@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.1053 → 0.28.1055

package/dist/bin/agt.js

@@ -40,12 +40,12 @@ import {
   success,
   table,
   warn
-} from "../chunk-Z45XEW4H.js";
+} from "../chunk-TBHLHBXJ.js";
 import {
   getProjectDir,
   isSessionResumeDisabled,
   readDirectChatSessionState
-} from "../chunk-4ZH75WMF.js";
+} from "../chunk-A7HDJW23.js";
 import {
   AnchorSessionClient,
   CHANNEL_REGISTRY,
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ import {
   serializeManifestForSlackCli,
   sessionFileExists,
   sessionTranscriptDir
-} from "../chunk-MQ4COFCI.js";
+} from "../chunk-P544KDE3.js";
 import "../chunk-OCMJ5E6J.js";
 import "../chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 import "../chunk-EL5MWGGH.js";
@@ -5474,7 +5474,7 @@ import { execFileSync, execSync } from "child_process";
 import { existsSync as existsSync11, realpathSync as realpathSync2 } from "fs";
 import chalk18 from "chalk";
 import ora16 from "ora";
-var cliVersion = true ? "0.28.1053" : "dev";
+var cliVersion = true ? "0.28.1055" : "dev";
 async function fetchLatestVersion() {
   const host2 = getHost();
   if (!host2) return null;
@@ -6734,7 +6734,7 @@ function handleError(err) {
 }
 
 // src/bin/agt.ts
-var cliVersion2 = true ? "0.28.1053" : "dev";
+var cliVersion2 = true ? "0.28.1055" : "dev";
 var program = new Command();
 program.name("agt").description("Augmented CLI \u2014 agent provisioning and management").version(cliVersion2).option("--json", "Emit machine-readable JSON output (suppress spinners and colors)").option("--skip-update-check", "Skip the automatic update check on startup");
 program.hook("preAction", async (thisCommand, actionCommand) => {

package/dist/{chunk-4ZH75WMF.js → chunk-A7HDJW23.js}

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ import {
   rotateDailySession,
   sessionFileExists,
   todayLocalIso
-} from "./chunk-MQ4COFCI.js";
+} from "./chunk-P544KDE3.js";
 import {
   classifyUnanswerablePane,
   findUsageLimitResetHint,
@@ -6011,4 +6011,4 @@ export {
   stopAllSessionsAndWait,
   getProjectDir
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-4ZH75WMF.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-A7HDJW23.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-MQ4COFCI.js → chunk-P544KDE3.js}

