@integrity-labs/agt-cli 0.28.1039 → 0.28.1041

package/dist/{claude-pair-runtime-NKWXDI6H.js → claude-pair-runtime-JZU32YLZ.js}

@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ async function spawnPairSession(session) {
     return { ok: true };
   } catch {
   }
-  const { resolveClaudeBinary } = await import("./persistent-session-QZAKDZIX.js");
+  const { resolveClaudeBinary } = await import("./persistent-session-3IGNGFEX.js");
   const claudeBin = resolveClaudeBinary();
   const pairEnv = {
     ...process.env,
@@ -734,4 +734,4 @@ export {
   startClaudePair,
   submitClaudePairCode
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=claude-pair-runtime-NKWXDI6H.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=claude-pair-runtime-JZU32YLZ.js.map

package/dist/lib/manager-worker.js

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ import {
   safeWriteJsonAtomic,
   setConfigHash,
   tripClass
-} from "../chunk-X6D6UADI.js";
+} from "../chunk-7ORA3ZVJ.js";
 import {
   getProjectDir as getProjectDir2,
   getReadyTasks,
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ import {
   takeZombieDetection,
   toOpencodeModel,
   writeEgressAllowlist
-} from "../chunk-TAWCN7OK.js";
+} from "../chunk-OHT4PWAK.js";
 import {
   ACCOUNT_ENFORCEMENT_MARKER_FILENAME,
   AnchorSessionClient,
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ import {
   subagentActivityAgeSeconds,
   sumTranscriptUsageInWindow,
   transcriptActivityAgeSeconds
-} from "../chunk-UB2HLH5P.js";
+} from "../chunk-TXRZFABA.js";
 import {
   classifyUnanswerablePane,
   paneRemedy
@@ -13931,7 +13931,7 @@ var pendingDayRolloverReset = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
 var dayRolloverInboundHold = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
 var INBOUND_HOLD_EPISODE_GAP_MS = 12e4;
 async function channelInboundActivityAgeSecondsFor(codeName) {
-  const { newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-6OG3SYLZ.js");
+  const { newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-OVMYX6PK.js");
   const newest = newestPendingInboundActivityMtimeMs(dirname11(paneLogPath(codeName)));
   if (newest === null) return null;
   return Math.max(0, Math.floor((Date.now() - newest) / 1e3));
@@ -14677,7 +14677,7 @@ var agentRestartTimezoneInputs = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
 var lastVersionCheckAt = 0;
 var VERSION_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1e3;
 var lastResponsivenessProbeAt = 0;
-var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.1039" : "dev";
+var agtCliVersion = true ? "0.28.1041" : "dev";
 function resolveBrewPath(execFileSync3) {
   try {
     const out = execFileSync3("which", ["brew"], { timeout: 5e3 }).toString().trim();
@@ -16312,7 +16312,7 @@ function flushRestartedAgentDiagnostics(hostId, codeNames) {
   if (codeNames.length === 0) return;
   void (async () => {
     try {
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-QZAKDZIX.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-3IGNGFEX.js");
       await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
         host_id: hostId,
         agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics(codeNames, quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor, forwardedToolsFor, runtimeVersionFor)
@@ -16454,7 +16454,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
     }
     try {
       const { detectHostSecurity } = await import("../host-security-KQYYZZVW.js");
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-QZAKDZIX.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-3IGNGFEX.js");
       const diagCodeNames = [...agentState.persistentSessionAgents];
       const agentDiagnostics = diagCodeNames.length > 0 ? collectDiagnostics(diagCodeNames, quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor, forwardedToolsFor, runtimeVersionFor) : void 0;
       let tailscaleHostname;
@@ -16630,7 +16630,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
         collectPanelessActivityProbes,
         getResponsivenessIntervalMs,
