@hue-run/sdk 0.9.0 → 0.10.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CLI.md +100 -29
- package/ENVIRONMENTS.md +44 -9
- package/EVALUATIONS.md +39 -19
- package/README.md +51 -22
- package/dist/cli/eval-direct.d.ts +12 -1
- package/dist/cli/eval-direct.js +145 -33
- package/dist/cli/eval.d.ts +28 -1
- package/dist/cli/eval.js +469 -72
- package/dist/evals/checkpoint.d.ts +15 -1
- package/dist/evals/checkpoint.js +34 -3
- package/dist/evals/client.d.ts +19 -3
- package/dist/evals/client.js +82 -34
- package/dist/evals/environment-target.d.ts +18 -3
- package/dist/evals/environment-target.js +22 -10
- package/dist/evals/exit-cleanup.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/evals/exit-cleanup.js +26 -0
- package/dist/evals/files.d.ts +59 -1
- package/dist/evals/files.js +187 -27
- package/dist/evals/local-worker.d.ts +21 -3
- package/dist/evals/local-worker.js +14 -0
- package/dist/evals/runner.d.ts +45 -0
- package/dist/evals/runner.js +164 -13
- package/dist/evals/scenarios.d.ts +7 -5
- package/dist/evals/scenarios.js +71 -14
- package/dist/evals/simulation.d.ts +17 -4
- package/dist/evals/simulation.js +8 -0
- package/dist/evals/types.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/evals/verdicts.d.ts +15 -2
- package/dist/evals/verdicts.js +43 -9
- package/dist/evals.d.ts +4 -3
- package/dist/evals.js +2 -2
- package/dist/inline-files.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/inline-files.js +40 -17
- package/dist/snapshot.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/snapshot.js +47 -12
- package/dist/transport.js +2 -2
- package/dist/version.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/version.js +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/evals/files.js
CHANGED
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@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
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import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
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import {
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import {
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import { constants } from "node:fs";
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import { lstat, mkdir, open, readFile, rename, rm } from "node:fs/promises";
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import { extname, join, resolve } from "node:path";
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import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
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import { HueApiError } from "./client.js";
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import { ArtifactSizeError, HueApiError } from "./client.js";
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/** Roles the target receives. Organization templates stay with grading, as in the managed protocol. */
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export const targetFileRoles = [
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"source",
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@@ -37,25 +38,153 @@ export class OutputFileError extends Error {
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this.name = "OutputFileError";
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}
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}
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/**
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* Thrown when a pinned file cannot be used: its downloaded bytes differ from the manifest's size
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* or SHA-256 (`case_file_mismatch`), or a file meant for an agent working in a world is not
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* named by one safe file name (`case_file_name_refused`). Raised before the case's execution
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* starts, so no execution, world or target call is spent on it.
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*/
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export class CaseFileError extends Error {
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code;
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artifactId;
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constructor(
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/** Stable diagnostic code. */
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code,
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/** Hue artifact identity of the refused file. */
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artifactId, message) {
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super(`${message} (${code})`);
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this.code = code;
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this.artifactId = artifactId;
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this.name = "CaseFileError";
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}
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}
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const sha256 = (bytes) => createHash("sha256").update(bytes).digest("hex");
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/**
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/** A file name quoted for a message: at most 120 characters, controls escaped. */
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const quoted = (name) => JSON.stringify([...name].slice(0, 120).join(""));
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/** Names Windows reserves for devices, with or without an extension. */
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const DEVICE_NAME = /^(?:con|prn|aux|nul|com[0-9¹²³]|lpt[0-9¹²³]|conin\$|conout\$)$/iu;
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/** The longest file name the runner writes, in UTF-8 bytes: room is left for the temporary
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* suffix of an atomic write and a copy counter within the usual 255-byte limit. */
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const MAX_NAME_BYTES = 200;
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/** The longest prefix of `name` that fits in `bytes` UTF-8 bytes, cut between code points. */
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function truncateBytes(name, bytes) {
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let kept = "";
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let size = 0;
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for (const character of name) {
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size += Buffer.byteLength(character);
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if (size > bytes)
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break;
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kept += character;
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}
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return kept;
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}
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/**
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* Whether `name` can be used unchanged as one file name: not empty, `.` or `..`; no `/`, `\`,
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* C0 or C1 control character, or character Windows reserves (`: < > " | ? *`); no Windows device
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* name (`CON`, `NUL`, `COM1`, … with any extension); no trailing dot or space, which Windows
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* drops; at most 200 UTF-8 bytes. An absolute path or a path with a parent step always contains
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* a separator, so it is refused too.
