@indigoai-us/hq-cli 5.74.0 → 5.76.0

package/dist/commands/run.js

@@ -7,7 +7,11 @@ import { computeSha256 } from '../utils/integrity.js';
 import { vaultApiFetch, getCompanyUid } from '../utils/vault-api.js';
 import { discoverSchemas } from '../run/discover-schemas.js';
 import { installHqPlugin, prewarmHqSecrets } from '../run/hq-plugin.js';
-async function buildRunUsage(scriptPath) {
+const SECRET_LOAD_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
+export async function buildRunUsage(scriptPath, scriptId) {
+    if (scriptId && !scriptPath) {
+        throw new Error('--script-id requires --script');
+    }
     if (!scriptPath) {
         return undefined;
     }
@@ -15,7 +19,7 @@ async function buildRunUsage(scriptPath) {
     return {
         channel: 'run',
         script: {
-            scriptId: resolvedPath,
+            scriptId: scriptId ?? resolvedPath,
             path: resolvedPath,
             sha256: await computeSha256(resolvedPath),
             attestationLevel: 'self-asserted-hash',
@@ -29,6 +33,7 @@ export function registerRunCommand(program) {
         .option('--company <slug>', 'Company slug (overrides @hqCompany in schema)')
         .option('--schema <path>', 'Explicit schema path (skips walk-up discovery)')
         .option('--script <path>', 'Attach local script identity for script-locked secrets')
+        .option('--script-id <id>', 'Stable script identifier approved by policy')
         .option('--check', 'Resolve schema and validate vars without executing the command')
         .allowUnknownOption(true)
         .action(async (opts) => {
@@ -68,13 +73,14 @@ export function registerRunCommand(program) {
             }
             const token = await ensureCognitoToken();
             const uid = await getCompanyUid(token, slug);
-            const usage = await buildRunUsage(opts.script);
+            const usage = await buildRunUsage(opts.script, opts.scriptId);
             const fetchBatch = async (companyUid, names, requestUsage) => {
                 const res = await vaultApiFetch({
                     token,
                     path: `/secrets/${encodeURIComponent(companyUid)}/load`,
                     method: 'POST',
                     body: requestUsage ? { names, usage: requestUsage } : { names },
+                    signal: AbortSignal.timeout(SECRET_LOAD_TIMEOUT_MS),
                 });
                 if (!res.ok) {
                     const body = await res.json().catch(() => ({}));

package/dist/commands/secrets.js

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import * as readline from "node:readline";
 import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
 import * as nodePath from "node:path";
 import { ensureCognitoToken } from "../utils/cognito-session.js";
-import { DEFAULT_SECRETS_CACHE_TTL_MS, readCache, writeCache, removeCacheEntry, clearAllCache, } from "../utils/secrets-cache.js";
+import { DEFAULT_SECRETS_CACHE_TTL_MS, writeCache, removeCacheEntry, clearAllCache, } from "../utils/secrets-cache.js";
 import { computeSha256 } from "../utils/integrity.js";
 import { SECRET_NAME_PATTERN, GROUP_ID_PATTERN, EMAIL_PATTERN } from "./_patterns.js";
 import { describeSecretsScope, formatSecretSaved, formatSecretsListEmpty, formatSecretsListHeader, } from "./secrets-scope.js";
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ function promptSecretInteractively() {
 // large --only list is chunked client-side rather than 400'd whole by the
 // server (the legacy per-key GET path had no such cap).
 const MAX_BATCH_NAMES = 100;
+const SECRET_LOAD_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
 function parseSecretAclPrincipal(principal) {
     const p = principal.trim();
     if (p === "@all") {
@@ -232,10 +233,23 @@ function normalizeSecretTier(tier) {
 function normalizeScriptLockMode(mode) {
     return mode === "enforced" ? "enforced" : "off";
 }
-function normalizeCacheTtlMs(cacheTtlMs) {
-    return typeof cacheTtlMs === "number"
-        ? cacheTtlMs
-        : DEFAULT_SECRETS_CACHE_TTL_MS;
+function normalizeCacheTtlMs(metadata) {
+    // Controlled rows must never reach the offline cache even if a mixed-version
+    // or malformed response carries a positive TTL. The server is authoritative
+    // for access, but the client still has enough policy metadata to fail safe.
