@holmes-lab/holmes-kit 0.39.0 → 0.40.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +578 -6
- package/README.md +120 -41
- package/dist/.build-id +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/admission-policy.d.ts +37 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/admission-policy.js +147 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/bounded-reader.d.ts +56 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/bounded-reader.js +135 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/change-classifier.d.ts +34 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/change-classifier.js +278 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/config-loader.d.ts +30 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/config-loader.js +145 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/event-judgement.d.ts +37 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/event-judgement.js +251 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/path-rules.d.ts +35 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/path-rules.js +88 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/pin.d.ts +7 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/pin.js +29 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/ports.d.ts +48 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/ports.js +11 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/range-resolver.d.ts +32 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/range-resolver.js +51 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/self-containment.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/self-containment.js +125 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/signature-source.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/signature-source.js +4 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/transition-planner.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/transition-planner.js +14 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/verdict.d.ts +38 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/verdict.js +17 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/wiring.d.ts +44 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/core/wiring.js +618 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/forge/git-object-port.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/holmes/admission/forge/git-object-port.js +132 -0
- package/dist/holmes/assoc/assoc-arm.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/assoc/assoc-arm.js +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/cli/agents.d.ts +8 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/agents.js +9 -5
- package/dist/holmes/cli/approve-cli.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/approve-cli.js +392 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/approve-ref.d.ts +13 -7
- package/dist/holmes/cli/approve-ref.js +30 -10
- package/dist/holmes/cli/approve-status.d.ts +26 -2
- package/dist/holmes/cli/approve-status.js +98 -18
- package/dist/holmes/cli/approve-watch.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/approve-watch.js +10 -5
- package/dist/holmes/cli/approve.d.ts +49 -13
- package/dist/holmes/cli/approve.js +249 -67
- package/dist/holmes/cli/attest.js +2 -1
- package/dist/holmes/cli/autonomy.d.ts +4 -1
- package/dist/holmes/cli/autonomy.js +17 -10
- package/dist/holmes/cli/codex-oracle.d.ts +11 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/codex-oracle.js +5 -1
- package/dist/holmes/cli/codex-toml.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/codex-toml.js +36 -2
- package/dist/holmes/cli/doctor-boundary.d.ts +76 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/doctor-boundary.js +308 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/doctor-locks.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/doctor-locks.js +119 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/doctor.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/doctor.js +34 -5
- package/dist/holmes/cli/flags.d.ts +23 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/flags.js +89 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/index.d.ts +5 -1
- package/dist/holmes/cli/index.js +226 -442
- package/dist/holmes/cli/init.js +33 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/interactive-prompt.d.ts +39 -2
- package/dist/holmes/cli/interactive-prompt.js +98 -16
- package/dist/holmes/cli/lock-recover.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/lock-recover.js +126 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/mcp-processes.js +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/cli/release-docs.js +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/cli/run-exec.d.ts +141 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/run-exec.js +1435 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/run-provision.d.ts +3 -1
- package/dist/holmes/cli/run-provision.js +255 -44
- package/dist/holmes/cli/run-wiring.d.ts +69 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/run-wiring.js +270 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/run.d.ts +21 -0
- package/dist/holmes/cli/run.js +341 -92
- package/dist/holmes/cli/runtime-binding-approval.js +32 -19
- package/dist/holmes/cli/screen-safe.d.ts +3 -92
- package/dist/holmes/cli/screen-safe.js +18 -756
- package/dist/holmes/config/config.d.ts +19 -0
- package/dist/holmes/config/config.js +18 -3
- package/dist/holmes/cpg/foundation/language-matrix.js +2 -2
