@humanagencyp/hap-core 0.8.2 → 0.8.4

package/README.md

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-# @humanagencyprotocol/hap-core
+# @humanagencyp/hap-core
 
-Core types, cryptographic primitives, and verification logic for the [Human Agency Protocol](https://humanagencyprotocol.com).
+Core types, cryptographic primitives, and verification logic for the [Human Agency Protocol](https://humanagencyprotocol.org).
 
 ## Install
 
 ```bash
-npm install @humanagencyprotocol/hap-core
+npm install @humanagencyp/hap-core
 ```
 
 ## What's included
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ import {
   verify,
   registerProfile,
   getProfile,
-} from '@humanagencyprotocol/hap-core';
+} from '@humanagencyp/hap-core';
 
 // Register a profile
 registerProfile(profile.id, profile);

package/dist/index.d.mts

@@ -415,6 +415,28 @@ interface AgentProfile {
      * know why 0.5 exists. Absent → surfaces show the version alone.
      */
     whatsNew?: string;
+    /**
+     * Whether receipts under this profile may be looked up BY THEIR CONTENT — a
+     * verifier holding the content supplies its hash and learns which receipts
+     * bind it, without needing a receipt id.
+     *
+     * OFF unless declared, and that default is the point. The lookup is a
+     * confirmation oracle: given a guess at the content it says whether that
+     * content was authorized. Where the bound content has low entropy this is
+     * disclosure, not verification — guessing a message body is hopeless,
+     * guessing `production` takes a second. It is the same enumeration hazard
+     * recorded for per-field commitments, arriving from the other direction.
+     *
+     * Enable only when the bound content is unguessable enough that producing it
+     * is equivalent to already having it: prose, an artifact URL, a whole record
+     * payload. Never for a binding over a short value drawn from a small set.
+     *
+     * Why it must exist at all: most consequential actions cannot carry their
+     * receipt id. A released build was built before the receipt existed, a
+     * content-addressed artifact would change identity if the id were added, and
+     * a forwarded message has usually lost the footer that carried it.
+     */
+    receipt_lookup?: boolean;
     /**
      * v0.3 frame schema (deprecated, kept for backward compat).
      * Used when boundsSchema is not present.

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -415,6 +415,28 @@ interface AgentProfile {
      * know why 0.5 exists. Absent → surfaces show the version alone.
      */
     whatsNew?: string;
+    /**
+     * Whether receipts under this profile may be looked up BY THEIR CONTENT — a
+     * verifier holding the content supplies its hash and learns which receipts
+     * bind it, without needing a receipt id.
+     *
+     * OFF unless declared, and that default is the point. The lookup is a
+     * confirmation oracle: given a guess at the content it says whether that
+     * content was authorized. Where the bound content has low entropy this is
+     * disclosure, not verification — guessing a message body is hopeless,
+     * guessing `production` takes a second. It is the same enumeration hazard
+     * recorded for per-field commitments, arriving from the other direction.
+     *
+     * Enable only when the bound content is unguessable enough that producing it
+     * is equivalent to already having it: prose, an artifact URL, a whole record
+     * payload. Never for a binding over a short value drawn from a small set.
+     *
+     * Why it must exist at all: most consequential actions cannot carry their
+     * receipt id. A released build was built before the receipt existed, a
+     * content-addressed artifact would change identity if the id were added, and
+     * a forwarded message has usually lost the footer that carried it.
+     */
+    receipt_lookup?: boolean;
     /**
      * v0.3 frame schema (deprecated, kept for backward compat).
      * Used when boundsSchema is not present.

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@humanagencyp/hap-core",
-  "version": "0.8.2",
+  "version": "0.8.4",
   "description": "Core types, cryptographic primitives, and verification logic for the Human Agency Protocol",
   "license": "MIT",
   "repository": {

package/src/types.ts

@@ -427,6 +427,29 @@ export interface AgentProfile {
    */
   whatsNew?: string;
 
+  /**
+   * Whether receipts under this profile may be looked up BY THEIR CONTENT — a
+   * verifier holding the content supplies its hash and learns which receipts
+   * bind it, without needing a receipt id.
+   *
+   * OFF unless declared, and that default is the point. The lookup is a
+   * confirmation oracle: given a guess at the content it says whether that
+   * content was authorized. Where the bound content has low entropy this is
+   * disclosure, not verification — guessing a message body is hopeless,
+   * guessing `production` takes a second. It is the same enumeration hazard
+   * recorded for per-field commitments, arriving from the other direction.
+   *
+   * Enable only when the bound content is unguessable enough that producing it
+   * is equivalent to already having it: prose, an artifact URL, a whole record
+   * payload. Never for a binding over a short value drawn from a small set.
+   *
+   * Why it must exist at all: most consequential actions cannot carry their
+   * receipt id. A released build was built before the receipt existed, a
+   * content-addressed artifact would change identity if the id were added, and
+   * a forwarded message has usually lost the footer that carried it.
+   */
+  receipt_lookup?: boolean;
+
   /**
    * v0.3 frame schema (deprecated, kept for backward compat).
    * Used when boundsSchema is not present.