@iislee/opencodex 2.11.0 → 2.31.0

package/src/codex/user-identity.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,557 @@
+/**
+ * Environment-independent identity and namespace resolution for Codex writes.
+ *
+ * Bun 1.3.14 made the obvious implementation unsafe: both `os.homedir()` and
+ * `os.userInfo().homedir` follow HOME. A service and CLI for the same account
+ * could therefore coordinate through different databases. The namespace is
+ * keyed only by the effective uid/SID and the canonical CODEX_HOME.
+ *
+ * Design record: devlog/_fin/260804_codex_write_substrate/005_contract.md §7.
+ */
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import {
+  lstatSync,
+  mkdirSync,
+  realpathSync,
+  statSync,
+} from "node:fs";
+import { isAbsolute, join, resolve } from "node:path";
+
+import { resolveTrustedWindowsPowerShellExe } from "../lib/windows-elevation";
+
+import type {
+  ResolveCodexCoordinatorDatabasePath,
+  ResolveCodexCatalogSerializationDatabasePath,
+  ResolveCodexHistorySerializationDatabasePath,
+  ResolveEffectiveUserIdentity,
+  UserIdentity,
+} from "./convergence-types";
+
+const POSIX_PRIVATE_MODE = 0o700;
+const POSIX_TMP_REQUIRED_MODE = 0o1003;
+const POSIX_TMP_PATH = "/tmp";
+const SID_PATTERN = /^S-1-(?:\d+-)+\d+$/i;
+
+/**
+ * Hard budget for the Windows identity-lookup PowerShell child. These lookups
+ * run at startup and on config writes; a hung child must fail the lookup
+ * (recoverable — the caller refuses) rather than wedge the proxy indefinitely.
+ */
+const WINDOWS_POWERSHELL_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS = 8_000;
+
+/**
+ * The same budget, widened for a contended CI runner.
+ *
+ * 8s is a generous ceiling for `powershell.exe -Command` on a real desktop and is not one
+ * on a GitHub Windows runner executing a quarter of this suite: the composed-acceptance
+ * cases fail there with "Windows effective-account lookup timed out" while the child is
+ * still starting. That is runner contention, not a hung lookup, and the budget exists to
+ * bound the latter.
+ *
+ * Gated on `CI` alone. A user's machine keeps the 8s ceiling exactly as before, so the
+ * recoverable-refusal contract this budget protects is unchanged where it matters.
+ */
+const WINDOWS_POWERSHELL_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_CI_MS = 30_000;
+
+function windowsIdentityLookupTimeoutMs(): number {
+  return process.env.CI === "true"
+    ? WINDOWS_POWERSHELL_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_CI_MS
+    : WINDOWS_POWERSHELL_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS;
+}
+
+/**
+ * FOLDERID_LocalAppData, and the flag that makes the lookup ignore the caller's
+ * environment.
+ *
+ * The obvious spelling, .NET's
+ * `GetFolderPath(SpecialFolder.LocalApplicationData)`, is unusable here: on
+* Windows it resolves through `USERPROFILE`, and when the profile named there has
+ * no local AppData directory on disk it returns an EMPTY STRING rather than an
+ * error. Any
+* caller that redirected `USERPROFILE` (the test sandbox does, and so does a
+ * service account whose profile has not been materialized) therefore refused every
+ * coordinator lookup with "returned an empty value", which is the exact
+ * environment dependence this module exists to eliminate.
+ *
+ * `SHGetKnownFolderPath` with a null token and `KF_FLAG_DEFAULT_PATH` reads the
+ * known-folder registration for the effective token instead: it returns the real
+ * per-user path whether or not the directory exists, and it is unaffected by
+ * `USERPROFILE`, `LOCALAPPDATA`, `HOMEDRIVE`, or `HOMEPATH`. A non-null token argument
+* is NOT equivalent: passing (HANDLE)-1 resolves the DEFAULT USER profile
+ * (the built-in "Default" profile), which would key coordination to a namespace
+ * no real account writes to.