+    if (metadata.tier === "sensitive" ||
+        metadata.tier === "nuclear" ||
+        metadata.scriptLock?.mode === "enforced") {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (metadata.cacheTtlMs === undefined) {
+        return DEFAULT_SECRETS_CACHE_TTL_MS;
+    }
+    return typeof metadata.cacheTtlMs === "number" &&
+        Number.isFinite(metadata.cacheTtlMs) &&
+        metadata.cacheTtlMs > 0
+        ? metadata.cacheTtlMs
+        : 0;
 }
 function extractApiMessage(body, fallback) {
     const message = typeof body.message === "string" ? body.message : undefined;
@@ -243,6 +257,9 @@ function extractApiMessage(body, fallback) {
     return message ?? error ?? fallback;
 }
 async function buildSecretUsage(channel, scriptPath, scriptId, attestationLevel = "self-asserted-hash") {
+    if (scriptId && !scriptPath) {
+        throw new Error("--script-id requires --script");
+    }
     if (!scriptPath) {
         return { channel };
     }
@@ -308,11 +325,25 @@ function renderSandboxJobResult(job, secretNames) {
 }
 function normalizePolicyRecord(secretPath, data) {
     const policy = data.policy ?? { path: secretPath };
-    const scripts = Array.isArray(policy.scripts)
-        ? policy.scripts
-        : Array.isArray(data.scripts)
-            ? data.scripts
-            : [];
+    const scripts = Array.isArray(policy.scriptLock?.approvedScripts)
+        ? policy.scriptLock.approvedScripts
+            .filter((script) => script !== null &&
+            typeof script === "object" &&
+            typeof script.scriptId === "string" &&
+            typeof script.path === "string" &&
+            typeof script.attestationLevel === "string" &&
+            !script.revokedAt)
+            .map((script) => ({
+            scriptId: script.scriptId,
+            scriptPath: script.path,
+            sha256: typeof script.sha256 === "string" ? script.sha256 : "",
+            attestationLevel: script.attestationLevel,
+        }))
+        : Array.isArray(policy.scripts)
+            ? policy.scripts.filter(isSecretPolicyScript)
+            : Array.isArray(data.scripts)
+                ? data.scripts.filter(isSecretPolicyScript)
+                : [];
     return {
         path: policy.path ?? secretPath,
         tier: normalizeSecretTier(policy.tier),
@@ -323,6 +354,15 @@ function normalizePolicyRecord(secretPath, data) {
         scripts,
     };
 }
+function isSecretPolicyScript(value) {
+    if (!value || typeof value !== "object" || Array.isArray(value))
+        return false;
+    const script = value;
+    return (typeof script.scriptId === "string" &&
+        typeof script.scriptPath === "string" &&
+        typeof script.sha256 === "string" &&
+        typeof script.attestationLevel === "string");
+}
 function renderPolicySummary(policy) {
     console.log(chalk.bold(`Policy: ${policy.path}`));
     console.log(`  Tier:          ${normalizeSecretTier(policy.tier)}`);
@@ -351,7 +391,7 @@ function renderPolicyScripts(scripts) {
             script.scriptId.padEnd(idWidth),
             script.scriptPath.padEnd(pathWidth),
             script.attestationLevel.padEnd(attestationWidth),
-            script.sha256,
+            script.sha256 || "-",
         ].join("  "));
     }
 }
@@ -370,84 +410,136 @@ function renderPolicyScripts(scripts) {
 // `env` through it stops those callers from emitting the warning while keeping
 // identical UX and error text.
