@iflow-mcp/jkheadley-instar 0.26.2

package/dist/core/PromptGuard.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+/**
+ * PromptGuard — Prompt injection defense for LLM conflict resolution.
+ *
+ * Mitigations:
+ *   1. System prompt boundary enforcement (clear delimiters)
+ *   2. Content filtering (blocks known injection patterns)
+ *   3. Output validation (structured JSON expected → reject freeform)
+ *   4. Deterministic fallback (if output is suspect, fall back to Tier 0)
+ *
+ * From INTELLIGENT_SYNC_SPEC Section 5.1.1 (Prompt Injection Defenses).
+ */
+export type InjectionThreatLevel = 'none' | 'low' | 'medium' | 'high';
+export interface ContentScanResult {
+    /** Whether injection was detected. */
+    detected: boolean;
+    /** Threat level. */
+    threatLevel: InjectionThreatLevel;
+    /** Matched patterns. */
+    matches: InjectionMatch[];
+    /** Whether the content should be blocked from LLM submission. */
+    shouldBlock: boolean;
+}
+export interface InjectionMatch {
+    /** The pattern that matched. */
+    patternName: string;
+    /** Where in the content. */
+    offset: number;
+    /** The matched text (truncated for safety). */
+    matchedText: string;
+    /** Severity of this specific match. */
+    severity: InjectionThreatLevel;
+}
+export interface OutputValidationResult {
+    /** Whether the output appears valid. */
+    valid: boolean;
+    /** Reason for rejection, if invalid. */
+    reason?: string;
+    /** Whether to fall back to deterministic resolution (Tier 0). */
+    fallbackRecommended: boolean;
+}
+export interface PromptBoundary {
+    /** System instruction delimiter. */
+    systemStart: string;
+    /** End of system instructions. */
+    systemEnd: string;
+    /** User content delimiter. */
+    contentStart: string;
+    /** End of user content. */
+    contentEnd: string;
+}
+export interface PromptGuardConfig {
+    /** Custom injection patterns. */
+    customPatterns?: InjectionPattern[];
+    /** Prompt boundary markers. */
+    boundary?: Partial<PromptBoundary>;
+    /** Threat level that triggers blocking (default: 'high'). */
+    blockThreshold?: InjectionThreatLevel;
+    /** Maximum output length before suspicion (default: 10000). */
+    maxOutputLength?: number;
+    /** Whether to enable output structure validation (default: true). */
+    validateOutputStructure?: boolean;
+}
+export interface InjectionPattern {
+    /** Human-readable name. */
+    name: string;
+    /** Regex to detect. */
+    pattern: RegExp;
+    /** Severity if matched. */
+    severity: InjectionThreatLevel;
+}
+export declare class PromptGuard {
+    private patterns;
+    private boundary;
+    private blockThreshold;
+    private maxOutputLength;
+    private validateOutputStructure;
+    constructor(config?: PromptGuardConfig);
+    /**
+     * Scan content for prompt injection attempts.
+     * Run this on file content before including it in an LLM prompt.
+     */
+    scanContent(content: string): ContentScanResult;
+    /**
+     * Wrap system instructions and content with clear boundary markers.
+     * This makes it harder for injected content to escape the content zone.
+     */
+    wrapPrompt(opts: {
+        systemInstructions: string;
+        mergeContent: string;
+        responseFormat?: string;
+    }): string;
+    /**
+     * Validate LLM output for signs of injection success.
+     *
+     * Checks:
+     * 1. Output length (unexpectedly long → suspicious)
+     * 2. JSON structure (if structured output expected)
+     * 3. Instruction leakage (system prompt repeated in output)
+     * 4. Unexpected content patterns
+     */
+    validateOutput(output: string, opts?: {
+        /** Expected output to be valid JSON. */
+        expectJson?: boolean;
+        /** Fragments of the system prompt (to detect leakage). */
+        systemPromptFragments?: string[];
+    }): OutputValidationResult;
+    /**
+     * Sanitize content before including in a prompt.
+     * Escapes delimiter patterns and neutralizes common injection vectors.
+     */
+    sanitizeContent(content: string): string;
+    /**
+     * Get the configured prompt boundary markers.
+     */
+    getBoundary(): PromptBoundary;
+    /**
+     * Compute overall threat level from matches.
