@inferencesh/sdk 0.21.0 → 0.22.0

package/dist/types.d.ts

@@ -120,7 +120,17 @@ export interface AgentToolConfig {
 }
 export interface HookToolConfig {
     url: string;
+    /**
+     * Secret is write-only: a new value for the X-Hook-Secret header. On
+     * save it moves into the team's encrypted secret store and SecretRef
+     * names it; a stored config, and every read, has it empty.
+     */
     secret?: string;
+    /**
+     * SecretRef names the stored hook secret. Sending it back unchanged
+     * (with Secret empty) keeps it; leaving both empty removes it.
+     */
+    secret_ref?: string;
     input_schema?: any;
     output_schema?: any;
 }
@@ -162,9 +172,23 @@ export interface HTTPToolConfig {
     url: string;
     method?: string;
     auth?: ToolAuthConfig;
+    /**
+     * Headers are sent with every call. A value is either a reference to a
+     * team secret ("${{secrets.NAME}}"), kept as written, or a literal: on
+     * save a literal moves into the team's encrypted secret store and
+     * HeaderSecretRefs names it, so a stored config and every read carry
+     * the header with an empty value. An empty value whose header has a
+     * ref keeps the stored one.
+     */
     headers?: {
         [key: string]: string;
     };
+    /**
+     * HeaderSecretRefs maps a header name to its stored value.
+     */
+    header_secret_refs?: {
+        [key: string]: string;
+    };
     input_schema?: any;
     output_schema?: any;
 }
@@ -191,7 +215,11 @@ export interface AgentToolConfigDTO {
 }
 export interface HookToolConfigDTO {
     url: string;
+    /**
+     * Secret is always empty on a read; SecretRef says one is stored.
+     */
     secret?: string;
+    secret_ref?: string;
     input_schema?: any;
     output_schema?: any;
 }
@@ -203,9 +231,16 @@ export interface HTTPToolConfigDTO {
     url: string;
     method?: string;
     auth?: ToolAuthConfig;
+    /**
+     * Headers lists every header; a stored (secret) value reads as empty,
+     * and HeaderSecretRefs names it.
+     */
     headers?: {
         [key: string]: string;
     };
+    header_secret_refs?: {
+        [key: string]: string;
+    };
     input_schema?: any;
     output_schema?: any;
 }
@@ -273,18 +308,38 @@ export interface AgentVersionDTO extends BaseModelDTO, PermissionModelDTO {
     permissions?: AgentPermissions;
     hooks?: LifecycleHookConfig[];
     output_schema?: any;
+    /**
+     * VisitorReads is the scope groups of the team's resources (knowledge,
+     * files, artifacts, remotes) a visitor of an embed of this version can
+     * have it read by id, beyond what it configures by name. Set when the
+     * agent is read (get, version get); the value a publication of it
+     * answers. Absent elsewhere (lists, chats).
+     */
+    visitor_reads?: ScopeGroup[];
 }
 /**
  * CreateAgentRequest is the request body for POST /agents
  * For new agents: omit ID, backend generates it
  * For new version of existing agent: include ID
+ * A new agent's namespace is its team's; the body cannot name one.
  */
 export interface CreateAgentRequest {
     id?: string;
     name: string;
     title?: string;
-    namespace?: string;
     images?: AgentImages;
+    visibility?: Visibility;
+    /**
+     * Harness runs the agent: "inference" (ours) or an external harness.
+     */
+    harness?: string;
+    /**
+     * ProfileID and RemoteID place the agent on one of the caller's
+     * machines; ProjectID files it in a project.
+     */
+    profile_id?: string;
+    remote_id?: string;
+    project_id?: string;
     /**
      * Version config (embedded - backend generates version ID, timestamps, etc)
      */
@@ -557,6 +612,49 @@ export interface DeviceAuthPollResponse {
      */
     session_token?: string;
     team_id?: string;
+    /**
+     * AdminUntil is set when an admin elevation request was approved: the
+     * CLI login that asked now carries admin power until then. No
+     * credential comes with it.
