@humanagencyp/hap-core 0.5.0 → 0.5.2

package/dist/index.d.mts

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ interface ResolvedDomain {
 }
 interface AttestationPayload {
     attestation_id: string;
-    version: '0.3' | '0.4';
+    version: '0.3' | '0.4' | '0.5';
     profile_id: string;
     /** v0.3 (deprecated) — hash of the authorization frame */
     frame_hash?: string;
@@ -23,8 +23,29 @@ interface AttestationPayload {
     /** v0.4 — hash of the context parameters */
     context_hash?: string;
     execution_context_hash: string;
-    resolved_domains: ResolvedDomain[];
+    /**
+     * v0.4 (deprecated in v0.5) — domain-scoped owners. Optional so v0.5
+     * attestations that carry only `resolved_owners` remain valid. During the
+     * transition the AS emits BOTH `resolved_domains` (internal coverage) and
+     * `resolved_owners` (the v0.5 signed wire field).
+     */
+    resolved_domains?: ResolvedDomain[];
+    /**
+     * v0.5 — the Decision Owner DIDs this attestation covers (person-centric
+     * model; replaces the abstract domain in `resolved_domains`). Carried in the
+     * signed payload so verifiers bind the action to the human(s) who authorized it.
+     */
+    resolved_owners?: string[];
     gate_content_hashes: Record<string, string>;
+    /**
+     * v0.5 (companion spec `intent-disclosure@0.1`) — present iff the attestation
+     * carries an encrypted-intent disclosure object. `sha256:`-prefixed hash that
+     * binds the disclosure's `intent_ciphertext` + `approvers_frozen` into the
+     * signed payload (see {@link computeIntentDisclosureHash}), so a compromised
+     * AS cannot swap the ciphertext/wrapped keys or alter the approver set
+     * without invalidating the attestation signature (companion invariant C2).
+     */
+    intent_disclosure_hash?: string;
     /**
      * v0.4 — commitment mode chosen by the decision owner at attestation time.
      * - 'automatic': agent may invoke bounded tools without per-action review.
@@ -161,6 +182,32 @@ interface ProfileBoundsField {
     /** @deprecated v0.4: use boundType: { kind: 'enum', values: [...] }. */
     enum?: string[];
 }
+/**
+ * v0.5 Content Provenance — how a profile's action content is hashed into a
+ * signed receipt (`contentHash`). The ephemeral-content analog of Output
+ * Provenance: it binds the *bytes* of the action rather than a location.
+ *
+ * Profile-bound and OPTIONAL. Absent → no content hash is produced (full
+ * backward compatibility). The gateway computes the hash; the SP only ever
+ * receives the hash, never the content, so HAP's privacy-minimal design holds.
+ *
+ * The profile declares only the *policy* — whether to bind and how to
+ * canonicalize. It does NOT name the tool field: that is tool-specific and is
+ * resolved at runtime (the same content-field resolver the footer uses for
+ * `kind:"text"`; the whole record payload for `kind:"jcs"`).
+ */
+interface ContentBinding {
+    /** Canonicalization version. A verifier MUST pin the version named here. */
+    version: string;
+    /**
+     * - 'jcs'  → structured writes: RFC 8785 JCS over the record payload.
+     * - 'text' → free text: NFC + LF + trailing-whitespace strip (see
+     *   canonicalizeText), auto-detected content field.
+     */
+    kind: 'jcs' | 'text';
+    /** text only: hash the content BEFORE any appended Suveren footer. */
+    pre_footer?: boolean;
+}
 /**
  * Context field definition within a v0.4 profile.
  */
@@ -280,6 +327,13 @@ interface AgentProfile {
         max: number;
     };
     retention_minimum: number;
+    /**
+     * v0.5 Content Provenance (OPTIONAL, profile-bound). When present, the
+     * gateway computes a `contentHash` for gated writes under this profile and
+     * passes it (hash only) to the SP, which signs it into the receipt. Absent
+     * → no content hash. See {@link ContentBinding}.
+     */
+    content_binding?: ContentBinding;
     /**
      * Tool gating configuration — how MCP tools map to execution context.
      * @deprecated Tool gating now lives in integration manifests (content/integrations/*.json).
@@ -436,6 +490,101 @@ type GatekeeperResult = {
  */
 declare function canonicalize(value: unknown): string;
 