+     */
+    private computeThreatLevel;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=PromptGuard.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/PromptGuard.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"PromptGuard.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/core/PromptGuard.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AAIH,MAAM,MAAM,oBAAoB,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK,GAAG,QAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;AAEtE,MAAM,WAAW,iBAAiB;IAChC,sCAAsC;IACtC,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IAClB,oBAAoB;IACpB,WAAW,EAAE,oBAAoB,CAAC;IAClC,wBAAwB;IACxB,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC;IAC1B,iEAAiE;IACjE,WAAW,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;CACtB;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,cAAc;IAC7B,gCAAgC;IAChC,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB,4BAA4B;IAC5B,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,+CAA+C;IAC/C,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB,uCAAuC;IACvC,QAAQ,EAAE,oBAAoB,CAAC;CAChC;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,sBAAsB;IACrC,wCAAwC;IACxC,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACf,wCAAwC;IACxC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,iEAAiE;IACjE,mBAAmB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;CAC9B;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,cAAc;IAC7B,oCAAoC;IACpC,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB,kCAAkC;IAClC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,8BAA8B;IAC9B,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACrB,2BAA2B;IAC3B,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACpB;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,iBAAiB;IAChC,iCAAiC;IACjC,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC;IACpC,+BAA+B;IAC/B,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC;IACnC,6DAA6D;IAC7D,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,oBAAoB,CAAC;IACtC,+DAA+D;IAC/D,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACzB,qEAAqE;IACrE,uBAAuB,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;CACnC;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,gBAAgB;IAC/B,2BAA2B;IAC3B,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACb,uBAAuB;IACvB,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,2BAA2B;IAC3B,QAAQ,EAAE,oBAAoB,CAAC;CAChC;AA8FD,qBAAa,WAAW;IACtB,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAqB;IACrC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAiB;IACjC,OAAO,CAAC,cAAc,CAAuB;IAC7C,OAAO,CAAC,eAAe,CAAS;IAChC,OAAO,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAU;gBAE7B,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,iBAAiB;IAatC;;;OAGG;IACH,WAAW,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,iBAAiB;IA8B/C;;;OAGG;IACH,UAAU,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;QACf,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAC3B,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QACrB,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;KACzB,GAAG,MAAM;IAkBV;;;;;;;;OAQG;IACH,cAAc,CACZ,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EACd,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE;QACL,wCAAwC;QACxC,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;QACrB,0DAA0D;QAC1D,qBAAqB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;KAClC,GACA,sBAAsB;IA2DzB;;;OAGG;IACH,eAAe,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM;IAaxC;;OAEG;IACH,WAAW,IAAI,cAAc;IAM7B;;OAEG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,kBAAkB;CAkB3B"}

package/dist/core/PromptGuard.js

@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
+/**
+ * PromptGuard — Prompt injection defense for LLM conflict resolution.
+ *
+ * Mitigations:
+ *   1. System prompt boundary enforcement (clear delimiters)
+ *   2. Content filtering (blocks known injection patterns)
+ *   3. Output validation (structured JSON expected → reject freeform)
+ *   4. Deterministic fallback (if output is suspect, fall back to Tier 0)
+ *
+ * From INTELLIGENT_SYNC_SPEC Section 5.1.1 (Prompt Injection Defenses).
+ */
+// ── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+const DEFAULT_BOUNDARY = {
+    systemStart: '<<<SYSTEM_INSTRUCTIONS>>>',
+    systemEnd: '<<<END_SYSTEM_INSTRUCTIONS>>>',
+    contentStart: '<<<MERGE_CONTENT>>>',
+    contentEnd: '<<<END_MERGE_CONTENT>>>',
+};
+const DEFAULT_MAX_OUTPUT_LENGTH = 10_000;
+/**
+ * Known prompt injection patterns.
+ * These detect attempts to override system instructions from within
+ * merge content (file diffs, commit messages, etc.).