- package/dist/holmes/cpg/import-resolver.js +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/governance/approval-decisions.d.ts +47 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/approval-decisions.js +29 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/approval-grants.d.ts +220 -1
- package/dist/holmes/governance/approval-grants.js +612 -33
- package/dist/holmes/governance/approval-queue.d.ts +26 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/approval-queue.js +109 -11
- package/dist/holmes/governance/approval-spend.d.ts +95 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/approval-spend.js +191 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/autonomous-shell.d.ts +61 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/autonomous-shell.js +332 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/autonomy.d.ts +12 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/autonomy.js +51 -15
- package/dist/holmes/governance/constitution.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/constitution.js +32 -12
- package/dist/holmes/governance/full-autonomy.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/full-autonomy.js +103 -7
- package/dist/holmes/governance/harness-catalog.d.ts +103 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/harness-catalog.js +348 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/human-channel.d.ts +38 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/human-channel.js +49 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/install-manifest.d.ts +22 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/install-manifest.js +160 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/ledger-rechain.js +2 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/ledger-store.conformance.d.ts +7 -1
- package/dist/holmes/governance/ledger-store.conformance.js +66 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/ledger-store.d.ts +88 -11
- package/dist/holmes/governance/ledger-store.js +186 -8
- package/dist/holmes/governance/provenance-chain.d.ts +16 -4
- package/dist/holmes/governance/provenance-chain.js +19 -4
- package/dist/holmes/governance/provenance-ledger.d.ts +6 -3
- package/dist/holmes/governance/provenance-ledger.js +53 -18
- package/dist/holmes/governance/push-gate-runner.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/push-gate-runner.js +50 -9
- package/dist/holmes/governance/push-gate.d.ts +13 -2
- package/dist/holmes/governance/push-gate.js +106 -14
- package/dist/holmes/governance/recorded-pairs.d.ts +96 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/recorded-pairs.js +522 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/replica-id.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/governance/replica-id.js +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/governance/spec-seam.d.ts +59 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/spec-seam.js +587 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/spend-kinds.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/holmes/governance/spend-kinds.js +18 -0
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/advisory-line.d.ts +102 -0
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/advisory-line.js +718 -0
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/decision-ledger.d.ts +2 -1
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/decision-ledger.js +2 -1
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/impact-gate.d.ts +7 -0
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/impact-gate.js +33 -6
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/line-continuation.d.ts +8 -0
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/line-continuation.js +39 -0
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/operator-person.d.ts +28 -4
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/operator-person.js +57 -11
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/refusal-codes.d.ts +8 -3
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/refusal-codes.js +64 -10
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/risk-classifier.d.ts +15 -9
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/risk-classifier.js +228 -16
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/risk-gate.d.ts +2 -8
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/risk-gate.js +7 -34
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/risk-types.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/run-plan-scope.js +3 -1
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/run-refusals.js +24 -8
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/run-stages.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/run-stages.js +25 -5
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/scope-judgment.js +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/shell-words.js +24 -3
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/unresolved-write.d.ts +40 -0
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/unresolved-write.js +556 -0
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/write-target.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/holmes/guardrail/write-target.js +26 -5
- package/dist/holmes/hooks/pre-tool-use.d.ts +116 -1
- package/dist/holmes/hooks/pre-tool-use.js +1176 -170
- package/dist/holmes/hooks/rtm-refresh-child.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/hooks/rtm-refresh-child.js +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/hooks/session-start.js +17 -1
- package/dist/holmes/hooks/stop.d.ts +23 -0
- package/dist/holmes/hooks/stop.js +86 -33
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/approval-adapters.js +3 -1