+/**
+ * Content binding — Level 2 content proof (HAP v0.5 Content Provenance).
+ *
+ * A receipt normally proves who/why/bounds/when but NOT the action's content.
+ * Content binding closes that gap: the gateway computes a `content_hash` over
+ * the action's content per the profile's {@link ContentBinding} and hands the
+ * SP only the hash. The SP signs it into the receipt verbatim — it never sees
+ * the content, so HAP's privacy-minimal design is preserved. Anyone holding
+ * the content can recompute the hash and check it against the signed receipt.
+ *
+ * The hash only verifies if the verifier reproduces the EXACT bytes we hashed,
+ * so canonicalization is normative and versioned (pin via `ContentBinding.version`):
+ *
+ *  - kind:"jcs"  → RFC 8785 JCS of the record payload (see {@link canonicalize}).
+ *  - kind:"text" → UTF-8 of the string after {@link canonicalizeText}
+ *    (Unicode NFC, LF line endings, trailing per-line whitespace stripped,
+ *    trailing blank lines removed), taken pre-footer when `pre_footer` is set.
+ *
+ * Both Node and the browser produce byte-identical output: JCS relies only on
+ * environment-independent primitives, and the text rule uses String.normalize +
+ * plain string ops. The SHA-256 is computed with Node `crypto` here (the same
+ * pattern as frame.ts); browser callers that need to recompute use their own
+ * SubtleCrypto digest over the identical canonical bytes.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Canonicalize free text per the v0.5 'text' rule. Idempotent.
+ *
+ *   1. Unicode NFC normalization.
+ *   2. CRLF / CR → LF.
+ *   3. Strip trailing spaces/tabs from every line.
+ *   4. Remove trailing blank lines.
+ */
+declare function canonicalizeText(input: string): string;
+/**
+ * Compute the canonical bytes that a content hash is taken over, WITHOUT
+ * hashing — exposed so verifiers can debug a mismatch by inspecting the exact
+ * serialization both sides should agree on.
+ */
+declare function contentCanonicalBytes(kind: ContentBinding['kind'], content: Record<string, unknown> | string): string;
+/**
+ * Compute a profile-bound content hash, formatted `sha256:<hex>` (matching the
+ * frame/bounds/context hash format used elsewhere in HAP).
+ *
+ * @param binding the profile's content_binding declaration
+ * @param content the record payload (jcs) or the resolved text field (text)
+ */
+declare function computeContentHash(binding: ContentBinding, content: Record<string, unknown> | string): string;
+
+/**
+ * Intent hashing + intent-disclosure binding (HAP v0.5).
+ *
+ * Two shared, environment-independent hashes that the attester (gateway), the
+ * Authority Server, and any approver MUST compute identically:
+ *
+ *  1. {@link computeIntentHash} — `gate_content_hashes.intent`. The intent text
+ *     is canonicalized (Unicode NFC, LF line endings, trailing-whitespace strip
+ *     — the same rule as content-binding's `canonicalizeText`) before hashing,
+ *     so independent multi-owner approvers reproduce an identical hash from the
+ *     same logical statement. See protocol.md → "Intent canonicalization".
+ *
+ *  2. {@link computeIntentDisclosureHash} — `intent_disclosure_hash`, the C2
+ *     binding from companion spec `intent-disclosure@0.1`. It commits the
+ *     encrypted disclosure object (`intent_ciphertext` + `approvers_frozen`)
+ *     into the SIGNED attestation payload, so a compromised AS cannot swap the
+ *     ciphertext/wrapped keys or widen/shrink the approver set without breaking
+ *     the attestation signature.
+ *
+ * Both produce `sha256:<hex>` to match the frame/bounds/context hash format.
+ */
+/**
+ * `gate_content_hashes.intent` for an intent statement.
+ * Canonicalizes the text (NFC / LF / trailing-whitespace strip) before hashing.
+ */
+declare function computeIntentHash(intentText: string): string;
+/**
+ * The exact bytes `intent_disclosure_hash` is taken over, WITHOUT hashing —
+ * exposed so an implementer debugging a mismatch can inspect the serialization
+ * both sides must agree on:
+ *
+ *   intent_ciphertext ‖ "\n" ‖ JCS(sort(approvers_frozen))
+ *
+ * where `intent_ciphertext` is the exact base64url string of the disclosure
+ * object, `sort` orders the approver DIDs by Unicode code point, and `JCS` is
+ * RFC 8785 canonicalization of the sorted array (via {@link canonicalize}).
+ */
+declare function intentDisclosureCanonicalBytes(intentCiphertext: string, approversFrozen: string[]): string;
+/**
+ * `intent_disclosure_hash` — `sha256:<hex>` over
+ * {@link intentDisclosureCanonicalBytes}. Computed by the attester after
+ * encryption and signed into the attestation; recomputed by the AS (at
+ * issuance) and by each approver (on receipt) and compared, fail-closed.
+ */
+declare function computeIntentDisclosureHash(intentCiphertext: string, approversFrozen: string[]): string;
+
 /**
  * Frame Canonicalization for Agent Profiles
  *
@@ -633,4 +782,4 @@ declare function listProfiles(): string[];
 declare function getAllProfiles(): AgentProfile[];
 declare function clearProfiles(): void;
 
-export { type AgentBoundsParams, type AgentContextParams, type AgentFrameParams, type AgentProfile, type Attestation, type AttestationHeader, type AttestationPayload, type BoundType, type CumulativeFieldDef, type CumulativeWindow, type DeclaredFieldDef, type ExecutionContextFieldDef, type ExecutionLogEntry, type ExecutionLogQuery, type ExecutionMappingTransform, type ExecutionMappingValue, type ExecutionPath, type FieldConstraint, type FieldUnit, type GateQuestion, type GatekeeperError, type GatekeeperRequest, type GatekeeperResult, type ProfileBoundsField, type ProfileContextField, type ProfileFrameField, type ProfileToolGating, type ProfileToolGatingEntry, type ResolvedDomain, attestationId, canonicalBounds, canonicalContext, canonicalFrame, canonicalize, checkAttestationExpiry, clearProfiles, computeBoundsHash, computeContextHash, computeFrameHash, decodeAttestationBlob, encodeAttestationBlob, frameHash, getAllProfiles, getProfile, isV4Attestation, listProfiles, registerProfile, validateBoundsParams, validateContextParams, validateFrameParams, verify, verifyAttestation, verifyAttestationSignature, verifyAttestationV4, verifyBoundsHash, verifyContextHash, verifyFrameHash };
+export { type AgentBoundsParams, type AgentContextParams, type AgentFrameParams, type AgentProfile, type Attestation, type AttestationHeader, type AttestationPayload, type BoundType, type ContentBinding, type CumulativeFieldDef, type CumulativeWindow, type DeclaredFieldDef, type ExecutionContextFieldDef, type ExecutionLogEntry, type ExecutionLogQuery, type ExecutionMappingTransform, type ExecutionMappingValue, type ExecutionPath, type FieldConstraint, type FieldUnit, type GateQuestion, type GatekeeperError, type GatekeeperRequest, type GatekeeperResult, type ProfileBoundsField, type ProfileContextField, type ProfileFrameField, type ProfileToolGating, type ProfileToolGatingEntry, type ResolvedDomain, attestationId, canonicalBounds, canonicalContext, canonicalFrame, canonicalize, canonicalizeText, checkAttestationExpiry, clearProfiles, computeBoundsHash, computeContentHash, computeContextHash, computeFrameHash, computeIntentDisclosureHash, computeIntentHash, contentCanonicalBytes, decodeAttestationBlob, encodeAttestationBlob, frameHash, getAllProfiles, getProfile, intentDisclosureCanonicalBytes, isV4Attestation, listProfiles, registerProfile, validateBoundsParams, validateContextParams, validateFrameParams, verify, verifyAttestation, verifyAttestationSignature, verifyAttestationV4, verifyBoundsHash, verifyContextHash, verifyFrameHash };

