@humanbased/crosscheck 1.2.0-beta.81 → 1.2.0

package/assets/skills/code-review-skill/reference/cross-cutting/xss-prevention.md

@@ -1,264 +0,0 @@
-# XSS Prevention Guide
-
-Language-agnostic Cross-Site Scripting prevention strategies with cross-framework code examples.
-
-> **Related**: [Security Review Guide](../security-review-guide.md) for comprehensive security checklist and decision framework.
-
-## XSS Types
-
-XSS is ranked #3 in the OWASP Top 10 (2021, merged with Injection). Three variants:
-
-| Type | Description | Attack Vector |
-|------|-------------|---------------|
-| **Reflected** | Malicious script reflected off the server in the response | URL parameters, form submissions |
-| **Stored (Persistent)** | Malicious script stored in the database and served to users | Comments, profiles, messages |
-| **DOM-based** | Client-side JavaScript modifies the DOM unsafely | `innerHTML`, `document.write()`, `eval()` |
-
-## Universal Prevention Strategy
-
-1. **Output encoding** — encode data for the context it's rendered in (HTML, JS, URL, CSS)
-2. **Content Security Policy (CSP)** — restrict which scripts can execute
-3. **Input sanitization** — only when rich text is required (DOMPurify)
-4. **Framework auto-escaping** — rely on framework defaults, audit escape hatches
-
-> **Key distinction**: Input validation prevents bad data from entering the system. Output encoding prevents bad data from being rendered as code. Both are necessary; neither alone is sufficient.
-
----
-
-## Cross-Framework Examples
-
-### React
-
-```typescript
-// ✅ React auto-escapes JSX expressions (default safe)
-return <div>{userInput}</div>;
-
-// ❌ dangerouslySetInnerHTML bypasses escaping
-return <div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: userInput }} />;
-
-// ✅ If HTML is required, sanitize first
-import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
-return <div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{
-  __html: DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput)
-}} />;
-
-// ❌ href with javascript: protocol
-return <a href={`javascript:void(${userInput})`}>Click</a>;
-
-// ✅ Validate URL protocol
-const safeUrl = userInput.startsWith('https://') ? userInput : '#';
-return <a href={safeUrl}>Click</a>;
-
-// ❌ eval / new Function with user input
-const result = eval(userInput);
-
-// ❌ innerHTML in refs / effects
-useEffect(() => {
-  ref.current.innerHTML = userInput;
-}, [userInput]);
-```
-
-### Vue
-
-```html
-<!-- ✅ Vue auto-escapes text interpolation -->
-<div>{{ userInput }}</div>
-
-<!-- ❌ v-html bypasses escaping -->
-<div v-html="userInput"></div>
-
-<!-- ✅ Sanitize before v-html -->
-<div v-html="sanitized(userInput)"></div>
-```
-
-```typescript
-import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
-
-export default {
-  methods: {
-    sanitized(input: string): string {
-      return DOMPurify.sanitize(input);
-    }
-  }
-};
-
-// ❌ v-bind:href with javascript: protocol
-// <a :href="userInput">Click</a>  — userInput could be "javascript:alert(1)"
-```
-
-### Angular
-
-```typescript
-// ✅ Angular auto-escapes interpolation (default safe)
-template: `<div>{{ userInput }}</div>`
-
-// ❌ bypassSecurityTrustHtml disables sanitization
-import { DomSanitizer } from '@angular/platform-browser';
-
-constructor(private sanitizer: DomSanitizer) {
-  this.unsafe = this.sanitizer.bypassSecurityTrustHtml(userInput);
-}
-
-// ❌ bypassSecurityTrustUrl with javascript: protocol
-this.unsafeUrl = this.sanitizer.bypassSecurityTrustUrl(userInput);
-
-// ✅ Only use bypassSecurityTrust* with server-validated content
-// and document the reason
-```
-
-### Svelte
-
-```svelte
-<!-- ✅ Svelte auto-escapes expressions -->
-<div>{userInput}</div>
-
-<!-- ❌ {@html} bypasses escaping -->
-<div>{@html userInput}</div>
-
-<!-- ✅ Sanitize before {@html} -->
-<script>
-  import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
-  const sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput);
-</script>
-<div>{@html sanitized}</div>
-```
-
-### Django (Server-Side)
-
-```python
-# ✅ Django auto-escapes template variables
-# template: <p>{{ user_bio }}</p>
-
-# ❌ mark_safe bypasses auto-escaping
-from django.utils.safestring import mark_safe
-return HttpResponse(mark_safe(f"<p>{user_bio}</p>"))
-
-# ❌ autoescape off in template
-# {% autoescape off %}{{ user_bio }}{% endautoescape %}
-
-# ✅ If mark_safe is necessary, escape first
-from django.utils.html import escape
-return HttpResponse(mark_safe(f"<p>{escape(user_bio)}</p>"))
-```
-
-### Server-Side Rendering
-
-```typescript
-// ❌ SSR: injecting raw user data into HTML
-const html = `<div>${userInput}</div>`;
-
-// ✅ Always escape server-side rendered content
-import escapeHtml from 'escape-html';
-const html = `<div>${escapeHtml(userInput)}</div>`;
-
-// ❌ JSON serialization without escaping
-const json = JSON.stringify({ name: userInput });
-// userInput could contain </script> to break out of script tags
-
-// ✅ JSON in HTML: escape < and >
-const safe = JSON.stringify({ name: userInput })
-  .replace(/</g, '\\u003c')
-  .replace(/>/g, '\\u003e');
-```
-
----
-
-## Content Security Policy (CSP)
-
-CSP is defense-in-depth. Even if XSS escapes output encoding, CSP limits what an attacker can do.