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/approval-commit.js +3 -2
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/approval-policy.d.ts +2 -1
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/approval-policy.js +3 -1
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/adoption.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/approval-ask.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/approval-ask.js +18 -7
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/entity-integration.d.ts +3 -3
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/entity-integration.js +29 -11
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/entity-renumber.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/entity-renumber.js +29 -11
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/entity-store.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/entity-store.js +133 -59
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/maintenance-analysis.d.ts +13 -0
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/maintenance-analysis.js +59 -2
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/operator-inspection.d.ts +9 -5
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/operator-inspection.js +79 -16
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/phase-queries.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/requirement-triage.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/review-evidence.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/review-evidence.js +35 -11
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/review-queries.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/review-queries.js +8 -1
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/review-verdict.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/review-verdict.js +10 -3
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/risk-assessment.d.ts +7 -2
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/risk-assessment.js +34 -12
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/runtime-binding-tool.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/slice-orchestration.d.ts +6 -1
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/slice-orchestration.js +14 -1
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/spec-approval.d.ts +15 -3
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/spec-approval.js +32 -5
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/spec-authoring.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/spec-authoring.js +19 -2
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/spec-lifecycle.d.ts +11 -38
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/spec-lifecycle.js +441 -94
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/spec-queries.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/taint-screening.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/taint-screening.js +2 -2
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/test-execution.d.ts +471 -4
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/test-execution.js +199 -21
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers/workspace-queries.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers.d.ts +557 -82
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/handlers.js +74 -23
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/harness-attestation.d.ts +78 -5
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/harness-attestation.js +325 -53
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/maintenance-analyze.d.ts +6 -1
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/maintenance-analyze.js +13 -11
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/maintenance-evidence.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/maintenance-evidence.js +35 -3
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/requirement-triage-evidence.js +22 -13
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/server-staleness.js +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/server.js +9 -8
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/spec-id-guard.js +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/tool-schemas.d.ts +13 -0
- package/dist/holmes/mcp/tool-schemas.js +42 -9
- package/dist/holmes/project/act-root.d.ts +19 -0
- package/dist/holmes/project/act-root.js +100 -0
- package/dist/holmes/project/baseline.d.ts +15 -2
- package/dist/holmes/project/baseline.js +14 -8
- package/dist/holmes/project/bounded-group.d.ts +47 -0
- package/dist/holmes/project/bounded-group.js +140 -0
- package/dist/holmes/project/bounded-io.d.ts +51 -2
- package/dist/holmes/project/bounded-io.js +140 -6
- package/dist/holmes/project/change-source.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/holmes/project/change-source.js +14 -6
- package/dist/holmes/project/instance-id.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/holmes/project/instance-id.js +233 -0
- package/dist/holmes/project/machine-identity.d.ts +25 -0
- package/dist/holmes/project/machine-identity.js +133 -0
- package/dist/holmes/project/owned-lock.d.ts +84 -0
- package/dist/holmes/project/owned-lock.js +263 -0
- package/dist/holmes/project/plain-lock-fs.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/holmes/project/plain-lock-fs.js +126 -0
- package/dist/holmes/project/request-lock.d.ts +85 -0
- package/dist/holmes/project/request-lock.js +459 -0
- package/dist/holmes/project/root.d.ts +12 -4
- package/dist/holmes/project/root.js +29 -8
- package/dist/holmes/project/run-records.d.ts +19 -0