         occupancyQualificationClassifications
-      } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-6OG3SYLZ.js");
+      } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-OVMYX6PK.js");
       const probeIntervalMs = getResponsivenessIntervalMs();
       if (now - lastResponsivenessProbeAt > probeIntervalMs) {
         const probeCodeNames = [...agentState.persistentSessionAgents];
@@ -16747,7 +16747,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
           collectResponsivenessProbes,
           livePendingInboundOldestAgeSeconds,
           parkPendingInbound
-        } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-6OG3SYLZ.js");
+        } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-OVMYX6PK.js");
         const { getProjectDir: wedgeProjectDir } = await import("../scheduler-engine-M6AFZWNU.js");
         const wedgeNow = /* @__PURE__ */ new Date();
         const liveAgents = agentState.persistentSessionAgents;
@@ -16903,7 +16903,7 @@ async function pollCycleInner() {
     }
     try {
       const { scrapeMcpFailedBannerCount } = await import("../pane-mcp-banner-scraper-VR5QGP3J.js");
-      const { probeSessionAuth } = await import("../session-auth-dead-EH4N7PWU.js");
+      const { probeSessionAuth } = await import("../session-auth-dead-EL5HEEEV.js");
       const observations = [];
       const pendingCacheCommits = [];
       const modelApiErrorReportingOn = hostFlagStore().getBoolean("model-api-error-reporting");
@@ -21446,7 +21446,7 @@ async function handleRestartDoorbell(agentId, requestedAt, restartReason) {
       try {
         const freshId = rotateSessionForWedge(codeName);
         consecutiveWedgeCycles.delete(codeName);
-        const { parkPendingInbound: parkForRestart } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-6OG3SYLZ.js");
+        const { parkPendingInbound: parkForRestart } = await import("../responsiveness-probe-OVMYX6PK.js");
         const { parked, deadLettered } = parkForRestart(codeName, /* @__PURE__ */ new Date());
         const parkNote = parked > 0 ? `, ${parked} inbound parked` : "";
         const deadNote = deadLettered > 0 ? `, ${deadLettered} undeliverable dead-lettered` : "";
@@ -21489,7 +21489,7 @@ async function handleRestartDoorbell(agentId, requestedAt, restartReason) {
     void api.post("/host/restart-ack", { host_id: hostId, agent_id: agentId, restart_requested_at: requestedAt }).catch((err) => log(`[restart-lane] ack failed for '${codeName}': ${err.message}`));
     void (async () => {
       try {
-        const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-QZAKDZIX.js");
+        const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-3IGNGFEX.js");
         await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
           host_id: hostId,
           agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics([codeName], quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor, forwardedToolsFor, runtimeVersionFor)
@@ -21540,7 +21540,7 @@ async function respawnAgentAfterMcpStop(codeName, reason) {
     }
     try {
       const hostId = await getHostId();
-      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-QZAKDZIX.js");
+      const { collectDiagnostics } = await import("../persistent-session-3IGNGFEX.js");
       await api.post("/host/heartbeat", {
         host_id: hostId,
         agent_diagnostics: collectDiagnostics([codeName], quarantineEntriesFor, claudeMdSizeFor, spawnOutcomeForDiagnostics, pidPressureFor, forwardedToolsFor, runtimeVersionFor)
@@ -22212,7 +22212,7 @@ async function processClaudePairSessions(agents) {
     // cannot take it for itself — by the time it runs, the write it is looking
     // for may already have happened.
     snapshotPairConfig
-  } = await import("../claude-pair-runtime-NKWXDI6H.js");
+  } = await import("../claude-pair-runtime-JZU32YLZ.js");
   for (const pairId of pendingResp.cancelled_pair_ids ?? []) {
     log(`[claude-pair] sweeping orphan tmux session for pair ${pairId.slice(0, 8)}`);
     const killed = await killPairSession(pairTmuxSession(pairId));