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ interface ResolvedDomain {
 }
 interface AttestationPayload {
     attestation_id: string;
-    version: '0.3' | '0.4';
+    version: '0.3' | '0.4' | '0.5';
     profile_id: string;
     /** v0.3 (deprecated) — hash of the authorization frame */
     frame_hash?: string;
@@ -23,8 +23,29 @@ interface AttestationPayload {
     /** v0.4 — hash of the context parameters */
     context_hash?: string;
     execution_context_hash: string;
-    resolved_domains: ResolvedDomain[];
+    /**
+     * v0.4 (deprecated in v0.5) — domain-scoped owners. Optional so v0.5
+     * attestations that carry only `resolved_owners` remain valid. During the
+     * transition the AS emits BOTH `resolved_domains` (internal coverage) and
+     * `resolved_owners` (the v0.5 signed wire field).
+     */
+    resolved_domains?: ResolvedDomain[];
+    /**
+     * v0.5 — the Decision Owner DIDs this attestation covers (person-centric
+     * model; replaces the abstract domain in `resolved_domains`). Carried in the
+     * signed payload so verifiers bind the action to the human(s) who authorized it.
+     */
+    resolved_owners?: string[];
     gate_content_hashes: Record<string, string>;
+    /**
+     * v0.5 (companion spec `intent-disclosure@0.1`) — present iff the attestation
+     * carries an encrypted-intent disclosure object. `sha256:`-prefixed hash that
+     * binds the disclosure's `intent_ciphertext` + `approvers_frozen` into the
+     * signed payload (see {@link computeIntentDisclosureHash}), so a compromised
+     * AS cannot swap the ciphertext/wrapped keys or alter the approver set
+     * without invalidating the attestation signature (companion invariant C2).
+     */
+    intent_disclosure_hash?: string;
     /**
      * v0.4 — commitment mode chosen by the decision owner at attestation time.
      * - 'automatic': agent may invoke bounded tools without per-action review.
@@ -161,6 +182,32 @@ interface ProfileBoundsField {
     /** @deprecated v0.4: use boundType: { kind: 'enum', values: [...] }. */
     enum?: string[];
 }
+/**
+ * v0.5 Content Provenance — how a profile's action content is hashed into a
+ * signed receipt (`contentHash`). The ephemeral-content analog of Output
+ * Provenance: it binds the *bytes* of the action rather than a location.
+ *
+ * Profile-bound and OPTIONAL. Absent → no content hash is produced (full
+ * backward compatibility). The gateway computes the hash; the SP only ever
+ * receives the hash, never the content, so HAP's privacy-minimal design holds.
+ *
+ * The profile declares only the *policy* — whether to bind and how to
+ * canonicalize. It does NOT name the tool field: that is tool-specific and is
+ * resolved at runtime (the same content-field resolver the footer uses for
+ * `kind:"text"`; the whole record payload for `kind:"jcs"`).
+ */
+interface ContentBinding {
+    /** Canonicalization version. A verifier MUST pin the version named here. */
+    version: string;
+    /**
+     * - 'jcs'  → structured writes: RFC 8785 JCS over the record payload.
+     * - 'text' → free text: NFC + LF + trailing-whitespace strip (see
+     *   canonicalizeText), auto-detected content field.
+     */
+    kind: 'jcs' | 'text';
+    /** text only: hash the content BEFORE any appended Suveren footer. */
+    pre_footer?: boolean;
+}
 /**
  * Context field definition within a v0.4 profile.
  */
@@ -280,6 +327,13 @@ interface AgentProfile {
         max: number;
     };
     retention_minimum: number;
+    /**
+     * v0.5 Content Provenance (OPTIONAL, profile-bound). When present, the
+     * gateway computes a `contentHash` for gated writes under this profile and
+     * passes it (hash only) to the SP, which signs it into the receipt. Absent
+     * → no content hash. See {@link ContentBinding}.
+     */
+    content_binding?: ContentBinding;
     /**
      * Tool gating configuration — how MCP tools map to execution context.
      * @deprecated Tool gating now lives in integration manifests (content/integrations/*.json).
@@ -436,6 +490,101 @@ type GatekeeperResult = {
  */
 declare function canonicalize(value: unknown): string;
 