-
-```nginx
-# ✅ Recommended CSP (strict)
-Content-Security-Policy:
-  default-src 'self';
-  script-src 'self' 'nonce-{random}' 'strict-dynamic';
-  style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
-  img-src 'self' data: https:;
-  object-src 'none';
-  base-uri 'self';
-  form-action 'self';
-  frame-ancestors 'none';
-```
-
-```typescript
-// ✅ Express middleware
-import helmet from 'helmet';
-
-app.use(helmet.contentSecurityPolicy({
-  directives: {
-    defaultSrc: ["'self'"],
-    scriptSrc: ["'self'", "'nonce-{random}'"],
-    styleSrc: ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'"],
-    objectSrc: ["'none'"],
-    baseUri: ["'self'"],
-    formAction: ["'self'"],
-    frameAncestors: ["'none'"],
-  },
-}));
-```
-
-```html
-<!-- ✅ CSP nonce in script tags -->
-<script nonce="{random}">
-  // Allowed by CSP
-</script>
-
-<!-- ❌ Inline event handlers (blocked by CSP without 'unsafe-inline') -->
-<button onclick="doSomething()">Click</button>
-
-<!-- ✅ Event listeners in JS with nonce -->
-<script nonce="{random}">
-  document.getElementById('btn').addEventListener('click', doSomething);
-</script>
-```
-
-**CSP anti-patterns to avoid:**
-- `script-src 'unsafe-inline'` without nonce/hash
-- `script-src 'unsafe-eval'` (enables `eval()`)
-- `default-src *` (allows loading from any origin)
-- `script-src https:` (allows any HTTPS origin, including attacker-controlled)
-
----
-
-## Input Validation vs Output Encoding
-
-| Layer | What | When | Example |
-|-------|------|------|---------|
-| **Input validation** | Reject/clean data on entry | At API boundary | Reject `<script>` in a name field |
-| **Output encoding** | Encode data for render context | At render time | `&lt;script&gt;` in HTML |
-
-**Rule**: Input validation is a convenience (reject obviously bad data). Output encoding is the security boundary. Never rely on input validation alone.
-
----
-
-## Detection & Testing
-
-```bash
-# Automated scanning
-# OWASP ZAP
-zap-cli quick-scan --spider https://example.com
-
-# Manual testing payloads
-<script>alert(1)</script>
-<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
-" onmouseover="alert(1)
-javascript:alert(1)
-'-alert(1)-'
-
-# Static analysis (code review)
-grep -rn "innerHTML\|dangerouslySetInnerHTML\|v-html\|bypassSecurityTrust\|mark_safe\|@html\|{@html" src/
-grep -rn "eval(\|new Function\|document.write\|setTimeout.*string\|setInterval.*string" src/
-```
-
----
-
-## Review Checklist
-
-- [ ] Framework auto-escaping is relied upon by default (no manual escaping)
-- [ ] `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` / `v-html` / `bypassSecurityTrust` / `{@html}` / `mark_safe` are audited
-- [ ] All HTML rendering escape hatches are preceded by `DOMPurify.sanitize()` or equivalent
-- [ ] CSP is configured with nonce-based or hash-based script-src
-- [ ] No `eval()`, `new Function()`, or `javascript:` URLs with user input
-- [ ] No inline event handlers (`onclick="..."`) when CSP is enabled
-- [ ] Server-side rendered content is escaped before injection
-- [ ] JSON in HTML is properly escaped (`</script>` → `\u003c/script\u003e`)