- package/dist/holmes/project/run-records.js +94 -12
- package/dist/holmes/project/screen-text.d.ts +94 -0
- package/dist/holmes/project/screen-text.js +763 -0
- package/dist/holmes/project/spend-lock.d.ts +82 -0
- package/dist/holmes/project/spend-lock.js +413 -0
- package/dist/holmes/refresh/freshness-coordinator.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/refresh/freshness-coordinator.js +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/review/condition-hunk-replay.js +4 -2
- package/dist/holmes/review/confidence-calibration.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/review/confidence-calibration.js +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/review/content-verify.js +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/review/evidence-mode.d.ts +21 -0
- package/dist/holmes/review/evidence-mode.js +33 -0
- package/dist/holmes/review/head-worktree.d.ts +55 -0
- package/dist/holmes/review/head-worktree.js +329 -0
- package/dist/holmes/review/hop-ablation.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/holmes/review/hop-ablation.js +5 -5
- package/dist/holmes/review/mrp.js +13 -3
- package/dist/holmes/review/point-in-time-replay.js +12 -3
- package/dist/holmes/review/rank-diagnosis.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/holmes/review/rank-diagnosis.js +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/review/replay-corpus.d.ts +10 -4
- package/dist/holmes/review/replay-corpus.js +25 -9
- package/dist/holmes/review/requirement-triage.js +2 -2
- package/dist/holmes/review/run-provenance.d.ts +45 -0
- package/dist/holmes/review/run-provenance.js +314 -0
- package/dist/holmes/review/semantic-arm.d.ts +3 -3
- package/dist/holmes/review/semantic-arm.js +3 -3
- package/dist/holmes/review/test-evidence.d.ts +174 -0
- package/dist/holmes/review/test-evidence.js +330 -2
- package/dist/holmes/review/test-outcomes.js +3 -1
- package/dist/holmes/review/test-reports.d.ts +94 -0
- package/dist/holmes/review/test-reports.js +382 -0
- package/dist/holmes/review/test-runner.d.ts +180 -58
- package/dist/holmes/review/test-runner.js +560 -324
- package/dist/holmes/review/test-selection-breadth.js +2 -2
- package/dist/holmes/review/test-units.d.ts +159 -0
- package/dist/holmes/review/test-units.js +814 -0
- package/dist/holmes/review/verdicts.d.ts +105 -8
- package/dist/holmes/review/verdicts.js +640 -36
- package/dist/holmes/rtm/anchor-census.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/holmes/rtm/anchor-census.js +151 -0
- package/dist/holmes/rtm/anchor-ids.d.ts +25 -1
- package/dist/holmes/rtm/anchor-ids.js +45 -2
- package/dist/holmes/rtm/comment-ranges.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/holmes/rtm/comment-ranges.js +104 -0
- package/dist/holmes/rtm/counted-tests.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/holmes/rtm/counted-tests.js +63 -0
- package/dist/holmes/rtm/impact-advisory.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/rtm/known-defects.js +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/rtm/localize.js +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/rtm/taint-benchmark.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/rtm/taint-vocabulary.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/rtm/test-scope.d.ts +31 -0
- package/dist/holmes/rtm/test-scope.js +166 -5
- package/dist/holmes/rtm/trace-gaps.js +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/runtime/dispatch.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/holmes/runtime/dispatch.js +12 -1
- package/dist/holmes/semantic/cloud-usage.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/semantic/cloud-usage.js +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/semantic/unreadable-paths.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/semantic/unreadable-paths.js +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/spec/approval-blockers.js +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/spec/entity-store.d.ts +6 -1
- package/dist/holmes/spec/entity-store.js +16 -2
- package/dist/holmes/spec/entity-transaction.d.ts +7 -2
- package/dist/holmes/spec/entity-transaction.js +87 -170
- package/dist/holmes/spec/spec-store.d.ts +12 -6
- package/dist/holmes/spec/spec-store.js +4 -2
- package/dist/holmes/spec/spec-types.js +1 -1
- package/dist/holmes/spec/succession-guard.d.ts +56 -0
- package/dist/holmes/spec/succession-guard.js +187 -0
- package/dist/holmes/spec/succession.d.ts +70 -0
- package/dist/holmes/spec/succession.js +171 -0
- package/dist/holmes/spec/transition-policy.d.ts +2 -2
- package/docs/install-guide.md +9 -3
- package/docs/language-support.md +78 -0
- package/package.json +4 -3
- package/playbooks/author-slice/PLAYBOOK.md +1 -1
- package/playbooks/promote-slice/PLAYBOOK.md +5 -1
- package/playbooks/publish/PLAYBOOK.md +47 -34
- package/dist/holmes/review/manual-baseline.d.ts +0 -209
- package/dist/holmes/review/manual-baseline.js +0 -2847
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})();
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exports.DEFAULT_SPECS_DIR = void 0;
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exports.anchorMoveOnly = exports.DEFAULT_SPECS_DIR = void 0;
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exports.resolveRmSignals = resolveRmSignals;
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exports.resolveStagedStore = resolveStagedStore;
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exports.readApprovalFromEnv = readApprovalFromEnv;
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exports.sedInPlaceFiles = sedInPlaceFiles;