+/**
+ * Content binding — Level 2 content proof (HAP v0.5 Content Provenance).
+ *
+ * A receipt normally proves who/why/bounds/when but NOT the action's content.
+ * Content binding closes that gap: the gateway computes a `content_hash` over
+ * the action's content per the profile's {@link ContentBinding} and hands the
+ * SP only the hash. The SP signs it into the receipt verbatim — it never sees
+ * the content, so HAP's privacy-minimal design is preserved. Anyone holding
+ * the content can recompute the hash and check it against the signed receipt.
+ *
+ * The hash only verifies if the verifier reproduces the EXACT bytes we hashed,
+ * so canonicalization is normative and versioned (pin via `ContentBinding.version`):
+ *
+ *  - kind:"jcs"  → RFC 8785 JCS of the record payload (see {@link canonicalize}).
+ *  - kind:"text" → UTF-8 of the string after {@link canonicalizeText}
+ *    (Unicode NFC, LF line endings, trailing per-line whitespace stripped,
+ *    trailing blank lines removed), taken pre-footer when `pre_footer` is set.
+ *
+ * Both Node and the browser produce byte-identical output: JCS relies only on
+ * environment-independent primitives, and the text rule uses String.normalize +
+ * plain string ops. The SHA-256 is computed with Node `crypto` here (the same
+ * pattern as frame.ts); browser callers that need to recompute use their own
+ * SubtleCrypto digest over the identical canonical bytes.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Canonicalize free text per the v0.5 'text' rule. Idempotent.
+ *
+ *   1. Unicode NFC normalization.
+ *   2. CRLF / CR → LF.
+ *   3. Strip trailing spaces/tabs from every line.
+ *   4. Remove trailing blank lines.
+ */
+declare function canonicalizeText(input: string): string;
+/**
+ * Compute the canonical bytes that a content hash is taken over, WITHOUT
+ * hashing — exposed so verifiers can debug a mismatch by inspecting the exact
+ * serialization both sides should agree on.
+ */
+declare function contentCanonicalBytes(kind: ContentBinding['kind'], content: Record<string, unknown> | string): string;
+/**
+ * Compute a profile-bound content hash, formatted `sha256:<hex>` (matching the
+ * frame/bounds/context hash format used elsewhere in HAP).
+ *
+ * @param binding the profile's content_binding declaration
+ * @param content the record payload (jcs) or the resolved text field (text)
+ */
+declare function computeContentHash(binding: ContentBinding, content: Record<string, unknown> | string): string;
+
+/**
+ * Intent hashing + intent-disclosure binding (HAP v0.5).
+ *
+ * Two shared, environment-independent hashes that the attester (gateway), the
+ * Authority Server, and any approver MUST compute identically:
+ *
+ *  1. {@link computeIntentHash} — `gate_content_hashes.intent`. The intent text
+ *     is canonicalized (Unicode NFC, LF line endings, trailing-whitespace strip
+ *     — the same rule as content-binding's `canonicalizeText`) before hashing,
+ *     so independent multi-owner approvers reproduce an identical hash from the
+ *     same logical statement. See protocol.md → "Intent canonicalization".
+ *
+ *  2. {@link computeIntentDisclosureHash} — `intent_disclosure_hash`, the C2
+ *     binding from companion spec `intent-disclosure@0.1`. It commits the
+ *     encrypted disclosure object (`intent_ciphertext` + `approvers_frozen`)
+ *     into the SIGNED attestation payload, so a compromised AS cannot swap the
+ *     ciphertext/wrapped keys or widen/shrink the approver set without breaking
+ *     the attestation signature.
+ *
+ * Both produce `sha256:<hex>` to match the frame/bounds/context hash format.
+ */
+/**
+ * `gate_content_hashes.intent` for an intent statement.
+ * Canonicalizes the text (NFC / LF / trailing-whitespace strip) before hashing.
+ */
+declare function computeIntentHash(intentText: string): string;
+/**
+ * The exact bytes `intent_disclosure_hash` is taken over, WITHOUT hashing —
+ * exposed so an implementer debugging a mismatch can inspect the serialization
+ * both sides must agree on:
+ *
+ *   intent_ciphertext ‖ "\n" ‖ JCS(sort(approvers_frozen))
+ *
+ * where `intent_ciphertext` is the exact base64url string of the disclosure
+ * object, `sort` orders the approver DIDs by Unicode code point, and `JCS` is
+ * RFC 8785 canonicalization of the sorted array (via {@link canonicalize}).
+ */
+declare function intentDisclosureCanonicalBytes(intentCiphertext: string, approversFrozen: string[]): string;
+/**
+ * `intent_disclosure_hash` — `sha256:<hex>` over
+ * {@link intentDisclosureCanonicalBytes}. Computed by the attester after
+ * encryption and signed into the attestation; recomputed by the AS (at
+ * issuance) and by each approver (on receipt) and compared, fail-closed.
+ */
+declare function computeIntentDisclosureHash(intentCiphertext: string, approversFrozen: string[]): string;
+
 /**
  * Frame Canonicalization for Agent Profiles
  *
@@ -633,4 +782,4 @@ declare function listProfiles(): string[];
 declare function getAllProfiles(): AgentProfile[];
 declare function clearProfiles(): void;
 
-export { type AgentBoundsParams, type AgentContextParams, type AgentFrameParams, type AgentProfile, type Attestation, type AttestationHeader, type AttestationPayload, type BoundType, type CumulativeFieldDef, type CumulativeWindow, type DeclaredFieldDef, type ExecutionContextFieldDef, type ExecutionLogEntry, type ExecutionLogQuery, type ExecutionMappingTransform, type ExecutionMappingValue, type ExecutionPath, type FieldConstraint, type FieldUnit, type GateQuestion, type GatekeeperError, type GatekeeperRequest, type GatekeeperResult, type ProfileBoundsField, type ProfileContextField, type ProfileFrameField, type ProfileToolGating, type ProfileToolGatingEntry, type ResolvedDomain, attestationId, canonicalBounds, canonicalContext, canonicalFrame, canonicalize, checkAttestationExpiry, clearProfiles, computeBoundsHash, computeContextHash, computeFrameHash, decodeAttestationBlob, encodeAttestationBlob, frameHash, getAllProfiles, getProfile, isV4Attestation, listProfiles, registerProfile, validateBoundsParams, validateContextParams, validateFrameParams, verify, verifyAttestation, verifyAttestationSignature, verifyAttestationV4, verifyBoundsHash, verifyContextHash, verifyFrameHash };
+export { type AgentBoundsParams, type AgentContextParams, type AgentFrameParams, type AgentProfile, type Attestation, type AttestationHeader, type AttestationPayload, type BoundType, type ContentBinding, type CumulativeFieldDef, type CumulativeWindow, type DeclaredFieldDef, type ExecutionContextFieldDef, type ExecutionLogEntry, type ExecutionLogQuery, type ExecutionMappingTransform, type ExecutionMappingValue, type ExecutionPath, type FieldConstraint, type FieldUnit, type GateQuestion, type GatekeeperError, type GatekeeperRequest, type GatekeeperResult, type ProfileBoundsField, type ProfileContextField, type ProfileFrameField, type ProfileToolGating, type ProfileToolGatingEntry, type ResolvedDomain, attestationId, canonicalBounds, canonicalContext, canonicalFrame, canonicalize, canonicalizeText, checkAttestationExpiry, clearProfiles, computeBoundsHash, computeContentHash, computeContextHash, computeFrameHash, computeIntentDisclosureHash, computeIntentHash, contentCanonicalBytes, decodeAttestationBlob, encodeAttestationBlob, frameHash, getAllProfiles, getProfile, intentDisclosureCanonicalBytes, isV4Attestation, listProfiles, registerProfile, validateBoundsParams, validateContextParams, validateFrameParams, verify, verifyAttestation, verifyAttestationSignature, verifyAttestationV4, verifyBoundsHash, verifyContextHash, verifyFrameHash };

package/dist/index.js

@@ -35,16 +35,22 @@ __export(index_exports, {
   canonicalContext: () => canonicalContext,
   canonicalFrame: () => canonicalFrame,
   canonicalize: () => canonicalize,
+  canonicalizeText: () => canonicalizeText,
   checkAttestationExpiry: () => checkAttestationExpiry,
   clearProfiles: () => clearProfiles,
   computeBoundsHash: () => computeBoundsHash,
+  computeContentHash: () => computeContentHash,
   computeContextHash: () => computeContextHash,
   computeFrameHash: () => computeFrameHash,
+  computeIntentDisclosureHash: () => computeIntentDisclosureHash,
+  computeIntentHash: () => computeIntentHash,
+  contentCanonicalBytes: () => contentCanonicalBytes,
   decodeAttestationBlob: () => decodeAttestationBlob,
   encodeAttestationBlob: () => encodeAttestationBlob,
   frameHash: () => frameHash,
   getAllProfiles: () => getAllProfiles,
   getProfile: () => getProfile,
+  intentDisclosureCanonicalBytes: () => intentDisclosureCanonicalBytes,
   isV4Attestation: () => isV4Attestation,
   listProfiles: () => listProfiles,
   registerProfile: () => registerProfile,
@@ -86,8 +92,52 @@ function canonicalize(value) {
   return "{" + parts.join(",") + "}";
 }
 
