@i4ctime/q-ring 0.12.0 → 0.13.1

package/dist/mcp.js

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ import {
   tunnelList,
   tunnelRead,
   verifyAuditChain
-} from "./chunk-YWDKAZWS.js";
+} from "./chunk-Q3UCKJAJ.js";
 
 // src/mcp.ts
 import { StdioServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js";
@@ -2491,7 +2491,7 @@ function registerToolingTools(server2) {
         "Inject only secrets carrying at least one of these tags. Combinable with `keys` as an AND filter."
       ),
       profile: z9.enum(["unrestricted", "restricted", "ci"]).optional().default("restricted").describe(
-        "Exec sandbox profile. 'restricted' (default) limits PATH and inheritable env vars; 'ci' is restricted plus CI-friendly defaults (no TTY); 'unrestricted' inherits the full server environment \u2014 only pick this when you understand the leak risk."
+        "Exec sandbox profile. 'restricted' (default) denies a fixed list of network-tool binaries (curl, wget, ssh, scp, nc, netcat, ncat), strips proxy env vars, and caps runtime at 30s \u2014 it is NOT a real sandbox: it does not restrict PATH, and interpreters invoked directly (python, node, perl, etc.) can still make network requests and read the injected secret env vars. 'ci' allows network with a 300s cap and blocks a few destructive commands; 'unrestricted' inherits the full server environment. For untrusted commands use OS-level isolation (containers, network namespaces), not this profile."
       ),
       scope: scope6,
       projectPath: projectPath6,
@@ -2658,7 +2658,7 @@ ${result.stderr}`);
           `Dashboard already running at ${dashboardInstance.url}`
         );
       }
-      const { startDashboardServer } = await import("./dashboard-HHJY73JX.js");
+      const { startDashboardServer } = await import("./dashboard-2UDYGGTT.js");
       dashboardInstance = startDashboardServer({ port: params.port });
       return text(
         `Dashboard started at ${dashboardInstance.url}