@indigoai-us/hq-cli 5.75.0 → 5.76.0

package/dist/commands/mcp-registration.d.ts

@@ -429,11 +429,10 @@ export interface McpManifest {
 /**
  * Resolve a `${secret:NAME}` reference to its plaintext value, or return `null`
  * when the secret is unavailable (un-minted / TTL-expired / no company context).
- * Production binds this to `secrets-cache.ts` (`readCache(companyUid, NAME)`,
- * AES-256-GCM, 0600, 5-min TTL); TESTS inject a pure map so they NEVER read the
- * real encrypted cache. Returning `null` for a referenced secret is a hard error
- * at emit (we refuse to write a broken header), distinct from a name with no
- * reference at all.
+ * Production binds this to an in-memory map populated by a fresh vault `/load`
+ * authorization response; tests inject a pure map. Returning `null` for a
+ * referenced secret is a hard error at emit (we refuse to write a broken
+ * header), distinct from a name with no reference at all.
  */
 export type SecretResolver = (name: string) => string | null;
 /** True iff `value` contains at least one `${secret:NAME}` reference. */

package/dist/commands/mcp-registration.js

@@ -848,7 +848,8 @@ function restoreSafely(realTarget, backupDir) {
 //
 // SECRET SAFETY (the hard rule from the PRD authModel / US-002 AC):
 //   - `${secret:NAME}` resolves ONLY here, at emit, via the injected
-//     {@link SecretResolver} (production = the AES-256-GCM `secrets-cache.ts`).
+//     {@link SecretResolver}. Production injects values returned by a fresh
+//     server authorization; the encrypted disk cache is never a value fallback.
 //   - The RESOLVED value lands in `~/.claude.json` — a 0600 user-global file that
 //     is NOT synced/committed — because the runtime needs the real header to work.
 //   - The resolved value is REDACTED from every return value and never echoed; we
@@ -885,9 +886,9 @@ export function resolveSecretRefs(value, resolve, secretSink) {
     return value.replace(SECRET_REF_RE, (_match, name) => {
         const resolved = resolve(name);
         if (resolved === null || resolved === undefined) {
-            throw new McpManifestError(`cannot resolve \${secret:${name}} at emit — the secret is not in the cache ` +
-                '(mint it via the pack onboarding / `hq run`, then re-install). HQ refuses to ' +
-                'write a half-resolved header.');
+            throw new McpManifestError(`cannot resolve \${secret:${name}} at emit — the secret was not available ` +
+                'after online vault authorization (check login, company scope, and access, ' +
+                'then re-install). HQ refuses to write a half-resolved header.');
         }
         if (resolved.length > 0)
             secretSink.add(resolved);

package/dist/commands/outposts.d.ts

@@ -23,13 +23,27 @@
 import { Command } from "commander";
 import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
 import { type BillingErrorPayload } from "../utils/billing-gate.js";
+/**
+ * hq-pro's per-person cap envelope on a `409` provision block. Unlike every
+ * other `/outpost/*` failure this body carries NO `message`/`error` field —
+ * only the cap facts — so it has to be decoded structurally or the reason
+ * degrades to a bare `res.statusText` ("Conflict").
+ */
+export interface OutpostCappedPayload {
+    limit: number;
+    outposts: OutpostSummary[];
+}
+/** Decode hq-pro's `{ capped, limit, outposts }` cap envelope, if present. */
+export declare function parseCappedPayload(body: unknown): OutpostCappedPayload | undefined;
 /** A non-2xx from the `/outpost/*` control plane. Carries status + `step`. */
 export declare class OutpostHttpError extends Error {
     status: number;
     step?: string;
     /** hq-pro's billing envelope on a `402 billing_required` provision block. */
     billing?: BillingErrorPayload;
-    constructor(status: number, message: string, step?: string, billing?: BillingErrorPayload);
+    /** hq-pro's cap envelope on a `409` provision block. */
+    capped?: OutpostCappedPayload;
+    constructor(status: number, message: string, step?: string, billing?: BillingErrorPayload, capped?: OutpostCappedPayload);
 }
 /** Row summary from `GET /outpost/list`. */
 export interface OutpostSummary {
@@ -59,9 +73,11 @@ export declare function outpostRequest<T>(opts: {
 /**
  * Provision the caller's Outpost. Sends the cached Cognito refresh token so the
  * box can authenticate AS the caller (the same body the console's
- * `provisionMyOutpost` sends). Idempotent server-side: a caller already at their
- * per-person cap gets their existing box back rather than a duplicate. The
- * refresh token is sent over HTTPS and NEVER printed.
+ * `provisionMyOutpost` sends). No duplicate is ever created: a caller already at
+ * their per-person cap gets a `409` whose body lists their existing boxes —
+ * thrown here as an `OutpostHttpError` carrying `capped` (hq-pro checks the cap
+ * BEFORE activation billing, so a capped call is never charged). The refresh
+ * token is sent over HTTPS and NEVER printed.
  */
 export declare function provisionOutpost(token: string, input: {
     refreshToken: string;