package/dist/mcp/direct-chat-channel.js

@@ -32966,10 +32966,45 @@ var OAUTH_PROVIDERS = {
       // bill at creation time. Read-only would force a follow-up manual
       // upload in Xero; write closes the loop.
       "accounting.attachments",
-      // accounting.transactions.read → granular read-only replacements
-      // for the surfaces we don't yet need write access on.
-      "accounting.payments.read",
-      "accounting.banktransactions.read",
+      // payments: write (CS-1845) enables `xero.payment.create`, which does
+      // PUT /Payments. These two were `.read` only, described as "surfaces we
+      // don't yet need write access on" — but the xero-broker had ALREADY
+      // registered write verbs against both, so the claim was false when it was
+      // written and the verbs could never succeed. A live approval of AUD
+      // 57,748.35 against INV-0407 was approved by a human and then failed with
+      // Xero `401 {Title: Unauthorized, Detail: AuthorizationUnsuccessful}`,
+      // AFTER the handler's single 401 refresh-retry — which is what rules out
+      // an expired token: a freshly refreshed token still 401s when the GRANT
+      // never carried the scope.
+      //
+      // banktransactions: write for the same reason — `xero.bank_transaction.delete`
+      // is registered and would have failed identically the first time anyone
+      // approved one. It is a DESTRUCTIVE verb, so it was one approval away from
+      // being the more alarming report.
+      //
+      // The variant without `.read` is the read+write granular scope, so the
+      // `.read` entries are gone from THIS list.
+      //
+      // That is not the same as "consent asks for them once" (Obi Wan
+      // `167f3932fcdf` on #6564 corrected an earlier version of this comment,
+      // which claimed it was). The authorize route unions `defaultScopes` with
+      // `listAgentRequiredOAuthScopes` (lib/agent-oauth-scope-deficit.ts, called
+      // from routes/integrations-oauth.ts), and the catalog's `xero:read` defined
+      // scope still lists `accounting.payments.read` and
+      // `accounting.banktransactions.read` in its `oauth_scopes` — so an agent
+      // with xero:read installed requests the `.read` variants alongside these.
+      // Harmless, because write implies read, but do not write comments here that
+      // describe the consent string as though this array were all of it.
+      //
+      // DO NOT substitute the broad `accounting.transactions`: Xero rejects the
+      // manifest for apps created after 2026-03-02 (see the note above).
+      //
+      // RECONNECT REQUIRED, same as `accounting.manualjournals` below: the broker
+      // posts with the agent's own OAuth access_token, so every existing install
+      // keeps failing until it reconnects and re-consents. Shipping this scope is
+      // necessary and NOT sufficient.
+      "accounting.payments",
+      "accounting.banktransactions",
       // manualjournals: write (CS-1439) enables the xero-broker to post
       // manual journals (reclasses, accruals, corrections) on approval. The
       // variant without `.read` is the read+write granular scope. Note: an

package/dist/mcp/index.js

@@ -25582,10 +25582,45 @@ var OAUTH_PROVIDERS = {
       // bill at creation time. Read-only would force a follow-up manual
       // upload in Xero; write closes the loop.
       "accounting.attachments",
-      // accounting.transactions.read → granular read-only replacements
-      // for the surfaces we don't yet need write access on.
-      "accounting.payments.read",
-      "accounting.banktransactions.read",
+      // payments: write (CS-1845) enables `xero.payment.create`, which does
+      // PUT /Payments. These two were `.read` only, described as "surfaces we
+      // don't yet need write access on" — but the xero-broker had ALREADY
+      // registered write verbs against both, so the claim was false when it was
+      // written and the verbs could never succeed. A live approval of AUD
+      // 57,748.35 against INV-0407 was approved by a human and then failed with
+      // Xero `401 {Title: Unauthorized, Detail: AuthorizationUnsuccessful}`,
+      // AFTER the handler's single 401 refresh-retry — which is what rules out
+      // an expired token: a freshly refreshed token still 401s when the GRANT
+      // never carried the scope.
+      //
+      // banktransactions: write for the same reason — `xero.bank_transaction.delete`
+      // is registered and would have failed identically the first time anyone
+      // approved one. It is a DESTRUCTIVE verb, so it was one approval away from
+      // being the more alarming report.
+      //
+      // The variant without `.read` is the read+write granular scope, so the
+      // `.read` entries are gone from THIS list.
+      //
+      // That is not the same as "consent asks for them once" (Obi Wan
+      // `167f3932fcdf` on #6564 corrected an earlier version of this comment,
+      // which claimed it was). The authorize route unions `defaultScopes` with
+      // `listAgentRequiredOAuthScopes` (lib/agent-oauth-scope-deficit.ts, called
+      // from routes/integrations-oauth.ts), and the catalog's `xero:read` defined
+      // scope still lists `accounting.payments.read` and
+      // `accounting.banktransactions.read` in its `oauth_scopes` — so an agent
+      // with xero:read installed requests the `.read` variants alongside these.
+      // Harmless, because write implies read, but do not write comments here that
+      // describe the consent string as though this array were all of it.
+      //
+      // DO NOT substitute the broad `accounting.transactions`: Xero rejects the
+      // manifest for apps created after 2026-03-02 (see the note above).
+      //
+      // RECONNECT REQUIRED, same as `accounting.manualjournals` below: the broker
+      // posts with the agent's own OAuth access_token, so every existing install
+      // keeps failing until it reconnects and re-consents. Shipping this scope is
+      // necessary and NOT sufficient.
+      "accounting.payments",
+      "accounting.banktransactions",
       // manualjournals: write (CS-1439) enables the xero-broker to post
       // manual journals (reclasses, accruals, corrections) on approval. The
       // variant without `.read` is the read+write granular scope. Note: an