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exports.lockRecoverAct = lockRecoverAct;
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exports.lockRecoverAdvisory = lockRecoverAdvisory;
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exports.hookOutputFor = hookOutputFor;
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exports.authorityMention = authorityMention;
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exports.readOnlySearch = readOnlySearch;
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exports.psShowsEnvironment = psShowsEnvironment;
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exports.agentCliLaunch = agentCliLaunch;
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+
exports.agentLaunchSegments = agentLaunchSegments;
|
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+
exports.hereDocWord = hereDocWord;
|
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50
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+
exports.scanShell = scanShell;
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46
51
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exports.dumpsEnvInCommandPosition = dumpsEnvInCommandPosition;
|
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52
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+
exports.patchMarked = patchMarked;
|
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47
53
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exports.ledgerSummaryOf = ledgerSummaryOf;
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48
54
|
exports.normalizeHookInput = normalizeHookInput;
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49
55
|
exports.preEditEvidenceGate = preEditEvidenceGate;
|
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@@ -51,9 +57,12 @@ exports.decideOnGateError = decideOnGateError;
|
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51
57
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exports.isGovernedProject = isGovernedProject;
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52
58
|
exports.gateErrorDecision = gateErrorDecision;
|
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53
59
|
exports.wiredSpecsDir = wiredSpecsDir;
|
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|
+
exports.settleVerdict = settleVerdict;
|
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61
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+
exports.settleOnMainThread = settleOnMainThread;
|
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62
|
+
exports.auditApprovalFor = auditApprovalFor;
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54
63
|
exports.evaluateHook = evaluateHook;
|
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55
64
|
exports.readSpecsSync = readSpecsSync;
|
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56
|
-
// @implements A-SPEC-476.7, A-SPEC-226.3, A-SPEC-774.28, A-SPEC-747.4, A-SPEC-747.7, A-SPEC-774.23, A-SPEC-753.3, A-SPEC-773, A-SPEC-773.1, A-SPEC-773.2, A-SPEC-134.2,A-SPEC-278,A-SPEC-733, A-SPEC-734, A-SPEC-747, A-SPEC-477.1, A-SPEC-753, A-SPEC-163.7, A-SPEC-768.2, A-SPEC-772.1, A-SPEC-747.3, A-SPEC-774.26, A-SPEC-163.8, A-SPEC-790, A-SPEC-790.2, A-SPEC-790.7, A-SPEC-790.8, A-SPEC-792.5
|
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65
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+
// @implements A-SPEC-333.9, A-SPEC-794.57, A-SPEC-794.55, A-SPEC-794.54, A-SPEC-794.53, A-SPEC-794.52, A-SPEC-794.49, A-SPEC-222.12, A-SPEC-222.13, A-SPEC-476.7, A-SPEC-226.3, A-SPEC-774.28, A-SPEC-747.4, A-SPEC-747.7, A-SPEC-774.23, A-SPEC-753.3, A-SPEC-773, A-SPEC-773.1, A-SPEC-773.2, A-SPEC-134.2,A-SPEC-278,A-SPEC-733, A-SPEC-734, A-SPEC-747, A-SPEC-477.1, A-SPEC-753, A-SPEC-163.7, A-SPEC-768.2, A-SPEC-772.1, A-SPEC-747.3, A-SPEC-774.26, A-SPEC-163.8, A-SPEC-790, A-SPEC-790.2, A-SPEC-790.7, A-SPEC-790.8, A-SPEC-792.5, A-SPEC-245.9, A-SPEC-245.15, A-SPEC-245.17
|
|
57
66
|
const powershell_shell_1 = require("../guardrail/powershell-shell");
|
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58
67
|
const shell_argument_roles_1 = require("../guardrail/shell-argument-roles");
|
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59
68
|
// @implements A-SPEC-549.3 — the hook's deny reasons are English here; hooks-english.test.ts drives
|
|
@@ -82,6 +91,8 @@ const run_mode_1 = require("../governance/run-mode");
|
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|
82
91
|
const classification_mode_1 = require("../guardrail/classification-mode");
|
|
83
92
|
const scope_refusal_memory_1 = require("../guardrail/scope-refusal-memory");
|
|
84
93
|
const agent_launch_policy_1 = require("../guardrail/agent-launch-policy");
|
|
94
|
+
const line_continuation_1 = require("../guardrail/line-continuation");
|
|
95
|
+
const unresolved_write_1 = require("../guardrail/unresolved-write");
|
|
85
96
|
const risk_classifier_1 = require("../guardrail/risk-classifier");
|
|
86
97
|
const refusal_codes_1 = require("../guardrail/refusal-codes");
|
|
87
98
|
const run_refusals_1 = require("../guardrail/run-refusals");
|
|
@@ -102,7 +113,6 @@ const governance_history_1 = require("../guardrail/governance-history");
|
|
|
102
113
|
const rtm_check_1 = require("../rtm/rtm-check");
|
|
103
114
|
const ledger_store_1 = require("../governance/ledger-store");
|
|
104
115
|
const provenance_chain_1 = require("../governance/provenance-chain");
|
|
105
|
-
const ledger_lock_1 = require("../governance/ledger-lock");
|
|
106
116
|
// @implements A-SPEC-574.3 — the caller owns the store and hands the chain the question.