 //
-// Cache-first (so warm keys cost no request), chunked at MAX_BATCH_NAMES, and
-// throws on the FIRST unresolved key with the same `Failed to fetch secret
-// '<k>': <reason>` shape the per-key GET path used — never swallows a failure.
+// Every value use through exec/env/reveal is server-authorized, including when
+// an encrypted disk-cache entry exists. The cache remains write-through for
+// explicitly offline install-time consumers; these commands never trust it as
+// an authorization decision. This means a policy, ACL, tier, or script-approval
+// change takes effect on their next use even though there is no push revocation.
+// Requests are chunked at MAX_BATCH_NAMES and throw on the FIRST unresolved key
+// with the same `Failed to fetch secret '<k>': <reason>` shape the per-key GET
+// path used — never swallows a failure.
 export async function loadRevealedSecrets(token, companyUid, keys, usage) {
     const resolved = new Map();
-    const missing = [];
-    for (const key of keys) {
-        const cached = readCache(companyUid, key);
-        if (cached !== null) {
-            resolved.set(key, cached);
-        }
-        else if (!missing.includes(key)) {
-            missing.push(key);
-        }
-    }
-    for (let i = 0; i < missing.length; i += MAX_BATCH_NAMES) {
-        const chunk = missing.slice(i, i + MAX_BATCH_NAMES);
-        const res = await vaultApiFetch({
-            token,
-            path: `/secrets/${encodeURIComponent(companyUid)}/load`,
-            method: "POST",
-            body: usage ? { names: chunk, usage } : { names: chunk },
-        });
-        if (!res.ok) {
-            const body = (await res.json().catch(() => ({})));
-            const message = extractApiMessage(body, res.statusText);
-            // High-security ("nuclear") refusal surfaced at the batch level (rather
-            // than per-name): point the caller at the proxy and never leak plaintext.
-            if (body.code === "high_security_denied" || body.highSecurity === true) {
-                throw new Error("A requested secret is high-security and cannot be injected locally — it can only be used through the HQ secret proxy, which keeps the plaintext server-side.");
-            }
-            if (res.status >= 400 &&
-                res.status < 500 &&
-                typeof body.code === "string") {
-                throw new Error(message);
-            }
-            throw new Error(`Failed to batch-load secrets: ${message}`);
-        }
-        const data = (await res.json());
-        for (const s of data.secrets ?? []) {
-            if (s.value == null) {
-                throw new Error(`Secret '${s.name}' has no value (reveal may not be permitted).`);
+    const requested = [...new Set(keys)];
+    try {
+        for (let i = 0; i < requested.length; i += MAX_BATCH_NAMES) {
+            const chunk = requested.slice(i, i + MAX_BATCH_NAMES);
+            const chunkNames = new Set(chunk);
+            const res = await vaultApiFetch({
+                token,
+                path: `/secrets/${encodeURIComponent(companyUid)}/load`,
+                method: "POST",
+                body: usage ? { names: chunk, usage } : { names: chunk },
+                signal: AbortSignal.timeout(SECRET_LOAD_TIMEOUT_MS),
+            });
+            if (!res.ok) {
+                const body = (await res.json().catch(() => ({})));
+                const message = extractApiMessage(body, res.statusText);
+                // High-security ("nuclear") refusal surfaced at the batch level (rather
+                // than per-name): point the caller at the proxy and never leak plaintext.