-// src/frame.ts
+// src/content-binding.ts
 var import_crypto = require("crypto");
+function canonicalizeText(input) {
+  const nfc = input.normalize("NFC");
+  const lf = nfc.replace(/\r\n?/g, "\n");
+  const lines = lf.split("\n").map((line) => line.replace(/[ \t]+$/, ""));
+  return lines.join("\n").replace(/\n+$/, "");
+}
+function sha256Hex(bytes) {
+  return (0, import_crypto.createHash)("sha256").update(bytes, "utf8").digest("hex");
+}
+function contentCanonicalBytes(kind, content) {
+  if (kind === "jcs") {
+    if (typeof content === "string") {
+      throw new Error('content_binding kind="jcs" expects a record payload (object), got a string');
+    }
+    return canonicalize(content);
+  }
+  if (typeof content !== "string") {
+    throw new Error('content_binding kind="text" expects a string, got an object');
+  }
+  return canonicalizeText(content);
+}
+function computeContentHash(binding, content) {
+  return `sha256:${sha256Hex(contentCanonicalBytes(binding.kind, content))}`;
+}
+
+// src/intent-disclosure.ts
+var import_crypto2 = require("crypto");
+function sha256Hex2(bytes) {
+  return (0, import_crypto2.createHash)("sha256").update(bytes, "utf8").digest("hex");
+}
+function computeIntentHash(intentText) {
+  return `sha256:${sha256Hex2(canonicalizeText(intentText))}`;
+}
+function intentDisclosureCanonicalBytes(intentCiphertext, approversFrozen) {
+  const sorted = [...approversFrozen].sort();
+  return `${intentCiphertext}
+${canonicalize(sorted)}`;
+}
+function computeIntentDisclosureHash(intentCiphertext, approversFrozen) {
+  return `sha256:${sha256Hex2(intentDisclosureCanonicalBytes(intentCiphertext, approversFrozen))}`;
+}
+
+// src/frame.ts
+var import_crypto3 = require("crypto");
 function validateFrameParams(params, profile) {
   const errors = [];
   if (!profile.frameSchema) {
@@ -124,7 +174,7 @@ function canonicalFrame(params, profile) {
   return lines.join("\n");
 }
 function frameHash(canonicalFrameString) {
-  const hash = (0, import_crypto.createHash)("sha256").update(canonicalFrameString, "utf8").digest("hex");
+  const hash = (0, import_crypto3.createHash)("sha256").update(canonicalFrameString, "utf8").digest("hex");
   return `sha256:${hash}`;
 }
 function computeFrameHash(params, profile) {
@@ -208,17 +258,17 @@ function canonicalContext(params, profile) {
 }
 function computeBoundsHash(params, profile) {
   const canonical = canonicalBounds(params, profile);
-  const hash = (0, import_crypto.createHash)("sha256").update(canonical, "utf8").digest("hex");
+  const hash = (0, import_crypto3.createHash)("sha256").update(canonical, "utf8").digest("hex");
   return `sha256:${hash}`;
 }
 function computeContextHash(params, profile) {
   const canonical = canonicalContext(params, profile);
-  const hash = (0, import_crypto.createHash)("sha256").update(canonical, "utf8").digest("hex");
+  const hash = (0, import_crypto3.createHash)("sha256").update(canonical, "utf8").digest("hex");
   return `sha256:${hash}`;
 }
 
 // src/attestation.ts
-var import_crypto2 = require("crypto");
+var import_crypto4 = require("crypto");
 var ed = __toESM(require("@noble/ed25519"));
 function decodeAttestationBlob(blob) {
   try {
@@ -236,7 +286,7 @@ function encodeAttestationBlob(attestation) {
   return base64.replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_").replace(/=+$/, "");
 }
 function attestationId(blob) {
-  const hash = (0, import_crypto2.createHash)("sha256").update(blob, "utf8").digest("hex");
+  const hash = (0, import_crypto4.createHash)("sha256").update(blob, "utf8").digest("hex");
   return `sha256:${hash}`;
 }
 async function verifyAttestationSignature(attestation, publicKeyHex) {
@@ -366,11 +416,11 @@ async function verifyV3(request, profile, publicKeyHex, now, executionLog, error
     try {
       checkAttestationExpiry(attestation.payload, now);
     } catch {
-      const domainNames = attestation.payload.resolved_domains.map((d) => d.domain).join(", ");
+      const domainNames = (attestation.payload.resolved_domains ?? []).map((d) => d.domain).join(", ");
       errors.push({ code: "TTL_EXPIRED", message: `Attestation for domain "${domainNames}" has expired` });
       continue;
     }
-    for (const rd of attestation.payload.resolved_domains) {
+    for (const rd of attestation.payload.resolved_domains ?? []) {
       coveredDomains.add(rd.domain);
     }
   }
@@ -445,11 +495,11 @@ async function verifyV4(request, profile, publicKeyHex, now, executionLog) {
     try {
       checkAttestationExpiry(attestation.payload, now);
     } catch {
-      const domainNames = attestation.payload.resolved_domains.map((d) => d.domain).join(", ");
+      const domainNames = (attestation.payload.resolved_domains ?? []).map((d) => d.domain).join(", ");
       errors.push({ code: "TTL_EXPIRED", message: `Attestation for domain "${domainNames}" has expired` });
       continue;
     }
-    for (const rd of attestation.payload.resolved_domains) {
+    for (const rd of attestation.payload.resolved_domains ?? []) {
       coveredDomains.add(rd.domain);
     }
   }
@@ -746,16 +796,22 @@ function resolveCumulativeFields(request, profile, executionLog, now) {
   canonicalContext,
   canonicalFrame,
   canonicalize,
+  canonicalizeText,
   checkAttestationExpiry,
   clearProfiles,
   computeBoundsHash,
+  computeContentHash,
   computeContextHash,
   computeFrameHash,
+  computeIntentDisclosureHash,
+  computeIntentHash,
+  contentCanonicalBytes,
   decodeAttestationBlob,
   encodeAttestationBlob,
   frameHash,
   getAllProfiles,
   getProfile,
+  intentDisclosureCanonicalBytes,
   isV4Attestation,
   listProfiles,
   registerProfile,

package/dist/index.mjs

@@ -23,8 +23,52 @@ function canonicalize(value) {
   return "{" + parts.join(",") + "}";
 }
 
