not restricted with the provider, then reconnect: ${snippet}`,
+          details: { ...baseDetails, reason: "provider_access_blocked" }
+        };
+      }
       if (kind === "site") {
         return {
           status: "down",
@@ -13346,6 +13433,13 @@ async function probeComposioMcpToolCall(config, fetchImpl = fetch) {
           details: { ...baseDetails, reason: "site_unresolved" }
         };
       }
+      if (resolved.requestedTool && !resolved.fallback && toolName === resolved.requestedTool) {
+        return {
+          status: "degraded",
+          message: `Live tool call '${toolName}' (this integration's connectivity test) failed with an error the probe does not recognise, so the connection cannot be confirmed working: ${snippet}`,
+          details: { ...baseDetails, reason: "connectivity_test_failed", tool_error: snippet }
+        };
+      }
       return {
         status: "ok",
         message: `Live tool call '${toolName}' resolved the account (tool error: ${snippet})`,
@@ -15354,27 +15448,21 @@ function isBareAck(text) {
 }
 
 // ../../packages/core/dist/conversations/metrics.js
+var DAY_MS2 = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3;
+var ALL_TIME_FLOOR_ISO = "2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z";
+var ALL_TIME_FLOOR_MS = Date.parse(ALL_TIME_FLOOR_ISO);
 var PERIOD_CONFIG = {
-  "24h": { windowMs: 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3, bucket: "hour" },
-  "7d": { windowMs: 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3, bucket: "day" },
-  "30d": { windowMs: 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3, bucket: "day" }
+  "24h": { windowMs: DAY_MS2, bucket: "hour" },
+  "7d": { windowMs: 7 * DAY_MS2, bucket: "day" },
+  "30d": { windowMs: 30 * DAY_MS2, bucket: "day" },
+  "90d": { windowMs: 90 * DAY_MS2, bucket: "day" },
+  "180d": { windowMs: 180 * DAY_MS2, bucket: "day" },
+  all: { windowMs: null, bucket: "day" }
 };
 var CONVERSATION_METRICS_PERIODS = Object.keys(PERIOD_CONFIG);
 
 // ../../packages/core/dist/conversations/eval-scores.js
 var EVAL_SCORE_MA_WINDOW_MS = 28 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3;
-var PERIOD_CONFIG2 = {
-  "24h": { windowMs: 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3, bucket: "hour" },
-  "7d": { windowMs: 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3, bucket: "day" },
-  "30d": { windowMs: 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3, bucket: "day" }
-};
-
-// ../../packages/core/dist/conversations/eval-failures.js
-var PERIOD_WINDOW_MS = {
-  "24h": 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3,
-  "7d": 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3,
-  "30d": 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3
-};
 
 // ../../packages/core/dist/conversations/eval-failure-categories.js
 var CONVERSATION_FAILURE_CATEGORIES = [
@@ -15432,19 +15520,9 @@ function buildFailureCategoryPromptLines() {
 function isConversationFailureCategory(v) {
   return typeof v === "string" && CONVERSATION_FAILURE_CATEGORIES.includes(v);
 }
-var PERIOD_WINDOW_MS2 = {
-  "24h": 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3,
-  "7d": 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3,
-  "30d": 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3
-};
 
 // ../../packages/core/dist/ratings/kanban-ratings.js
 var RATING_MA_WINDOW_MS = 28 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3;
-var PERIOD_CONFIG3 = {
-  "24h": { windowMs: 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3, bucket: "hour" },
-  "7d": { windowMs: 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3, bucket: "day" },
-  "30d": { windowMs: 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3, bucket: "day" }
-};
 
 // ../../packages/core/dist/triggers/registry.js
 var sources = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
@@ -16158,4 +16236,4 @@ export {
   peekCurrentSession,
   readDailySessionPin
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-UDJINPUK.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-7F2UFKYG.js.map