+     */
+    admin_until?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * AdminElevateRequest is the body of POST /device/auth/elevate: a platform
+ * admin's CLI login asking to carry admin power for TTLSeconds (default one
+ * hour, at most eight).
+ */
+export interface AdminElevateRequest {
+    ttl_seconds?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * AdminElevateResponse is a pending elevation request: the admin approves
+ * UserCode at ApproveURL in their browser and the CLI polls PollURL.
+ */
+export interface AdminElevateResponse {
+    user_code: string;
+    device_code: string;
+    poll_url: string;
+    approve_url: string;
+    expires_in: number;
+    interval: number;
+    ttl_seconds: number;
+}
+/**
+ * AdminElevationStatus is GET /device/auth/elevate: whether the calling
+ * session carries an admin elevation, and until when.
+ */
+export interface AdminElevationStatus {
+    elevated: boolean;
+    admin_until?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * AdminElevationDropResponse is DELETE /device/auth/elevate. Dropped is
+ * false when the session held no elevation.
+ */
+export interface AdminElevationDropResponse {
+    elevated: boolean;
+    dropped: boolean;
 }
 export interface MeResponse {
     user?: UserDTO;
@@ -585,6 +683,19 @@ export interface MeResponse {
      * POST /teams/{personal_team_id}/complete-setup.
      */
     needs_username: boolean;
+    /**
+     * PlatformPower: the credential carries platform administration
+     * (admin:read): an admin's own browser sign-in that proved their
+     * authenticator, or an elevated CLI login. The admin role alone is not
+     * it.
+     */
+    platform_power: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Scopes is every scope the request's credential holds
+     * (AuthContext.HeldScopes): what a client asks before it calls a route
+     * it may not reach (an API key holds no sign-in-only scope).
+     */
+    scopes: Scope[];
 }
 export interface TeamCreateRequest {
     name: string;
@@ -650,6 +761,12 @@ export interface CredentialConnectRequest {
      * are OAuth permission scopes.
      */
     connection_scope?: CredentialScope;
+    /**
+     * AnotherAccount connects an account next to the ones already
+     * connected: the provider is asked to let the user choose the account
+     * rather than reuse the one it remembers.
+     */
+    another_account?: boolean;
 }
 /**
  * CredentialCompleteOAuthRequest is what the provider's redirect delivered:
@@ -746,7 +863,7 @@ export interface EstimateCostResponse {
 /**
  * Scope represents an API key permission scope string.
  */
-export type Scope = "*" | "agents" | "apps" | "conversations" | "files" | "datastores" | "templates" | "flows" | "projects" | "teams" | "billing" | "artifacts" | "agents:read" | "agents:write" | "agents:execute" | "apps:read" | "apps:write" | "apps:execute" | "conversations:read" | "conversations:write" | "files:read" | "files:write" | "datastores:read" | "datastores:write" | "flows:read" | "flows:write" | "flows:execute" | "projects:read" | "projects:write" | "teams:read" | "teams:write" | "billing:read" | "billing:write" | "secrets:read" | "secrets:write" | "credentials:read" | "credentials:write" | "engines:read" | "engines:write" | "remotes:read" | "remotes:write" | "apikeys:read" | "apikeys:write" | "knowledge:read" | "knowledge:write" | "artifacts:read" | "artifacts:write" | "user:read" | "user:write" | "settings:read" | "settings:write";
+export type Scope = "*" | "agents" | "apps" | "conversations" | "files" | "datastores" | "templates" | "flows" | "projects" | "teams" | "billing" | "artifacts" | "agents:read" | "agents:write" | "agents:execute" | "apps:read" | "apps:write" | "apps:execute" | "conversations:read" | "conversations:write" | "files:read" | "files:write" | "datastores:read" | "datastores:write" | "flows:read" | "flows:write" | "flows:execute" | "projects:read" | "projects:write" | "teams:read" | "teams:write" | "billing:read" | "billing:write" | "secrets:read" | "secrets:write" | "secrets:reveal" | "credentials:read" | "credentials:write" | "engines:read" | "engines:write" | "remotes:read" | "remotes:write" | "apikeys:read" | "apikeys:write" | "knowledge:read" | "knowledge:write" | "artifacts:read" | "artifacts:write" | "user:read" | "user:write" | "settings:read" | "settings:write" | "approvals:write" | "admin:read" | "admin:write" | "admin:pricing";
 /**
  * API Key Scopes - hierarchical permission system.
