@hyper.authio/server 0.7.0 → 0.8.1

package/README.md

@@ -34,12 +34,13 @@ try {
 | `resource` | | The API's own resource identifier (RFC 8707); added to `audiences` and used for RFC 9728. |
 | `resourceMetadata` | off | `true` (or the URL) adds `resource_metadata="{origin}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource{path}"` to `401` challenges (RFC 9728). |
 | `requiredScopes` | | Scopes every request must carry (all); `authioBearer` answers `403 insufficient_scope`. |
-| `clientEncryptionKey`, `clientEncryptionKeyPath` | | Decrypts access tokens Authio encrypts to this key (RSA-OAEP, RSA-OAEP-256) and validates them locally. RSA1_5 is refused (`legacy_algorithm`), even with `allowLegacyEncryptionAlgorithms`. |
+| `clientEncryptionKey`, `clientEncryptionKeyPath` | | Decrypts access tokens Authio encrypts to this key and validates them locally. Without it nothing is decrypted. RSA1_5 is refused (`legacy_algorithm`), even with `allowLegacyEncryptionAlgorithms`. |
+| `encryptionAlgorithms`, `encryptionMethods` | `RSA-OAEP`, `RSA-OAEP-256`; the CBC-HS methods | The JWE `alg` and `enc` accepted, as registered in Authio (AES-GCM may be listed; RSA1_5 cannot: Node cannot decrypt it). |
 | `introspection` | `none` | `none`: local JWT validation. `activeCheck`: then confirmed active by introspection (cached per `jti`), so a revoked token, an ended session or a suspension is refused before the token expires. `introspectionOnly`: introspection alone, for opaque tokens (or encrypted ones without the key). |
-| `client` | | The API's confidential client, needed by introspection: an `AuthioClient` or `{ clientId, clientSecret }` (or a private key). It must be the resource server's introspection client. |
+| `client` | | The API's confidential client, needed by introspection: an `AuthioClient` or `{ clientId, clientSecret }` (or a private key), with `tokenEndpointAuthMethod` as the client is registered. It must be the resource server's introspection client. |
 | `introspectionCacheDuration` | 30 s | Never past the token's expiry; only active answers are kept. |
 | `clockSkew` | 30 s | |
-| `validAlgorithms` | RS*, PS*, ES* | |
+| `accessTokenSignedResponseAlg` | RS*, PS*, ES* (never HS*) | The algorithm (or several) access tokens are signed with, as the client is registered in Authio. HS256/384/512 are verified with the `clientSecret` of `client: { clientId, clientSecret }` (at least 32, 48 or 64 bytes). |
 | `rejectNonAccessTokens` | `true` | Refuses a token whose `typ` is not `Bearer` (an ID token, for one). |
 | `roleClaims` | `["role"]` | Claims holding flat role names (a Role claim mapper). |
 | `groupClaims` | `["groups"]` | Claims holding group names (a Group claim mapper). |
@@ -60,6 +61,26 @@ const path = protectedResourceMetadataPath(verifier.resource!); // /.well-known/
 const document = createProtectedResourceMetadata({ issuer, resource: verifier.resource!, scopesSupported: ["orders:read"] });
 ```
 
+### Access tokens signed with the client secret (HS*)
+
+Authio signs a client's access tokens with the algorithm of its access token setting. When that is HS256, HS384 or
+HS512, the signature is made with the client secret: only who holds the secret validates the token locally, so that is
+the client's own API.
+
+```ts
+const verifier = createAuthioVerifier({
+  issuer,
+  audiences: "storefront",
+  accessTokenSignedResponseAlg: "HS256",
+  client: { clientId: "storefront", clientSecret: process.env.AUTHIO_CLIENT_SECRET! }, // 32+ bytes for HS256
+});
+```
+
+Third-party APIs never get the secret: they validate such tokens with introspection (`introspection:
+"introspectionOnly"` and their own introspection client). Without `accessTokenSignedResponseAlg`, an HS* token is
+refused (`invalid_algorithm`) with a description naming both ways. `authioBearer` and the MCP packages take the same
+option.
+
 ## The caller
 
 `AuthioUser` reads every form of permission, the same way from a JWT or an introspection answer:
@@ -99,11 +120,25 @@ const refusal = authorize(user, requirePermission("orders", "write"), anyOf(requ
 
 if (refusal) {
   const error = new AuthioForbiddenError(refusal);
-  // 403, with error.wwwAuthenticate when the refusal is about scopes (insufficient_scope) or the sign-in
-  // (insufficient_user_authentication); toProblemDetails(error) for an RFC 9457 body.
+  // error.status: 401 when the refusal asks for a stronger or more recent sign-in (insufficient_user_authentication,
+  // RFC 9470 §3), 403 otherwise; error.wwwAuthenticate for scope (insufficient_scope) and sign-in refusals;
+  // toProblemDetails(error) for an RFC 9457 body with the same status.
 }
 ```
 