package/dist/commands/outposts.js

@@ -32,18 +32,33 @@ import { loadCachedTokens } from "@indigoai-us/hq-cloud";
 import { ensureCognitoToken } from "../utils/cognito-session.js";
 import { vaultApiFetch } from "../utils/vault-api.js";
 import { OUTPOST_PRICE_CENTS, confirmChargeOrExit, parseBillingPayload, surfaceBillingRequired, } from "../utils/billing-gate.js";
+/** Decode hq-pro's `{ capped, limit, outposts }` cap envelope, if present. */
+export function parseCappedPayload(body) {
+    if (!body || typeof body !== "object")
+        return undefined;
+    const b = body;
+    if (b.capped !== true)
+        return undefined;
+    return {
+        limit: typeof b.limit === "number" ? b.limit : 0,
+        outposts: Array.isArray(b.outposts) ? b.outposts : [],
+    };
+}
 /** A non-2xx from the `/outpost/*` control plane. Carries status + `step`. */
 export class OutpostHttpError extends Error {
     status;
     step;
     /** hq-pro's billing envelope on a `402 billing_required` provision block. */
     billing;
-    constructor(status, message, step, billing) {
+    /** hq-pro's cap envelope on a `409` provision block. */
+    capped;
+    constructor(status, message, step, billing, capped) {
         super(message);
         this.name = "OutpostHttpError";
         this.status = status;
         this.step = step;
         this.billing = billing;
+        this.capped = capped;
     }
 }
 /**
@@ -62,16 +77,18 @@ export async function outpostRequest(opts) {
             : typeof body.error === "string"
                 ? body.error
                 : res.statusText;
-        throw new OutpostHttpError(res.status, message, body.step, parseBillingPayload(body));
+        throw new OutpostHttpError(res.status, message, body.step, parseBillingPayload(body), parseCappedPayload(body));
     }
     return (await res.json());
 }
 /**
  * Provision the caller's Outpost. Sends the cached Cognito refresh token so the
  * box can authenticate AS the caller (the same body the console's
- * `provisionMyOutpost` sends). Idempotent server-side: a caller already at their
- * per-person cap gets their existing box back rather than a duplicate. The
- * refresh token is sent over HTTPS and NEVER printed.
+ * `provisionMyOutpost` sends). No duplicate is ever created: a caller already at
+ * their per-person cap gets a `409` whose body lists their existing boxes —
+ * thrown here as an `OutpostHttpError` carrying `capped` (hq-pro checks the cap
+ * BEFORE activation billing, so a capped call is never charged). The refresh
+ * token is sent over HTTPS and NEVER printed.
  */
 export async function provisionOutpost(token, input) {
     return outpostRequest({
@@ -300,6 +317,24 @@ function ensureTrailingNewline(s) {
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Command registration
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * Explain a `409` per-person cap. hq-pro checks the cap BEFORE activation
+ * billing, so nothing was charged — worth saying, since the caller just
+ * confirmed a recurring charge to get here.
+ */
+function surfaceOutpostCapped(capped) {
+    const owned = capped.outposts.length;
+    console.error(chalk.yellow(`You're already at your Outpost limit (${owned} of ${capped.limit}). ` +
+        `No new box was provisioned and you have not been charged.`));
+    for (const o of capped.outposts) {
+        const detail = [o.state, o.instanceName, o.region]
+            .filter(Boolean)
