@humanagencyp/hap-core 0.8.1 → 0.8.3

package/dist/index.d.mts

@@ -401,6 +401,42 @@ interface AgentProfile {
     name?: string;
     version: string;
     description: string;
+    /**
+     * One line on what this version changed and why it matters to the person
+     * granting authority — written for them, not for a changelog.
+     *
+     * A grant pins the profile version it was signed against, so authorities
+     * issued before a newer version keep their old terms indefinitely and
+     * nothing prompts an upgrade. A version number alone does not motivate one:
+     * "email@0.4 → 0.5" says nothing, while "binds recipients, not only the
+     * message body" says what the older grant is not protecting.
+     *
+     * Belongs on the profile because the profile is what changed; a UI cannot
+     * know why 0.5 exists. Absent → surfaces show the version alone.
+     */
+    whatsNew?: string;
+    /**
+     * Whether receipts under this profile may be looked up BY THEIR CONTENT — a
+     * verifier holding the content supplies its hash and learns which receipts
+     * bind it, without needing a receipt id.
+     *
+     * OFF unless declared, and that default is the point. The lookup is a
+     * confirmation oracle: given a guess at the content it says whether that
+     * content was authorized. Where the bound content has low entropy this is
+     * disclosure, not verification — guessing a message body is hopeless,
+     * guessing `production` takes a second. It is the same enumeration hazard
+     * recorded for per-field commitments, arriving from the other direction.
+     *
+     * Enable only when the bound content is unguessable enough that producing it
+     * is equivalent to already having it: prose, an artifact URL, a whole record
+     * payload. Never for a binding over a short value drawn from a small set.
+     *
+     * Why it must exist at all: most consequential actions cannot carry their
+     * receipt id. A released build was built before the receipt existed, a
+     * content-addressed artifact would change identity if the id were added, and
+     * a forwarded message has usually lost the footer that carried it.
+     */
+    receipt_lookup?: boolean;
     /**
      * v0.3 frame schema (deprecated, kept for backward compat).
      * Used when boundsSchema is not present.

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -401,6 +401,42 @@ interface AgentProfile {
     name?: string;
     version: string;
     description: string;
+    /**
+     * One line on what this version changed and why it matters to the person
+     * granting authority — written for them, not for a changelog.
+     *
+     * A grant pins the profile version it was signed against, so authorities
+     * issued before a newer version keep their old terms indefinitely and
+     * nothing prompts an upgrade. A version number alone does not motivate one:
+     * "email@0.4 → 0.5" says nothing, while "binds recipients, not only the
+     * message body" says what the older grant is not protecting.
+     *
+     * Belongs on the profile because the profile is what changed; a UI cannot
+     * know why 0.5 exists. Absent → surfaces show the version alone.
+     */
+    whatsNew?: string;
+    /**
+     * Whether receipts under this profile may be looked up BY THEIR CONTENT — a
+     * verifier holding the content supplies its hash and learns which receipts
+     * bind it, without needing a receipt id.
+     *
+     * OFF unless declared, and that default is the point. The lookup is a
+     * confirmation oracle: given a guess at the content it says whether that
+     * content was authorized. Where the bound content has low entropy this is
+     * disclosure, not verification — guessing a message body is hopeless,
+     * guessing `production` takes a second. It is the same enumeration hazard
+     * recorded for per-field commitments, arriving from the other direction.
+     *
+     * Enable only when the bound content is unguessable enough that producing it
+     * is equivalent to already having it: prose, an artifact URL, a whole record
+     * payload. Never for a binding over a short value drawn from a small set.
+     *
+     * Why it must exist at all: most consequential actions cannot carry their
+     * receipt id. A released build was built before the receipt existed, a
+     * content-addressed artifact would change identity if the id were added, and
+     * a forwarded message has usually lost the footer that carried it.
+     */
+    receipt_lookup?: boolean;
     /**
      * v0.3 frame schema (deprecated, kept for backward compat).
      * Used when boundsSchema is not present.

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@humanagencyp/hap-core",
-  "version": "0.8.1",
+  "version": "0.8.3",
   "description": "Core types, cryptographic primitives, and verification logic for the Human Agency Protocol",
   "license": "MIT",
   "repository": {

package/src/types.ts

@@ -412,6 +412,44 @@ export interface AgentProfile {
   version: string;
   description: string;
 
+  /**
+   * One line on what this version changed and why it matters to the person
+   * granting authority — written for them, not for a changelog.
+   *
+   * A grant pins the profile version it was signed against, so authorities
+   * issued before a newer version keep their old terms indefinitely and
+   * nothing prompts an upgrade. A version number alone does not motivate one:
+   * "email@0.4 → 0.5" says nothing, while "binds recipients, not only the
+   * message body" says what the older grant is not protecting.
+   *
+   * Belongs on the profile because the profile is what changed; a UI cannot
+   * know why 0.5 exists. Absent → surfaces show the version alone.
+   */
+  whatsNew?: string;
+
+  /**
+   * Whether receipts under this profile may be looked up BY THEIR CONTENT — a
+   * verifier holding the content supplies its hash and learns which receipts
+   * bind it, without needing a receipt id.
+   *
+   * OFF unless declared, and that default is the point. The lookup is a
+   * confirmation oracle: given a guess at the content it says whether that
+   * content was authorized. Where the bound content has low entropy this is
+   * disclosure, not verification — guessing a message body is hopeless,
+   * guessing `production` takes a second. It is the same enumeration hazard
+   * recorded for per-field commitments, arriving from the other direction.
+   *
+   * Enable only when the bound content is unguessable enough that producing it
+   * is equivalent to already having it: prose, an artifact URL, a whole record
+   * payload. Never for a binding over a short value drawn from a small set.
+   *
+   * Why it must exist at all: most consequential actions cannot carry their
+   * receipt id. A released build was built before the receipt existed, a
+   * content-addressed artifact would change identity if the id were added, and
+   * a forwarded message has usually lost the footer that carried it.
+   */
+  receipt_lookup?: boolean;
+
   /**
    * v0.3 frame schema (deprecated, kept for backward compat).
    * Used when boundsSchema is not present.