+| Refusal | Status | `WWW-Authenticate` |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| No token | `401` | `Bearer` (no `error`, RFC 6750 §3.1) |
+| Token not valid | `401` | `Bearer error="invalid_token", error_description="…"` |
+| Missing scope | `403` | `Bearer error="insufficient_scope", error_description="…", scope="…"` |
+| Sign-in too weak or too old (step-up) | `401` | `Bearer error="insufficient_user_authentication", error_description="…", acr_values="…", max_age=…` |
+| Missing role, permission, group, claim, organization, client or caller kind | `403` | none |
+
+`resource_metadata` (RFC 9728 §5.1) is added to every `401` when the verifier publishes the protected resource
+metadata (`resourceMetadata`): the verifier's own refusals carry it, and `new AuthioForbiddenError(refusal, {
+resourceMetadata: verifier.resourceMetadataUrl })` (or `withResourceMetadata`) adds it to a step-up; the guards of
+`@hyper.authio/express` do it for you. The table is `conformance/challenges.json`, which every Authio library runs.
+
 Rules: `requireScope`, `requireRole`, `requirePermission`, `requireGroup`, `requireClaim`, `requireOrganization`,
 `requireAuthenticationLevel`, `requireAuthenticationMethod`, `requireRecentAuthentication`, `requireCallerKind`,
 `requireClient`, combined with `allOf` and `anyOf`. `authorize` checks every rule and joins their messages.
@@ -111,8 +146,9 @@ Rules: `requireScope`, `requireRole`, `requirePermission`, `requireGroup`, `requ
 **Step-up (RFC 9470)**: `requireAuthenticationLevel(2, { maxAge: 300 })`, `requireAuthenticationMethod("otp")` and
 `requireRecentAuthentication(300)` refuse with `insufficient_user_authentication`, `acrValues` (the level asked for;
 `2` for `mfa`/`otp`/`mca`, `3` for `swk`/`hwk`) and `maxAge`, so the challenge reads
-`Bearer error="insufficient_user_authentication", error_description="…", acr_values="2", max_age=300`. A client
-answers it with `createStepUpAuthorizationUrl` from `@hyper.authio/client`.
+`Bearer error="insufficient_user_authentication", error_description="…", acr_values="2", max_age=300`, answered with
+`401` (RFC 9470 §3; `403` before 0.8.1). A client answers it with `createStepUpAuthorizationUrl` from
+`@hyper.authio/client`.
 
 ## Webhooks
 

package/dist/index.cjs

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 'use strict';
 
 var client = require('@hyper.authio/client');
+var jose = require('jose');
 