|
|
107
117
|
const ledger_store_2 = require("../governance/ledger-store");
|
|
108
118
|
const risk_gate_1 = require("../guardrail/risk-gate");
|
|
@@ -112,7 +122,10 @@ const linear_match_1 = require("../guardrail/linear-match");
|
|
|
112
122
|
const approval_grants_1 = require("../governance/approval-grants");
|
|
113
123
|
const approval_blockers_1 = require("../spec/approval-blockers");
|
|
114
124
|
const impact_gate_1 = require("../guardrail/impact-gate");
|
|
125
|
+
const advisory_line_1 = require("../guardrail/advisory-line");
|
|
126
|
+
const heartbeat_1 = require("./heartbeat");
|
|
115
127
|
const bounded_io_1 = require("../project/bounded-io");
|
|
128
|
+
const flags_1 = require("../cli/flags"); // @implements A-SPEC-245.18 — the CLI's own flag reading, one source
|
|
116
129
|
// Resolve per-rm-target git facts (H1 git-aware guardrail): is each recursive-rm target a
|
|
117
130
|
// regenerable build artifact (gitignored), version-controlled source (tracked), or escaping the
|
|
118
131
|
// project? This is the I/O half — the classifier stays pure and merely consumes these signals.
|
|
@@ -187,27 +200,41 @@ function resolveStagedStore(command, projectRoot, specsDir) {
|
|
|
187
200
|
return undefined;
|
|
188
201
|
if (!fs.existsSync(specsDir))
|
|
189
202
|
return undefined;
|
|
190
|
-
|
|
203
|
+
// the repository question first (one bounded child); the change list itself is computed without `git status`
|
|
204
|
+
const r = (0, bounded_io_1.gitOnce)(projectRoot, ['--no-optional-locks', '-c', 'core.fsmonitor=false', 'rev-parse', '--show-toplevel'], 'repo', { env: (0, root_1.cleanSubprocessEnv)() });
|
|
191
205
|
const answer = (0, bounded_io_1.gitAnswerOf)(r, projectRoot);
|
|
192
206
|
if (answer === 'no-repository')
|
|
193
207
|
return undefined;
|
|
208
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-222.12 (N1) — and another replica's ledger file (any provenance*.jsonl but this writer's own)
|
|
209
|
+
const ledgerDir = path.join(projectRoot, '.ax', 'ledger');
|
|
194
210
|
if (answer !== 'answered')
|
|
195
|
-
return { specsDir, unanswered: true };
|
|
196
|
-
|
|
197
|
-
|
|
198
|
-
|
|
199
|
-
|
|
200
|
-
|
|
201
|
-
|
|
202
|
-
|
|
203
|
-
if (
|
|
204
|
-
|
|
205
|
-
|
|
206
|
-
|
|
207
|
-
|
|
208
|
-
|
|
209
|
-
|
|
210
|
-
|
|
211
|
+
return { specsDir, unanswered: true, ledgerDir };
|
|
212
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-792.32 — `git status` re-hashes a racily clean file through its clean filter, which ran the
|
|
213
|
+
// agent's filter command inside this hook (measured 2026-10-26); worktreeChanges compares bytes without git's filters
|
|
214
|
+
let changes;
|
|
215
|
+
let foreign = [];
|
|
216
|
+
try {
|
|
217
|
+
const { worktreeChanges } = require('../governance/spec-seam');
|
|
218
|
+
changes = worktreeChanges(projectRoot, [path.relative(projectRoot, specsDir)]);
|
|
219
|
+
if (fs.existsSync(ledgerDir)) {
|
|
220
|
+
let own = null;
|
|
221
|
+
try {
|
|
222
|
+
own = new ledger_store_1.FileLedgerStore(ledgerDir).replicaId();
|
|
223
|
+
}
|
|
224
|
+
catch {
|
|
225
|
+
own = null;
|
|
226
|
+
}
|
|
227
|
+
foreign = worktreeChanges(projectRoot, [path.relative(projectRoot, ledgerDir)]).filter((c) => {
|
|
228
|
