@iaforged/context-code 1.0.72 → 1.0.74

package/dist/src/tools/PowerShellTool/gitSafety.js

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+/**
+ * Git can be weaponized for sandbox escape via two vectors:
+ * 1. Bare-repo attack: if cwd contains HEAD + objects/ + refs/ but no valid
+ *    .git/HEAD, Git treats cwd as a bare repository and runs hooks from cwd.
+ * 2. Git-internal write + git: a compound command creates HEAD/objects/refs/
+ *    hooks/ then runs git — the git subcommand executes the freshly-created
+ *    malicious hooks.
+ */
+import { basename, posix, resolve, sep } from 'path';
+import { getCwd } from '../../utils/cwd.js';
+import { PS_TOKENIZER_DASH_CHARS } from '../../utils/powershell/parser.js';
+/**
+ * If a normalized path starts with `../<cwd-basename>/`, it re-enters cwd
+ * via the parent — resolve it to the cwd-relative form. posix.normalize
+ * preserves leading `..` (no cwd context), so `../project/hooks` with
+ * cwd=/x/project stays `../project/hooks` and misses the `hooks/` prefix
+ * match even though it resolves to the same directory at runtime.
+ * Check/use divergence: validator sees `../project/hooks`, PowerShell
+ * resolves against cwd to `hooks`.
+ */
+function resolveCwdReentry(normalized) {
+    if (!normalized.startsWith('../'))
+        return normalized;
+    const cwdBase = basename(getCwd()).toLowerCase();
+    if (!cwdBase)
+        return normalized;
+    // Iteratively strip `../<cwd-basename>/` pairs (handles `../../p/p/hooks`
+    // when cwd has repeated basename segments is unlikely, but one-level is
+    // the common attack).
+    const prefix = '../' + cwdBase + '/';
+    let s = normalized;
+    while (s.startsWith(prefix)) {
+        s = s.slice(prefix.length);
+    }
+    // Also handle exact `../<cwd-basename>` (no trailing slash)
+    if (s === '../' + cwdBase)
+        return '.';
+    return s;
+}
+/**
+ * Normalize PS arg text → canonical path for git-internal matching.
+ * Order matters: structural strips first (colon-bound param, quotes,
+ * backtick escapes, provider prefix, drive-relative prefix), then NTFS
+ * per-component trailing-strip (spaces always; dots only if not `./..`
+ * after space-strip), then posix.normalize (resolves `..`, `.`, `//`),
+ * then case-fold.
+ */
+function normalizeGitPathArg(arg) {
+    let s = arg;
+    // Normalize parameter prefixes: dash chars (–, —, ―) and forward-slash
+    // (PS 5.1). /Path:hooks/pre-commit → extract colon-bound value. (bug #28)
+    if (s.length > 0 && (PS_TOKENIZER_DASH_CHARS.has(s[0]) || s[0] === '/')) {
+        const c = s.indexOf(':', 1);
+        if (c > 0)
+            s = s.slice(c + 1);
+    }
+    s = s.replace(/^['"]|['"]$/g, '');
+    s = s.replace(/`/g, '');
+    // PS provider-qualified path: FileSystem::hooks/pre-commit → hooks/pre-commit
+    // Also handles fully-qualified form: Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\FileSystem::path
+    s = s.replace(/^(?:[A-Za-z0-9_.]+\\){0,3}FileSystem::/i, '');
+    // Drive-relative C:foo (no separator after colon) is cwd-relative on that
+    // drive. C:\foo (WITH separator) is absolute and must NOT match — the
+    // negative lookahead preserves it.
+    s = s.replace(/^[A-Za-z]:(?![/\\])/, '');
+    s = s.replace(/\\/g, '/');
+    // Win32 CreateFileW per-component: iteratively strip trailing spaces,
+    // then trailing dots, stopping if the result is `.` or `..` (special).
+    // `.. ` → `..`, `.. .` → `..`, `...` → '' → `.`, `hooks .` → `hooks`.