 // src/user.ts
 var accessTokenTypes = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["bearer", "api_key"]);
@@ -470,16 +471,30 @@ var AuthioBearerError = class _AuthioBearerError extends client.AuthioError {
     return parameters.length === 0 ? "Bearer" : `Bearer ${parameters.join(", ")}`;
   }
 };
-var AuthioForbiddenError = class extends client.AuthioError {
-  status = 403;
+var AuthioForbiddenError = class _AuthioForbiddenError extends client.AuthioError {
+  /** `401` for a step-up (`insufficient_user_authentication`), `403` otherwise. */
+  status;
   failure;
-  constructor(failure) {
+  /** The API's protected resource metadata URL (RFC 9728), sent as `resource_metadata` with a step-up `401`. */
+  resourceMetadata;
+  constructor(failure, options = {}) {
     super(failure.message);
     this.failure = failure;
+    this.status = failure.error === "insufficient_user_authentication" ? 401 : 403;
+    this.resourceMetadata = options.resourceMetadata;
   }
-  /** The `WWW-Authenticate` value, or `undefined` when the refusal is not about scopes or the sign-in. */
+  /** The same refusal, pointing at the API's protected resource metadata. */
+  withResourceMetadata(resourceMetadata) {
+    if (!resourceMetadata || resourceMetadata === this.resourceMetadata) return this;
+    return new _AuthioForbiddenError(this.failure, { resourceMetadata });
+  }
+  /**
+   * The `WWW-Authenticate` value, or `undefined` when the refusal is not about scopes or the sign-in. A step-up `401`
+   * carries `resource_metadata` when `resourceMetadata` is set.
+   */
   get wwwAuthenticate() {
-    return toForbiddenChallenge(this.failure);
+    const challenge = toForbiddenChallenge(this.failure);
+    return challenge && this.status === 401 && this.resourceMetadata ? `${challenge}, resource_metadata="${escapeQuoted(this.resourceMetadata)}"` : challenge;
   }
 };
 function toForbiddenChallenge(failure) {
@@ -493,15 +508,15 @@ function toForbiddenChallenge(failure) {
 function toProblemDetails(error) {
   if (error instanceof AuthioBearerError)
     return {
-      type: "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc9110#section-15.5.2",
+      type: unauthorizedType,
       title: "Unauthorized",
       status: 401,
       detail: "A valid Authio access token is required."
     };
   return {
-    type: "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc9110#section-15.5.4",
-    title: "Forbidden",
-    status: 403,
+    type: error.status === 401 ? unauthorizedType : "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc9110#section-15.5.4",
+    title: error.status === 401 ? "Unauthorized" : "Forbidden",
+    status: error.status,
     detail: error.failure.message || "The caller is not allowed to access this resource.",
     ...error.failure.error ? { error: error.failure.error } : {},
     ...error.failure.scope ? { scope: error.failure.scope } : {},
@@ -509,6 +524,7 @@ function toProblemDetails(error) {
     ...error.failure.maxAge !== void 0 ? { max_age: error.failure.maxAge } : {}
   };
 }
+var unauthorizedType = "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc9110#section-15.5.2";
 function toHeaderText(text) {
   return [...text].map((character) => character >= " " && character <= "~" && character !== '"' && character !== "\\" ? character : "?").join("");
 }
@@ -553,7 +569,8 @@ var AuthioBearerErrorDescriptions = {
   Unconfirmed: "Authio could not be reached to confirm that the token is active.",
   Empty: "The token is empty.",
   Encrypted: "The token is encrypted; set clientEncryptionKey to decrypt it, or validate it with introspection ('introspectionOnly').",
-  SigningKeysUnavailable: "Authio could not be reached to read its signing keys."
+  SigningKeysUnavailable: "Authio could not be reached to read its signing keys.",
+  Symmetric: "The token is signed with the client's secret (HS*): set accessTokenSignedResponseAlg and the client's clientSecret to validate it locally, or validate it with introspection ('introspectionOnly')."
 };
 var maxCachedAnswers = 1e4;
 function createAuthioVerifier(options) {
@@ -573,7 +590,9 @@ function createAuthioVerifier(options) {
   const resourceMetadataUrl = resolveResourceMetadata(options.resourceMetadata, resource);
   const cacheDurationMs = client.seconds(options.introspectionCacheDuration, 30, "introspectionCacheDuration");
   const clockSkew = client.seconds(options.clockSkew, 30, "clockSkew") / 1e3;
-  const algorithms = options.validAlgorithms && options.validAlgorithms.length > 0 ? [...options.validAlgorithms] : void 0;
+  const algorithms = resolveAccessTokenAlgorithms(options.accessTokenSignedResponseAlg);
+  const symmetric = algorithms?.filter((algorithm) => client.AuthioHmacAlgorithms.includes(algorithm)) ?? [];
+  const clientSecret = symmetric.length > 0 ? resolveClientSecret(options, symmetric) : void 0;