+
const m = /^provenance(?:\.([^/]+))?\.jsonl$/i.exec(path.posix.basename(c.path));
|
|
229
|
+
return m !== null && !(own !== null && m[1] === own);
|
|
230
|
+
});
|
|
231
|
+
}
|
|
232
|
+
}
|
|
233
|
+
catch {
|
|
234
|
+
return { specsDir, unanswered: true, ledgerDir };
|
|
235
|
+
}
|
|
236
|
+
return { specsDir, tracked: changes.some((c) => !c.untracked), untracked: changes.some((c) => c.untracked),
|
|
237
|
+
ledgerDir, foreignLedger: { tracked: foreign.some((c) => !c.untracked), untracked: foreign.some((c) => c.untracked) } };
|
|
211
238
|
}
|
|
212
239
|
/**
|
|
213
240
|
* @implements A-SPEC-476.3 — what a file tool's write does to the caps in `<root>/ax.config.json`: `null` leaves both as
|
|
@@ -647,6 +674,138 @@ function wrappedServerWord(normalized) {
|
|
|
647
674
|
}
|
|
648
675
|
return false;
|
|
649
676
|
}
|
|
677
|
+
/**
|
|
678
|
+
* @implements A-SPEC-245.9 (1b-5, item 7) — `holmes-kit lock recover` retires a lock another process may hold: the
|
|
679
|
+
* operator's act. The CLI refuses it from an agent by the environment and the process ancestry, which a process
|
|
680
|
+
* reparented away from the harness escapes, so the gate refuses the command itself. A segment counts when its command
|
|
681
|
+
* word (after env, nohup, time, command, exec, builtin and NAME=value) runs the CLI — `holmes-kit`, `npx [-y]
|
|
682
|
+
* [@holmes-lab/]holmes-kit[@v]`, or `node <…/holmes/cli/index.js | …holmes-kit[.js]>` — and its next words are
|
|
683
|
+
* `lock recover`; a mention as an argument (echo, grep) is not the act.
|
|
684
|
+
*/
|
|
685
|
+
function lockRecoverAct(command) {
|
|
686
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.17 (item 1) — read through the gate's own shell reading, as the agent-CLI launch is: segments
|
|
687
|
+
// split on unquoted separators (so `{`, `then`, `do`, `!` lead a segment), quoting removed (joined quotes and
|
|
688
|
+
// backslashes read as the word they make), a -c body, an eval argument, a command substitution and a here-document
|
|
689
|
+
// read as words of a command, an inert text command's arguments (echo, grep …) left as data. By word, not by wrapper:
|
|
690
|
+
// sudo, timeout, nice, time, setsid, screen, tmux, xargs, env options, command -p and the package runners need no
|
|
691
|
+
// list. Named limits: a word made by variable expansion ($H lock recover) and an eval body built at run time — both
|
|
692
|
+
// refused since A-SPEC-245.18 when the command's text names holmes-kit, lock and recover.
|
|
693
|
+
// the reading hands the predicate a word's basename, so index.js finds the segment; the full word is judged below
|
|
694
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.19 (item 2) — the hook is early refusal of the direct forms only; the authority boundary is
|
|
695
|
+
// the CLI's operator judgement (operatorActGuard: the inherited harness marker or the process ancestry). Text that
|
|
696
|
+
// names the act and is handed to a shell, an interpreter or a run-time word is advised on (lockRecoverAdvisory), not
|
|
697
|
+
// refused: it refused commit messages, PR bodies and prose. Named limit: the hook does not read interpreter source,
|
|
698
|
+
// package scripts, aliases or run-time words.