+*/
+const WINDOWS_LOCAL_APPDATA_FOLDER_ID = "F1B32785-6FBA-4FCF-9D55-7B8E7F157091";
+const WINDOWS_KF_FLAG_DEFAULT_PATH = "0x00000400";
+
+export class CodexUserIdentityRefusal extends Error {
+  readonly code = "CODEX_USER_IDENTITY_REFUSED";
+
+  constructor(message: string, options?: ErrorOptions) {
+    super(message, options);
+    this.name = "CodexUserIdentityRefusal";
+  }
+}
+
+function refuse(message: string, cause?: unknown): never {
+  throw new CodexUserIdentityRefusal(message, cause === undefined ? undefined : { cause });
+}
+
+function windowsIdentityPowerShellCommand(expression: string): string[] {
+  // PowerShell 5.1 can encode redirected native/host output with the active
+  // Windows code page. Base64 contains ASCII only, while the payload is
+  // explicitly UTF-16LE, so Korean and Western profile paths arrive unchanged.
+  const deterministicOutput = [
+    "$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'",
+    `$ocxValue = [string](${expression})`,
+    "$ocxBytes = [System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($ocxValue)",
+    "[Console]::Out.Write([Convert]::ToBase64String($ocxBytes))",
+  ].join("; ");
+  return [
+    resolveTrustedWindowsPowerShellExe(),
+    "-NoLogo",
+    "-NoProfile",
+    "-NonInteractive",
+    "-Command",
+    deterministicOutput,
+  ];
+}
+
+function windowsIdentityPowerShellSpawnOptions(): {
+  stdin: "ignore";
+  stdout: "pipe";
+  stderr: "pipe";
+  timeout: number;
+  windowsHide: boolean;
+} {
+  return {
+    stdin: "ignore",
+    stdout: "pipe",
+    stderr: "pipe",
+    timeout: windowsIdentityLookupTimeoutMs(),
+    windowsHide: true,
+  };
+}
+
+/** Test-only readback of the trusted executable and static arguments (#1278). */
+export function windowsIdentityPowerShellCommandForTests(expression: string): string[] {
+  return windowsIdentityPowerShellCommand(expression);
+}
+
+/**
+ * PowerShell expression yielding the effective account's local AppData path.
+ *
+ * P/Invoke rather than a .NET convenience wrapper, for the reason recorded on
+ * WINDOWS_LOCAL_APPDATA_FOLDER_ID: the wrapper follows `USERPROFILE` and answers
+ * an empty string for a profile whose directory is absent, which is precisely
+ * the environment dependence this module refuses to inherit. The type is added
+ * under a unique name per process because `Add-Type` cannot redefine one.
+ *
+ * The whole sequence is wrapped in one `$(...)` subexpression because the caller
+ * substitutes this text into `[string](<expression>)`; several statements
+ * spliced in bare would close that cast's parenthesis early and fail to parse.
+ */
+function windowsLocalAppDataExpression(): string {
+  const signature =
+    '[DllImport("shell32.dll", CharSet = CharSet.Unicode)] public static extern int '
+    + 'SHGetKnownFolderPath(ref System.Guid id, uint flags, System.IntPtr token, out System.IntPtr path);';
+  const statements = [
+    `$ocxShell = Add-Type -MemberDefinition '${signature}'`
+      + " -Name OcxKnownFolder -Namespace OcxIdentity -PassThru",
+    `$ocxFolderId = [System.Guid]'${WINDOWS_LOCAL_APPDATA_FOLDER_ID}'`,
+    "$ocxPathPtr = [System.IntPtr]::Zero",
+    "$ocxHr = $ocxShell::SHGetKnownFolderPath([ref]$ocxFolderId, "
+      + `${WINDOWS_KF_FLAG_DEFAULT_PATH}, [System.IntPtr]::Zero, [ref]$ocxPathPtr)`,
+    "if ($ocxHr -ne 0) { throw 'SHGetKnownFolderPath failed' }",
+    "try { [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::PtrToStringUni($ocxPathPtr) }"
+      + " finally { [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::FreeCoTaskMem($ocxPathPtr) }",
+  ];
+  return `$(${statements.join("; ")})`;
+}
+
+/** Test-only readback of the environment-independent known-folder expression. */
+export function windowsLocalAppDataExpressionForTests(): string {
+  return windowsLocalAppDataExpression();
+}
+
+/** Test-only readback of the spawn options shared by the identity lookups (#1278). */
+export function windowsIdentityPowerShellSpawnOptionsForTests(): ReturnType<
+  typeof windowsIdentityPowerShellSpawnOptions
+> {
+  return windowsIdentityPowerShellSpawnOptions();
+}
+
+function decodeWindowsIdentityPowerShellOutput(output: Uint8Array): string {
+  let encoded: string;
+  try {
+    encoded = new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true }).decode(output).trim();
+  } catch (cause) {
+    refuse("Windows effective-account lookup returned a malformed value.", cause);
+  }
+  if (!/^(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4})*(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{2}==|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{3}=)?$/.test(encoded)) {
+    refuse("Windows effective-account lookup returned a malformed value.");
+  }
+  const bytes = Buffer.from(encoded, "base64");
+  if (bytes.length % 2 !== 0 || bytes.toString("base64") !== encoded) {
+    refuse("Windows effective-account lookup returned a malformed value.");
+  }
+  return bytes.toString("utf16le").trim();
+}
+
+/** Test-only decode seam for the deterministic PowerShell output contract. */
+export function decodeWindowsIdentityPowerShellOutputForTests(output: Uint8Array): string {
+  return decodeWindowsIdentityPowerShellOutput(output);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Per-process memo for the Windows lookups.