+    // Originally-'' (leading slash split) stays '' (absolute-path marker).
+    s = s
+        .split('/')
+        .map(c => {
+        if (c === '')
+            return c;
+        let prev;
+        do {
+            prev = c;
+            c = c.replace(/ +$/, '');
+            if (c === '.' || c === '..')
+                return c;
+            c = c.replace(/\.+$/, '');
+        } while (c !== prev);
+        return c || '.';
+    })
+        .join('/');
+    s = posix.normalize(s);
+    if (s.startsWith('./'))
+        s = s.slice(2);
+    return s.toLowerCase();
+}
+const GIT_INTERNAL_PREFIXES = ['head', 'objects', 'refs', 'hooks'];
+/**
+ * SECURITY: Resolve a normalized path that escapes cwd (leading `../` or
+ * absolute) against the actual cwd, then check if it lands back INSIDE cwd.
+ * If so, strip cwd and return the cwd-relative remainder for prefix matching.
+ * If it lands outside cwd, return null (genuinely external — path-validation's
+ * concern). Covers `..\<cwd-basename>\HEAD` and `C:\<full-cwd>\HEAD` which
+ * posix.normalize alone cannot resolve (it leaves leading `..` as-is).
+ *
+ * This is the SOLE guard for the bare-repo HEAD attack. path-validation's
+ * DANGEROUS_FILES deliberately excludes bare `HEAD` (false-positive risk
+ * on legitimate non-git files named HEAD) and DANGEROUS_DIRECTORIES
+ * matches per-segment `.git` only — so `<cwd>/HEAD` passes that layer.
+ * The cwd-resolution here is load-bearing; do not remove without adding
+ * an alternative guard.
+ */
+function resolveEscapingPathToCwdRelative(n) {
+    const cwd = getCwd();
+    // Reconstruct a platform-resolvable path from the posix-normalized form.
+    // `n` has forward slashes (normalizeGitPathArg converted \\ → /); resolve()
+    // handles forward slashes on Windows.
+    const abs = resolve(cwd, n);
+    const cwdWithSep = cwd.endsWith(sep) ? cwd : cwd + sep;
+    // Case-insensitive comparison: normalizeGitPathArg lowercased `n`, so
+    // resolve() output has lowercase components from `n` but cwd may be
+    // mixed-case (e.g. C:\Users\...). Windows paths are case-insensitive.
+    const absLower = abs.toLowerCase();
+    const cwdLower = cwd.toLowerCase();
+    const cwdWithSepLower = cwdWithSep.toLowerCase();
+    if (absLower === cwdLower)
+        return '.';
+    if (!absLower.startsWith(cwdWithSepLower))
+        return null;
+    return abs.slice(cwdWithSep.length).replace(/\\/g, '/').toLowerCase();
+}
+function matchesGitInternalPrefix(n) {
+    if (n === 'head' || n === '.git')
+        return true;
+    if (n.startsWith('.git/') || /^git~\d+($|\/)/.test(n))
+        return true;
+    for (const p of GIT_INTERNAL_PREFIXES) {
+        if (p === 'head')
+            continue;
+        if (n === p || n.startsWith(p + '/'))
+            return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+/**
+ * True if arg (raw PS arg text) resolves to a git-internal path in cwd.
+ * Covers both bare-repo paths (hooks/, refs/) and standard-repo paths
+ * (.git/hooks/, .git/config).
+ */
+export function isGitInternalPathPS(arg) {
+    const n = resolveCwdReentry(normalizeGitPathArg(arg));
+    if (matchesGitInternalPrefix(n))
+        return true;
+    // SECURITY: leading `../` or absolute paths that resolveCwdReentry and
+    // posix.normalize couldn't fully resolve. Resolve against actual cwd — if
+    // the result lands back in cwd at a git-internal location, the guard must
+    // still fire.