+            .join("  ");
+        console.error(`  ${o.outpostId}  ${detail}`);
+    }
+    console.error(chalk.dim("Inspect it: hq outposts status"));
+    console.error(chalk.dim("Or tear it down first: hq outposts destroy --id <id> --yes"));
+}
 function fail(err) {
     if (err instanceof OutpostHttpError) {
         console.error(chalk.red(err.message));
@@ -615,7 +650,17 @@ function authGitHubViaVault(deps) {
         "unset GITHUB_TOKEN",
         'printf "%s" "$TOKEN" | gh auth login --with-token',
     ].join("\n");
-    const authed = runBestEffort(deps, "hq", ["secrets", "--personal", "exec", "--only", "GITHUB_TOKEN", "--", "bash", "-c", ghLogin], "GitHub auth via vault");
+    const authed = runBestEffort(deps, "hq", [
+        "secrets",
+        "--personal",
+        "exec",
+        "--only",
+        "GITHUB_TOKEN",
+        "--",
+        "bash",
+        "-c",
+        ghLogin,
+    ], "GitHub auth via vault");
     if (authed) {
         // Let plain `git clone https://github.com/...` reuse gh's token so private
         // repos don't prompt for a username/password.
@@ -670,7 +715,15 @@ async function replicaSyncOutpost(opts, deps) {
         console.warn("replica-sync: auth refresh failed — skipping this cycle (token likely expired).");
         return;
     }
-    runBestEffort(deps, "hq", ["sync", "pull", "--personal", "--hq-root", hqRoot, "--on-conflict", "keep"], "personal vault pull");
+    runBestEffort(deps, "hq", [
+        "sync",
+        "pull",
+        "--personal",
+        "--hq-root",
+        hqRoot,
+        "--on-conflict",
+        "keep",
+    ], "personal vault pull");
     // rescue lays down the core kernel and expects companies/ to exist.
     deps.mkdirp(path.join(hqRoot, "companies"));
     runBestEffort(deps, "hq", ["rescue", "--hq-root", hqRoot, "--yes"], "HQ kernel rescue");
@@ -722,9 +775,17 @@ export function registerOutpostsCommand(program, selfDeployOverrides = {}) {
         .option("--yes", "Confirm the $80/month charge (required to provision)")
         .action(async function (opts) {
         try {
+            // Reject an unrecognized runtime rather than resolving it to claude:
+            // `--runtime codx` would otherwise hand back a silently Claude box.
+            if (opts.runtime !== undefined &&
+                opts.runtime !== "claude" &&
+                opts.runtime !== "codex") {
+                console.error(chalk.red(`Invalid --runtime '${opts.runtime}': must be 'claude' or 'codex'.`));
+                process.exit(1);
+            }
             const agentRuntime = opts.runtime === "codex"
                 ? "codex"
-                : opts.runtime
+                : opts.runtime === "claude"
                     ? "claude"
                     : undefined;
             let diskSizeGb;
@@ -767,6 +828,14 @@ export function registerOutpostsCommand(program, selfDeployOverrides = {}) {
                     await surfaceBillingRequired(token, err.billing);
                     process.exit(1);
                 }
+                // Already at the per-person cap → say so and name the box they own,
+                // not a bare "Conflict".
+                if (err instanceof OutpostHttpError &&
+                    err.status === 409 &&
+                    err.capped) {
+                    surfaceOutpostCapped(err.capped);
+                    process.exit(1);
+                }
                 throw err;
             }
         }