+                if (body.code === "high_security_denied" || body.highSecurity === true) {
+                    throw new Error("A requested secret is high-security and cannot be injected locally — it can only be used through the HQ secret proxy, which keeps the plaintext server-side.");
+                }
+                if (res.status >= 400 &&
+                    res.status < 500 &&
+                    typeof body.code === "string") {
+                    throw new Error(message);
+                }
+                throw new Error(`Failed to batch-load secrets: ${message}`);
             }
-            const cacheTtlMs = normalizeCacheTtlMs(s.cacheTtlMs);
-            if (cacheTtlMs > 0) {
-                writeCache(companyUid, s.name, s.value, cacheTtlMs);
+            const data = (await res.json());
+            if (!Array.isArray(data.secrets) || !Array.isArray(data.errors)) {
+                throw new Error("Invalid secret load response from vault");
+            }
+            const errorsByName = new Map();
+            const seenNames = new Set();
+            for (const rawSecret of data.secrets) {
+                if (!rawSecret || typeof rawSecret !== "object") {
+                    throw new Error("Invalid secret load response from vault");
+                }
+                const s = rawSecret;
+                if (typeof s.name !== "string" ||
+                    !chunkNames.has(s.name) ||
+                    seenNames.has(s.name) ||
+                    (s.value != null && typeof s.value !== "string")) {
+                    throw new Error("Invalid secret load response from vault");
+                }
+                seenNames.add(s.name);
+                if (s.value == null) {
+                    errorsByName.set(s.name, {
+                        code: "not_returned",
+                        message: `Secret '${s.name}' has no value (reveal may not be permitted).`,
+                    });
+                    removeCacheEntry(companyUid, s.name);
+                    continue;
+                }
+                const cacheTtlMs = normalizeCacheTtlMs(s);
+                if (cacheTtlMs > 0) {
+                    writeCache(companyUid, s.name, s.value, cacheTtlMs);
+                }
+                else {
+                    removeCacheEntry(companyUid, s.name);
+                }
+                resolved.set(s.name, s.value);
+            }
+            for (const rawError of data.errors) {
+                if (!rawError || typeof rawError !== "object") {
+                    throw new Error("Invalid secret load response from vault");
+                }
+                const e = rawError;
+                if (typeof e.name !== "string" ||
+                    !chunkNames.has(e.name) ||
+                    seenNames.has(e.name) ||
+                    typeof e.code !== "string" ||
+                    (e.message !== undefined && typeof e.message !== "string")) {
+                    throw new Error("Invalid secret load response from vault");
+                }
+                seenNames.add(e.name);
+                errorsByName.set(e.name, { code: e.code, message: e.message });
+                resolved.delete(e.name);
+                removeCacheEntry(companyUid, e.name);
+            }
+            // Any requested key in this chunk the server did not return is a per-key
+            // failure — surface it with the same prefix the single-GET path used so
+            // callers (and scripts grepping stderr) see no behavior change.
+            let firstFailure = null;
+            for (const key of chunk) {
+                if (resolved.has(key))
+                    continue;
+                removeCacheEntry(companyUid, key);
+                const err = errorsByName.get(key);
+                // High-security ("nuclear") secret: the server refuses to vend it on the
+                // local-injection (batch-load) path — per-name code `high_security_denied`,
+                // no plaintext returned. Every caller of loadRevealedSecrets injects or
+                // prints the plaintext locally (`secrets get --reveal`, `secrets exec`,
+                // `secrets env`), so a high-security secret can NEVER be used here. Surface
+                // a clear, actionable error pointing at the proxy instead of a raw failure.
+                if (err?.code === "high_security_denied") {
+                    firstFailure ??= new Error(`Secret '${key}' is high-security and cannot be injected locally — it can only be used through the HQ secret proxy, which keeps the plaintext server-side.`);
+                    continue;
+                }
+                const reason = err?.code === "not_found"
+                    ? "Secret not found"
+                    : err?.code === "forbidden"
+                        ? err.message ?? "No read permission"
+                        : err?.message ?? err?.code ?? "not returned by vault";
+                firstFailure ??= new Error(`Failed to fetch secret '${key}': ${reason}`);
+            }
+            if (firstFailure) {
+                throw firstFailure;
             }
-            resolved.set(s.name, s.value);
-        }
-        const errorsByName = new Map();
-        for (const e of data.errors ?? []) {
-            errorsByName.set(e.name, { code: e.code, message: e.message });
         }
-        // Any requested key in this chunk the server did not return is a per-key
-        // failure — surface it with the same prefix the single-GET path used so
-        // callers (and scripts grepping stderr) see no behavior change.