package/dist/mcp/origami.js

@@ -39699,10 +39699,45 @@ var OAUTH_PROVIDERS = {
       // bill at creation time. Read-only would force a follow-up manual
       // upload in Xero; write closes the loop.
       "accounting.attachments",
-      // accounting.transactions.read → granular read-only replacements
-      // for the surfaces we don't yet need write access on.
-      "accounting.payments.read",
-      "accounting.banktransactions.read",
+      // payments: write (CS-1845) enables `xero.payment.create`, which does
+      // PUT /Payments. These two were `.read` only, described as "surfaces we
+      // don't yet need write access on" — but the xero-broker had ALREADY
+      // registered write verbs against both, so the claim was false when it was
+      // written and the verbs could never succeed. A live approval of AUD
+      // 57,748.35 against INV-0407 was approved by a human and then failed with
+      // Xero `401 {Title: Unauthorized, Detail: AuthorizationUnsuccessful}`,
+      // AFTER the handler's single 401 refresh-retry — which is what rules out
+      // an expired token: a freshly refreshed token still 401s when the GRANT
+      // never carried the scope.
+      //
+      // banktransactions: write for the same reason — `xero.bank_transaction.delete`
+      // is registered and would have failed identically the first time anyone
+      // approved one. It is a DESTRUCTIVE verb, so it was one approval away from
+      // being the more alarming report.
+      //
+      // The variant without `.read` is the read+write granular scope, so the
+      // `.read` entries are gone from THIS list.
+      //
+      // That is not the same as "consent asks for them once" (Obi Wan
+      // `167f3932fcdf` on #6564 corrected an earlier version of this comment,
+      // which claimed it was). The authorize route unions `defaultScopes` with
+      // `listAgentRequiredOAuthScopes` (lib/agent-oauth-scope-deficit.ts, called
+      // from routes/integrations-oauth.ts), and the catalog's `xero:read` defined
+      // scope still lists `accounting.payments.read` and
+      // `accounting.banktransactions.read` in its `oauth_scopes` — so an agent
+      // with xero:read installed requests the `.read` variants alongside these.
+      // Harmless, because write implies read, but do not write comments here that
+      // describe the consent string as though this array were all of it.
+      //
+      // DO NOT substitute the broad `accounting.transactions`: Xero rejects the
+      // manifest for apps created after 2026-03-02 (see the note above).
+      //
+      // RECONNECT REQUIRED, same as `accounting.manualjournals` below: the broker
+      // posts with the agent's own OAuth access_token, so every existing install
+      // keeps failing until it reconnects and re-consents. Shipping this scope is
+      // necessary and NOT sufficient.
+      "accounting.payments",
+      "accounting.banktransactions",
       // manualjournals: write (CS-1439) enables the xero-broker to post
       // manual journals (reclasses, accruals, corrections) on approval. The
       // variant without `.read` is the read+write granular scope. Note: an