-// src/frame.ts
+// src/content-binding.ts
 import { createHash } from "crypto";
+function canonicalizeText(input) {
+  const nfc = input.normalize("NFC");
+  const lf = nfc.replace(/\r\n?/g, "\n");
+  const lines = lf.split("\n").map((line) => line.replace(/[ \t]+$/, ""));
+  return lines.join("\n").replace(/\n+$/, "");
+}
+function sha256Hex(bytes) {
+  return createHash("sha256").update(bytes, "utf8").digest("hex");
+}
+function contentCanonicalBytes(kind, content) {
+  if (kind === "jcs") {
+    if (typeof content === "string") {
+      throw new Error('content_binding kind="jcs" expects a record payload (object), got a string');
+    }
+    return canonicalize(content);
+  }
+  if (typeof content !== "string") {
+    throw new Error('content_binding kind="text" expects a string, got an object');
+  }
+  return canonicalizeText(content);
+}
+function computeContentHash(binding, content) {
+  return `sha256:${sha256Hex(contentCanonicalBytes(binding.kind, content))}`;
+}
+
+// src/intent-disclosure.ts
+import { createHash as createHash2 } from "crypto";
+function sha256Hex2(bytes) {
+  return createHash2("sha256").update(bytes, "utf8").digest("hex");
+}
+function computeIntentHash(intentText) {
+  return `sha256:${sha256Hex2(canonicalizeText(intentText))}`;
+}
+function intentDisclosureCanonicalBytes(intentCiphertext, approversFrozen) {
+  const sorted = [...approversFrozen].sort();
+  return `${intentCiphertext}
+${canonicalize(sorted)}`;
+}
+function computeIntentDisclosureHash(intentCiphertext, approversFrozen) {
+  return `sha256:${sha256Hex2(intentDisclosureCanonicalBytes(intentCiphertext, approversFrozen))}`;
+}
+
+// src/frame.ts
+import { createHash as createHash3 } from "crypto";
 function validateFrameParams(params, profile) {
   const errors = [];
   if (!profile.frameSchema) {
@@ -61,7 +105,7 @@ function canonicalFrame(params, profile) {
   return lines.join("\n");
 }
 function frameHash(canonicalFrameString) {
-  const hash = createHash("sha256").update(canonicalFrameString, "utf8").digest("hex");
+  const hash = createHash3("sha256").update(canonicalFrameString, "utf8").digest("hex");
   return `sha256:${hash}`;
 }
 function computeFrameHash(params, profile) {
@@ -145,17 +189,17 @@ function canonicalContext(params, profile) {
 }
 function computeBoundsHash(params, profile) {
   const canonical = canonicalBounds(params, profile);
-  const hash = createHash("sha256").update(canonical, "utf8").digest("hex");
+  const hash = createHash3("sha256").update(canonical, "utf8").digest("hex");
   return `sha256:${hash}`;
 }
 function computeContextHash(params, profile) {
   const canonical = canonicalContext(params, profile);
-  const hash = createHash("sha256").update(canonical, "utf8").digest("hex");
+  const hash = createHash3("sha256").update(canonical, "utf8").digest("hex");
   return `sha256:${hash}`;
 }
 
 // src/attestation.ts
-import { createHash as createHash2 } from "crypto";
+import { createHash as createHash4 } from "crypto";
 import * as ed from "@noble/ed25519";
 function decodeAttestationBlob(blob) {
   try {
@@ -173,7 +217,7 @@ function encodeAttestationBlob(attestation) {
   return base64.replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_").replace(/=+$/, "");
 }
 function attestationId(blob) {
-  const hash = createHash2("sha256").update(blob, "utf8").digest("hex");
+  const hash = createHash4("sha256").update(blob, "utf8").digest("hex");
   return `sha256:${hash}`;
 }
 async function verifyAttestationSignature(attestation, publicKeyHex) {
@@ -303,11 +347,11 @@ async function verifyV3(request, profile, publicKeyHex, now, executionLog, error
     try {
       checkAttestationExpiry(attestation.payload, now);
     } catch {
-      const domainNames = attestation.payload.resolved_domains.map((d) => d.domain).join(", ");
+      const domainNames = (attestation.payload.resolved_domains ?? []).map((d) => d.domain).join(", ");
       errors.push({ code: "TTL_EXPIRED", message: `Attestation for domain "${domainNames}" has expired` });
       continue;
     }
-    for (const rd of attestation.payload.resolved_domains) {
+    for (const rd of attestation.payload.resolved_domains ?? []) {
       coveredDomains.add(rd.domain);
     }
   }
@@ -382,11 +426,11 @@ async function verifyV4(request, profile, publicKeyHex, now, executionLog) {
     try {
       checkAttestationExpiry(attestation.payload, now);
     } catch {
-      const domainNames = attestation.payload.resolved_domains.map((d) => d.domain).join(", ");
+      const domainNames = (attestation.payload.resolved_domains ?? []).map((d) => d.domain).join(", ");
       errors.push({ code: "TTL_EXPIRED", message: `Attestation for domain "${domainNames}" has expired` });
       continue;
     }
-    for (const rd of attestation.payload.resolved_domains) {
+    for (const rd of attestation.payload.resolved_domains ?? []) {
       coveredDomains.add(rd.domain);
     }
   }
@@ -682,16 +726,22 @@ export {
   canonicalContext,
   canonicalFrame,
   canonicalize,
+  canonicalizeText,
   checkAttestationExpiry,
   clearProfiles,
   computeBoundsHash,
+  computeContentHash,
   computeContextHash,
   computeFrameHash,
+  computeIntentDisclosureHash,
+  computeIntentHash,
+  contentCanonicalBytes,
   decodeAttestationBlob,
   encodeAttestationBlob,
   frameHash,
   getAllProfiles,
   getProfile,
+  intentDisclosureCanonicalBytes,
   isV4Attestation,
   listProfiles,
   registerProfile,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@humanagencyp/hap-core",
-  "version": "0.5.0",
+  "version": "0.5.2",
   "description": "Core types, cryptographic primitives, and verification logic for the Human Agency Protocol",
   "license": "MIT",
   "repository": {