+    if (n.startsWith('../') || n.startsWith('/') || /^[a-z]:/.test(n)) {
+        const rel = resolveEscapingPathToCwdRelative(n);
+        if (rel !== null && matchesGitInternalPrefix(rel))
+            return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+/**
+ * True if arg resolves to a path inside .git/ (standard-repo metadata dir).
+ * Unlike isGitInternalPathPS, does NOT match bare-repo-style root-level
+ * `hooks/`, `refs/` etc. — those are common project directory names.
+ */
+export function isDotGitPathPS(arg) {
+    const n = resolveCwdReentry(normalizeGitPathArg(arg));
+    if (matchesDotGitPrefix(n))
+        return true;
+    // SECURITY: same cwd-resolution as isGitInternalPathPS — catch
+    // `..\<cwd-basename>\.git\hooks\pre-commit` that lands back in cwd.
+    if (n.startsWith('../') || n.startsWith('/') || /^[a-z]:/.test(n)) {
+        const rel = resolveEscapingPathToCwdRelative(n);
+        if (rel !== null && matchesDotGitPrefix(rel))
+            return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+function matchesDotGitPrefix(n) {
+    if (n === '.git' || n.startsWith('.git/'))
+        return true;
+    // NTFS 8.3 short names: .git becomes GIT~1 (or GIT~2, etc. if multiple
+    // dotfiles start with "git"). normalizeGitPathArg lowercases, so check
+    // for git~N as the first component.
+    return /^git~\d+($|\/)/.test(n);
+}

package/dist/src/tools/PowerShellTool/modeValidation.js

@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+/**
+ * PowerShell permission mode validation.
+ *
+ * Checks if commands should be auto-allowed based on the current permission mode.
+ * In acceptEdits mode, filesystem-modifying PowerShell cmdlets are auto-allowed.
+ * Follows the same patterns as BashTool/modeValidation.ts.
+ */
+import { deriveSecurityFlags, getPipelineSegments, PS_TOKENIZER_DASH_CHARS, } from '../../utils/powershell/parser.js';
+import { argLeaksValue, isAllowlistedPipelineTail, isCwdChangingCmdlet, isSafeOutputCommand, resolveToCanonical, } from './readOnlyValidation.js';
+/**
+ * Filesystem-modifying cmdlets that are auto-allowed in acceptEdits mode.
+ * Stored as canonical (lowercase) cmdlet names.
+ *
+ * Tier 3 cmdlets with complex parameter binding removed — they fall through to
+ * 'ask'. Only simple write cmdlets (first positional = -Path) are auto-allowed
+ * here, and they get path validation via CMDLET_PATH_CONFIG in pathValidation.ts.
+ */
+const ACCEPT_EDITS_ALLOWED_CMDLETS = new Set([
+    'set-content',
+    'add-content',
+    'remove-item',
+    'clear-content',
+]);
+function isAcceptEditsAllowedCmdlet(name) {
+    // resolveToCanonical handles aliases via COMMON_ALIASES, so e.g. 'rm' → 'remove-item',
+    // 'ac' → 'add-content'. Any alias that resolves to an allowed cmdlet is automatically
+    // allowed. Tier 3 cmdlets (new-item, copy-item, move-item, etc.) and their aliases
+    // (mkdir, ni, cp, mv, etc.) resolve to cmdlets NOT in the set and fall through to 'ask'.
+    const canonical = resolveToCanonical(name);
+    return ACCEPT_EDITS_ALLOWED_CMDLETS.has(canonical);
+}
+/**
+ * New-Item -ItemType values that create filesystem links (reparse points or
+ * hard links). All three redirect path resolution at runtime — symbolic links
+ * and junctions are directory/file reparse points; hard links alias a file's
+ * inode. Any of these let a later relative-path write land outside the
+ * validator's view.
+ */
+const LINK_ITEM_TYPES = new Set(['symboliclink', 'junction', 'hardlink']);
+/**
+ * Check if a lowered, dash-normalized arg (colon-value stripped) is an
+ * unambiguous PowerShell abbreviation of New-Item's -ItemType or -Type param.