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*/
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export function isSafeFileName(name) {
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if (typeof name !== "string" || !name || name === "." || name === "..")
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return false;
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// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex -- control characters are refused
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if (/[/\\:<>"|?*\x00-\x1f\x7f-\x9f]/u.test(name))
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return false;
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if (name.endsWith(".") || name.endsWith(" "))
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return false;
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if (DEVICE_NAME.test(name.split(".")[0].trimEnd()))
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return false;
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return Buffer.byteLength(name) <= MAX_NAME_BYTES;
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}
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/** Refuse a pinned file whose name is not one safe file name; see {@link isSafeFileName}. */
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export function assertSafeFileNames(files) {
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for (const file of files)
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if (!isSafeFileName(file.filename))
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throw new CaseFileError("case_file_name_refused", file.artifactId, `Pinned file ${quoted(String(file.filename))} is not a safe file name`);
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}
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/**
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* Reduce a declared file name to a single printable path segment, at most 200 UTF-8 bytes. A
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* longer name keeps its extension, so `.pdf` stays `.pdf`, and its stem is shortened and marked
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* with a short hash of the whole name, so two long names never shorten to the same one.
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*/
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export function safeFilename(name) {
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const cleaned = [...name]
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.filter((c) => c.charCodeAt(0) >= 32 && c.charCodeAt(0) !== 127 && c !== "/" && c !== "\\")
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.join("")
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.trim();
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-
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-
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let kept = cleaned;
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if (Buffer.byteLength(cleaned) > MAX_NAME_BYTES) {
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const found = extname(cleaned);
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const extension = Buffer.byteLength(found) <= 32 ? found : "";
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const mark = `~${sha256(Buffer.from(cleaned)).slice(0, 8)}`;
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const room = MAX_NAME_BYTES - Buffer.byteLength(extension) - mark.length;
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kept = `${truncateBytes(cleaned.slice(0, cleaned.length - extension.length), room)}${mark}${extension}`;
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}
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return kept && kept !== "." && kept !== ".." ? kept : "file";
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}
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/** Create `path` if needed and require a directory this user owns that no one else can open. */
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async function privateDirectory(path) {
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const root = resolve(path);
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await mkdir(root, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
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const info = await lstat(root);
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const uid = process.getuid?.();
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if (!info.isDirectory() ||
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info.isSymbolicLink() ||
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(uid !== undefined && info.uid !== uid) ||
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(process.platform !== "win32" && (info.mode & 0o077) !== 0))
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throw new Error("Use a private files directory (owned by this user, mode 0700, no symlink)");
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return root;
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}
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// A symlink as the last path component fails to open, and a FIFO or device never blocks.
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const AGENT_FILE_FLAGS = constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW | constants.O_NONBLOCK;
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/**
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* Read a file an agent wrote without trusting its path: the last component must not be a
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* symlink and the open file must be a regular file of at most `maxBytes`, checked before any byte
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* is read, and, when `expected` is given, the very file a listing saw. The bytes come from that
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* open file. Returns undefined for a missing file only when nothing was expected there; every
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* other refusal is an `OutputFileError` naming `label`.
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*/
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export async function readAgentFile(path, label, maxBytes, expected) {
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let file;
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try {
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file = await open(path, AGENT_FILE_FLAGS);
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}
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catch (error) {
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const code = error.code;
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if (code === "ENOENT" && !expected)
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return undefined;
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if (code === "ELOOP" || code === "EMLINK")
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throw new OutputFileError(`${label} is a symbolic link`);
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if (code === "ENOENT")
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throw new OutputFileError(`${label} changed while it was collected`);
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throw new OutputFileError(`${label} could not be read`);
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}
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try {
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const info = await file.stat();
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if (!info.isFile())
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throw new OutputFileError(`${label} is not a regular file`);
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if (expected && (info.dev !== expected.dev || info.ino !== expected.ino))
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throw new OutputFileError(`${label} changed while it was collected`);
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if (info.size > maxBytes)
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throw new OutputFileError(`${label} exceeds ${Math.floor(maxBytes / 1024 / 1024)} MiB`);
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// One byte past the size seen: a file that is still growing is refused, not read whole.