package/dist/mcp/slack-channel.js

@@ -33916,10 +33916,45 @@ var OAUTH_PROVIDERS = {
       // bill at creation time. Read-only would force a follow-up manual
       // upload in Xero; write closes the loop.
       "accounting.attachments",
-      // accounting.transactions.read → granular read-only replacements
-      // for the surfaces we don't yet need write access on.
-      "accounting.payments.read",
-      "accounting.banktransactions.read",
+      // payments: write (CS-1845) enables `xero.payment.create`, which does
+      // PUT /Payments. These two were `.read` only, described as "surfaces we
+      // don't yet need write access on" — but the xero-broker had ALREADY
+      // registered write verbs against both, so the claim was false when it was
+      // written and the verbs could never succeed. A live approval of AUD
+      // 57,748.35 against INV-0407 was approved by a human and then failed with
+      // Xero `401 {Title: Unauthorized, Detail: AuthorizationUnsuccessful}`,
+      // AFTER the handler's single 401 refresh-retry — which is what rules out
+      // an expired token: a freshly refreshed token still 401s when the GRANT
+      // never carried the scope.
+      //
+      // banktransactions: write for the same reason — `xero.bank_transaction.delete`
+      // is registered and would have failed identically the first time anyone
+      // approved one. It is a DESTRUCTIVE verb, so it was one approval away from
+      // being the more alarming report.
+      //
+      // The variant without `.read` is the read+write granular scope, so the
+      // `.read` entries are gone from THIS list.
+      //
+      // That is not the same as "consent asks for them once" (Obi Wan
+      // `167f3932fcdf` on #6564 corrected an earlier version of this comment,
+      // which claimed it was). The authorize route unions `defaultScopes` with
+      // `listAgentRequiredOAuthScopes` (lib/agent-oauth-scope-deficit.ts, called
+      // from routes/integrations-oauth.ts), and the catalog's `xero:read` defined
+      // scope still lists `accounting.payments.read` and
+      // `accounting.banktransactions.read` in its `oauth_scopes` — so an agent
+      // with xero:read installed requests the `.read` variants alongside these.
+      // Harmless, because write implies read, but do not write comments here that
+      // describe the consent string as though this array were all of it.
+      //
+      // DO NOT substitute the broad `accounting.transactions`: Xero rejects the
+      // manifest for apps created after 2026-03-02 (see the note above).
+      //
+      // RECONNECT REQUIRED, same as `accounting.manualjournals` below: the broker
+      // posts with the agent's own OAuth access_token, so every existing install
+      // keeps failing until it reconnects and re-consents. Shipping this scope is
+      // necessary and NOT sufficient.
+      "accounting.payments",
+      "accounting.banktransactions",
       // manualjournals: write (CS-1439) enables the xero-broker to post
       // manual journals (reclasses, accruals, corrections) on approval. The
       // variant without `.read` is the read+write granular scope. Note: an