  * Resource-level scopes (e.g., "agents") imply all action-level scopes (e.g., "agents:read").
@@ -935,6 +1052,12 @@ export declare const ScopeSecretsRead: Scope;
  * Empty scopes = full access (for backwards compatibility with existing keys).
  */
 export declare const ScopeSecretsWrite: Scope;
+/**
+ * ScopeSecretsReveal reads a secret's plaintext value. A key holding
+ * secrets:read holds it too (keys revealed with secrets:read before it
+ * existed); an app's OAuth token or a bound session never does.
+ */
+export declare const ScopeSecretsReveal: Scope;
 /**
  * Action-level scopes for credentials (connected accounts, vaults,
  * auth schemes, MCP servers).
@@ -1016,10 +1139,36 @@ export declare const ScopeSettingsRead: Scope;
  * Empty scopes = full access (for backwards compatibility with existing keys).
  */
 export declare const ScopeSettingsWrite: Scope;
+/**
+ * Approvals: answering a human-in-the-loop question (a tool approval, a
+ * gate, a widget or MCP input request, always-allow) and widening a
+ * chat's approval policy (allow every tool, skip hooks, allow rules).
+ * Held only by the account holder's own sign-in.
+ */
+export declare const ScopeApprovalsWrite: Scope;
+/**
+ * ScopeAdminRead views platform administration (/admin GET). Held
+ * only by an admin's own sign-in; the route's admin gate decides
+ * whether it carries power.
+ */
+export declare const ScopeAdminRead: Scope;
+/**
+ * ScopeAdminWrite changes platform administration (/admin). Held only
+ * by an admin's own sign-in.
+ */
+export declare const ScopeAdminWrite: Scope;
+/**
+ * ScopeAdminPricing reads and changes store pricing: a version's
+ * terms, its draft pricing (edit, evaluate, discard, publish, apply to
+ * the listing) and the sample tasks drafts are evaluated against. Held
+ * by an admin's own sign-in with platform power, and by a key of the
+ * platform's automation account (ScopeDefinition.Automation).
+ */
+export declare const ScopeAdminPricing: Scope;
 /**
  * ScopeGroup identifies a category of scopes for UI grouping
  */
-export type ScopeGroup = "agents" | "apps" | "conversations" | "files" | "datastores" | "flows" | "projects" | "teams" | "billing" | "secrets" | "credentials" | "engines" | "remotes" | "apikeys" | "knowledge" | "artifacts" | "user" | "settings";
+export type ScopeGroup = "agents" | "apps" | "conversations" | "files" | "datastores" | "flows" | "projects" | "teams" | "billing" | "secrets" | "credentials" | "engines" | "remotes" | "apikeys" | "knowledge" | "artifacts" | "user" | "settings" | "approvals" | "admin";
 export declare const ScopeGroupAgents: ScopeGroup;
 export declare const ScopeGroupApps: ScopeGroup;
 export declare const ScopeGroupConversations: ScopeGroup;
@@ -1038,6 +1187,8 @@ export declare const ScopeGroupKnowledge: ScopeGroup;
 export declare const ScopeGroupArtifacts: ScopeGroup;
 export declare const ScopeGroupUser: ScopeGroup;
 export declare const ScopeGroupSettings: ScopeGroup;
+export declare const ScopeGroupApprovals: ScopeGroup;
+export declare const ScopeGroupAdmin: ScopeGroup;
 /**
  * ScopeDefinition describes a single scope for UI rendering
  */
@@ -1046,6 +1197,30 @@ export interface ScopeDefinition {
     label: string;
     description: string;
     group: ScopeGroup;
+    /**
+     * SignInOnly: only the account holder's own sign-in (browser session,
+     * CLI login) holds it. No API key, workspace key, OAuth token, bound or
+     * grant session can be granted it or pass a check for it.