package/dist/commands/pack-install.d.ts

@@ -305,26 +305,21 @@ export declare function renderMcpServerLine(payloadDir: string, item: string): s
  */
 export declare function confirmMcp(pkg: PackManifest, payloadDir: string, allowMcp: boolean): Promise<boolean>;
 /**
- * Build the install-time {@link SecretResolver} bound to the HQ vault's local
- * secrets-cache (`~/.hq/secrets-cache/<scope>/<NAME>`, AES-256-GCM, 0600, TTL'd).
+ * Build an install-time {@link SecretResolver} from a fresh server authorization
+ * decision. The encrypted cache may identify one unambiguous scope, but its
+ * plaintext is never trusted or read to register an MCP server.
  *
- * Active-company resolution at install time is INDIRECT by design: `hq install`
- * has no `--company` flag and runs OFFLINE (no token), so we cannot resolve a
- * single active company UID the way `hq run` / `hq secrets` do (via
- * `getEntityUid` over the network). Instead we probe EVERY cached scope
- * (`cmp_*`/`prs_*` — whichever has minted secrets locally) for the requested
- * name and return the first hit. This naturally resolves to whichever company
- * context just provisioned the secret (e.g. the one `/connect-shopify` minted
- * `VYG_API_KEY` under), without guessing, and works whether the vault scoped the
- * key under a company or person entity.
+ * With `--company`, the caller-selected company is resolved normally. Without
+ * it, exactly one cache scope may identify the intended company/person context;
+ * multiple scopes are ambiguous and fail closed. The requested names are then
+ * loaded through the same server-authorized endpoint as exec/env/run. Offline,
+ * expired-session, forbidden, not-found, script-lock, and malformed-response
+ * outcomes all produce an empty resolver, so MCP registration is deferred.
  *
- * On MISS across all scopes (no cache, expired TTL, or key never minted) it
- * returns `null` — which is exactly what {@link registerMcpServers}'s
- * unresolvable-secret path keys off to defer that server gracefully. With no
- * cached scopes at all (`listSecretCacheScopes()` → `[]`) it simply returns
- * `null` for every name, the desired graceful-deferral behavior.
+ * The returned synchronous resolver contains only values from that fresh
+ * authorization response. No cached value is a fallback.
  */
-export declare function makeInstallSecretResolver(): SecretResolver;
+export declare function makeInstallSecretResolver(secretNames: string[], company?: string): Promise<SecretResolver>;
 /**
  * Install the fetched payload to `<hqRoot>/core/packages/<pkg.name>/` (HQ
  * v12+ layout). The HQ template (`hq-core` / `hq-core-staging`) ships
@@ -381,6 +376,8 @@ export declare function runScanPackages(hqRoot: string, opts?: {
 }): void;
 export interface InstallPackOptions {
     allowHooks?: boolean;
+    /** Company context for online authorization of install-time MCP secret refs. */
+    company?: string;
     /**
      * US-010 install-time MCP trust prompt bypass (CI/ambient-trust). Mirrors
      * `allowHooks`: when set, `confirmMcp` skips the prompt and prints a yellow