-        for (const key of chunk) {
-            if (resolved.has(key))
-                continue;
-            const err = errorsByName.get(key);
-            // High-security ("nuclear") secret: the server refuses to vend it on the
-            // local-injection (batch-load) path — per-name code `high_security_denied`,
-            // no plaintext returned. Every caller of loadRevealedSecrets injects or
-            // prints the plaintext locally (`secrets get --reveal`, `secrets exec`,
-            // `secrets env`), so a high-security secret can NEVER be used here. Surface
-            // a clear, actionable error pointing at the proxy instead of a raw failure.
-            if (err?.code === "high_security_denied") {
-                throw new Error(`Secret '${key}' is high-security and cannot be injected locally — it can only be used through the HQ secret proxy, which keeps the plaintext server-side.`);
-            }
-            const reason = err?.code === "not_found"
-                ? "Secret not found"
-                : err?.code === "forbidden"
-                    ? err.message ?? "No read permission"
-                    : err?.message ?? err?.code ?? "not returned by vault";
-            throw new Error(`Failed to fetch secret '${key}': ${reason}`);
+        return resolved;
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        // A transport failure, stale session, malformed response, or a later chunk
+        // failure must not leave values written by this attempted operation available
+        // to offline cache readers. Evict the whole request before failing closed.
+        for (const key of requested) {
+            removeCacheEntry(companyUid, key);
         }
+        throw err;
     }
-    return resolved;
 }
 export function registerSecretsCommand(program) {
     const secrets = program
@@ -846,6 +938,7 @@ export function registerSecretsCommand(program) {
                 process.exit(1);
             }
             const data = (await res.json().catch(() => ({})));
+            removeCacheEntry(companyUid, secretPath);
             console.log(chalk.green(`Policy updated for '${secretPath}'.`));
             renderPolicySummary(normalizePolicyRecord(secretPath, data.policy ? data : { policy: { path: secretPath, tier, scriptLock } }));
         }
@@ -890,6 +983,7 @@ export function registerSecretsCommand(program) {
                 console.error(chalk.red(`Failed to approve script: ${extractApiMessage(body, res.statusText)}`));
                 process.exit(1);
             }
+            removeCacheEntry(companyUid, secretPath);
             console.log(chalk.green(`Approved script '${opts.id}' for '${secretPath}'.`));
         }
         catch (err) {
@@ -921,6 +1015,7 @@ export function registerSecretsCommand(program) {
                 console.error(chalk.red(`Failed to revoke script: ${extractApiMessage(body, res.statusText)}`));
                 process.exit(1);
             }
+            removeCacheEntry(companyUid, secretPath);
             console.log(chalk.green(`Revoked script '${opts.id}' for '${secretPath}'.`));
         }
         catch (err) {
@@ -1044,9 +1139,14 @@ export function registerSecretsCommand(program) {
             renderSandboxJobResult(job, keys);
             const exitCode = typeof job.exitCode === "number" ? job.exitCode : undefined;
             if (job.success === false || (exitCode !== undefined && exitCode !== 0) || job.status === "failed") {
-                const code = exitCode && exitCode !== 0 ? exitCode : 1;
-                console.error(chalk.red(`Sandbox command failed with exit code ${code}.`));
-                process.exit(code);
+                if (exitCode !== undefined && exitCode !== 0) {
+                    console.error(chalk.red(`Sandbox command failed with exit code ${exitCode}.`));
+                    process.exit(exitCode);
+                }
+                console.error(chalk.red(job.error !== undefined
+                    ? scrubSandboxOutput(job.error, keys)
+                    : "Sandbox execution failed before the command produced an exit code."));