+ * Min prefixes: `-it` (avoids ambiguity with other New-Item params), `-ty`
+ * (avoids `-t` colliding with `-Target`).
+ */
+function isItemTypeParamAbbrev(p) {
+    return ((p.length >= 3 && '-itemtype'.startsWith(p)) ||
+        (p.length >= 3 && '-type'.startsWith(p)));
+}
+/**
+ * Detects New-Item creating a filesystem link (-ItemType SymbolicLink /
+ * Junction / HardLink, or the -Type alias). Links poison subsequent path
+ * resolution the same way Set-Location/New-PSDrive do: a relative path
+ * through the link resolves to the link target, not the validator's view.
+ * Finding #18.
+ *
+ * Handles PS parameter abbreviation (`-it`, `-ite`, ... `-itemtype`; `-ty`,
+ * `-typ`, `-type`), unicode dash prefixes (en-dash/em-dash/horizontal-bar),
+ * and colon-bound values (`-it:Junction`).
+ */
+export function isSymlinkCreatingCommand(cmd) {
+    const canonical = resolveToCanonical(cmd.name);
+    if (canonical !== 'new-item')
+        return false;
+    for (let i = 0; i < cmd.args.length; i++) {
+        const raw = cmd.args[i] ?? '';
+        if (raw.length === 0)
+            continue;
+        // Normalize unicode dash prefixes (–, —, ―) and forward-slash (PS 5.1
+        // parameter prefix) → ASCII `-` so prefix comparison works. PS tokenizer
+        // treats all four dash chars plus `/` as parameter markers. (bug #26)
+        const normalized = PS_TOKENIZER_DASH_CHARS.has(raw[0]) || raw[0] === '/'
+            ? '-' + raw.slice(1)
+            : raw;
+        const lower = normalized.toLowerCase();
+        // Split colon-bound value: -it:SymbolicLink → param='-it', val='symboliclink'
+        const colonIdx = lower.indexOf(':', 1);
+        const paramRaw = colonIdx > 0 ? lower.slice(0, colonIdx) : lower;
+        // Strip backtick escapes: -Item`Type → -ItemType (bug #22)
+        const param = paramRaw.replace(/`/g, '');
+        if (!isItemTypeParamAbbrev(param))
+            continue;
+        const rawVal = colonIdx > 0
+            ? lower.slice(colonIdx + 1)
+            : (cmd.args[i + 1]?.toLowerCase() ?? '');
+        // Strip backtick escapes from colon-bound value: -it:Sym`bolicLink → symboliclink
+        // Mirrors the param-name strip at L103. Space-separated args use .value
+        // (backtick-resolved by .NET parser), but colon-bound uses .text (raw source).
+        // Strip surrounding quotes: -it:'SymbolicLink' or -it:"Junction" (bug #6)
+        const val = rawVal.replace(/`/g, '').replace(/^['"]|['"]$/g, '');
+        if (LINK_ITEM_TYPES.has(val))
+            return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+/**
+ * Checks if commands should be handled differently based on the current permission mode.
+ *
+ * In acceptEdits mode, auto-allows filesystem-modifying PowerShell cmdlets.
+ * Uses the AST to resolve aliases before checking the allowlist.
+ *
+ * @param input - The PowerShell command input
+ * @param parsed - The parsed AST of the command
+ * @param toolPermissionContext - Context containing mode and permissions
+ * @returns
+ * - 'allow' if the current mode permits auto-approval
+ * - 'passthrough' if no mode-specific handling applies
+ */
+export function checkPermissionMode(input, parsed, toolPermissionContext) {
+    // Skip bypass and dontAsk modes (handled elsewhere)
+    if (toolPermissionContext.mode === 'bypassPermissions' ||
+        toolPermissionContext.mode === 'dontAsk') {
+        return {
+            behavior: 'passthrough',
+            message: 'Mode is handled in main permission flow',
+        };
+    }
+    if (toolPermissionContext.mode !== 'acceptEdits') {
+        return {
+            behavior: 'passthrough',
+            message: 'No mode-specific validation required',
+        };
+    }
+    // acceptEdits mode: check if all commands are filesystem-modifying cmdlets
+    if (!parsed.valid) {
+        return {
+            behavior: 'passthrough',
+            message: 'Cannot validate mode for unparsed command',
+        };
+    }
+    // SECURITY: Check for subexpressions, script blocks, or member invocations
+    // that could be used to smuggle arbitrary code through acceptEdits mode.