@@ -6920,7 +6920,7 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
   },
   {
     key: "email-require-approval-enforcement",
-    description: 'Enforcement gate for the `email.require_approval` guardrail (ENG-9611). That guardrail has been `default_for_new_orgs` since ~2026-05-03 and its display text promises "Require human approval before sending any email", but nothing ever read it: its only runtime path was toGuardrailForPrompt, i.e. a line in the agent CLAUDE.md. When ON for an org, a DISPATCHING email send (never a draft-create, ENG-7980) is held and routed to Human Approval regardless of recipient domain \u2014 which is what "any email" means, and is what distinguishes it from email-guard-require-approval-enabled, whose require_approval stage only intercepts a would-be DOMAIN block. Deliberately separate from the guardrail row: roughly four months of orgs already carry an inert `enforce`-level row, so reading the row alone would arm a blocking control across all of them on deploy. New orgs are armed by an org-scoped override written at org creation; existing orgs stay off until an operator flips them. Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.',
+    description: 'Enforcement gate for the `email.require_approval` guardrail (ENG-9611). That guardrail has been `default_for_new_orgs` since ~2026-05-03 and its display text promises "Require human approval before sending any email", but nothing ever read it: its only runtime path was toGuardrailForPrompt, i.e. a line in the agent CLAUDE.md. When ON for an org, a DISPATCHING email send (never a draft-create, ENG-7980) is held and routed to Human Approval regardless of recipient domain \u2014 which is what "any email" means, and is what distinguishes it from email-guard-require-approval-enabled, whose require_approval stage only intercepts a would-be DOMAIN block. Deliberately separate from the guardrail row: roughly four months of orgs already carry an inert `enforce`-level row, so reading the row alone would arm a blocking control across all of them on deploy. New orgs are no longer armed (ENG-11234). Orgs created while the ENG-9629/9675 new-org arm was live keep their org-scoped ON override until an operator flips them per org. Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.',
     flagType: "boolean",
     // Declared safe value is `false` (no hold). A flag-DB read error degrades here, so a flags
     // outage can never silently start holding real customer email — the same fail-OPEN posture
@@ -6930,36 +6930,15 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     defaultValue: false,
     // Turning it on holds real customer email pending a human tap, so it is a deliberate,
     // audited per-org flip (ADR-0022 §4).
-    sensitive: true,
-    // ENG-9629: NEW orgs are armed on. Declared here rather than hardcoded in the
-    // seeding code, so `listNewOrgFlagOverrides()` is the one answer to "which flags
-    // does a new org get". `defaultValue` stays false so the ~4 months of orgs already
-    // carrying an inert enforce-level email.require_approval row are NOT armed on deploy.
-    // ENG-9675: EVERY creation path, self-serve included.
-    //
-    // ENG-9630 had restricted this to API-created orgs on the grounds that a
-    // self-serve org has no way of being TOLD about a held send — no Slack
-    // alert channel is wired at signup. That reasoning was wrong, and the check
-    // behind it was incomplete: it confirmed an in-console page exists at
-    // /organization/approvals and stopped, without looking at the dispatch path.
-    //
-    // `routeBlockedCallToApproval` has three dispatchers, and the Direct Chat
-    // one (lib/integration-broker-approval-direct-chat.ts, ENG-7680) is the
-    // universal fallback — "every managed agent always has a Direct Chat session
-    // its operator/manager watches in the Console ... usable out of the box with
-    // no per-org approval-route setup and no Slack dependency". It posts into a
-    // thread keyed on the approval_requests.id and correlates the manager's
-    // reply back through tryCaptureDirectChatApproval, so a self-serve org has
-    // both a zero-config delivery channel AND a reply path.
-    //
-    // With the stated blocker gone, the guardrail's own promise — "before
-    // sending any email" — applies to the organizations with the LEAST operator
-    // oversight exactly as it does to the rest.
-    //
-    // Existing self-serve orgs are deliberately NOT armed by this: newOrgOverride
-    // is applied at creation, and nothing backfills. Extending it to them is a
-    // separate decision with a comms obligation.
-    newOrgOverride: true
+    sensitive: true
+    // No newOrgOverride (ENG-11234). ENG-9629/ENG-9675 armed this on EVERY new org at
+    // creation, so every org created since then held each dispatching send, internal
+    // recipients included, behind a human tap. In practice that stalled real work: Pedders
+    // (CS-1904/1908/1910) had an agent's emails to its own principal expire unapproved,
+    // because "any email" includes the person the agent works for. New orgs now start at
+    // `defaultValue` (off) like every other org; turning it on is the deliberate, audited
+    // per-org flip `sensitive: true` already describes. Orgs armed by the old override keep
+    // their override row; nothing here disarms them (that is an operator decision per org).
   },
   {
     key: "mail-rule-control-enforcement",
@@ -6982,6 +6961,16 @@ var FLAG_REGISTRY = [
     // put a first-of-its-kind classifier in front of real customer traffic with nothing
