@ian2018cs/agenthub 0.1.59 → 0.1.60

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ian2018cs/agenthub",
-  "version": "0.1.59",
+  "version": "0.1.60",
   "description": "A web-based UI for AI Agents",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "server/index.js",

package/server/claude-sdk.js

@@ -549,6 +549,16 @@ async function queryClaudeSDK(command, options = {}, ws) {
                     }
                   };
                 }
+                // 路径重写：将 .claude 路径替换为用户专属目录后告知 SDK 使用新参数
+                if (guardResult.modifiedInput) {
+                  return {
+                    hookSpecificOutput: {
+                      hookEventName: 'PreToolUse',
+                      permissionDecision: 'allow',
+                      updatedInput: guardResult.modifiedInput,
+                    }
+                  };
+                }
               } catch (err) {
                 console.error(`[ToolGuard] Error evaluating ${hookInput.tool_name}:`, err.message);
                 // 守卫出错时不阻塞正常流程，降级为原有权限控制

package/server/services/tool-guard/index.js

@@ -7,27 +7,85 @@
 
 import { evaluateRules } from './rules.js';
 import { reviewWithLLM } from './llm-reviewer.js';
-import { getUserPaths, DATA_DIR } from '../user-directories.js';
+import { DATA_DIR, getUserPaths } from '../user-directories.js';
 import path from 'path';
 
 const VERBOSE = process.env.TOOL_GUARD_VERBOSE === 'true';
 
+/**
+ * 将工具输入中的 .claude 路径重写为用户专属 claudeDir
+ *
+ * 处理以下模式（以便多用户环境下正确访问技能、配置等）：
+ *   ~/.claude/...      → claudeDir/...
+ *   $HOME/.claude/...  → claudeDir/...
+ *   ./.claude/...      → claudeDir/...（相对路径，常见于技能脚本调用）
+ *
+ * @param {string} toolName
+ * @param {Record<string, unknown>} input
+ * @param {string} claudeDir - 用户的 .claude 绝对路径
+ * @returns {Record<string, unknown>|null} 有改动时返回新 input 对象，否则返回 null
+ */
+function rewriteClaudePaths(toolName, input, claudeDir) {
+  if (!input || !claudeDir) return null;
+
+  function replaceInStr(str) {
+    if (!str || typeof str !== 'string') return str;
+    let s = str;
+    // ~/.claude
+    s = s.replace(/~\/\.claude(\/|$)/g, `${claudeDir}$1`);
+    // $HOME/.claude
+    s = s.replace(/\$HOME\/\.claude(\/|$)/g, `${claudeDir}$1`);
+    // ./.claude（前面是行首、空白或引号）
+    s = s.replace(/(^|[\s"'])\.\/\.claude(\/|$)/g, `$1${claudeDir}$2`);
+    return s;
+  }
+
+  const newInput = { ...input };
+  let modified = false;
+
+  if (['Read', 'Write', 'Edit'].includes(toolName) && typeof input.file_path === 'string') {
+    const rewritten = replaceInStr(input.file_path);
+    if (rewritten !== input.file_path) { newInput.file_path = rewritten; modified = true; }
+  }
+
+  if (['Glob', 'Grep'].includes(toolName) && typeof input.path === 'string') {
+    const rewritten = replaceInStr(input.path);
+    if (rewritten !== input.path) { newInput.path = rewritten; modified = true; }
+  }
+
+  if (toolName === 'Bash' && typeof input.command === 'string') {
+    const rewritten = replaceInStr(input.command);
+    if (rewritten !== input.command) { newInput.command = rewritten; modified = true; }
+  }
+
+  return modified ? newInput : null;
+}
+
 /**
  * 评估工具调用是否安全
  * @param {string} toolName - 工具名称（如 Bash, Read, Write, Edit, Glob, Grep）
  * @param {Record<string, unknown>} input - 工具参数
  * @param {{ userUuid: string, cwd?: string }} opts
- * @returns {Promise<{ allowed: boolean, reason?: string }>}
+ * @returns {Promise<{ allowed: boolean, reason?: string, modifiedInput?: Record<string, unknown> }>}
  */
 export async function evaluate(toolName, input, { userUuid, cwd }) {
   if (process.env.TOOL_GUARD_ENABLED === 'false') {
     return { allowed: true };
   }
 