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const bytes = Buffer.allocUnsafe(info.size + 1);
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let total = 0;
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while (total < bytes.length) {
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const { bytesRead } = await file.read(bytes, total, bytes.length - total, total);
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if (!bytesRead)
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break;
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total += bytesRead;
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}
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if (total !== info.size)
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throw new OutputFileError(`${label} changed while it was collected`);
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return bytes.subarray(0, total);
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}
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finally {
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await file.close();
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}
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}
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async function writePrivate(path, bytes) {
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const temporary = `${path}.${randomUUID()}.tmp`;
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const file = await open(temporary, "wx", 0o600);
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@@ -74,6 +203,28 @@ async function verifiedBytes(path, expected) {
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throw new Error(`Saved file ${path} no longer matches its verified identity`);
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return bytes;
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}
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/** Download one pinned file and check its size and SHA-256 against the manifest. The download
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* stops one byte past the pinned size. */
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async function downloadVerified(client, file) {
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const mismatch = () => new CaseFileError("case_file_mismatch", file.artifactId, `Downloaded file ${quoted(file.filename)} does not match its pinned size and SHA-256`);
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let bytes;
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try {
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bytes = await client.downloadArtifact(file.artifactId, { maxBytes: file.byteSize });
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}
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catch (error) {
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if (error instanceof ArtifactSizeError)
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throw mismatch();
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throw error;
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}
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if (bytes.byteLength !== file.byteSize || sha256(bytes) !== file.sha256)
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throw mismatch();
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return bytes;
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}
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/** Check pinned files against the manifest without keeping them: nothing is written to disk. */
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export async function verifyCaseFiles(client, files) {
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for (const file of files)
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await downloadVerified(client, file);
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}
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/**
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* Save verified copies of a case's pinned input files under `directory`. A file already
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* present with the pinned identity is reused, so a resumed run does not download again.
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@@ -91,12 +242,8 @@ export async function downloadCaseFiles(client, files, directory, primaryArtifac
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catch {
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present = false;
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}
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if (!present)
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-
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if (bytes.byteLength !== file.byteSize || sha256(bytes) !== file.sha256)
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throw new Error(`Downloaded input ${file.filename} does not match its pinned identity`);
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await writePrivate(path, bytes);
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}
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if (!present)
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await writePrivate(path, await downloadVerified(client, file));
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saved.push({
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artifactId: file.artifactId,
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role: file.role,
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@@ -110,6 +257,26 @@ export async function downloadCaseFiles(client, files, directory, primaryArtifac
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257
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}
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258
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return saved;
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259
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}
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/**
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* Download a case's needed inputs under `caseDirectory`: the agent-visible roles into `inputs/`
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* and evaluator-only files into `evaluator-inputs/`, so the directory the target's files live in
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* never holds an evaluator's file. `all` keeps the manifest order for scorers; `target` is the
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* agent-visible subset.
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*/
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export async function downloadCaseInputs(client, files, caseDirectory) {
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const visible = (file) => targetFileRoles.includes(file.role);
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const agentFiles = files.filter(visible);
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const evaluatorFiles = files.filter((file) => !visible(file));
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const target = agentFiles.length
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? await downloadCaseFiles(client, agentFiles, join(caseDirectory, "inputs"))
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: [];
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const evaluator = evaluatorFiles.length
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? await downloadCaseFiles(client, evaluatorFiles, join(caseDirectory, "evaluator-inputs"))
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: [];
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const saved = [...target, ...evaluator];
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const all = files.map((file) => saved.find((entry) => entry.artifactId === file.artifactId && entry.role === file.role));
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return { all, target };
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}
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280
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/** Copy the target's generated files next to the checkpoint and record their identities. */
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281
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export async function stageOutputFiles(files, directory) {
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282
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if (!Array.isArray(files) || !files.length)
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@@ -132,24 +299,17 @@ export async function stageOutputFiles(files, directory) {
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299
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names.add(filename);
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300
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if (!outputContentTypes.includes(file.contentType))
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throw new OutputFileError(`Unsupported generated file type ${String(file.contentType)}`);
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-
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-
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catch {
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// A path is read once, as a regular file within the limit, and staged from those bytes.
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303
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const bytes = file.bytes ??