+ *
+ * Both values -- the effective token's SID and its known-folder local AppData --
+ * are fixed for the lifetime of a process: neither can change without a new logon
+ * token, and the lookups deliberately ignore the environment, so nothing a caller
+ * does between two calls can alter the answer. Each call otherwise spawns a fresh
+ * PowerShell, roughly 150ms for the SID and 310ms for the folder, and the
+ * coordinator asks for both on every config write and lock acquisition. That cost
+ * pushed real multi-process injection tests past their budget while proving
+ * nothing: the second spawn re-derives what the first already established.
+ *
+ * Only successful lookups are memoized, so a transient failure cannot pin the
+ * process into a permanently refusing state.
+ */
+const windowsIdentityValueCache = new Map<string, string>();
+
+/** Test-only reset so a suite can force a fresh lookup. */
+export function resetWindowsIdentityValueCacheForTests(): void {
+  windowsIdentityValueCache.clear();
+}
+
+function powershellValue(expression: string): string {
+  const memoized = windowsIdentityValueCache.get(expression);
+  if (memoized !== undefined) return memoized;
+  let command: string[];
+  try {
+    command = windowsIdentityPowerShellCommand(expression);
+  } catch (cause) {
+    refuse("Windows effective-account lookup could not start.", cause);
+  }
+  let result: ReturnType<typeof Bun.spawnSync>;
+  try {
+    // `windowsHide` is the popup fix (#1278): the desktop proxy parent runs
+    // without a console, so a console-subsystem child spawned without
+    // CREATE_NO_WINDOW gets a fresh visible console window at startup and on
+    // every config write. Do not add PowerShell's `-WindowStyle Hidden` here:
+    // Bun 1.3.14 can fail that direct CLI combination before the SID command
+    // executes (#1589); the process-level `windowsHide` flag is sufficient.