package/dist/commands/pack-install.js

@@ -49,9 +49,11 @@ import { findHqRoot } from '../utils/manifest.js';
 import { readHqVersion, routeContribution, listInstalledPacks } from '../utils/pack-contributions.js';
 import { CONTRIBUTION_TABLE, payloadFor } from '../utils/contribution-table.js';
 import { safeExtractTarball } from './safe-extract.js';
-import { vaultApiFetchPublic } from '../utils/vault-api.js';
+import { getCompanyUid, vaultApiFetchPublic } from '../utils/vault-api.js';
+import { ensureCognitoToken } from '../utils/cognito-session.js';
 import { redactSecrets, SECRET_REDACTION, registerMcpServers, McpManifestError, } from './mcp-registration.js';
-import { readCache, listSecretCacheScopes } from '../utils/secrets-cache.js';
+import { listSecretCacheScopes } from '../utils/secrets-cache.js';
+import { loadRevealedSecrets } from './secrets.js';
 const PACK_UPDATE_CACHE_TTL_MS = 12 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
 const PACK_UPDATE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 3_000;
 const gitLsRemoteMemo = new Map();
@@ -1349,34 +1351,56 @@ function evalConditional(expr) {
 // key) still SUCCEEDS, skipping only the server whose secret is not yet present.
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 /**
- * Build the install-time {@link SecretResolver} bound to the HQ vault's local
- * secrets-cache (`~/.hq/secrets-cache/<scope>/<NAME>`, AES-256-GCM, 0600, TTL'd).
+ * Build an install-time {@link SecretResolver} from a fresh server authorization
+ * decision. The encrypted cache may identify one unambiguous scope, but its
+ * plaintext is never trusted or read to register an MCP server.
  *
- * Active-company resolution at install time is INDIRECT by design: `hq install`
- * has no `--company` flag and runs OFFLINE (no token), so we cannot resolve a
- * single active company UID the way `hq run` / `hq secrets` do (via
- * `getEntityUid` over the network). Instead we probe EVERY cached scope
- * (`cmp_*`/`prs_*` — whichever has minted secrets locally) for the requested
- * name and return the first hit. This naturally resolves to whichever company
- * context just provisioned the secret (e.g. the one `/connect-shopify` minted
- * `VYG_API_KEY` under), without guessing, and works whether the vault scoped the
- * key under a company or person entity.
+ * With `--company`, the caller-selected company is resolved normally. Without
+ * it, exactly one cache scope may identify the intended company/person context;
+ * multiple scopes are ambiguous and fail closed. The requested names are then
+ * loaded through the same server-authorized endpoint as exec/env/run. Offline,
+ * expired-session, forbidden, not-found, script-lock, and malformed-response
+ * outcomes all produce an empty resolver, so MCP registration is deferred.
  *
- * On MISS across all scopes (no cache, expired TTL, or key never minted) it
- * returns `null` — which is exactly what {@link registerMcpServers}'s
- * unresolvable-secret path keys off to defer that server gracefully. With no
- * cached scopes at all (`listSecretCacheScopes()` → `[]`) it simply returns
- * `null` for every name, the desired graceful-deferral behavior.
+ * The returned synchronous resolver contains only values from that fresh
+ * authorization response. No cached value is a fallback.
  */
-export function makeInstallSecretResolver() {
-    return (name) => {
-        for (const scope of listSecretCacheScopes()) {
-            const value = readCache(scope, name);
-            if (value !== null)
-                return value;
+export async function makeInstallSecretResolver(secretNames, company) {
+    const names = [...new Set(secretNames)];
+    if (names.length === 0)
+        return () => null;
+    try {
+        const token = await ensureCognitoToken({ interactive: false });
+        let scopeUid;
+        if (company) {
+            scopeUid = await getCompanyUid(token, company);
         }
-        return null;
-    };
+        else {
+            const scopes = listSecretCacheScopes();
+            if (scopes.length !== 1)
+                return () => null;
+            [scopeUid] = scopes;
+        }
+        const authorized = await loadRevealedSecrets(token, scopeUid, names);
+        return (name) => authorized.get(name) ?? null;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return () => null;
+    }
+}
+const INSTALL_SECRET_REF_RE = /\$\{secret:([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*(?:\/[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]+)*)\}/g;
+function collectManifestSecretNames(manifest) {
+    const names = new Set();
+    for (const value of [
+        ...Object.values(manifest.headers ?? {}),
+        ...Object.values(manifest.env ?? {}),
+    ]) {
+        INSTALL_SECRET_REF_RE.lastIndex = 0;
+        for (let match = INSTALL_SECRET_REF_RE.exec(value); match; match = INSTALL_SECRET_REF_RE.exec(value)) {
+            names.add(match[1]);
+        }
+    }
+    return [...names];
 }
 /**
  * Load + shape-validate + parse a pack's per-server MCP manifest from disk.
@@ -1424,13 +1448,13 @@ function extractDeferredSecretName(message) {
  *   - ANY OTHER error               → RE-THROW (abort install). Only the
  *     unresolvable-secret case is swallowed.
  */
-function wireMcpServers(pkg, destDir) {
-    const resolveSecret = makeInstallSecretResolver();
+async function wireMcpServers(pkg, destDir, company) {
     const loadManifest = (name) => loadMcpManifestFrom(destDir, name);
     const registered = [];
     const skipped = [];
     for (const name of pkg.contributes.mcp ?? []) {
         try {
+            const resolveSecret = await makeInstallSecretResolver(collectManifestSecretNames(loadManifest(name)), company);
             // Per-server call: registerMcpServers throws on the FIRST unresolvable
             // secret, so calling it one name at a time lets us catch + continue.
             registerMcpServers(pkg.name, [name], { loadManifest, resolveSecret });
@@ -1676,7 +1700,7 @@ export async function installPack(source, opts = {}) {
         // Per-server secret-deferral keeps a fresh install (key not yet minted) at
         // exit 0, deferring only the unresolvable server (see wireMcpServers).
         if (Array.isArray(pkg.contributes.mcp) && pkg.contributes.mcp.length > 0) {
-            const { registered, skipped } = wireMcpServers(pkg, destDir);
+            const { registered, skipped } = await wireMcpServers(pkg, destDir, opts.company);
             // One-line summary (server NAMES only — never resolved secret VALUES).
             say(chalk.dim(`  MCP servers: registered [${registered.join(', ')}]; ` +
                 `skipped [${skipped.join(', ')}].`));