+ */
+const BUILTIN_PATTERNS = [
+    // Direct instruction override attempts
+    {
+        name: 'system-override',
+        pattern: /(?:ignore|disregard|forget)\s+(?:all\s+)?(?:previous|above|prior|system)\s+(?:instructions?|prompts?|rules?)/gi,
+        severity: 'high',
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'role-hijack',
+        pattern: /you\s+are\s+(?:now|actually)\s+(?:a|an)\s+/gi,
+        severity: 'high',
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'new-instructions',
+        pattern: /(?:new|updated|revised)\s+(?:system\s+)?instructions?:\s*/gi,
+        severity: 'high',
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'admin-override',
+        pattern: /(?:admin|root|sudo|superuser)\s+(?:override|access|mode)/gi,
+        severity: 'medium',
+    },
+    // Data exfiltration attempts
+    {
+        name: 'data-exfil',
+        pattern: /(?:output|print|return|send|leak|exfiltrate)\s+(?:all\s+)?(?:the\s+)?(?:system\s+)?(?:prompt|instructions?|secrets?|keys?|tokens?)/gi,
+        severity: 'high',
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'base64-exfil',
+        pattern: /(?:encode|convert)\s+(?:to\s+)?base64/gi,
+        severity: 'low',
+    },
+    // Delimiter manipulation
+    {
+        name: 'delimiter-inject',
+        pattern: /<<<(?:SYSTEM|END_SYSTEM|MERGE|END_MERGE)/gi,
+        severity: 'high',
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'xml-tag-inject',
+        pattern: /<\/?(?:system|instructions?|prompt|admin|root|override)>/gi,
+        severity: 'medium',
+    },
+    // Control flow manipulation
+    {
+        name: 'completion-hijack',
+        pattern: /(?:instead|rather)\s+(?:of\s+)?(?:merging|resolving|the\s+conflict)/gi,
+        severity: 'medium',
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'tool-call-inject',
+        pattern: /(?:call|execute|run|invoke)\s+(?:the\s+)?(?:function|tool|command|script)/gi,
+        severity: 'medium',
+    },
+    // Jailbreak patterns
+    {
+        name: 'dan-pattern',
+        pattern: /\bDAN\b.*\bDo\s+Anything\s+Now\b/gi,
+        severity: 'high',
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'developer-mode',
+        pattern: /(?:developer|debug|test|maintenance)\s+mode\s+(?:enabled|activated|on)/gi,
+        severity: 'medium',
+    },
+];
+const THREAT_ORDER = ['none', 'low', 'medium', 'high'];
+// ── PromptGuard ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+export class PromptGuard {
+    patterns;
+    boundary;
+    blockThreshold;
+    maxOutputLength;
+    validateOutputStructure;
+    constructor(config) {
+        this.patterns = [
+            ...BUILTIN_PATTERNS,
+            ...(config?.customPatterns ?? []),
+        ];
+        this.boundary = { ...DEFAULT_BOUNDARY, ...config?.boundary };
+        this.blockThreshold = config?.blockThreshold ?? 'high';
+        this.maxOutputLength = config?.maxOutputLength ?? DEFAULT_MAX_OUTPUT_LENGTH;
+        this.validateOutputStructure = config?.validateOutputStructure ?? true;
+    }
+    // ── Input Scanning ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    /**
+     * Scan content for prompt injection attempts.
+     * Run this on file content before including it in an LLM prompt.
+     */
+    scanContent(content) {
+        const matches = [];
+        for (const { name, pattern, severity } of this.patterns) {
+            const regex = new RegExp(pattern.source, pattern.flags);
+            let match;
+            while ((match = regex.exec(content)) !== null) {
+                matches.push({
+                    patternName: name,
+                    offset: match.index,
+                    matchedText: match[0].slice(0, 100), // Truncate for safety
+                    severity,
+                });
+            }
+        }
+        const threatLevel = this.computeThreatLevel(matches);
+        const shouldBlock = THREAT_ORDER.indexOf(threatLevel) >= THREAT_ORDER.indexOf(this.blockThreshold);
+        return {
+            detected: matches.length > 0,
+            threatLevel,
+            matches,
+            shouldBlock,
+        };
+    }
+    // ── Prompt Wrapping ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+    /**
+     * Wrap system instructions and content with clear boundary markers.
+     * This makes it harder for injected content to escape the content zone.
+     */
+    wrapPrompt(opts) {
+        return [
+            this.boundary.systemStart,
+            opts.systemInstructions,
+            '',
+            opts.responseFormat
+                ? `RESPONSE FORMAT: ${opts.responseFormat}`
+                : 'RESPONSE FORMAT: Return ONLY a valid JSON object. No explanations, no markdown.',
+            this.boundary.systemEnd,
+            '',
+            this.boundary.contentStart,
+            opts.mergeContent,
+            this.boundary.contentEnd,
+        ].join('\n');
+    }
+    // ── Output Validation ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+    /**
+     * Validate LLM output for signs of injection success.