+    result = Bun.spawnSync(command, windowsIdentityPowerShellSpawnOptions());
+  } catch (cause) {
+    refuse("Windows effective-account lookup could not start.", cause);
+  }
+  if (result.exitedDueToTimeout) refuse("Windows effective-account lookup timed out.");
+  if (result.exitCode !== 0) refuse("Windows effective-account lookup failed.");
+  const value = decodeWindowsIdentityPowerShellOutput(result.stdout ?? Buffer.alloc(0));
+  if (!value) refuse("Windows effective-account lookup returned an empty value.");
+  windowsIdentityValueCache.set(expression, value);
+  return value;
+}
+
+function resolveWindowsSid(): string {
+  const sid = powershellValue(
+    "[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent().User.Value",
+  );
+  if (!SID_PATTERN.test(sid)) refuse("Windows effective-account lookup returned an invalid SID.");
+  return sid.toUpperCase();
+}
+
+export const resolveEffectiveUserIdentity: ResolveEffectiveUserIdentity = () => {
+  if (process.platform === "win32") {
+    return { platform: "win32", sid: resolveWindowsSid() };
+  }
+
+  const getuid = process.getuid;
+  if (typeof getuid !== "function") {
+    refuse("The runtime does not expose the effective POSIX uid.");
+  }
+  let uid: number;
+  try {
+    uid = getuid.call(process);
+  } catch (cause) {
+    refuse("The effective POSIX uid lookup failed.", cause);
+  }
+  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(uid) || uid < 0) {
+    refuse("The runtime returned an invalid effective POSIX uid.");
+  }
+  return { platform: "posix", uid };
+};
+
+function assertPrivatePosixDirectory(path: string, uid: number): void {
+  let entry;
+  try {
+    entry = lstatSync(path);
+  } catch (cause) {
+    refuse("The Codex coordinator namespace cannot be inspected.", cause);
+  }
+  if (entry.isSymbolicLink() || !entry.isDirectory()) {
+    refuse("The Codex coordinator namespace is not a real directory.");
+  }
+  if (entry.uid !== uid || (entry.mode & 0o777) !== POSIX_PRIVATE_MODE) {
+    refuse("The Codex coordinator namespace has unsafe ownership or permissions.");
+  }
+}
+
+function ensurePrivatePosixDirectory(path: string, uid: number): void {
+  try {
+    mkdirSync(path, { mode: POSIX_PRIVATE_MODE });
+  } catch (cause) {
+    const code = cause && typeof cause === "object" && "code" in cause
+      ? String((cause as { code?: unknown }).code)
+      : "";
+    if (code !== "EEXIST") refuse("The Codex coordinator namespace cannot be created.", cause);
+  }
+  assertPrivatePosixDirectory(path, uid);
+}
+
+function resolveTrustedPosixTmp(): string {
+  let realTmp: string;
+  try {
+    realTmp = realpathSync.native(POSIX_TMP_PATH);
+    const entry = statSync(realTmp);
+    if (!entry.isDirectory() || entry.uid !== 0) {
+      refuse("The system temporary directory has unsafe ownership.");
+    }
+    if ((entry.mode & POSIX_TMP_REQUIRED_MODE) !== POSIX_TMP_REQUIRED_MODE) {
+      refuse("The system temporary directory lacks sticky world write/search permissions.");
+    }
+  } catch (cause) {
+    if (cause instanceof CodexUserIdentityRefusal) throw cause;
+    refuse("The system temporary directory cannot be trusted.", cause);
+  }
+  return realTmp;
+}
+
+function resolvePosixRuntimeRoot(uid: number): string {
+  const realTmp = resolveTrustedPosixTmp();
+  const root = join(realTmp, `opencodex-runtime-v1-${uid}`);
+  ensurePrivatePosixDirectory(root, uid);
+  return root;
+}
+
+export type CoordinatorNamespaceProbe =
+  | { readonly status: "ok"; readonly root: string }
+  | { readonly status: "missing" };
+
+/**
+ * Read-only namespace probe for diagnostics (`ocx doctor`).
+ *
+ * Unlike the runtime resolvers, this never creates the root or the lock
+ * directories: a doctor run must observe the namespace, not initialize it.
+ * A missing namespace is reported as `missing` instead of refused, so a fresh
+ * machine does not read as a broken one; an existing but unsafe namespace is
+ * refused exactly like the creating path would refuse it.