package/dist/commands/pkg-install.js

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ export function registerPackageInstallCommand(parent) {
         .command('install <source>')
         .description('Install a package. Sources: bare slug (registry, Cognito-gated), ' +
         '@scope/name[@ver] (npm pack), git URL[#ref], or local path.')
-        .option('--company <co>', 'Scope the package to a specific company (registry flow only)')
+        .option('--company <co>', 'Scope package secret authorization to a specific company')
         .option('--allow-hooks', 'Skip the hooks confirmation prompt (content-pack flow)')
         .option('--allow-mcp', 'Skip the MCP server confirmation prompt (content-pack flow)')
         .option('--branch', 'Follow a ref instead of SHA-pinning (git content-pack flow)')
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ export function registerPackageInstallCommand(parent) {
         try {
             if (sourceMatchesPackPattern(source)) {
                 await installPack(source, {
+                    company: opts.company,
                     allowHooks: opts.allowHooks,
                     allowMcp: opts.allowMcp,
                     followBranch: opts.branch,
@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ export function registerPackageInstallCommand(parent) {
                 // would fail at registry setup. Resolve it through the marketplace
                 // listings transport — the live install path — instead.
                 await installPack(`${MARKETPLACE_PREFIX}${source}`, {
+                    company: opts.company,
                     allowHooks: opts.allowHooks,
                     allowMcp: opts.allowMcp,
                     followBranch: opts.branch,

package/dist/commands/run.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
 import { Command } from 'commander';
+import type { SecretUsage } from './secrets.js';
+export declare function buildRunUsage(scriptPath?: string, scriptId?: string): Promise<SecretUsage | undefined>;
 export declare function registerRunCommand(program: Command): void;
 //# sourceMappingURL=run.d.ts.map

package/dist/commands/run.js

@@ -7,7 +7,11 @@ import { computeSha256 } from '../utils/integrity.js';
 import { vaultApiFetch, getCompanyUid } from '../utils/vault-api.js';
 import { discoverSchemas } from '../run/discover-schemas.js';
 import { installHqPlugin, prewarmHqSecrets } from '../run/hq-plugin.js';
-async function buildRunUsage(scriptPath) {
+const SECRET_LOAD_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
+export async function buildRunUsage(scriptPath, scriptId) {
+    if (scriptId && !scriptPath) {
+        throw new Error('--script-id requires --script');
+    }
     if (!scriptPath) {
         return undefined;
     }
@@ -15,7 +19,7 @@ async function buildRunUsage(scriptPath) {
     return {
         channel: 'run',
         script: {
-            scriptId: resolvedPath,
+            scriptId: scriptId ?? resolvedPath,
             path: resolvedPath,
             sha256: await computeSha256(resolvedPath),
             attestationLevel: 'self-asserted-hash',
@@ -29,6 +33,7 @@ export function registerRunCommand(program) {
         .option('--company <slug>', 'Company slug (overrides @hqCompany in schema)')
         .option('--schema <path>', 'Explicit schema path (skips walk-up discovery)')
         .option('--script <path>', 'Attach local script identity for script-locked secrets')
+        .option('--script-id <id>', 'Stable script identifier approved by policy')
         .option('--check', 'Resolve schema and validate vars without executing the command')
         .allowUnknownOption(true)
         .action(async (opts) => {
@@ -68,13 +73,14 @@ export function registerRunCommand(program) {
             }
             const token = await ensureCognitoToken();
             const uid = await getCompanyUid(token, slug);
-            const usage = await buildRunUsage(opts.script);
+            const usage = await buildRunUsage(opts.script, opts.scriptId);
             const fetchBatch = async (companyUid, names, requestUsage) => {
                 const res = await vaultApiFetch({
                     token,
                     path: `/secrets/${encodeURIComponent(companyUid)}/load`,
                     method: 'POST',
                     body: requestUsage ? { names, usage: requestUsage } : { names },
+                    signal: AbortSignal.timeout(SECRET_LOAD_TIMEOUT_MS),
                 });
                 if (!res.ok) {
                     const body = await res.json().catch(() => ({}));