+    const securityFlags = deriveSecurityFlags(parsed);
+    if (securityFlags.hasSubExpressions ||
+        securityFlags.hasScriptBlocks ||
+        securityFlags.hasMemberInvocations ||
+        securityFlags.hasSplatting ||
+        securityFlags.hasAssignments ||
+        securityFlags.hasStopParsing ||
+        securityFlags.hasExpandableStrings) {
+        return {
+            behavior: 'passthrough',
+            message: 'Command contains subexpressions, script blocks, or member invocations that require approval',
+        };
+    }
+    const segments = getPipelineSegments(parsed);
+    // SECURITY: Empty segments with valid parse = no commands to check, don't auto-allow
+    if (segments.length === 0) {
+        return {
+            behavior: 'passthrough',
+            message: 'No commands found to validate for acceptEdits mode',
+        };
+    }
+    // SECURITY: Compound cwd desync guard — BashTool parity.
+    // When any statement in a compound contains Set-Location/Push-Location/Pop-Location
+    // (or aliases like cd, sl, chdir, pushd, popd), the cwd changes between statements.
+    // Path validation resolves relative paths against the stale process cwd, so a write
+    // cmdlet in a later statement targets a different directory than the validator checked.
+    // Example: `Set-Location ./.claude; Set-Content ./settings.json '...'` — the validator
+    // sees ./settings.json as /project/settings.json, but PowerShell writes to
+    // /project/.claude/settings.json. Refuse to auto-allow any write operation in a
+    // compound that contains a cwd-changing command. This matches BashTool's
+    // compoundCommandHasCd guard (BashTool/pathValidation.ts:630-655).
+    const totalCommands = segments.reduce((sum, seg) => sum + seg.commands.length, 0);
+    if (totalCommands > 1) {
+        let hasCdCommand = false;
+        let hasSymlinkCreate = false;
+        let hasWriteCommand = false;
+        for (const seg of segments) {
+            for (const cmd of seg.commands) {
+                if (cmd.elementType !== 'CommandAst')
+                    continue;
+                if (isCwdChangingCmdlet(cmd.name))
+                    hasCdCommand = true;
+                if (isSymlinkCreatingCommand(cmd))
+                    hasSymlinkCreate = true;
+                if (isAcceptEditsAllowedCmdlet(cmd.name))
+                    hasWriteCommand = true;
+            }
+        }
+        if (hasCdCommand && hasWriteCommand) {
+            return {
+                behavior: 'passthrough',
+                message: 'Compound command contains a directory-changing command (Set-Location/Push-Location/Pop-Location) with a write operation — cannot auto-allow because path validation uses stale cwd',
+            };
+        }
+        // SECURITY: Link-create compound guard (finding #18). Mirrors the cd
+        // guard above. `New-Item -ItemType SymbolicLink -Path ./link -Value /etc;
+        // Get-Content ./link/passwd` — path validation resolves ./link/passwd
+        // against cwd (no link there at validation time), but runtime follows
+        // the just-created link to /etc/passwd. Same TOCTOU shape as cwd desync.
+        // Applies to SymbolicLink, Junction, and HardLink — all three redirect
+        // path resolution at runtime.
+        // No `hasWriteCommand` requirement: read-through-symlink is equally
+        // dangerous (exfil via Get-Content ./link/etc/shadow), and any other
+        // command using paths after a just-created link is unvalidatable.