package/src/content-binding.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/**
+ * Content binding — Level 2 content proof (HAP v0.5 Content Provenance).
+ *
+ * A receipt normally proves who/why/bounds/when but NOT the action's content.
+ * Content binding closes that gap: the gateway computes a `content_hash` over
+ * the action's content per the profile's {@link ContentBinding} and hands the
+ * SP only the hash. The SP signs it into the receipt verbatim — it never sees
+ * the content, so HAP's privacy-minimal design is preserved. Anyone holding
+ * the content can recompute the hash and check it against the signed receipt.
+ *
+ * The hash only verifies if the verifier reproduces the EXACT bytes we hashed,
+ * so canonicalization is normative and versioned (pin via `ContentBinding.version`):
+ *
+ *  - kind:"jcs"  → RFC 8785 JCS of the record payload (see {@link canonicalize}).
+ *  - kind:"text" → UTF-8 of the string after {@link canonicalizeText}
+ *    (Unicode NFC, LF line endings, trailing per-line whitespace stripped,
+ *    trailing blank lines removed), taken pre-footer when `pre_footer` is set.
+ *
+ * Both Node and the browser produce byte-identical output: JCS relies only on
+ * environment-independent primitives, and the text rule uses String.normalize +
+ * plain string ops. The SHA-256 is computed with Node `crypto` here (the same
+ * pattern as frame.ts); browser callers that need to recompute use their own
+ * SubtleCrypto digest over the identical canonical bytes.
+ */
+
+import { createHash } from 'crypto';
+import { canonicalize } from './canonicalize';
+import type { ContentBinding } from './types';
+
+/**
+ * Canonicalize free text per the v0.5 'text' rule. Idempotent.
+ *
+ *   1. Unicode NFC normalization.
+ *   2. CRLF / CR → LF.
+ *   3. Strip trailing spaces/tabs from every line.
+ *   4. Remove trailing blank lines.
+ */
+export function canonicalizeText(input: string): string {
+  const nfc = input.normalize('NFC');
+  const lf = nfc.replace(/\r\n?/g, '\n');
+  const lines = lf.split('\n').map((line) => line.replace(/[ \t]+$/, ''));
+  return lines.join('\n').replace(/\n+$/, '');
+}
+
+/** sha256 of a UTF-8 string → 64 hex chars. */
+function sha256Hex(bytes: string): string {
+  return createHash('sha256').update(bytes, 'utf8').digest('hex');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Compute the canonical bytes that a content hash is taken over, WITHOUT
+ * hashing — exposed so verifiers can debug a mismatch by inspecting the exact
+ * serialization both sides should agree on.
+ */
+export function contentCanonicalBytes(
+  kind: ContentBinding['kind'],
+  content: Record<string, unknown> | string,
+): string {
+  if (kind === 'jcs') {
+    if (typeof content === 'string') {
+      throw new Error('content_binding kind="jcs" expects a record payload (object), got a string');
+    }
+    return canonicalize(content);
+  }
+  if (typeof content !== 'string') {
+    throw new Error('content_binding kind="text" expects a string, got an object');
+  }
+  return canonicalizeText(content);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Compute a profile-bound content hash, formatted `sha256:<hex>` (matching the
+ * frame/bounds/context hash format used elsewhere in HAP).
+ *
+ * @param binding the profile's content_binding declaration
+ * @param content the record payload (jcs) or the resolved text field (text)
+ */
+export function computeContentHash(
+  binding: ContentBinding,
+  content: Record<string, unknown> | string,
+): string {
+  return `sha256:${sha256Hex(contentCanonicalBytes(binding.kind, content))}`;
+}

package/src/gatekeeper.ts

@@ -131,12 +131,12 @@ async function verifyV3(
     try {
       checkAttestationExpiry(attestation.payload, now);
     } catch {
-      const domainNames = attestation.payload.resolved_domains.map(d => d.domain).join(', ');
+      const domainNames = (attestation.payload.resolved_domains ?? []).map(d => d.domain).join(', ');
       errors.push({ code: 'TTL_EXPIRED', message: `Attestation for domain "${domainNames}" has expired` });
       continue;
     }
 
-    for (const rd of attestation.payload.resolved_domains) {
+    for (const rd of attestation.payload.resolved_domains ?? []) {
       coveredDomains.add(rd.domain);
     }
   }
@@ -244,12 +244,12 @@ async function verifyV4(
     try {
       checkAttestationExpiry(attestation.payload, now);
     } catch {
-      const domainNames = attestation.payload.resolved_domains.map(d => d.domain).join(', ');
+      const domainNames = (attestation.payload.resolved_domains ?? []).map(d => d.domain).join(', ');
       errors.push({ code: 'TTL_EXPIRED', message: `Attestation for domain "${domainNames}" has expired` });
       continue;
     }
 
-    for (const rd of attestation.payload.resolved_domains) {
+    for (const rd of attestation.payload.resolved_domains ?? []) {
       coveredDomains.add(rd.domain);
     }
   }

package/src/index.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
 
 export * from './types';
 export * from './canonicalize';
+export * from './content-binding';
+export * from './intent-disclosure';
 export * from './frame';
 export * from './attestation';
 export * from './gatekeeper';