+     *
+     * Checks:
+     * 1. Output length (unexpectedly long → suspicious)
+     * 2. JSON structure (if structured output expected)
+     * 3. Instruction leakage (system prompt repeated in output)
+     * 4. Unexpected content patterns
+     */
+    validateOutput(output, opts) {
+        // Check 1: Output length
+        if (output.length > this.maxOutputLength) {
+            return {
+                valid: false,
+                reason: `Output length (${output.length}) exceeds maximum (${this.maxOutputLength})`,
+                fallbackRecommended: true,
+            };
+        }
+        // Check 2: JSON structure validation
+        if (this.validateOutputStructure && opts?.expectJson) {
+            const trimmed = output.trim();
+            // Allow JSON wrapped in markdown code blocks
+            const jsonContent = trimmed.replace(/^```(?:json)?\n?/, '').replace(/\n?```$/, '').trim();
+            try {
+                JSON.parse(jsonContent);
+            }
+            catch {
+                return {
+                    valid: false,
+                    reason: 'Expected JSON output but received non-JSON content',
+                    fallbackRecommended: true,
+                };
+            }
+        }
+        // Check 3: System prompt leakage
+        if (opts?.systemPromptFragments) {
+            for (const fragment of opts.systemPromptFragments) {
+                if (fragment.length > 10 && output.includes(fragment)) {
+                    return {
+                        valid: false,
+                        reason: `System prompt fragment leaked in output: "${fragment.slice(0, 30)}..."`,
+                        fallbackRecommended: true,
+                    };
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        // Check 4: Boundary markers in output (should never appear)
+        if (output.includes(this.boundary.systemStart) ||
+            output.includes(this.boundary.systemEnd) ||
+            output.includes(this.boundary.contentStart) ||
+            output.includes(this.boundary.contentEnd)) {
+            return {
+                valid: false,
+                reason: 'Boundary markers detected in output — possible prompt manipulation',
+                fallbackRecommended: true,
+            };
+        }
+        return { valid: true, fallbackRecommended: false };
+    }
+    // ── Sanitization ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    /**
+     * Sanitize content before including in a prompt.
+     * Escapes delimiter patterns and neutralizes common injection vectors.
+     */
+    sanitizeContent(content) {
+        let sanitized = content;
+        // Escape boundary markers
+        sanitized = sanitized
+            .replace(/<<</g, '‹‹‹')
+            .replace(/>>>/g, '›››');
+        return sanitized;
+    }
+    // ── Access ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    /**
+     * Get the configured prompt boundary markers.
+     */
+    getBoundary() {
+        return { ...this.boundary };
+    }
+    // ── Private Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+    /**
+     * Compute overall threat level from matches.
+     */
+    computeThreatLevel(matches) {
+        if (matches.length === 0)
+            return 'none';
+        let maxLevel = 'none';
+        for (const match of matches) {
+            if (THREAT_ORDER.indexOf(match.severity) > THREAT_ORDER.indexOf(maxLevel)) {
+                maxLevel = match.severity;
+            }
+        }
+        // Multiple medium-severity matches escalate to high
+        const mediumCount = matches.filter(m => m.severity === 'medium').length;
+        if (mediumCount >= 3 && maxLevel === 'medium') {
+            maxLevel = 'high';
+        }
+        return maxLevel;
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=PromptGuard.js.map

package/dist/core/PromptGuard.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"PromptGuard.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/core/PromptGuard.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AAsEH,wEAAwE;AAExE,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAmB;IACvC,WAAW,EAAE,2BAA2B;IACxC,SAAS,EAAE,+BAA+B;IAC1C,YAAY,EAAE,qBAAqB;IACnC,UAAU,EAAE,yBAAyB;CACtC,CAAC;AAEF,MAAM,yBAAyB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;AAEzC;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAuB;IAC3C,uCAAuC;IACvC;QACE,IAAI,EAAE,iBAAiB;QACvB,OAAO,EAAE,gHAAgH;QACzH,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM;KACjB;IACD;QACE,IAAI,EAAE,aAAa;QACnB,OAAO,EAAE,8CAA8C;QACvD,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM;KACjB;IACD;QACE,IAAI,EAAE,kBAAkB;QACxB,OAAO,EAAE,6DAA6D;QACtE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM;KACjB;IACD;QACE,IAAI,EAAE,gBAAgB;QACtB,OAAO,EAAE,4DAA4D;QACrE,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ;KACnB;IAED,6BAA6B;IAC7B;QACE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;QAClB,OAAO,EAAE,sIAAsI;QAC/I,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM;KACjB;IACD;QACE,IAAI,EAAE,cAAc;QACpB,OAAO,EAAE,yCAAyC;QAClD,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK;KAChB;IAED,yBAAyB;IACzB;QACE,IAAI,EAAE,kBAAkB;QACxB,OAAO,EAAE,4CAA4C;QACrD,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM;KACjB;IACD;QACE,IAAI,EAAE,gBAAgB;QACtB,OAAO,EAAE,4DAA4D;QACrE,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ;KACnB;IAED,4BAA4B;IAC5B;QACE,IAAI,EAAE,mBAAmB;QACzB,OAAO,EAAE,uEAAuE;QAChF,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ;KACnB;IACD;QACE,IAAI,EAAE,kBAAkB;QACxB,OAAO,EAAE,6EAA6E;QACtF,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ;KACnB;IAED,qBAAqB;IACrB;QACE,IAAI,EAAE,aAAa;QACnB,OAAO,EAAE,oCAAoC;QAC7C,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM;KACjB;IACD;QACE,IAAI,EAAE,gBAAgB;QACtB,OAAO,EAAE,0EAA0E;QACnF,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ;KACnB;CACF,CAAC;AAEF,MAAM,YAAY,GAA2B,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AAE/E,wEAAwE;AAExE,MAAM,OAAO,WAAW;IACd,QAAQ,CAAqB;IAC7B,QAAQ,CAAiB;IACzB,cAAc,CAAuB;IACrC,eAAe,CAAS;IACxB,uBAAuB,CAAU;IAEzC,YAAY,MAA0B;QACpC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,GAAG;YACd,GAAG,gBAAgB;YACnB,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;SAClC,CAAC;QACF,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,GAAG,EAAE,GAAG,gBAAgB,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;QAC7D,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC;QACvD,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,eAAe,IAAI,yBAAyB,CAAC;QAC5E,IAAI,CAAC,uBAAuB,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,uBAAuB,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC;IACzE,CAAC;IAED,qEAAqE;IAErE;;;OAGG;IACH,WAAW,CAAC,OAAe;QACzB,MAAM,OAAO,GAAqB,EAAE,CAAC;QAErC,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;YACxD,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;YACxD,IAAI,KAA6B,CAAC;YAElC,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;gBAC9C,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;oBACX,WAAW,EAAE,IAAI;oBACjB,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK;oBACnB,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,sBAAsB;oBAC3D,QAAQ;iBACT,CAAC,CAAC;YACL,CAAC;QACH,CAAC;QAED,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;QACrD,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC;QAEnG,OAAO;YACL,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC;YAC5B,WAAW;YACX,OAAO;YACP,WAAW;SACZ,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;IAED,qEAAqE;IAErE;;;OAGG;IACH,UAAU,CAAC,IAIV;QACC,OAAO;YACL,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,WAAW;YACzB,IAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB;YACvB,EAAE;YACF,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc;gBACjB,CAAC,CAAC,oBAAoB,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE;gBAC3C,CAAC,CAAC,iFAAiF;YACrF,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS;YACvB,EAAE;YACF,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,YAAY;YAC1B,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY;YACjB,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,UAAU;SACzB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IACf,CAAC;IAED,qEAAqE;IAErE;;;;;;;;OAQG;IACH,cAAc,CACZ,MAAc,EACd,IAKC;QAED,yBAAyB;QACzB,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;YACzC,OAAO;gBACL,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK;gBACZ,MAAM,EAAE,kBAAkB,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,sBAAsB,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,GAAG;gBACpF,mBAAmB,EAAE,IAAI;aAC1B,CAAC;QACJ,CAAC;QAED,qCAAqC;QACrC,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,uBAAuB,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;YACrD,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAC9B,6CAA6C;YAC7C,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,kBAAkB,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAE1F,IAAI,CAAC;gBACH,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;YAC1B,CAAC;YAAC,MAAM,CAAC;gBACP,OAAO;oBACL,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK;oBACZ,MAAM,EAAE,oDAAoD;oBAC5D,mBAAmB,EAAE,IAAI;iBAC1B,CAAC;YACJ,CAAC;QACH,CAAC;QAED,iCAAiC;QACjC,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,CAAC;YAChC,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,qBAAqB,EAAE,CAAC;gBAClD,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;oBACtD,OAAO;wBACL,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK;wBACZ,MAAM,EAAE,6CAA6C,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM;wBAChF,mBAAmB,EAAE,IAAI;qBAC1B,CAAC;gBACJ,CAAC;YACH,CAAC;QACH,CAAC;QAED,4DAA4D;QAC5D,IACE,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC;YAC1C,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;YACxC,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC;YAC3C,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,EACzC,CAAC;YACD,OAAO;gBACL,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK;gBACZ,MAAM,EAAE,oEAAoE;gBAC5E,mBAAmB,EAAE,IAAI;aAC1B,CAAC;QACJ,CAAC;QAED,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;IACrD,CAAC;IAED,qEAAqE;IAErE;;;OAGG;IACH,eAAe,CAAC,OAAe;QAC7B,IAAI,SAAS,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC;QAExB,0BAA0B;QAC1B,SAAS,GAAG,SAAS;aAClB,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC;aACtB,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QAE1B,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;IACnB,CAAC;IAED,qEAAqE;IAErE;;OAEG;IACH,WAAW;QACT,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;IAC9B,CAAC;IAED,qEAAqE;IAErE;;OAEG;IACK,kBAAkB,CAAC,OAAyB;QAClD,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;YAAE,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC;QAExC,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAyB,MAAM,CAAC;QAC5C,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YAC5B,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;gBAC1E,QAAQ,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;YAC5B,CAAC;QACH,CAAC;QAED,oDAAoD;QACpD,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACxE,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;YAC9C,QAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;QACpB,CAAC;QAED,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;IAClB,CAAC;CACF"}

package/dist/core/RecipientResolver.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/**
+ * RecipientResolver — Resolves recipient context for review decisions.
+ *
+ * Queries RelationshipManager and AdaptiveTrust for known contacts and agents.
+ * Extracts ONLY structured metadata (communicationStyle, significance, themes,
+ * trustLevel, formality) — never free-text fields like notes or descriptions.
+ *
+ * Trust boundary: Fields allowed in reviewer prompts are strictly limited.
+ * See RecipientContext for the full allow-list.
+ */
+export interface RecipientContext {
+    recipientType: 'primary-user' | 'secondary-user' | 'agent' | 'external-contact';
+    /** Communication style preference (formal, casual, technical) */
+    communicationStyle?: string;
+    /** Relationship significance (high, medium, low) */
+    significance?: string;
+    /** Recurring conversation themes */
+    themes?: string[];
+    /** Trust level for agent recipients */
+    trustLevel?: string;
+    /** Formality preference */
+    formality?: string;
+}
+export interface RecipientResolverOptions {
+    stateDir: string;
+    relationships?: {
+        getContextForPerson(id: string): string | null;
+    } | null;
+    adaptiveTrust?: {
+        getProfile(): any;
+    } | null;
+}
+export declare class RecipientResolver {
+    private options;
+    constructor(options: RecipientResolverOptions);
+    /**
+     * Resolve recipient context for a given recipient.
+     *
+     * If recipientId is provided and a RelationshipManager is available,
+     * queries for structured metadata. Otherwise returns conservative defaults
+     * based on recipientType.
+     */
+    resolve(recipientId?: string, recipientType?: string): RecipientContext;
+    /**
+     * Parse the XML context string from RelationshipManager.
+     * Extracts ONLY structured metadata — never free-text fields.
+     */
+    private parseRelationshipContext;
+    /**
+     * Resolve trust level from AdaptiveTrust profile.
+     */
+    private resolveTrustLevel;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=RecipientResolver.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/RecipientResolver.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"RecipientResolver.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/core/RecipientResolver.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;GASG;AAEH,MAAM,WAAW,gBAAgB;IAC/B,aAAa,EAAE,cAAc,GAAG,gBAAgB,GAAG,OAAO,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC;IAChF,iEAAiE;IACjE,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC5B,oDAAoD;IACpD,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACtB,oCAAoC;IACpC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAClB,uCAAuC;IACvC,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB,2BAA2B;IAC3B,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACpB;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,wBAAwB;IACvC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE;QACd,mBAAmB,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;KAChD,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IACT,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE;QACd,UAAU,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC;KACnB,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;CACV;AA4CD,qBAAa,iBAAiB;IAC5B,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAA2B;gBAE9B,OAAO,EAAE,wBAAwB;IAI7C;;;;;;OAMG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,gBAAgB;IAwBvE;;;OAGG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,wBAAwB;IA4ChC;;OAEG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,iBAAiB;CAc1B"}

package/dist/core/RecipientResolver.js

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+/**
+ * RecipientResolver — Resolves recipient context for review decisions.
+ *
+ * Queries RelationshipManager and AdaptiveTrust for known contacts and agents.