+        if (hasSymlinkCreate) {
+            return {
+                behavior: 'passthrough',
+                message: 'Compound command creates a filesystem link (New-Item -ItemType SymbolicLink/Junction/HardLink) — cannot auto-allow because path validation cannot follow just-created links',
+            };
+        }
+    }
+    for (const segment of segments) {
+        for (const cmd of segment.commands) {
+            if (cmd.elementType !== 'CommandAst') {
+                // SECURITY: This guard is load-bearing for THREE cases. Do not narrow it.
+                //
+                // 1. Expression pipeline sources (designed): '/etc/passwd' | Remove-Item
+                //    — the string literal is CommandExpressionAst, piped value binds to
+                //    -Path. We cannot statically know what path it represents.
+                //
+                // 2. Control-flow statements (accidental but relied upon):
+                //    foreach ($x in ...) { Remove-Item $x }. Non-PipelineAst statements
+                //    produce a synthetic CommandExpressionAst entry in segment.commands
+                //    (parser.ts transformStatement). Without this guard, Remove-Item $x
+                //    in nestedCommands would be checked below and auto-allowed — but $x
+                //    is a loop-bound variable we cannot validate.
+                //
+                // 3. Non-PipelineAst redirection coverage (accidental): cmd && cmd2 > /tmp
+                //    also produces a synthetic element here. isReadOnlyCommand relies on
+                //    the same accident (its allowlist rejects the synthetic element's
+                //    full-text name), so both paths fail safe together.
+                return {
+                    behavior: 'passthrough',
+                    message: `Pipeline contains expression source (${cmd.elementType}) that cannot be statically validated`,
+                };
+            }
+            // SECURITY: nameType is computed from the raw name before stripModulePrefix.
+            // 'application' = raw name had path chars (. \\ /). scripts\\Remove-Item
+            // strips to Remove-Item and would match ACCEPT_EDITS_ALLOWED_CMDLETS below,
+            // but PowerShell runs scripts\\Remove-Item.ps1. Same gate as isAllowlistedCommand.
+            if (cmd.nameType === 'application') {
+                return {
+                    behavior: 'passthrough',
+                    message: `Command '${cmd.name}' resolved from a path-like name and requires approval`,
+                };
+            }
+            // SECURITY: elementTypes whitelist — same as isAllowlistedCommand.
+            // deriveSecurityFlags above checks hasSubExpressions/etc. but does NOT
+            // flag bare Variable/Other elementTypes. `Remove-Item $env:PATH`:
+            //   elementTypes = ['StringConstant', 'Variable']
+            //   deriveSecurityFlags: no subexpression → passes
+            //   checkPathConstraints: resolves literal text '$env:PATH' as relative
+            //     path → cwd/$env:PATH → inside cwd → allow
+            //   RUNTIME: PowerShell expands $env:PATH → deletes actual env value path
+            // isAllowlistedCommand rejects non-StringConstant/Parameter; this is the
+            // acceptEdits parity gate.
+            //
+            // Also check colon-bound expression metachars (same as isAllowlistedCommand's
+            // colon-bound check). `Remove-Item -Path:(1 > /tmp/x)`:
+            //   elementTypes = ['StringConstant', 'Parameter'] — passes whitelist above
+            //   deriveSecurityFlags: ParenExpressionAst in .Argument not detected by
+            //     Get-SecurityPatterns (ParenExpressionAst not in FindAll filter)
+            //   checkPathConstraints: literal text '-Path:(1 > /tmp/x)' not a path
+            //   RUNTIME: paren evaluates, redirection writes /tmp/x → arbitrary write
+            if (cmd.elementTypes) {
+                for (let i = 1; i < cmd.elementTypes.length; i++) {
+                    const t = cmd.elementTypes[i];
+                    if (t !== 'StringConstant' && t !== 'Parameter') {
+                        return {
+                            behavior: 'passthrough',
+                            message: `Command argument has unvalidatable type (${t}) — variable paths cannot be statically resolved`,
+                        };
+                    }
+                    if (t === 'Parameter') {
+                        // elementTypes[i] ↔ args[i-1] (elementTypes[0] is the command name).