+                process.exit(1);
             }
         }
         catch (err) {
@@ -1059,6 +1159,7 @@ export function registerSecretsCommand(program) {
         .description("Run a command with secrets injected as env vars")
         .requiredOption("--only <keys>", "Secret names to inject (comma-separated; may be repeated) (required)", collectSecretNames)
         .option("--script <path>", "Attach local script identity for script-locked secrets")
+        .option("--script-id <id>", "Stable script identifier approved by policy")
         .allowUnknownOption(true)
         .action(async (_opts, cmd) => {
         try {
@@ -1078,7 +1179,7 @@ export function registerSecretsCommand(program) {
             const keys = parseSecretNameList(_opts.only);
             const token = await ensureCognitoToken();
             const companyUid = await getEntityUid(token, scopeOpts(secrets.opts()));
-            const revealed = await loadRevealedSecrets(token, companyUid, keys, await buildSecretUsage("exec", _opts.script));
+            const revealed = await loadRevealedSecrets(token, companyUid, keys, await buildSecretUsage("exec", _opts.script, _opts.scriptId));
             const secretEnv = {};
             for (const key of keys) {
                 const value = revealed.get(key);
@@ -1115,6 +1216,7 @@ export function registerSecretsCommand(program) {
         .description("Print 'export KEY=VALUE' lines suitable for: source <(hq secrets env --only K1,K2)")
         .requiredOption("--only <keys>", "Secret names to print (comma-separated; may be repeated) (required)", collectSecretNames)
         .option("--script <path>", "Attach local script identity for script-locked secrets")
+        .option("--script-id <id>", "Stable script identifier approved by policy")
         .action(async (opts) => {
         try {
             const redact = process.stdout.isTTY;
@@ -1124,7 +1226,7 @@ export function registerSecretsCommand(program) {
             const keys = parseSecretNameList(opts.only);
             const token = await ensureCognitoToken();
             const companyUid = await getEntityUid(token, scopeOpts(secrets.opts()));
-            const revealed = await loadRevealedSecrets(token, companyUid, keys, await buildSecretUsage("env", opts.script));
+            const revealed = await loadRevealedSecrets(token, companyUid, keys, await buildSecretUsage("env", opts.script, opts.scriptId));
             for (const key of keys) {
                 const value = revealed.get(key);
                 // loadRevealedSecrets throws on any unresolved key, so a miss here is

package/dist/run/hq-plugin.js

@@ -1,9 +1,19 @@
 import { ResolutionError } from 'varlock/plugin-lib';
-import { DEFAULT_SECRETS_CACHE_TTL_MS, readCache, writeCache, } from '../utils/secrets-cache.js';
-function normalizeCacheTtlMs(cacheTtlMs) {
-    return typeof cacheTtlMs === 'number'
-        ? cacheTtlMs
-        : DEFAULT_SECRETS_CACHE_TTL_MS;
+import { DEFAULT_SECRETS_CACHE_TTL_MS, writeCache, removeCacheEntry, } from '../utils/secrets-cache.js';
+function normalizeCacheTtlMs(secret) {
+    if (secret.tier === 'sensitive' ||
+        secret.tier === 'nuclear' ||
+        secret.scriptLock?.mode === 'enforced') {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (secret.cacheTtlMs === undefined) {
+        return DEFAULT_SECRETS_CACHE_TTL_MS;
+    }
+    return typeof secret.cacheTtlMs === 'number' &&
+        Number.isFinite(secret.cacheTtlMs) &&
+        secret.cacheTtlMs > 0
+        ? secret.cacheTtlMs
+        : 0;
 }
 export function installHqPlugin(graph /* EnvGraph */, opts) {
     const pluginState = {
@@ -41,9 +51,9 @@ export function installHqPlugin(graph /* EnvGraph */, opts) {
             impliesSensitive: true,
             argsSchema: { type: 'array', arrayMaxLength: 1 },
             resolve: async function () {
-                // Cache-only read. `pluginState` is captured by this inner-class closure;
-                // `prewarmHqSecrets(graph, opts, state)` populates `state.uid` and
-                // `state.errorsByName` before `graph.resolveEnvValues()` calls us.