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(await readAgentFile(file.path, `Generated file ${filename}`, outputFileLimits.bytes));
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if (!bytes)
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throw new OutputFileError(`Generated file ${filename} could not be read`);
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141
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-
}
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142
307
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if (!bytes.byteLength)
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143
308
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throw new OutputFileError(`Generated file ${filename} is empty`);
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144
309
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if (bytes.byteLength > outputFileLimits.bytes)
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145
310
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throw new OutputFileError(`Generated file ${filename} exceeds 25 MiB`);
|
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146
311
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const path = join(root, filename);
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147
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-
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148
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-
await writePrivate(path, bytes);
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-
else {
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await copyFile(file.path, path);
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await verifiedBytes(path, { byteSize: bytes.byteLength, sha256: sha256(bytes) });
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}
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await writePrivate(path, bytes);
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staged.push({
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filename,
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contentType: file.contentType,
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import type { EnvironmentTool } from "../environment/tools.js";
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4
4
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import type { WorldHandoff } from "../environment/types.js";
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import type { ActualAgentManifestInputV2, AttemptConnectionBundleV2, RequestedAttemptProviderV2 } from "./attempt.js";
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import type { EvaluationClient } from "./client.js";
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7
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-
import { type RunExperimentTargetContext, type RunnerReport } from "./runner.js";
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7
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+
import { type RunExperimentTargetContext, type RunnerReport, type TelemetryNotAccepted } from "./runner.js";
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8
8
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import type { ExperimentCase, JsonValue, LocalAgentRegistration, LocalFile, LocalScorer, TargetResult } from "./types.js";
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9
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/** Capability strings a registration declares; Hue offers only matching cases. */
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export declare const localAgentCapabilities: {
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@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@ export declare const localAgentCapabilities: {
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/** Ordinary cases run directly on this machine: JSON inputs and pinned input files in,
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14
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* JSON output and generated files out. */
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15
15
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readonly direct: "direct:v1";
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+
/** Cases pinned to a world that also carry agent-visible input files: `target` receives them
|
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* with the world and may return generated files. Declare it with `input:<extension>` for each
|
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18
|
+
* accepted file type; it requires `target`. */
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+
readonly environmentFiles: "environment-files:v1";
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20
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};
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21
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/** Candidate-visible context for one queued local agent execution. */
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22
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export interface LocalAgentTargetContext {
|
|
@@ -47,6 +51,13 @@ export interface LocalAgentTargetContext {
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51
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/** Credential-bearing provider connections for this callback only. Hue never
|
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48
52
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* checkpoints, logs or adds this response to parity digests. */
|
|
49
53
|
connectionBundle?: AttemptConnectionBundleV2;
|
|
54
|
+
/** Verified copies of the case's agent-visible input files; evaluator-only files are
|
|
55
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+
* withheld. Hue offers a world case with such files only to a registration declaring
|
|
56
|
+
* `environment-files:v1`. Empty when the case has none. */
|
|
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+
files: LocalFile[];
|
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+
/** Private directory for this case, removed after it; return generated files with
|
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59
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+
* `withFiles`. */
|
|
60
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+
outputDirectory: string;
|
|
50
61
|
}
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|
51
62
|
/** Candidate-visible context for one queued ordinary case run directly on this machine. */
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52
63
|
export interface LocalAgentDirectContext {
|
|
@@ -88,6 +99,12 @@ export interface RunLocalAgentOptions {
|
|
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scorers?: LocalScorer[];
|
|
89
100
|
/** Cases in flight, between 1 and 16; defaults to 1. */
|
|
90
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concurrency?: number;
|
|
102
|
+
/** What a case does when its telemetry is not accepted; see
|
|
103
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+
* `traceNotAccepted` of {@link runExperiment}. Defaults to `"stop"`. */
|
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104
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+
traceNotAccepted?: "stop" | "fail_case";
|
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+
/** Called as each case is failed for its telemetry; see `onTelemetryNotAccepted` of
|
|
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+
* {@link runExperiment}. */
|
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|
+
onTelemetryNotAccepted?(entry: TelemetryNotAccepted): void | Promise<void>;
|
|
91
108
|
/** Polling interval in milliseconds, 250–60000; defaults to 2000. */
|
|
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109
|
pollIntervalMillis?: number;
|
|
93
110
|
/** Stops polling cooperatively; does not cancel an active callback. */
|
|
@@ -116,8 +133,9 @@ export interface RunLocalAgentOptions {
|
|
|
116
133
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surfaceKey: "google.gmail/mcp" | "slack/mcp";
|
|
117
134
|
};
|
|
118
135
|
/** Runs cases pinned to a hosted world (`environment:v1`): invokes the existing agent against
|
|
119
|
-
* isolated tools and candidate-safe context.