+     */
+    sign_in_only?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * NotForApps: an app's OAuth token, a bound session or a grant never
+     * holds it, whatever it was granted; the person's sign-in and API keys
+     * may.
+     */
+    not_for_apps?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * CostsCredits: using the scope spends the account's credits (running
+     * apps, agents, flows).
+     */
+    costs_credits?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Automation: a narrow platform-administration scope that a workspace
+     * key of the platform's automation account (the system team's service
+     * account) may hold, minted by an admin with platform power and always
+     * expiring. Every other key, token and app holds no admin scope.
+     */
+    automation?: boolean;
 }
 /**
  * ScopeGroupDefinition describes a group of scopes for UI rendering
@@ -1054,6 +1229,17 @@ export interface ScopeGroupDefinition {
     id: ScopeGroup;
     label: string;
     description: string;
+    /**
+     * PublicRows: the resource's rows can be public, so a credential
+     * without its read scope still reads what a signed-out caller reads
+     * (its public rows) instead of being refused.
+     */
+    public_rows?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * StaffOnly: the group's scopes are offered (GET /scopes) only to staff
+     * holding platform power: the platform's own engines.
+     */
+    staff_only?: boolean;
 }
 /**
  * ScopesResponse is the API response for GET /scopes
@@ -1062,6 +1248,20 @@ export interface ScopesResponse {
     scopes: ScopeDefinition[];
     groups: ScopeGroupDefinition[];
     presets: ScopePreset[];
+    /**
+     * AccountScopes are the account holder's own scopes (approvals,
+     * profile and sessions, keys, billing writes) a sign-in may be approved
+     * for: the device approval page offers them as their own section. No
+     * key or app is ever granted one.
+     */
+    account_scopes: ScopeDefinition[];
+    /**
+     * LoginPreset is what the device approval page preselects for
+     * `belt login`: the standard preset plus approvals:write (answering
+     * the person's own approvals from the CLI). Its Grants is what such a
+     * login holds (LoginGrants).
+     */
+    login_preset: ScopePreset;
 }
 /**
  * ScopePreset represents a predefined bundle of scopes for common use cases
@@ -1073,6 +1273,17 @@ export interface ScopePreset {
     scopes: Scope[];
     summary?: string[];
     hidden?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Default: the preset a new key or app grant starts from.
+     */
+    default?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Grants is every action scope the preset's key holds (Scopes expanded:
+     * a resource scope's actions, the read a write implies, secrets:reveal
+     * with secrets:read; never a sign-in-only scope), so a client compares a
+     * key against it without re-deriving the rule (ApiKeyDTO.Grants).
+     */
+    grants?: Scope[];
 }
 /**
  * ApiKeyDTO for API responses
@@ -1086,6 +1297,12 @@ export interface ApiKeyDTO extends BaseModelDTO, PermissionModelDTO {
     last_used_at?: string;
     expires_at?: string;
     scopes: Scope[];
+    /**
+     * Grants is every action scope the key holds: Scopes expanded the way a
+     * request with the key is checked (models.KeyGrants), every key scope
+     * for a key created without any.
+     */
+    grants: Scope[];
     source?: string;
     /**
      * Scope is who the key acts as: its creator (user) or the workspace.