+  // 路径适配：将 .claude 相关路径重写为用户专属目录（多用户模式兼容）
+  const { claudeDir } = getUserPaths(userUuid);
+  const rewrittenInput = rewriteClaudePaths(toolName, input, claudeDir);
+  const effectiveInput = rewrittenInput || input;
+
+  if (rewrittenInput && VERBOSE) {
+    console.log(`[ToolGuard] PATH-REWRITE ${toolName}: .claude paths → ${claudeDir}`);
+  }
+
   const context = buildContext(userUuid, cwd);
 
   // Phase 1: 正则规则快速检查
-  const { denied, uncertain, denyReasons, uncertainReasons } = evaluateRules(toolName, input, context);
+  const { denied, uncertain, denyReasons, uncertainReasons } = evaluateRules(toolName, effectiveInput, context);
 
   if (denied) {
     if (VERBOSE) console.log(`[ToolGuard] RULE-DENY ${toolName}: ${denyReasons.join('; ')}`);
@@ -36,19 +94,21 @@ export async function evaluate(toolName, input, { userUuid, cwd }) {
 
   if (!uncertain) {
     if (VERBOSE) console.log(`[ToolGuard] RULE-ALLOW ${toolName}`);
-    return { allowed: true };
+    return rewrittenInput ? { allowed: true, modifiedInput: rewrittenInput } : { allowed: true };
   }
 
   // Phase 2: LLM 兜底审查
   if (process.env.TOOL_GUARD_LLM_ENABLED === 'false') {
     if (VERBOSE) console.log(`[ToolGuard] LLM disabled, UNCERTAIN→ALLOW ${toolName}`);
-    return { allowed: true };
+    return rewrittenInput ? { allowed: true, modifiedInput: rewrittenInput } : { allowed: true };
   }
 
   try {
-    const llmResult = await reviewWithLLM(toolName, input, context, uncertainReasons);
+    const llmResult = await reviewWithLLM(toolName, effectiveInput, context, uncertainReasons);
     if (VERBOSE) console.log(`[ToolGuard] LLM-${llmResult.allowed ? 'ALLOW' : 'DENY'} ${toolName}: ${llmResult.reason || ''}`);
-    return llmResult;
+    return rewrittenInput && llmResult.allowed
+      ? { ...llmResult, modifiedInput: rewrittenInput }
+      : llmResult;
   } catch (err) {
     console.error(`[ToolGuard] LLM review error for ${toolName}:`, err.message);
     // LLM 失败时安全兜底：拒绝

package/server/services/tool-guard/rules.js

@@ -86,19 +86,8 @@ function checkPathsInContent(content, context) {
   const pathPattern = /(?:^|\s|=|"|')(\/[^\s"'`;|&><){}$]+)/gm;
   let match;
   while ((match = pathPattern.exec(nonCommentContent)) !== null) {
-    const resolvedPath = path.resolve(match[1]);
-    // 安全路径跳过
-    if (SAFE_SPECIAL_PATHS.includes(resolvedPath)) continue;
-    if (SAFE_COMMAND_PATHS.some(prefix => resolvedPath.startsWith(prefix))) continue;
-    if (isPathAllowed(resolvedPath, context)) continue;
-    if (isInTempDir(resolvedPath, context)) continue;
-    // 占位符/示例路径跳过
-    if (PLACEHOLDER_PATH_PREFIXES.some(prefix => resolvedPath.startsWith(prefix))) continue;
-    // API 端点路径跳过（/v1/..., /api/... 等，不是文件系统路径）
-    if (API_PATH_PATTERN.test(resolvedPath)) continue;
-    // 路径在文件系统上不存在 → 不是真实文件（API 路径、变量占位符等），无法被访问
-    if (!existsSync(resolvedPath)) continue;
-    return { denied: true, reason: `访问项目目录之外的路径: ${resolvedPath}` };
+    const bad = checkResolvedPath(path.resolve(match[1]), context);
+    if (bad) return { denied: true, reason: `访问项目目录之外的路径: ${bad}` };
   }
   return { denied: false };
 }
@@ -151,8 +140,19 @@ function hasTempUserSubdir(resolvedPath, context) {
   return resolvedPath.includes('/' + context.userUuid + '/') || resolvedPath.includes('/' + context.userUuid);
 }
 