|
|
120
|
-
|
|
136
|
+
* isolated tools and candidate-safe context. Return the output, or `withFiles(output, files)`
|
|
137
|
+
* when it generated files. */
|
|
138
|
+
target?(inputs: JsonValue, tools: Record<string, EnvironmentTool>, context: LocalAgentTargetContext): JsonValue | TargetResult | undefined | Promise<JsonValue | TargetResult | undefined>;
|
|
121
139
|
/** Runs ordinary cases without a world (`direct:v1`): the agent receives the case inputs
|
|
122
140
|
* and verified input files and returns JSON output and/or generated files. */
|
|
123
141
|
directTarget?(inputs: JsonValue, context: LocalAgentDirectContext): JsonValue | TargetResult | undefined | Promise<JsonValue | TargetResult | undefined>;
|
|
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ export const localAgentCapabilities = {
|
|
|
10
10
|
/** Ordinary cases run directly on this machine: JSON inputs and pinned input files in,
|
|
11
11
|
* JSON output and generated files out. */
|
|
12
12
|
direct: "direct:v1",
|
|
13
|
+
/** Cases pinned to a world that also carry agent-visible input files: `target` receives them
|
|
14
|
+
* with the world and may return generated files. Declare it with `input:<extension>` for each
|
|
15
|
+
* accepted file type; it requires `target`. */
|
|
16
|
+
environmentFiles: "environment-files:v1",
|
|
13
17
|
};
|
|
14
18
|
/** Allowlist the candidate surface for an ordinary case; frozen expectations stay with grading. */
|
|
15
19
|
export function localAgentDirectContext(context, signal) {
|
|
@@ -44,6 +48,8 @@ function localAgentTargetContext(context) {
|
|
|
44
48
|
...(context.connectionBundle
|
|
45
49
|
? { connectionBundle: structuredClone(context.connectionBundle) }
|
|
46
50
|
: {}),
|
|
51
|
+
files: structuredClone(context.files),
|
|
52
|
+
outputDirectory: context.outputDirectory,
|
|
47
53
|
};
|
|
48
54
|
}
|
|
49
55
|
/** The registration's capabilities: explicit values plus one per supplied callback. */
|
|
@@ -55,6 +61,8 @@ export function registeredCapabilities(options) {
|
|
|
55
61
|
throw new TypeError("direct:v1 requires a directTarget callback");
|
|
56
62
|
if (declared.includes(localAgentCapabilities.environment) && !options.target)
|
|
57
63
|
throw new TypeError("environment:v1 requires a target callback");
|
|
64
|
+
if (declared.includes(localAgentCapabilities.environmentFiles) && !options.target)
|
|
65
|
+
throw new TypeError("environment-files:v1 requires a target callback");
|
|
58
66
|
return [
|
|
59
67
|
...new Set([
|
|
60
68
|
...declared,
|
|
@@ -163,6 +171,12 @@ export async function runLocalAgent(options) {
|
|
|
163
171
|
// Worker dispatch uses the case pin: directTarget never receives a world.
|
|
164
172
|
environmentEvidence: options.directTarget ? "when_pinned" : "required",
|
|
165
173
|
traceEvidence: { mode: "required" },
|
|
174
|
+
...(options.traceNotAccepted ? { traceNotAccepted: options.traceNotAccepted } : {}),
|
|
175
|
+
...(options.onTelemetryNotAccepted
|
|
176
|
+
? {
|
|
177
|
+
onTelemetryNotAccepted: (entry) => options.onTelemetryNotAccepted(entry),
|
|
178
|
+
}
|
|
179
|
+
: {}),
|
|
166
180
|
scorers: options.scorers,
|
|
167
181
|
concurrency: options.concurrency,
|
|
168
182
|
target: (inputs, context) => {
|
package/dist/evals/runner.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -93,6 +93,19 @@ export interface RunExperimentOptions extends RunnerOptions {
|
|
|
93
93
|
/** Why evidence is omitted, up to 4000 characters. */
|
|
94
94
|
reason: string;
|
|
95
95
|
};
|
|
96
|
+
/**
|
|
97
|
+
* What a case does when evidence is required and its trace or logs are not fully accepted.