   const rejectNonAccessTokens = options.rejectNonAccessTokens ?? true;
   const claimSettings = { roleClaims: options.roleClaims, groupClaims: options.groupClaims };
   const cache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
@@ -581,7 +600,9 @@ function createAuthioVerifier(options) {
   const encryptionKey = options.clientEncryptionKey ?? (options.clientEncryptionKeyPath ? client.encryptionKeyFromFile(options.clientEncryptionKeyPath) : void 0);
   const decrypt = encryptionKey === void 0 ? void 0 : client.createAuthioTokenDecrypter(encryptionKey, {
     setting: options.clientEncryptionKey === void 0 ? "clientEncryptionKeyPath" : "clientEncryptionKey",
-    allowLegacyEncryptionAlgorithms: options.allowLegacyEncryptionAlgorithms
+    allowLegacyEncryptionAlgorithms: options.allowLegacyEncryptionAlgorithms,
+    encryptionAlgorithms: options.encryptionAlgorithms,
+    encryptionMethods: options.encryptionMethods
   });
   const requiredScopes = Object.freeze([...new Set((options.requiredScopes ?? []).filter((scope) => scope?.trim()))]);
   const introspect = async (token, key, signal) => {
@@ -611,7 +632,7 @@ function createAuthioVerifier(options) {
     }
     let keySet;
     try {
-      keySet = await signingKeys(signal);
+      keySet = client.withClientSecret(await signingKeys(signal), clientSecret);
     } catch (error) {
       throw new AuthioBearerError(AuthioBearerErrorDescriptions.SigningKeysUnavailable, { cause: error, reason: "signing_keys_unavailable" });
     }
@@ -625,6 +646,8 @@ function createAuthioVerifier(options) {
         now: connection.clock.now()
       }));
     } catch (error) {
+      if (error instanceof client.AuthioTokenValidationError && error.reason === "invalid_algorithm" && symmetric.length === 0 && isSymmetricToken(signed))
+        throw new AuthioBearerError(AuthioBearerErrorDescriptions.Symmetric, { cause: error, reason: error.reason });
       if (error instanceof client.AuthioTokenValidationError) throw new AuthioBearerError(error.message, { cause: error, reason: error.reason });
       throw error;
     }
@@ -706,6 +729,35 @@ function resolveResourceMetadata(setting, resource) {
     throw new client.AuthioConfigurationError("resourceMetadata: true needs the API's resource identifier: set options.resource, or pass the metadata URL.");
   return protectedResourceMetadataUrl(resource);
 }
+function resolveAccessTokenAlgorithms(setting) {
+  const algorithms = [...new Set((typeof setting === "string" ? [setting] : [...setting ?? []]).map((algorithm) => algorithm.trim()).filter(Boolean))];
+  const known = [...client.AuthioAsymmetricAlgorithms, ...client.AuthioHmacAlgorithms];
+  for (const algorithm of algorithms)
+    if (!known.includes(algorithm))
+      throw new client.AuthioConfigurationError(`The Authio accessTokenSignedResponseAlg '${algorithm}' is not one of ${known.join(", ")}.`);
+  return algorithms.length > 0 ? algorithms : void 0;
+}
+function resolveClientSecret(options, symmetric) {
+  const given = options.client;
+  const source = given && !isClient(given) ? given.clientSecret : void 0;
+  if (!source)
+    throw new client.AuthioConfigurationError(
+      `accessTokenSignedResponseAlg ${symmetric.join(", ")} is verified with the client secret: pass options.client as { clientId, clientSecret } (an AuthioClient does not expose its secret).`
+    );
+  if (typeof source === "string") for (const algorithm of symmetric) client.requireHmacSecretLength(algorithm, new TextEncoder().encode(source).length);
+  return async () => {
+    const value = typeof source === "function" ? await source() : source;
+    if (typeof value !== "string" || !value) throw new client.AuthioConfigurationError("The Authio clientSecret function returned no secret.");
+    return value;
+  };
+}
+function isSymmetricToken(token) {
+  try {
+    return client.AuthioHmacAlgorithms.includes(String(jose.decodeProtectedHeader(token).alg));
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
 function resolveClient(options) {
   const given = options.client;
   if (!given) return void 0;
@@ -868,13 +920,16 @@ function createOnBehalfOf(options) {
         };
         const token = await getToken(subject, request.signal);
         const response = await attempt(token);
-        if (response.status !== 401) return response;
+        if (response.status !== 401 || isStepUpChallenge(response)) return response;
         await invalidate(subject, token.accessToken);
         return attempt(await getToken(subject, request.signal));
       };
     }
   };
 }
+function isStepUpChallenge(response) {
+  return client.parseAuthioBearerChallenge(response.headers.get("www-authenticate"))?.error === client.AuthioOAuthErrors.InsufficientUserAuthentication;
+}
 function tokenOf(subject) {
   if (!subject) return void 0;
   return typeof subject === "string" ? subject : subject.token;