@@ -1255,6 +1472,30 @@ export interface AppDTO extends BaseModelDTO, PermissionModelDTO {
 export interface AppUIRef {
     artifact: string;
 }
+/**
+ * AppSandbox is what an app version's container may do beyond the engine's
+ * default hardening, as its package's inf.yml declares it:
+ * 	sandbox:
+ * 	  host_network: true          # share the host's network namespace
+ * 	  capabilities: [SYS_PTRACE]  # Linux capabilities the app's processes keep
+ * The API reads it from the package when the version is deployed and stores
+ * it on the version (server-owned: no caller writes it). Engines enforce the
+ * copy the task dispatch carries, and store review shows it. The empty value
+ * declares no exception.
+ */
+export interface AppSandbox {
+    /**
+     * HostNetwork runs the container on the host's network: it reaches the
+     * host's services and the cloud metadata service.
+     */
+    host_network?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Capabilities are Linux capability names without the CAP_ prefix, in
+     * upper case. The container is given them and the app's processes keep
+     * them.
+     */
+    capabilities?: string[];
+}
 /**
  * AppVersionDTO is the API response for an app version.
  */
@@ -1283,6 +1524,12 @@ export interface AppVersionDTO extends BaseModelDTO {
     required_secrets?: SecretRequirement[];
     required_credentials?: CredentialRequirement[];
     resources: AppResources;
+    /**
+     * Sandbox is the version's declared sandbox exceptions. Absent on a
+     * version deployed before the API recorded them (engines then read the
+     * package's inf.yml) and on a version with no package (a flow app).
+     */
+    sandbox?: AppSandbox;
     checksum?: string;
 }
 /**
@@ -2029,6 +2276,40 @@ export interface AlwaysAllowOptionsDTO {
      * own rules, or no chat rule could allow this call.
      */
     unavailable?: string;
+    /**
+     * SecretSend is set when the call is an agent of another team sending
+     * the runner's own secrets: what it sends and where. Approving the call
+     * sends them; the prompt names them.
+     */
+    secret_send?: SecretSendDTO;
+}
+/**
+ * SecretSendDTO is an agent of another team asking to send the runner's
+ * secrets with a call: "alice/helper wants to send OPENAI_API_KEY to
+ * alice.example". It rides on the call's approval interrupt (meta
+ * secret_send) and on its always-allow options.
+ */
+export interface SecretSendDTO {
+    /**
+     * Agent is the agent as people know it (namespace/name); AgentID is
+     * its id.
+     */
+    agent: string;
+    agent_id: string;
+    /**
+     * AgentVersionID is the agent version making the call: approving the
+     * prompt approves this version's send only.
+     */
+    agent_version_id: string;
+    /**
+     * Host is where the call sends them.
+     */
+    host: string;
+    /**
+     * Secrets are the runner's secrets the call sends, by name: secret
+     * keys (OPENAI_API_KEY) and logins (credential:github).
+     */
+    secrets: string[];
 }
 /**
  * AlwaysAllowRequest is POST /chats/{id}/tools/{toolId}/always-allow. The
@@ -2109,6 +2390,12 @@ export interface CredentialDTO extends BaseModelDTO, PermissionModelDTO {
     status: CredentialStatus;
     display_name: string;
     icon_url?: string;
+    /**
+     * AccountID is the provider's own, unchanging id for the account; what
+     * an account is named by when choosing one. AccountIdentifier is its
+     * label (an email, an @handle).
+     */
+    account_id?: string;
     account_identifier?: string;
     account_name?: string;
     scopes: StringSlice;
@@ -2155,7 +2442,17 @@ export interface CredentialConfigDTO {
      * itself (models.AuthScheme), so the UI can offer edit and remove.
      */
     auth_scheme_id?: string;
+    /**
+     * Credential is the login used where no account is named: the caller's
+     * own, else the workspace's default account.
+     */
     credential?: CredentialDTO;
+    /**
+     * Accounts is every login to this provider the caller can use, in that
+     * order (Credential first). More than one when several accounts are
+     * connected.