     // observed. Arm per-org, then revisit once there is evidence.
   },
+  {
+    key: "heartbeat-writes-claude-account-email",
+    description: "ENG-10796 (#6382): when ON, the host heartbeat writes the Claude account address it reads from the host (oauthAccount.emailAddress) into hosts.claude_account_email, so the Tokens label self-heals. OFF (default) the heartbeat never writes the column and the label stays whatever an operator set. Ships DARK because the column must first sit behind column-level grants (ENG-11162, #6596): until then any org member, and every co-tenant org on a pool host, can read it raw through Supabase REST, and on an IL-provisioned box the harvested address is a staff login (Obi Wan ecad15b6eff5). Evaluated at PLATFORM scope only: the heartbeat does not know the host org before its UPDATE, so flip the platform value once ENG-11162 is live.",
+    flagType: "boolean",
+    // Safe value is `false` (write nothing). A flag read error degrades here, so a flags outage
+    // can never start harvesting addresses into a customer-readable row.
+    defaultValue: false,
+    // Turning it on starts publishing an identifier into customer-visible rows (ADR-0022 §4).
+    sensitive: true
+  },
   {
     key: "email-guard-require-approval-enabled",
     description: "Platform enable-gate for the email-domain guardrail REQUIRE_APPROVAL stage (ENG-7939). When ON for an org, a scope at email_guard_stage=require_approval routes a send to a non-allowed domain into Human Approval (an Approve/Deny card) instead of a hard block: the rollout UI unlocks the option and the write routes accept require_approval. When OFF (default) the write routes reject require_approval and the UI shows it as not yet available, so no scope can select it. Structurally also depends on hitl-approval-routing being on (the approval broker fails closed to a hard block when routing is off). Evaluated per-org. Ships dark.",
@@ -8604,7 +8593,7 @@ var integration_metadata_v1_default = {
       type: "string",
       format: "uri",
       pattern: "^https://",
-      description: "Absolute HTTPS URL the broker uses as the vendor API root. Required when any tool descriptor relies on http_templater (i.e. whenever `tools[]` is non-empty)."
+      description: "Absolute HTTPS URL the broker uses as the vendor API root. Required when any tool descriptor relies on http_templater (i.e. whenever `tools[]` is non-empty), unless the definition declares a per-install `base_url_template` instead (CS-1863)."
     },
     auth_scheme: {
       type: "string",
@@ -8638,6 +8627,22 @@ var integration_metadata_v1_default = {
         }
       }
     },
+    base_url_template: {
+      type: "object",
+      description: "A PER-INSTALL API host (CS-1863), for vendors with one host per customer (Storrito: https://<ORG_UUID>.storrito.com/api/v1). Used when base_url is absent. `template` holds exactly one `{value}` placeholder in its host; the value is read from the install's config[config_key], must match value_pattern in full, and the built host must be exactly <value>.<host_suffix> over https. Resolved and re-validated at call time by resolveIntegrationBaseUrl.",
+      additionalProperties: false,
+      required: ["template", "config_key", "value_pattern", "host_suffix"],
+      properties: {
+        template: { type: "string", pattern: "^https://\\{value\\}\\.[^{}]+$" },
+        config_key: { type: "string", pattern: "^[a-z][a-z0-9_]*$" },
+        value_pattern: { type: "string", minLength: 1 },
+        host_suffix: { type: "string", pattern: "^[a-z0-9.-]+\\.[a-z]{2,}$" }
+      }
+    },
+    redirect_means_auth_failure: {
+      type: "boolean",
+      description: "The vendor answers a rejected credential with a REDIRECT (Storrito: a 302 to its login page) rather than a 401. A redirected non-GET call is never followed (vendor-fetch.ts) and always fails; with this set, it is also treated like a 401 and the install is flagged for re-auth."
+    },
     tools: {
       type: "array",
       description: "Auto-loaded MCP tool descriptors. Each entry produces one MCP tool entry per supported runtime scope.",
@@ -8649,7 +8654,10 @@ var integration_metadata_v1_default = {
     properties: { tools: { type: "array", minItems: 1 } },
     required: ["tools"]
   },
-  then: { required: ["base_url"] },
+  then: {
+    description: "A tool needs an API root: a fixed base_url, or a per-install base_url_template (CS-1863).",
+    anyOf: [{ required: ["base_url"] }, { required: ["base_url_template"] }]
+  },
   not: {
     description: "auth_scheme and auth_encoding are mutually exclusive (ENG-10524). The templater refuses the combination on every call, so catalog validation refuses it first.",
     required: ["auth_scheme", "auth_encoding"]
@@ -11579,7 +11587,11 @@ var HTTP_PROBE_PROVIDERS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
   // admin revokes it, and the integration is read-only, so a dead token would
   // otherwise surface as empty compliance reports rather than a failed write.
   // Routes to `probeMitti` against `GET /scheduling/v1/feed/schedules?limit=1`.
-  "mitti"
+  "mitti",
+  // CS-1863: Storrito, added with the integration. A deleted API credential
+  // answers with a redirect to the login page rather than a 401, so without a
+  // probe a dead token would surface only as failed story posts.
+  "storrito"
   // ENG-6100: GitHub is deliberately NOT here. This set drives the ASYNC
   // connectivity monitor's routing, where github (source_type='native')
   // stays host-side (cli_command — `gh`, the credential the agent actually
@@ -11743,6 +11755,46 @@ function resolveConnectivityProbe(input) {
   }
 }
 