-/** 系统敏感路径前缀 */
-const SYSTEM_PATHS = ['/etc/', '/usr/', '/var/', '/sys/', '/proc/', '/dev/', '/boot/', '/sbin/', '/lib/', '/bin/'];
+/**
+ * 对已解析的绝对路径执行统一白名单检查（供内容扫描和 Bash 命令扫描复用）
+ * @returns {string|null} null = 通过；字符串 = 越界的路径
+ */
+function checkResolvedPath(resolvedPath, context) {
+  if (SAFE_SPECIAL_PATHS.includes(resolvedPath)) return null;
+  if (SAFE_COMMAND_PATHS.some(prefix => resolvedPath.startsWith(prefix))) return null;
+  if (isPathAllowed(resolvedPath, context)) return null;
+  if (isInTempDir(resolvedPath, context)) return null;
+  if (PLACEHOLDER_PATH_PREFIXES.some(prefix => resolvedPath.startsWith(prefix))) return null;
+  if (!existsSync(resolvedPath)) return null;
+  return resolvedPath;
+}
 
 /** 安全命令路径前缀（用于 Bash 路径提取时排除） */
 const SAFE_COMMAND_PATHS = ['/usr/bin/', '/usr/local/bin/', '/bin/', '/sbin/', '/usr/sbin/', '/opt/homebrew/bin/'];
@@ -163,8 +163,6 @@ const SAFE_SPECIAL_PATHS = ['/dev/null', '/dev/stdin', '/dev/stdout', '/dev/stde
 /** 常见占位符路径前缀（示例/文档用途，不应被视为真实访问路径） */
 const PLACEHOLDER_PATH_PREFIXES = ['/path/to/', '/your/', '/example/', '/placeholder/'];
 
-/** API 路径模式：匹配 REST API 风格路径（如 /v1/images/generations），不是文件系统路径 */
-const API_PATH_PATTERN = /^\/(?:v\d+|api|graphql|rpc|rest|openapi|swagger)\//;
 
 /**
  * 检查单个文件路径的安全性
@@ -589,23 +587,8 @@ const rules = [
       }
 
       for (const rawPath of extractedPaths) {
-        const resolvedPath = path.resolve(rawPath);
-
-        // 白名单：只有以下路径允许通过，其他一律拒绝
-        // 1. 安全的特殊路径（/dev/null 等）
-        if (SAFE_SPECIAL_PATHS.includes(resolvedPath)) continue;
-
-        // 2. 命令路径（/usr/bin/ 等）— 执行命令本身，不是访问文件
-        if (SAFE_COMMAND_PATHS.some(prefix => resolvedPath.startsWith(prefix))) continue;
-
-        // 3. 在用户允许的目录内（user-data/{uuid}/, user-projects/{uuid}/, cwd）
-        if (isPathAllowed(resolvedPath, context)) continue;
-
-        // 4. 在临时目录中且有用户子目录 → 已由 temp-dir-isolation 规则处理，跳过
-        if (isInTempDir(resolvedPath, context)) continue;
-
-        // 不在白名单中 → DENY
-        return { result: 'deny', reason: `不允许访问项目目录之外的路径: ${resolvedPath}` };
+        const bad = checkResolvedPath(path.resolve(rawPath), context);
+        if (bad) return { result: 'deny', reason: `不允许访问项目目录之外的路径: ${bad}` };
       }
 
       // 检查命令复杂度：包含变量替换、子 shell 等 → UNCERTAIN