+ * Extracts ONLY structured metadata (communicationStyle, significance, themes,
+ * trustLevel, formality) — never free-text fields like notes or descriptions.
+ *
+ * Trust boundary: Fields allowed in reviewer prompts are strictly limited.
+ * See RecipientContext for the full allow-list.
+ */
+// ── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/** Extract the text content of an XML-like tag from a string. */
+function extractTag(xml, tagName) {
+    // Tags in RelationshipManager context use "Key: value" format on separate lines,
+    // not actual XML elements. e.g. "Communication style: casual"
+    const pattern = new RegExp(`^${escapeRegExp(tagName)}:\\s*(.+)$`, 'mi');
+    const match = xml.match(pattern);
+    return match ? match[1].trim() : null;
+}
+function escapeRegExp(s) {
+    return s.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
+}
+/** Map a numeric significance (1-10) to a human-readable level. */
+function significanceLevel(numStr) {
+    const n = parseInt(numStr, 10);
+    if (Number.isNaN(n))
+        return 'medium';
+    if (n >= 7)
+        return 'high';
+    if (n >= 4)
+        return 'medium';
+    return 'low';
+}
+/** Map a trust floor string to a simple trust level label. */
+function trustFloorToLevel(floor) {
+    if (floor === 'supervised')
+        return 'supervised';
+    if (floor === 'collaborative')
+        return 'collaborative';
+    return 'untrusted';
+}
+// ── Default contexts per recipient type ────────────────────────────
+const DEFAULTS = {
+    'primary-user': { communicationStyle: 'conversational', significance: 'high' },
+    'secondary-user': { communicationStyle: 'professional', significance: 'medium' },
+    'agent': { communicationStyle: 'technical', trustLevel: 'untrusted' },
+    'external-contact': { communicationStyle: 'professional', significance: 'low', formality: 'high' },
+};
+// ── Implementation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+export class RecipientResolver {
+    options;
+    constructor(options) {
+        this.options = options;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Resolve recipient context for a given recipient.
+     *
+     * If recipientId is provided and a RelationshipManager is available,
+     * queries for structured metadata. Otherwise returns conservative defaults
+     * based on recipientType.
+     */
+    resolve(recipientId, recipientType) {
+        const type = (recipientType ?? 'external-contact');
+        const defaults = DEFAULTS[type] ?? DEFAULTS['external-contact'];
+        const base = { recipientType: type, ...defaults };
+        // Attempt to enrich from RelationshipManager
+        if (recipientId && this.options.relationships) {
+            const xmlContext = this.options.relationships.getContextForPerson(recipientId);
+            if (xmlContext) {
+                return this.parseRelationshipContext(xmlContext, base);
+            }
+        }
+        // For agent recipients, attempt to resolve trust level from AdaptiveTrust
+        if (type === 'agent' && this.options.adaptiveTrust) {
+            const trustLevel = this.resolveTrustLevel();
+            if (trustLevel) {
+                base.trustLevel = trustLevel;
+            }
+        }
+        return base;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Parse the XML context string from RelationshipManager.
+     * Extracts ONLY structured metadata — never free-text fields.
+     */
+    parseRelationshipContext(xml, base) {
+        const result = { recipientType: base.recipientType };
+        // Communication style
+        const commStyle = extractTag(xml, 'Communication style');
+        result.communicationStyle = commStyle ?? base.communicationStyle;
+        // Significance (numeric → high/medium/low)
+        const sigRaw = extractTag(xml, 'Significance');
+        if (sigRaw) {
+            // Format is "N/10" — extract the number
+            const numMatch = sigRaw.match(/^(\d+)/);
+            result.significance = numMatch ? significanceLevel(numMatch[1]) : base.significance;
+        }
+        else {
+            result.significance = base.significance;
+        }
+        // Themes
+        const themesRaw = extractTag(xml, 'Key themes');
+        if (themesRaw) {
+            result.themes = themesRaw.split(',').map((t) => t.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+        }
+        // Formality — infer from communication style if not explicit
+        if (result.communicationStyle) {
+            const style = result.communicationStyle.toLowerCase();
+            if (style === 'formal' || style === 'professional') {
+                result.formality = 'high';
+            }
+            else if (style === 'casual' || style === 'conversational') {
+                result.formality = 'low';
+            }
+        }
+        // For agent recipients, also resolve trust level
+        if (base.recipientType === 'agent' && this.options.adaptiveTrust) {
+            const trustLevel = this.resolveTrustLevel();
+            if (trustLevel) {
+                result.trustLevel = trustLevel;
+            }
+        }
+        return result;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Resolve trust level from AdaptiveTrust profile.