+                // `pluginState` is captured by this inner-class closure;
+                // `prewarmHqSecrets(graph, opts, state)` server-authorizes and populates
+                // the in-memory values before `graph.resolveEnvValues()` calls us.
                 const explicit = this.arrArgs?.[0]?.staticValue;
                 const secretName = (typeof explicit === 'string' && explicit) ? explicit : this._ownerKey;
                 if (!secretName) {
@@ -66,11 +76,6 @@ export function installHqPlugin(graph /* EnvGraph */, opts) {
                     }
                     throw new ResolutionError(`Failed to load secret "${secretName}": ${err.message ?? err.code}`);
                 }
-                // Sentinel-check style throughout: `readCache` returns `string | null`
-                // (verified at `hq/packages/hq-cli/src/utils/secrets-cache.ts:45`); `pluginState.uid`
-                // is `string | null` per `PluginState`. Use `== null` (covers null AND undefined defensively)
-                // for both — do not mix in truthy checks like `if (!x)`, which would silently swallow a
-                // legitimate empty-string value if the contract ever loosened.
                 if (pluginState.uid == null) {
                     throw new ResolutionError('Internal error: prewarmHqSecrets was not called before resolveEnvValues');
                 }
@@ -78,11 +83,7 @@ export function installHqPlugin(graph /* EnvGraph */, opts) {
                 if (inMemory != null) {
                     return inMemory;
                 }
-                const cached = readCache(pluginState.uid, secretName); // string | null
-                if (cached == null) {
-                    throw new ResolutionError(`Internal error: pre-warm did not populate cache for "${secretName}"`);
-                }
-                return cached;
+                throw new ResolutionError(`Secret "${secretName}" was not returned by vault after server authorization`);
             },
         };
         // Captured during process(parent); used by resolve() to fall back to the var key.
@@ -144,22 +145,84 @@ export async function prewarmHqSecrets(graph /* EnvGraph */, opts, state) {
     if (uniqueNames.length > 100) {
         throw new Error(`hq run supports at most 100 hq() resolvers per schema; got ${uniqueNames.length}`);
     }
-    const result = await opts.fetchBatch(uid, uniqueNames, opts.usage);
-    for (const s of result.secrets) {
-        if (s.value == null) {
-            continue;
+    state.loadedSecretsByName.clear();
+    state.errorsByName = new Map();
+    let result;
+    try {
+        result = await opts.fetchBatch(uid, uniqueNames, opts.usage);
+        if (!Array.isArray(result.secrets) || !Array.isArray(result.errors)) {
+            throw new Error('Invalid secret load response from vault');
         }
-        state.loadedSecretsByName.set(s.name, s.value);
-        const cacheTtlMs = normalizeCacheTtlMs(s.cacheTtlMs);
-        if (cacheTtlMs > 0) {
-            writeCache(uid, s.name, s.value, cacheTtlMs);
+        const errorsByName = new Map();
+        const returnedNames = new Set();
+        const requestedNames = new Set(uniqueNames);
+        const seenNames = new Set();
+        for (const rawSecret of result.secrets) {
+            if (!rawSecret || typeof rawSecret !== 'object') {
+                throw new Error('Invalid secret load response from vault');
+            }
+            const s = rawSecret;
+            if (typeof s.name !== 'string' ||
+                !requestedNames.has(s.name) ||
+                seenNames.has(s.name) ||
+                (s.value != null && typeof s.value !== 'string')) {
+                throw new Error('Invalid secret load response from vault');
+            }
+            seenNames.add(s.name);
+            if (s.value == null) {
+                errorsByName.set(s.name, {
+                    code: 'not_returned',
+                    message: 'not returned by vault after server authorization',
+                });
+                removeCacheEntry(uid, s.name);
+                continue;
