@hydra-acp/cli 0.1.202 → 0.1.203

package/README.md

@@ -900,21 +900,21 @@ Agents are sourced from the [ACP Registry](https://github.com/agentclientprotoco
 ## Architecture
 
 ```
-            editor         browser          Slack        ← clients
-              │               │               │
-          hydra-acp   hydra-acp-browser hydra-acp-slack  ← hydra extensions
-              │               │               │
-              └───────────────┼───────────────┘
+           VS Code         Chrome            Slack       ← clients
+              │               │                │
+          hydra-ahp   hydra-acp-browser  hydra-acp-slack ← hydra extensions
+              │               │                │
+              └───────────────┼────────────────┘
                               │
                           WSS / HTTP
                               │
                           hydra-acp                      ← hydra daemon
                               │
-                      T1 → T2 → … → Tn                  ← hydra transformers
+                      T1 → T2 → … → Tn                   ← hydra transformers
                               │
-              ┌───────────────┼───────────────┐
-              │               │               │
-            claude         opencode           pi         ← agents
+            ┌───────────┬─────┴─────┬───────────┐
+            │           │           │           │
+         claude     opencode       pi         codex      ← agents
 ```
 
 ### How it works
@@ -1023,6 +1023,7 @@ All three are documented in [`PROTOCOL.md`](PROTOCOL.md), with endpoint shapes,
 The daemon exposes a process-management surface. Treat the service token like an SSH key.
 
 - **Default bind is `127.0.0.1`.** Cross-host access requires TLS + a strong token.
+- **Remote access is opt-in via `hydra-acp daemon listen`.** `tailnet` binds the tailnet IP with a CA-signed cert, `all` binds every interface with a self-signed cert, and `local` goes back to loopback. The daemon refuses a non-loopback bind without TLS; see [Accepting remote clients](#accepting-remote-clients).
 - **No anonymous access.** Every request — REST and WSS — must present the bearer token.
 - **Token rotation:** `hydra-acp init --rotate-token` invalidates the old token; running clients are kicked.
 - **Sandboxing is the user's responsibility.** Spawned agents inherit the daemon's filesystem and shell. Run the daemon under a restricted user or inside a container if you don't trust agents fully.
@@ -1030,31 +1031,6 @@ The daemon exposes a process-management surface. Treat the service token like an
 
 The service token (stored at `~/.hydra-acp/auth-token`, mode 0600) is generated on `hydra-acp init` and required as `Authorization: Bearer <token>` for every REST call and as a WebSocket subprotocol or query parameter for `wss://.../acp`. The token never leaves `~/.hydra-acp/`.
 
-> **Windows:** mode 0600 is not enforcement there. Windows derives file access from ACLs, and Node's `chmod` only toggles the read-only bit, so `auth-token` (along with `config.json`, `peers.json`, `remotes.json`, and the session records) inherits whatever the parent directory grants. On a machine with more than one interactive user, restrict `%USERPROFILE%\.hydra-acp` yourself, e.g. `icacls "%USERPROFILE%\.hydra-acp" /inheritance:r /grant:r "%USERNAME%:(OI)(CI)F"`.
-
-For remote access (binding to a non-loopback address), enable TLS via:
-
-```json
-{
-  "daemon": {
-    "tls": {
-      "cert": "/path/to/cert.pem",
-      "key": "/path/to/key.pem"
-    }
-  }
-}
-```
-
-The daemon refuses to bind to non-loopback hosts without TLS configured.
-`hydra-acp daemon listen` writes all of this for you (see
-[Accepting remote clients](#accepting-remote-clients)). To do it by hand, a
-self-signed cert is enough, since `remote add`'s TOFU handshake only needs a
-key pair to pin, not a CA-signed one:
-
-```sh
-openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -sha256 -days 3650 -nodes -keyout key.pem -out cert.pem -subj "/CN=$(hostname)"
-```
-
 ## License
 
 MIT.