+     */
+    resolveTrustLevel() {
+        if (!this.options.adaptiveTrust)
+            return null;
+        try {
+            const profile = this.options.adaptiveTrust.getProfile();
+            if (profile?.global?.floor) {
+                return trustFloorToLevel(profile.global.floor);
+            }
+        }
+        catch {
+            // Trust resolution failure should not break recipient resolution
+        }
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=RecipientResolver.js.map

package/dist/core/RecipientResolver.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"RecipientResolver.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/core/RecipientResolver.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;GASG;AA0BH,sEAAsE;AAEtE,iEAAiE;AACjE,SAAS,UAAU,CAAC,GAAW,EAAE,OAAe;IAC9C,iFAAiF;IACjF,8DAA8D;IAC9D,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IACxE,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IACjC,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;AACxC,CAAC;AAED,SAAS,YAAY,CAAC,CAAS;IAC7B,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AAClD,CAAC;AAED,mEAAmE;AACnE,SAAS,iBAAiB,CAAC,MAAc;IACvC,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IAC/B,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAAE,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;IACrC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;QAAE,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC;IAC1B,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;QAAE,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;IAC5B,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AACf,CAAC;AAED,8DAA8D;AAC9D,SAAS,iBAAiB,CAAC,KAAa;IACtC,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,YAAY;QAAE,OAAO,YAAY,CAAC;IAChD,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,eAAe;QAAE,OAAO,eAAe,CAAC;IACtD,OAAO,WAAW,CAAC;AACrB,CAAC;AAED,sEAAsE;AAEtE,MAAM,QAAQ,GAA4D;IACxE,cAAc,EAAE,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE;IAC9E,gBAAgB,EAAE,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE;IAChF,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE;IACrE,kBAAkB,EAAE,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE;CACnG,CAAC;AAEF,sEAAsE;AAEtE,MAAM,OAAO,iBAAiB;IACpB,OAAO,CAA2B;IAE1C,YAAY,OAAiC;QAC3C,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC;IACzB,CAAC;IAED;;;;;;OAMG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,WAAoB,EAAE,aAAsB;QAClD,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI,kBAAkB,CAAsC,CAAC;QACxF,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,CAAC;QAChE,MAAM,IAAI,GAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;QAEpE,6CAA6C;QAC7C,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;YAC9C,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;YAC/E,IAAI,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;gBACf,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;YACzD,CAAC;QACH,CAAC;QAED,0EAA0E;QAC1E,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;YACnD,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC;YAC5C,IAAI,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;gBACf,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,GAAG,UAAU,CAAC;YAC/B,CAAC;QACH,CAAC;QAED,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;IACd,CAAC;IAED;;;OAGG;IACK,wBAAwB,CAAC,GAAW,EAAE,IAAsB;QAClE,MAAM,MAAM,GAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;QAEvE,sBAAsB;QACtB,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC;QACzD,MAAM,CAAC,kBAAkB,GAAG,SAAS,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC;QAEjE,2CAA2C;QAC3C,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC;QAC/C,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YACX,wCAAwC;YACxC,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;YACxC,MAAM,CAAC,YAAY,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC;QACtF,CAAC;aAAM,CAAC;YACN,MAAM,CAAC,YAAY,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC;QAC1C,CAAC;QAED,SAAS;QACT,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC;QAChD,IAAI,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACd,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;QAC5E,CAAC;QAED,6DAA6D;QAC7D,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;YAC9B,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;YACtD,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC;gBACnD,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;YAC5B,CAAC;iBAAM,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC;gBAC5D,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC;YAC3B,CAAC;QACH,CAAC;QAED,iDAAiD;QACjD,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;YACjE,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC;YAC5C,IAAI,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;gBACf,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU,GAAG,UAAU,CAAC;YACjC,CAAC;QACH,CAAC;QAED,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,CAAC;IAED;;OAEG;IACK,iBAAiB;QACvB,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa;YAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;QAE7C,IAAI,CAAC;YACH,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;YACxD,IAAI,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;gBAC3B,OAAO,iBAAiB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;YACjD,CAAC;QACH,CAAC;QAAC,MAAM,CAAC;YACP,iEAAiE;QACnE,CAAC;QAED,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;IACd,CAAC;CACF"}