+ */
+export function probeCodexCoordinatorNamespace(identity: UserIdentity): CoordinatorNamespaceProbe {
+  if (identity.platform === "posix") {
+    const root = join(resolveTrustedPosixTmp(), `opencodex-runtime-v1-${identity.uid}`);
+    let entry;
+    try {
+      entry = lstatSync(root);
+    } catch (cause) {
+      const code = cause && typeof cause === "object" && "code" in cause
+        ? String((cause as { code?: unknown }).code)
+        : "";
+      if (code === "ENOENT") return { status: "missing" };
+      refuse("The Codex coordinator namespace cannot be inspected.", cause);
+    }
+    if (entry.isSymbolicLink() || !entry.isDirectory()) {
+      refuse("The Codex coordinator namespace is not a real directory.");
+    }
+    if (entry.uid !== identity.uid || (entry.mode & 0o777) !== POSIX_PRIVATE_MODE) {
+      refuse("The Codex coordinator namespace has unsafe ownership or permissions.");
+    }
+    return { status: "ok", root };
+  }
+
+  if (!SID_PATTERN.test(identity.sid)) refuse("The coordinator identity contains an invalid SID.");
+  const localAppData = powershellValue(windowsLocalAppDataExpression());
+  if (!isAbsolute(localAppData)) refuse("Windows LocalAppData resolution returned a relative path.");
+  const root = resolve(localAppData, "OpenCodex", "Runtime", "v1", identity.sid.toUpperCase());
+  let entry;
+  try {
+    entry = lstatSync(root);
+  } catch (cause) {
+    const code = cause && typeof cause === "object" && "code" in cause
+      ? String((cause as { code?: unknown }).code)
+      : "";
+    if (code === "ENOENT") return { status: "missing" };
+    refuse("The Windows coordinator namespace cannot be inspected.", cause);
+  }
+  if (entry.isSymbolicLink() || !entry.isDirectory()) {
+    refuse("The Windows coordinator namespace is not a real directory.");
+  }
+  try {
+    const real = realpathSync.native(root);
+    if (!samePathIdentity(real, root, "win32")) {
+      refuse("The Windows coordinator namespace is redirected by a junction or reparse point.");
+    }
+    return { status: "ok", root: real };
+  } catch (cause) {
+    if (cause instanceof CodexUserIdentityRefusal) throw cause;
+    refuse("The Windows coordinator namespace cannot be resolved.", cause);
+  }
+}
+
+function resolveWindowsRuntimeRoot(identity: Extract<UserIdentity, { platform: "win32" }>): string {
+  if (!SID_PATTERN.test(identity.sid)) refuse("The coordinator identity contains an invalid SID.");
+  const localAppData = powershellValue(windowsLocalAppDataExpression());
+  if (!isAbsolute(localAppData)) refuse("Windows LocalAppData resolution returned a relative path.");
+
+  // The SID and known-folder values come from the effective token/.NET OS APIs,
+  // never USERPROFILE or LOCALAPPDATA. WP11 adds descriptor/reparse/ACL checks at
+  // the stable-database open boundary where those checks can cover SQLite too.
+  const root = resolve(localAppData, "OpenCodex", "Runtime", "v1", identity.sid.toUpperCase());
+  try {
+    mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });
+  } catch (cause) {
+    refuse("The Windows coordinator namespace cannot be created.", cause);
+  }
+  // Canonicalize before anything is keyed on the path: a junctioned or
+  // differently-cased LocalAppData must land on ONE namespace, or two processes
+  // that share the real directory would build different lock paths and never
+  // contend. The lock modules also compare this path against realpath, so a
+  // non-canonical spelling here would read as "unsafe" on every acquisition.
+  //
+  // Canonicalizing must only ever fold spelling (case, separators). If the
+  // realpath lands somewhere else entirely, a component of the namespace is a
+  // junction/reparse redirect; accepting the target would convert the old
+  // refusal into silently opening the redirected location, so refuse instead.
+  try {
+    const real = realpathSync.native(root);
+    if (!samePathIdentity(real, root, "win32")) {
+      refuse("The Windows coordinator namespace is redirected by a junction or reparse point.");
+    }
+    return real;
+  } catch (cause) {
+    if (cause instanceof CodexUserIdentityRefusal) throw cause;
+    refuse("The Windows coordinator namespace cannot be resolved.", cause);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Windows path identity is case-insensitive; everywhere else it is exact.
+ *
+ * The lock modules compare a requested lock path against its own realpath, and
+ * byte equality refuses legitimate Windows spellings (drive-letter case, mixed
+ * component casing) as "unsafe". This is the same semantics
+ * `history-provider.ts` already applies to manifest paths; the platform
+ * argument exists so both branches are testable on any host.