|
|
98
|
+
* `"stop"` (the default) keeps the saved outcome, leaves the execution started for recovery and
|
|
99
|
+
* rejects. `"fail_case"` completes the execution as failed instead, with the evidence omitted
|
|
100
|
+
* under the reason `telemetry_not_accepted` and without its output or generated files, so no
|
|
101
|
+
* scorer can pass it; reports it in {@link RunnerReport.telemetryNotAccepted} and goes on with
|
|
102
|
+
* the other cases.
|
|
103
|
+
*/
|
|
104
|
+
traceNotAccepted?: "stop" | "fail_case";
|
|
105
|
+
/** Called when this call completes a case as failed under `traceNotAccepted: "fail_case"`,
|
|
106
|
+
* before the run goes on, so the failure is known even if a later case stops the run. A call
|
|
107
|
+
* that resumes an already completed case lists it in the report without calling again. */
|
|
108
|
+
onTelemetryNotAccepted?(entry: TelemetryNotAccepted): void | Promise<void>;
|
|
96
109
|
/** Runs the application for one frozen case; return the output, `withFiles(output, files)`
|
|
97
110
|
* when it generated files, or `undefined` when unavailable. */
|
|
98
111
|
target(inputs: JsonValue, context: RunExperimentTargetContext): JsonValue | TargetResult | undefined | Promise<JsonValue | TargetResult | undefined>;
|
|
@@ -112,7 +125,39 @@ export interface RunnerReport {
|
|
|
112
125
|
resultIds: string[];
|
|
113
126
|
/** Pins without a local implementation, left pending for their authorized executor. */
|
|
114
127
|
deferredScorerVersionIds: string[];
|
|
128
|
+
/** Cases completed as failed because their telemetry was not accepted, under
|
|
129
|
+
* `traceNotAccepted: "fail_case"`; absent when there were none. */
|
|
130
|
+
telemetryNotAccepted?: TelemetryNotAccepted[];
|
|
115
131
|
}
|
|
132
|
+
/** Export issue counts, never content: which signal, what happened, the HTTP status when Hue
|
|
133
|
+
* answered, and how many records. */
|
|
134
|
+
export interface TelemetryIssueCount {
|
|
135
|
+
/** Signal the records belong to. */
|
|
136
|
+
signal: "traces" | "logs";
|
|
137
|
+
/** `rejected` by Hue, `failed` to deliver, `dropped` from the queue, or an `invalid` record. */
|
|
138
|
+
kind: "rejected" | "failed" | "dropped" | "invalid";
|
|
139
|
+
/** HTTP status when the issue came from Hue's answer. */
|
|
140
|
+
status?: number;
|
|
141
|
+
/** Records affected. */
|
|
142
|
+
count: number;
|
|
143
|
+
}
|
|
144
|
+
/** A case whose trace or logs were not fully accepted, completed as failed. */
|
|
145
|
+
export interface TelemetryNotAccepted {
|
|
146
|
+
/** Experiment case (item) ID. */
|
|
147
|
+
caseId: string;
|
|
148
|
+
/** The case's caller-chosen key. */
|
|
149
|
+
caseKey: string;
|
|
150
|
+
/** Execution completed as failed. */
|
|
151
|
+
executionId: string;
|
|
152
|
+
/** Sanitized issues the transport reported while the case's telemetry was exported. */
|
|
153
|
+
issues: TelemetryIssueCount[];
|
|
154
|
+
}
|
|
155
|
+
/** Stable reason, and first word of the omission reason, of a case failed for its telemetry. */
|
|
156
|
+
export declare const TELEMETRY_NOT_ACCEPTED = "telemetry_not_accepted";
|
|
157
|
+
/** The issues of a failed export, summed by signal, kind and status. */
|
|
158
|
+
export declare function telemetryIssueCounts(error: unknown): TelemetryIssueCount[];
|
|
159
|
+
/** `telemetry_not_accepted`, then the issue counts, for example `traces failed 1 (HTTP 400)`. */
|
|
160
|
+
export declare function describeTelemetryIssues(issues: TelemetryIssueCount[]): string;
|
|
116
161
|
/**
|
|
117
162
|
* Runs every case of a frozen experiment through `target` on this machine, completes each
|
|
118
163
|
* execution, scores it with local scorers and uploads the results, checkpointing so an interrupted
|