package/src/intent-disclosure.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/**
+ * Intent hashing + intent-disclosure binding (HAP v0.5).
+ *
+ * Two shared, environment-independent hashes that the attester (gateway), the
+ * Authority Server, and any approver MUST compute identically:
+ *
+ *  1. {@link computeIntentHash} — `gate_content_hashes.intent`. The intent text
+ *     is canonicalized (Unicode NFC, LF line endings, trailing-whitespace strip
+ *     — the same rule as content-binding's `canonicalizeText`) before hashing,
+ *     so independent multi-owner approvers reproduce an identical hash from the
+ *     same logical statement. See protocol.md → "Intent canonicalization".
+ *
+ *  2. {@link computeIntentDisclosureHash} — `intent_disclosure_hash`, the C2
+ *     binding from companion spec `intent-disclosure@0.1`. It commits the
+ *     encrypted disclosure object (`intent_ciphertext` + `approvers_frozen`)
+ *     into the SIGNED attestation payload, so a compromised AS cannot swap the
+ *     ciphertext/wrapped keys or widen/shrink the approver set without breaking
+ *     the attestation signature.
+ *
+ * Both produce `sha256:<hex>` to match the frame/bounds/context hash format.
+ */
+
+import { createHash } from 'crypto';
+import { canonicalize } from './canonicalize';
+import { canonicalizeText } from './content-binding';
+
+function sha256Hex(bytes: string): string {
+  return createHash('sha256').update(bytes, 'utf8').digest('hex');
+}
+
+/**
+ * `gate_content_hashes.intent` for an intent statement.
+ * Canonicalizes the text (NFC / LF / trailing-whitespace strip) before hashing.
+ */
+export function computeIntentHash(intentText: string): string {
+  return `sha256:${sha256Hex(canonicalizeText(intentText))}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The exact bytes `intent_disclosure_hash` is taken over, WITHOUT hashing —
+ * exposed so an implementer debugging a mismatch can inspect the serialization
+ * both sides must agree on:
+ *
+ *   intent_ciphertext ‖ "\n" ‖ JCS(sort(approvers_frozen))
+ *
+ * where `intent_ciphertext` is the exact base64url string of the disclosure
+ * object, `sort` orders the approver DIDs by Unicode code point, and `JCS` is
+ * RFC 8785 canonicalization of the sorted array (via {@link canonicalize}).
+ */
+export function intentDisclosureCanonicalBytes(
+  intentCiphertext: string,
+  approversFrozen: string[],
+): string {
+  const sorted = [...approversFrozen].sort();
+  return `${intentCiphertext}\n${canonicalize(sorted)}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * `intent_disclosure_hash` — `sha256:<hex>` over
+ * {@link intentDisclosureCanonicalBytes}. Computed by the attester after
+ * encryption and signed into the attestation; recomputed by the AS (at
+ * issuance) and by each approver (on receipt) and compared, fail-closed.
+ */
+export function computeIntentDisclosureHash(
+  intentCiphertext: string,
+  approversFrozen: string[],
+): string {
+  return `sha256:${sha256Hex(intentDisclosureCanonicalBytes(intentCiphertext, approversFrozen))}`;
+}

package/src/types.ts

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ export interface ResolvedDomain {
 
 export interface AttestationPayload {
   attestation_id: string;
-  version: '0.3' | '0.4';
+  version: '0.3' | '0.4' | '0.5';
   profile_id: string;
   /** v0.3 (deprecated) — hash of the authorization frame */
   frame_hash?: string;
@@ -28,8 +28,29 @@ export interface AttestationPayload {
   /** v0.4 — hash of the context parameters */
   context_hash?: string;
   execution_context_hash: string;
-  resolved_domains: ResolvedDomain[];
+  /**
+   * v0.4 (deprecated in v0.5) — domain-scoped owners. Optional so v0.5
+   * attestations that carry only `resolved_owners` remain valid. During the
+   * transition the AS emits BOTH `resolved_domains` (internal coverage) and
+   * `resolved_owners` (the v0.5 signed wire field).
+   */
+  resolved_domains?: ResolvedDomain[];
+  /**
+   * v0.5 — the Decision Owner DIDs this attestation covers (person-centric
+   * model; replaces the abstract domain in `resolved_domains`). Carried in the
+   * signed payload so verifiers bind the action to the human(s) who authorized it.
+   */
+  resolved_owners?: string[];
   gate_content_hashes: Record<string, string>;
+  /**
+   * v0.5 (companion spec `intent-disclosure@0.1`) — present iff the attestation
+   * carries an encrypted-intent disclosure object. `sha256:`-prefixed hash that
+   * binds the disclosure's `intent_ciphertext` + `approvers_frozen` into the
+   * signed payload (see {@link computeIntentDisclosureHash}), so a compromised
+   * AS cannot swap the ciphertext/wrapped keys or alter the approver set
+   * without invalidating the attestation signature (companion invariant C2).
+   */
+  intent_disclosure_hash?: string;
   /**
    * v0.4 — commitment mode chosen by the decision owner at attestation time.
    * - 'automatic': agent may invoke bounded tools without per-action review.
@@ -166,6 +187,33 @@ export interface ProfileBoundsField {
   enum?: string[];
 }
 
+/**
+ * v0.5 Content Provenance — how a profile's action content is hashed into a
+ * signed receipt (`contentHash`). The ephemeral-content analog of Output
+ * Provenance: it binds the *bytes* of the action rather than a location.
+ *
+ * Profile-bound and OPTIONAL. Absent → no content hash is produced (full
+ * backward compatibility). The gateway computes the hash; the SP only ever
+ * receives the hash, never the content, so HAP's privacy-minimal design holds.
+ *
+ * The profile declares only the *policy* — whether to bind and how to
+ * canonicalize. It does NOT name the tool field: that is tool-specific and is
+ * resolved at runtime (the same content-field resolver the footer uses for
+ * `kind:"text"`; the whole record payload for `kind:"jcs"`).
+ */
+export interface ContentBinding {
+  /** Canonicalization version. A verifier MUST pin the version named here. */
+  version: string;
+  /**
+   * - 'jcs'  → structured writes: RFC 8785 JCS over the record payload.
+   * - 'text' → free text: NFC + LF + trailing-whitespace strip (see
+   *   canonicalizeText), auto-detected content field.
+   */
+  kind: 'jcs' | 'text';
+  /** text only: hash the content BEFORE any appended Suveren footer. */
+  pre_footer?: boolean;
+}
+
 /**
  * Context field definition within a v0.4 profile.
  */
@@ -295,6 +343,14 @@ export interface AgentProfile {
   ttl: { default: number; max: number };
   retention_minimum: number;
 
+  /**
+   * v0.5 Content Provenance (OPTIONAL, profile-bound). When present, the
+   * gateway computes a `contentHash` for gated writes under this profile and
+   * passes it (hash only) to the SP, which signs it into the receipt. Absent
+   * → no content hash. See {@link ContentBinding}.
+   */
+  content_binding?: ContentBinding;
+
   /**
    * Tool gating configuration — how MCP tools map to execution context.
    * @deprecated Tool gating now lives in integration manifests (content/integrations/*.json).