+                        const arg = cmd.args[i - 1] ?? '';
+                        const colonIdx = arg.indexOf(':');
+                        if (colonIdx > 0 && /[$(@{[]/.test(arg.slice(colonIdx + 1))) {
+                            return {
+                                behavior: 'passthrough',
+                                message: 'Colon-bound parameter contains an expression that cannot be statically validated',
+                            };
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            // Safe output cmdlets (Out-Null, etc.) and allowlisted pipeline-tail
+            // transformers (Format-*, Measure-Object, Select-Object, etc.) don't
+            // affect the semantics of the preceding command. Skip them so
+            // `Remove-Item ./foo | Out-Null` or `Set-Content ./foo hi | Format-Table`
+            // auto-allows the same as the bare write cmdlet. isAllowlistedPipelineTail
+            // is the narrow fallback for cmdlets moved from SAFE_OUTPUT_CMDLETS to
+            // CMDLET_ALLOWLIST (argLeaksValue validates their args).
+            if (isSafeOutputCommand(cmd.name) ||
+                isAllowlistedPipelineTail(cmd, input.command)) {
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (!isAcceptEditsAllowedCmdlet(cmd.name)) {
+                return {
+                    behavior: 'passthrough',
+                    message: `No mode-specific handling for '${cmd.name}' in acceptEdits mode`,
+                };
+            }
+            // SECURITY: Reject commands with unclassifiable argument types. 'Other'
+            // covers HashtableAst, ConvertExpressionAst, BinaryExpressionAst — all
+            // can contain nested redirections or code that the parser cannot fully
+            // decompose. isAllowlistedCommand (readOnlyValidation.ts) already
+            // enforces this whitelist via argLeaksValue; this closes the same gap
+            // in acceptEdits mode. Without this, @{k='payload' > ~/.bashrc} as a
+            // -Value argument passes because HashtableAst maps to 'Other'.
+            // argLeaksValue also catches colon-bound variables (-Flag:$env:SECRET).
+            if (argLeaksValue(cmd.name, cmd)) {
+                return {
+                    behavior: 'passthrough',
+                    message: `Arguments in '${cmd.name}' cannot be statically validated in acceptEdits mode`,
+                };
+            }
+        }
+        // Also check nested commands from control flow statements
+        if (segment.nestedCommands) {
+            for (const cmd of segment.nestedCommands) {
+                if (cmd.elementType !== 'CommandAst') {
+                    // SECURITY: Same as above — non-CommandAst element in nested commands
+                    // (control flow bodies) cannot be statically validated as a path source.
+                    return {
+                        behavior: 'passthrough',
+                        message: `Nested expression element (${cmd.elementType}) cannot be statically validated`,
+                    };
+                }
+                if (cmd.nameType === 'application') {
+                    return {
+                        behavior: 'passthrough',
+                        message: `Nested command '${cmd.name}' resolved from a path-like name and requires approval`,
+                    };
+                }
+                if (isSafeOutputCommand(cmd.name) ||
+                    isAllowlistedPipelineTail(cmd, input.command)) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                if (!isAcceptEditsAllowedCmdlet(cmd.name)) {
+                    return {
+                        behavior: 'passthrough',
+                        message: `No mode-specific handling for '${cmd.name}' in acceptEdits mode`,
+                    };
+                }
+                // SECURITY: Same argLeaksValue check as the main command loop above.
+                if (argLeaksValue(cmd.name, cmd)) {
+                    return {
+                        behavior: 'passthrough',
+                        message: `Arguments in nested '${cmd.name}' cannot be statically validated in acceptEdits mode`,
+                    };
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    // All commands are filesystem-modifying cmdlets -- auto-allow
+    return {
+        behavior: 'allow',
+        updatedInput: input,
+        decisionReason: {
+            type: 'mode',
+            mode: 'acceptEdits',
+        },
+    };
+}