+     */
+    accounts?: (CredentialDTO | undefined)[];
 }
 /**
  * SecretFieldConfig defines a secret field for the UI
@@ -2439,7 +2736,7 @@ export interface DecideEntitlementRequestRequest {
  * and APIError.Code on the legacy envelope. Clients branch on these, so a
  * code is a named const here, where it generates into models and the SDKs.
  */
-export type ErrorCode = "invalid_request" | "validation_error" | "unauthorized" | "forbidden" | "not_found" | "conflict" | "name_conflict" | "already_exists" | "not_configured" | "method_not_allowed" | "rate_limited" | "internal_error" | "team_role_required" | "blocked_by_usage_policy" | "last_owner" | "account_deactivated" | "account_banned" | "person_required" | "otp_required" | "impersonation_reason_required" | "mcp_auth_expired" | "limit_exceeded" | "feature_not_available" | "entitlement_unavailable" | "payment_required" | "payment_method_required" | "form_closed" | "already_submitted" | "already_claimed" | "already_entitled" | "request_open" | "agents_disabled" | "remote_offline" | "remote_timeout" | "harness_not_drivable" | "harness_too_old";
+export type ErrorCode = "invalid_request" | "validation_error" | "unauthorized" | "forbidden" | "not_found" | "conflict" | "name_conflict" | "already_exists" | "not_configured" | "method_not_allowed" | "rate_limited" | "internal_error" | "team_role_required" | "blocked_by_usage_policy" | "last_owner" | "account_deactivated" | "account_banned" | "person_required" | "otp_required" | "requires_sign_in" | "insufficient_scope" | "impersonation_reason_required" | "mcp_auth_expired" | "admin_session_required" | "admin_scopes_not_approved" | "cli_session_required" | "admin_required" | "same_admin_required" | "browser_session_required" | "invalid_ttl" | "admin_authenticator_required" | "limit_exceeded" | "feature_not_available" | "entitlement_unavailable" | "payment_required" | "payment_method_required" | "form_closed" | "already_submitted" | "already_claimed" | "already_entitled" | "request_open" | "invalid_code" | "already_processed" | "expired" | "app_retired" | "app_maintenance" | "invalid_transition" | "SESSION_NOT_FOUND" | "SESSION_EXPIRED" | "SESSION_ENDED" | "WORKER_LEASED" | "APP_MISMATCH" | "VERSION_MISMATCH" | "agents_disabled" | "remote_offline" | "remote_timeout" | "harness_not_drivable" | "harness_too_old";
 export declare const ErrorCodeInvalidRequest: ErrorCode;
 export declare const ErrorCodeValidationError: ErrorCode;
 export declare const ErrorCodeUnauthorized: ErrorCode;
@@ -2483,6 +2780,21 @@ export declare const ErrorCodeAccountBanned: ErrorCode;
  */
 export declare const ErrorCodePersonRequired: ErrorCode;
 export declare const ErrorCodeOTPRequired: ErrorCode;
+/**
+ * ErrorCodeRequiresSignIn (403): the action needs a scope only the
+ * account holder's own sign-in holds (answering an approval, widening a
+ * chat's approval policy, the account, API keys, billing changes,
+ * admin), and the request carried an API key, an app's OAuth token or
+ * another delegated credential. Sign in on the web app or with `belt
+ * login` to do it.
+ */
+export declare const ErrorCodeRequiresSignIn: ErrorCode;
+/**
+ * ErrorCodeInsufficientScope (403): the credential does not hold the
+ * scope the operation takes (an API key, an app's OAuth token or a
+ * narrowed login granted less). The detail names the scope.
+ */
+export declare const ErrorCodeInsufficientScope: ErrorCode;
 /**
  * ErrorCodeImpersonationReasonRequired (403): a platform admin named a
  * team they are not a member of without a live impersonation grant.
