@idevelopers/agentlock 0.1.0

package/dist/util/paths.js

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+import os from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+export function agentlockHome() {
+    return path.join(os.homedir(), ".agentlock");
+}
+export function auditLogPath() {
+    return path.join(agentlockHome(), "audit.jsonl");
+}
+export function licenseCachePath() {
+    return path.join(agentlockHome(), "license.json");
+}
+export function expandHome(inputPath) {
+    if (inputPath === "~") {
+        return os.homedir();
+    }
+    if (inputPath.startsWith("~/")) {
+        return path.join(os.homedir(), inputPath.slice(2));
+    }
+    return inputPath;
+}
+export function normalizeForPolicy(inputPath, cwd = process.cwd()) {
+    const resolved = path.resolve(cwd, expandHome(inputPath));
+    const home = os.homedir();
+    if (resolved === home) {
+        return "~";
+    }
+    if (resolved.startsWith(`${home}${path.sep}`)) {
+        return `~/${path.relative(home, resolved).split(path.sep).join("/")}`;
+    }
+    const relative = path.relative(cwd, resolved);
+    if (!relative.startsWith("..") && !path.isAbsolute(relative)) {
+        return relative.split(path.sep).join("/") || ".";
+    }
+    return resolved.split(path.sep).join("/");
+}

package/dist/util/redact.js

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+const SECRET_KEY_RE = /(key|token|secret|password|credential|authorization|cookie|license)/i;
+const SECRET_VALUE_RE = /(sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}|gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}|npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|[A-Za-z0-9_./+=-]{40,})/g;
+export function redactText(value) {
+    return value.replace(SECRET_VALUE_RE, "[REDACTED]");
+}
+export function redactValue(value) {
+    return redactUnknown(value);
+}
+function redactUnknown(value) {
+    if (typeof value === "string") {
+        return redactText(value);
+    }
+    if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+        return value.map(redactUnknown);
+    }
+    if (typeof value === "object" && value !== null) {
+        const redacted = {};
+        for (const [key, child] of Object.entries(value)) {
+            redacted[key] = SECRET_KEY_RE.test(key) ? "[REDACTED]" : redactUnknown(child);
+        }
+        return redacted;
+    }
+    return value;
+}
+export function tailRedacted(value, maxChars = 4096) {
+    const tail = value.length > maxChars ? value.slice(value.length - maxChars) : value;
+    return redactText(tail);
+}

package/package.json

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+{
+  "name": "@idevelopers/agentlock",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "description": "Local permission firewall for AI coding agents and MCP tools.",
+  "type": "module",
+  "bin": {
+    "agentlock": "dist/index.js"
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "build": "tsc",
+    "prepare": "npm run build",
+    "test": "vitest run"
+  },
+  "files": [
+    "dist",
+    "README.md",
+    "agentlock.policy.example.json",
+    ".mcp.json",
+    ".claude-plugin",
+    "codex-plugin",
+    "skills",
+    "commands"
+  ],
+  "keywords": [
+    "mcp",
+    "codex",
+    "claude-code",
+    "agents",
+    "security",
+    "firewall"
+  ],
+  "license": "MIT",
+  "publishConfig": {
+    "access": "public"
+  },
+  "dependencies": {
+    "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.13.0",
+    "@polar-sh/sdk": "^0.48.1",
+    "zod": "^3.25.67"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "@types/node": "^20.19.1",
+    "typescript": "^5.8.3",
+    "vitest": "^3.2.4"
+  },
+  "engines": {
+    "node": ">=20"
+  }
+}

package/skills/agentlock-workflow/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: agentlock-workflow
+description: Use when running AI coding work under AgentLock permission capsules, secret-safe scans, command checks, or guarded command execution.
+version: 0.1.0
+---
+
+# AgentLock Workflow
+
+Use this skill when an agent task should stay inside explicit local permissions.
+
+1. Call `agentlock_scan_environment` before starting work in a new repo.
+2. Call `agentlock_generate_policy` and create or update `agentlock.policy.json` from the returned policy.
+3. Before reading secret-adjacent files, running shell commands, contacting external domains, or calling broad MCP tools, call `agentlock_check_action`.
+4. Treat `block` as final unless the user changes policy. Treat `needs_approval` as requiring explicit user approval before continuing.
+5. Prefer `agentlock_run_guarded_command` for shell commands so policy evaluation, redacted output, and audit logging happen in one path.
+6. Review `agentlock_audit_log` after sensitive work to confirm what actions were allowed, blocked, or approved.
+7. Never print full secret values, license keys, tokens, cookies, or credential file contents.