package/dist/mcp/telegram-channel.js

@@ -34028,10 +34028,45 @@ var OAUTH_PROVIDERS = {
       // bill at creation time. Read-only would force a follow-up manual
       // upload in Xero; write closes the loop.
       "accounting.attachments",
-      // accounting.transactions.read → granular read-only replacements
-      // for the surfaces we don't yet need write access on.
-      "accounting.payments.read",
-      "accounting.banktransactions.read",
+      // payments: write (CS-1845) enables `xero.payment.create`, which does
+      // PUT /Payments. These two were `.read` only, described as "surfaces we
+      // don't yet need write access on" — but the xero-broker had ALREADY
+      // registered write verbs against both, so the claim was false when it was
+      // written and the verbs could never succeed. A live approval of AUD
+      // 57,748.35 against INV-0407 was approved by a human and then failed with
+      // Xero `401 {Title: Unauthorized, Detail: AuthorizationUnsuccessful}`,
+      // AFTER the handler's single 401 refresh-retry — which is what rules out
+      // an expired token: a freshly refreshed token still 401s when the GRANT
+      // never carried the scope.
+      //
+      // banktransactions: write for the same reason — `xero.bank_transaction.delete`
+      // is registered and would have failed identically the first time anyone
+      // approved one. It is a DESTRUCTIVE verb, so it was one approval away from
+      // being the more alarming report.
+      //
+      // The variant without `.read` is the read+write granular scope, so the
+      // `.read` entries are gone from THIS list.
+      //
+      // That is not the same as "consent asks for them once" (Obi Wan
+      // `167f3932fcdf` on #6564 corrected an earlier version of this comment,
+      // which claimed it was). The authorize route unions `defaultScopes` with
+      // `listAgentRequiredOAuthScopes` (lib/agent-oauth-scope-deficit.ts, called
+      // from routes/integrations-oauth.ts), and the catalog's `xero:read` defined
+      // scope still lists `accounting.payments.read` and
+      // `accounting.banktransactions.read` in its `oauth_scopes` — so an agent
+      // with xero:read installed requests the `.read` variants alongside these.
+      // Harmless, because write implies read, but do not write comments here that
+      // describe the consent string as though this array were all of it.
+      //
+      // DO NOT substitute the broad `accounting.transactions`: Xero rejects the
+      // manifest for apps created after 2026-03-02 (see the note above).
+      //
+      // RECONNECT REQUIRED, same as `accounting.manualjournals` below: the broker
+      // posts with the agent's own OAuth access_token, so every existing install
+      // keeps failing until it reconnects and re-consents. Shipping this scope is
+      // necessary and NOT sufficient.
+      "accounting.payments",
+      "accounting.banktransactions",
       // manualjournals: write (CS-1439) enables the xero-broker to post
       // manual journals (reclasses, accruals, corrections) on approval. The
       // variant without `.read` is the read+write granular scope. Note: an

package/dist/{persistent-session-QZAKDZIX.js → persistent-session-3IGNGFEX.js}

@@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ import {
   writeDirectChatSessionState,
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
-} from "./chunk-TAWCN7OK.js";
-import "./chunk-UB2HLH5P.js";
+} from "./chunk-OHT4PWAK.js";
+import "./chunk-TXRZFABA.js";
 import "./chunk-TQDIIS3X.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 import "./chunk-EL5MWGGH.js";
@@ -139,4 +139,4 @@ export {
   writeEgressAllowlist,
   writePersistentClaudeWrapper
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-QZAKDZIX.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=persistent-session-3IGNGFEX.js.map

package/dist/{responsiveness-probe-6OG3SYLZ.js → responsiveness-probe-OVMYX6PK.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   paneLogPath
-} from "./chunk-TAWCN7OK.js";
-import "./chunk-UB2HLH5P.js";
+} from "./chunk-OHT4PWAK.js";
+import "./chunk-TXRZFABA.js";
 import "./chunk-TQDIIS3X.js";
 import "./chunk-XWVM4KPK.js";
 import "./chunk-EL5MWGGH.js";
@@ -802,4 +802,4 @@ export {
   readAndResetSlackReplyBindingClassifications,
   readAndResetSlackReplyTargetClassifications
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-6OG3SYLZ.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=responsiveness-probe-OVMYX6PK.js.map

package/dist/{session-auth-dead-EH4N7PWU.js → session-auth-dead-EL5HEEEV.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   sessionTranscriptDir
-} from "./chunk-UB2HLH5P.js";
+} from "./chunk-TXRZFABA.js";
 import "./chunk-DGUM43GV.js";
 
 // src/lib/session-auth-dead.ts
@@ -204,4 +204,4 @@ export {
   decideSessionAuthState,
   probeSessionAuth
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=session-auth-dead-EH4N7PWU.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=session-auth-dead-EL5HEEEV.js.map

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@integrity-labs/agt-cli",
-  "version": "0.28.1039",
+  "version": "0.28.1041",
   "description": "Augmented Team CLI — agent provisioning and management",
   "type": "module",
   "engines": {