@@ -2490,6 +2802,37 @@ export declare const ErrorCodeOTPRequired: ErrorCode;
  */
 export declare const ErrorCodeImpersonationReasonRequired: ErrorCode;
 export declare const ErrorCodeMCPAuthExpired: ErrorCode;
+/**
+ * Admin elevation ("belt admin elevate"). AdminSessionRequired (403): a
+ * platform admin's credential that carries no admin power reached an
+ * admin route; a CLI login gets it by elevating. CLISessionRequired
+ * (403): only a CLI login may ask to be elevated. AdminRequired (403):
+ * only a platform admin may ask for or grant one. SameAdminRequired
+ * (403): the elevation was asked for by another account.
+ * BrowserSessionRequired (403): only the admin's own browser sign-in
+ * grants one, and only the person's own browser sign-in changes how the
+ * account is signed into (authenticator enrollment, RequireBrowserSession).
+ * InvalidTTL (400): the elevation asked for a window outside
+ * models.AdminElevationMinTTL..AdminElevationMaxTTL.
+ * AdminScopesNotApproved (403): a platform admin's CLI login was approved
+ * with a scope list that does not name the admin scopes, so it can't be
+ * elevated: log in again approving them, then elevate.
+ */
+export declare const ErrorCodeAdminSessionRequired: ErrorCode;
+export declare const ErrorCodeAdminScopesNotApproved: ErrorCode;
+export declare const ErrorCodeCLISessionRequired: ErrorCode;
+export declare const ErrorCodeAdminRequired: ErrorCode;
+export declare const ErrorCodeSameAdminRequired: ErrorCode;
+export declare const ErrorCodeBrowserSessionRequired: ErrorCode;
+export declare const ErrorCodeInvalidTTL: ErrorCode;
+/**
+ * AdminAuthenticatorRequired (403): a platform admin without an
+ * authenticator app (TOTP) enrolled. Admin power needs one; until it is
+ * enrolled (POST /auth/totp/enroll, then /auth/totp/confirm) the admin
+ * works as an ordinary member. An admin who has one but whose session
+ * has not proved it gets otp_required instead: re-authenticate with it.
+ */
+export declare const ErrorCodeAdminAuthenticatorRequired: ErrorCode;
 /**
  * Entitlements. LimitExceeded (402) and FeatureNotAvailable (403) carry
  * EntitlementErrorMeta. EntitlementUnavailable (500) means the plan could
@@ -2522,6 +2865,32 @@ export declare const ErrorCodeAlreadyClaimed: ErrorCode;
  */
 export declare const ErrorCodeAlreadyEntitled: ErrorCode;
 export declare const ErrorCodeRequestOpen: ErrorCode;
+/**
+ * Authorization codes (device sign-in, admin elevation) (400): the code
+ * is unknown, already approved or denied, or past its expiry.
+ */
+export declare const ErrorCodeInvalidCode: ErrorCode;
+export declare const ErrorCodeAlreadyProcessed: ErrorCode;
+export declare const ErrorCodeExpired: ErrorCode;
+/**
+ * Run-time refusals. AppRetired (410): the app no longer runs.
+ * AppMaintenance (503, Retry-After): the owner paused it; the message is
+ * theirs. InvalidTransition (409): the task already moved on.
+ */
+export declare const ErrorCodeAppRetired: ErrorCode;
+export declare const ErrorCodeAppMaintenance: ErrorCode;
+export declare const ErrorCodeInvalidTransition: ErrorCode;
+/**
+ * Session-bound runs. SessionNotFound (404), SessionExpired and
+ * SessionEnded (410), WorkerLeased, AppMismatch and VersionMismatch
+ * (409). The SDKs match these upper-case strings.
+ */
+export declare const ErrorCodeSessionNotFound: ErrorCode;
+export declare const ErrorCodeSessionExpired: ErrorCode;
+export declare const ErrorCodeSessionEnded: ErrorCode;
+export declare const ErrorCodeWorkerLeased: ErrorCode;
+export declare const ErrorCodeAppMismatch: ErrorCode;
+export declare const ErrorCodeVersionMismatch: ErrorCode;
 /**
  * Remote harness refusals.