+            }
+            returnedNames.add(s.name);
+            state.loadedSecretsByName.set(s.name, s.value);
+            const cacheTtlMs = normalizeCacheTtlMs(s);
+            if (cacheTtlMs > 0) {
+                writeCache(uid, s.name, s.value, cacheTtlMs);
+            }
+            else {
+                removeCacheEntry(uid, s.name);
+            }
+        }
+        for (const rawError of result.errors) {
+            if (!rawError || typeof rawError !== 'object') {
+                throw new Error('Invalid secret load response from vault');
+            }
+            const e = rawError;
+            if (typeof e.name !== 'string' ||
+                !requestedNames.has(e.name) ||
+                seenNames.has(e.name) ||
+                typeof e.code !== 'string' ||
+                (e.message !== undefined && typeof e.message !== 'string')) {
+                throw new Error('Invalid secret load response from vault');
+            }
+            seenNames.add(e.name);
+            errorsByName.set(e.name, { code: e.code, message: e.message });
+            state.loadedSecretsByName.delete(e.name);
+            removeCacheEntry(uid, e.name);
         }
+        for (const name of uniqueNames) {
+            if (!returnedNames.has(name) && !errorsByName.has(name)) {
+                errorsByName.set(name, {
+                    code: 'not_returned',
+                    message: 'not returned by vault after server authorization',
+                });
+                removeCacheEntry(uid, name);
+            }
+        }
+        state.errorsByName = errorsByName;
+        state.uid = uid;
     }
-    const errorsByName = new Map();
-    for (const e of result.errors) {
-        errorsByName.set(e.name, { code: e.code, message: e.message });
+    catch (err) {
+        state.loadedSecretsByName.clear();
+        state.errorsByName = new Map();
+        for (const name of uniqueNames) {
+            removeCacheEntry(uid, name);
+        }
+        throw err;
     }
-    state.errorsByName = errorsByName;
-    state.uid = uid;
 }
 //# sourceMappingURL=hq-plugin.js.map

package/dist/utils/sandbox-runner-client.d.ts

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ export interface SandboxRunnerJob {
     jobId: string;
     status: SandboxRunnerState;
     output?: string;
+    error?: string;
     exitCode?: number;
     success?: boolean;
 }

package/dist/utils/sandbox-runner-client.js

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ function normalizeJob(body, jobIdFallback) {
             : jobIdFallback ?? requireString(body, "jobId"),
         status,
         output: typeof body.output === "string" ? body.output : undefined,
+        error: typeof body.error === "string" ? body.error : undefined,
         exitCode: typeof body.exitCode === "number" ? body.exitCode : undefined,
         success: typeof body.success === "boolean" ? body.success : undefined,
     };

package/dist/utils/secrets-cache.d.ts

@@ -3,11 +3,10 @@ export declare function readCache(companyUid: string, name: string): string | nu
 export declare function writeCache(companyUid: string, name: string, value: string, ttlMs?: number): void;
 /**
  * List the scope UIDs (`cmp_*` / `prs_*` subdirectories) that currently have a
- * secrets-cache directory on disk. Used by offline callers (e.g. install-time MCP
- * registration) that have no `--company` flag and no network token and so cannot
- * resolve a single active company UID up front: they instead probe every cached
- * scope for a given secret name. Returns `[]` when the cache root is absent or
- * unreadable (the desired graceful-deferral behavior — no scopes, no hits).
+ * secrets-cache directory on disk. Install-time MCP registration may use an
+ * exactly-one result as a scope hint before reauthorizing every value online; it
+ * never reads cached plaintext through this helper. Returns `[]` when the cache
+ * root is absent or unreadable.
  */
 export declare function listSecretCacheScopes(): string[];
 export declare function removeCacheEntry(companyUid: string, name: string): void;