+ */
+export function samePathIdentity(
+  a: string,
+  b: string,
+  platform: NodeJS.Platform = process.platform,
+): boolean {
+  const left = resolve(a);
+  const right = resolve(b);
+  return platform === "win32" ? left.toLowerCase() === right.toLowerCase() : left === right;
+}
+
+export const resolveCodexCoordinatorDatabasePath: ResolveCodexCoordinatorDatabasePath = (
+  identity,
+  canonicalCodexHome,
+) => {
+  if (!isAbsolute(canonicalCodexHome)) {
+    refuse("The canonical CODEX_HOME must be an absolute path.");
+  }
+  const root = identity.platform === "posix"
+    ? resolvePosixRuntimeRoot(identity.uid)
+    : resolveWindowsRuntimeRoot(identity);
+  const locks = join(root, "native-write-locks");
+  if (identity.platform === "posix") ensurePrivatePosixDirectory(locks, identity.uid);
+  else {
+    try {
+      mkdirSync(locks, { recursive: true });
+    } catch (cause) {
+      refuse("The Windows coordinator lock directory cannot be created.", cause);
+    }
+  }
+
+  const homeDigest = createHash("sha256").update(canonicalCodexHome).digest("hex");
+  return join(locks, `${homeDigest}.sqlite`);
+};
+
+/**
+ * K's FINAL database path. Never the native coordinator path.
+ *
+ * Catalog serialization is a different ownership surface from the native
+ * coordinator N: `K -> C` is a legal order and `N -> K` nests, so sharing one
+ * database would make the required nesting self-contend. The two live in
+ * sibling directories under the same per-user runtime root — same identity
+ * namespace, same environment-independent parent, distinct exclusion.
+ *
+ * Consumers use the returned path verbatim and append nothing
+ * (`005_contract.md:1256-1330`).
+ */
+export const resolveCodexCatalogSerializationDatabasePath:
+  ResolveCodexCatalogSerializationDatabasePath = (identity, canonicalCodexHome) => {
+    if (!isAbsolute(canonicalCodexHome)) {
+      refuse("The canonical CODEX_HOME must be an absolute path.");
+    }
+    const root = identity.platform === "posix"
+      ? resolvePosixRuntimeRoot(identity.uid)
+      : resolveWindowsRuntimeRoot(identity);
+    const locks = join(root, "catalog-write-locks");
+    if (identity.platform === "posix") ensurePrivatePosixDirectory(locks, identity.uid);
+    else {
+      try {
+        mkdirSync(locks, { recursive: true });
+      } catch (cause) {
+        refuse("The Windows catalog serialization directory cannot be created.", cause);
+      }
+    }
+
+    const homeDigest = createHash("sha256").update(canonicalCodexHome).digest("hex");
+    return join(locks, `${homeDigest}.sqlite`);
+  };
+
+/**
+ * H's FINAL database path.
+ *
+ * Keyed by the canonical state DB in addition to the canonical home, unlike N and
+ * K. One `CODEX_HOME` can name a different `state_5.sqlite` — `model_catalog_json`
+ * has the same shape of indirection for catalogs — and two operations against
+ * different history databases are not the same exclusion. Hashing only the home
+ * would serialize them together, and hashing the raw request path would let two
+ * spellings of one database take different locks.
+ */
+export const resolveCodexHistorySerializationDatabasePath:
+  ResolveCodexHistorySerializationDatabasePath = (
+    identity,
+    canonicalCodexHome,
+    canonicalStateDbPath,
+  ) => {
+    if (!isAbsolute(canonicalCodexHome)) {
+      refuse("The canonical CODEX_HOME must be an absolute path.");
+    }
+    if (!isAbsolute(canonicalStateDbPath)) {
+      refuse("The canonical Codex state database must be an absolute path.");
+    }
+    const root = identity.platform === "posix"
+      ? resolvePosixRuntimeRoot(identity.uid)
+      : resolveWindowsRuntimeRoot(identity);
+    const locks = join(root, "history-write-locks");
+    if (identity.platform === "posix") ensurePrivatePosixDirectory(locks, identity.uid);
+    else {
+      try {
+        mkdirSync(locks, { recursive: true });
+      } catch (cause) {
+        refuse("The Windows history serialization directory cannot be created.", cause);
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Both components are length-prefixed so no pair of (home, stateDb) values can
+    // collide by concatenation.
+    const digest = createHash("sha256")
+      .update(`${canonicalCodexHome.length}:${canonicalCodexHome}`)
+      .update(`${canonicalStateDbPath.length}:${canonicalStateDbPath}`)
+      .digest("hex");
+    return join(locks, `${digest}.sqlite`);
+  };