  */
@@ -2542,6 +2911,14 @@ export interface TeamRoleRequiredMeta {
     required_role?: TeamRole;
     requires_org_admin?: boolean;
 }
+/**
+ * ScopeRefusedMeta is the meta of an insufficient_scope or
+ * requires_sign_in error: the scope the operation declares and the
+ * credential does not hold. The detail says what would hold it.
+ */
+export interface ScopeRefusedMeta {
+    required_scope: Scope;
+}
 /**
  * PaymentMethodRequiredMeta is the meta of a payment_method_required error.
  */
@@ -4017,12 +4394,23 @@ export interface CheckRequirementsResponse {
 export interface ResourceShareDTO extends BaseModelDTO {
     resource_id: string;
     resource_type: string;
+    /**
+     * UserID names the person a share is to; TeamID, with UserID empty,
+     * the resource's whole team.
+     */
     user_id: string;
+    team_id?: string;
     user?: UserRelationDTO;
     permission: Permission;
 }
+/**
+ * ShareRequest is POST /{resource}/{id}/share: a share to one person
+ * (user_id) or to the resource's whole team (team: true), at a permission
+ * (read when empty).
+ */
 export interface ShareRequest {
-    user_id: string;
+    user_id?: string;
+    team?: boolean;
     permission: Permission;
 }
 /**
@@ -4495,10 +4883,34 @@ export interface TelemetryReportDTO extends BaseModelDTO, PermissionModelDTO {
         [key: string]: any;
     };
 }
+/**
+ * SubmitTelemetryRequest is the CLI's diagnostics report for an account the
+ * abuse redlist flags. Payload is the host report (platform, locale,
+ * network); Device carries the identifiers that recognise the same machine
+ * across accounts. The API stores Device's hashes for matching and its
+ * readable names encrypted, apart from the payload.
+ */
 export interface SubmitTelemetryRequest {
     payload: {
         [key: string]: any;
     };
+    device?: DeviceEvidence;
+}
+/**
+ * DeviceEvidence is what a flagged account's CLI sends about its machine:
+ * salted hashes of the hostname, OS user, git user.name, MAC addresses and
+ * SSH key fingerprints, and the hostname, OS user and git user.name readable.
+ */
+export interface DeviceEvidence {
+    scheme: string;
+    hostname_hash?: string;
+    username_hash?: string;
+    git_user_name_hash?: string;
+    mac_hashes?: string[];
+    ssh_key_fingerprint_hashes?: string[];
+    hostname?: string;
+    username?: string;
+    git_user_name?: string;
 }
 /**
  * ToolInvocationFunction contains the function details for a tool invocation
@@ -6073,7 +6485,7 @@ export declare const PolicyEnforcementDisabled: PolicyEnforcement;
 /**
  * PolicyKind names what a rule governs; each kind has one matcher.
  */
-export type PolicyKind = "RemoteExec" | "Workspace" | "Harness" | "Tool" | "App" | "Agent" | "Knowledge" | "Mcp" | "Flow" | "WebFetch";
+export type PolicyKind = "RemoteExec" | "Workspace" | "Harness" | "Tool" | "App" | "Agent" | "Knowledge" | "Mcp" | "Flow" | "WebFetch" | "SecretSend";
 /**
  * PolicyKindRemoteExec: shell commands run on a remote.
  */
@@ -6103,6 +6515,11 @@ export declare const PolicyKindFlow: PolicyKind;
  * PolicyKindWebFetch: fetched domains.
  */
 export declare const PolicyKindWebFetch: PolicyKind;
+/**
+ * PolicyKindSecretSend: an agent of another team sending the runner's
+ * secrets to a host.
+ */
+export declare const PolicyKindSecretSend: PolicyKind;
 /**
  * FunctionKind is how an app function talks to its caller.
  */