+// ../../packages/core/dist/integrations/integration-broker/base-url.js
+var FORBIDDEN_IN_VALUE = /[./@:?#\\\s]/;
+function resolveTemplatedBaseUrl(spec, config) {
+  const raw = config?.[spec.config_key];
+  if (typeof raw !== "string")
+    return null;
+  const value = raw.trim().toLowerCase();
+  if (value === "" || FORBIDDEN_IN_VALUE.test(value))
+    return null;
+  let pattern;
+  try {
+    pattern = new RegExp(`^(?:${spec.value_pattern})$`, "i");
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+  if (!pattern.test(value))
+    return null;
+  const built = spec.template.replace("{value}", value);
+  let url;
+  try {
+    url = new URL(built);
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+  const suffix = spec.host_suffix.toLowerCase().replace(/^\.+/, "");
+  if (url.protocol !== "https:")
+    return null;
+  if (url.username !== "" || url.password !== "" || url.port !== "")
+    return null;
+  if (url.hostname !== `${value}.${suffix}`)
+    return null;
+  return built.replace(/\/+$/, "");
+}
+var STORRITO_BASE_URL_SPEC = {
+  template: "https://{value}.storrito.com/api/v1",
+  config_key: "org_id",
+  value_pattern: "[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}",
+  host_suffix: "storrito.com"
+};
+
 // ../../packages/core/dist/integrations/connectivity-http-probes.js
 var PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS = 1e4;
 var NULL_BODY_STATUSES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([101, 204, 205, 304]);
@@ -12064,8 +12116,59 @@ async function probeMitti(creds, fetchImpl) {
     return networkOutcome(err, String(token));
   }
 }
-async function probeHttpProvider(definitionId, credentials, fetchImpl = fetch) {
+async function probeStorrito(creds, fetchImpl, config) {
+  const token = creds.api_key ?? creds.access_token;
+  if (!token)
+    return { status: "down", message: "No credential present" };
+  const base = resolveTemplatedBaseUrl(STORRITO_BASE_URL_SPEC, config);
+  if (!base) {
+    return {
+      status: "down",
+      message: "Storrito organisation ID is missing or not a valid UUID - set it on the install (Storrito API settings)"
+    };
+  }
+  try {
+    const res = await timedFetch(fetchImpl, `${base}/list-instagram-users`, {
+      method: "POST",
+      headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}`, "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+      body: "{}",
+      redirect: "manual"
+    });
+    if (res.status >= 300 && res.status < 400) {
+      return {
+        status: "down",
+        cause: "auth_rejected",
+        message: "Storrito rejected the token (redirected to its login page) - the API credential was deleted, mistyped or belongs to another organisation"
+      };
+    }
+    if (!res.ok) {
+      const message = res.status === 401 || res.status === 403 ? `Storrito rejected the token (${res.status})` : res.status === 429 ? rateLimitMessage("Storrito", res.status) : `Storrito API returned ${res.status}`;
+      return { status: statusForHttp(res.status), cause: causeForHttp(res.status), message };
+    }
+    let body = null;
+    try {
+      body = await res.json();
+    } catch {
+      body = null;
+    }
+    if (!Array.isArray(body?.instagramUsers)) {
+      return { status: "down", message: "Storrito returned 200 without an Instagram account list - not a Storrito API response" };
+    }
+    if (body.instagramUsers.length === 0) {
+      return {
+        status: "degraded",
+        message: "Connected to Storrito, but no Instagram account is connected in Storrito yet - stories have nowhere to post"
+      };
+    }
+    return { status: "ok", message: `Connected to Storrito (${body.instagramUsers.length} Instagram account(s))` };
+  } catch (err) {
+    return networkOutcome(err, String(token));
+  }
+}
+async function probeHttpProvider(definitionId, credentials, fetchImpl = fetch, config) {
   switch (definitionId) {
+    case "storrito":
+      return probeStorrito(credentials, fetchImpl, config);
     case "linear":
       return probeLinear(credentials, fetchImpl);
     case "buffer":
@@ -15891,4 +15994,4 @@ export {
   peekCurrentSession,
   readDailySessionPin
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-MQ4COFCI.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-P544KDE3.js.map