|
|
699
|
+
const segments = agentLaunchSegments(command, 0, { test: (w) => isHolmesKitWord(w) || w === 'index.js' });
|
|
700
|
+
return segments.some(({ words, spans }) => !lockRecoverDataLead(words, spans) && words.some((w, i) => {
|
|
701
|
+
if (!isHolmesKitWord(w))
|
|
702
|
+
return false;
|
|
703
|
+
let j = i + 1;
|
|
704
|
+
while (j < words.length && (words[j].startsWith('-') || isHolmesKitWord(words[j])))
|
|
705
|
+
j++; // npx -p pkg holmes-kit, npm exec pkg --
|
|
706
|
+
if (words[j] !== 'lock')
|
|
707
|
+
return false;
|
|
708
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.18 (item 4) — xargs or parallel fills the arguments at run time
|
|
709
|
+
if (words.slice(0, i).some((p) => /^(?:xargs|parallel)$/.test(baseWord(p))))
|
|
710
|
+
return true;
|
|
711
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.18 (item 2) — the CLI removes flags wherever they stand (parseFlags): judge what is left
|
|
712
|
+
const after = words.slice(j + 1);
|
|
713
|
+
try {
|
|
714
|
+
return (0, flags_1.parseFlags)(after).positionals.includes('recover');
|
|
715
|
+
}
|
|
716
|
+
catch {
|
|
717
|
+
return after.includes('recover');
|
|
718
|
+
}
|
|
719
|
+
}));
|
|
720
|
+
}
|
|
721
|
+
const baseWord = (w) => w.split(/[\\/]/).pop() ?? w;
|
|
722
|
+
/**
|
|
723
|
+
* The CLI as a word: its name, a path to it, its .js/.cmd/.ps1/.exe shim, the package, each with an optional
|
|
724
|
+
* `@<version|tag>` (the shell reading hands the predicate `holmes-kit@0.40.0`, a basename — A-SPEC-245.18 item 1); its
|
|
725
|
+
* index.js under holmes/cli, or a relative one (`cd …/cli && node index.js`); the text after `=` and a leading `!`
|
|
726
|
+
* (`git -c alias.x='!holmes-kit …'`).
|
|
727
|
+
*/
|
|
728
|
+
const HOLMES_KIT_WORD = /^(?:\S*[\/\\])?holmes-kit(?:\.js|\.cmd|\.ps1|\.exe)?(?:@[^\s\/\\]+)?$|(?:^|[\/\\])holmes[\/\\]cli[\/\\]index\.js$|^(?:\.[\/\\])?index\.js$/i;
|
|
729
|
+
function isHolmesKitWord(w) {
|
|
730
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.19 (item 2) — after a sed delimiter too (`s|x|holmes-kit …|e`); A-SPEC-245.20 — `;` as well
|
|
731
|
+
const cut = Math.max(...['=', '|', '#', ',', ':', ';'].map((c) => w.lastIndexOf(c)));
|
|
732
|
+
return HOLMES_KIT_WORD.test(w.slice(cut + 1).replace(/^!/, ''));
|
|
733
|
+
}
|
|
734
|
+
/**
|
|
735
|
+
* @implements A-SPEC-245.18 (item 3) — a segment whose lead takes the text as data: jest (directly, through npx, or by a
|
|
736
|
+
* path to it), tee, and sed whose script carries no GNU execute (the `e` command, the `s///e` flag).
|
|
737
|
+
*/
|
|
738
|
+
function lockRecoverDataLead(words, spans) {
|
|
739
|
+
let i = 0;
|
|
740
|
+
while (i < words.length && /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*=/.test(words[i]))
|
|
741
|
+
i++;
|
|
742
|
+
if (words[i] === 'npx') {
|
|
743
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.19 (item 2) — a -p/--package value is not the command (a -c/--call string's words follow as
|
|
744
|
+
// the command, so it needs no rule of its own: A-SPEC-245.20 removed the duplicate)
|
|
745
|
+
i++;
|
|
746
|
+
while (words[i]?.startsWith('-'))
|
|
747
|
+
i += /^(?:-p|--package)$/.test(words[i]) ? 2 : 1;
|
|
748
|
+
}
|
|
749
|
+
const lead = baseWord(words[i] ?? '');
|
|
750
|
+
if (lead === 'jest' || lead === 'tee')
|
|
751
|
+
return true;
|
|
752
|
+
if (lead !== 'sed')
|
|
753
|
+
return false;
|
|
754
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.23 (item 1) — a script given through --expression= or attached to -e is read as a script
|
|
755
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.24 (items 2, 6d) — the words of one quoted span are one script again (the shell reading split a
|
|
756
|
+
// pattern address at its spaces), and GNU's abbreviated --expression spellings are stripped like the full one
|
|
757
|
+
const script = sedScriptWords(words.slice(i + 1), (spans ?? []).slice(i + 1))
|
|
758
|
+
// A-SPEC-245.25 (item 2, N2) — up to the bundle's first e only: `-e'e …'` and `-ne'e …'` keep the script's own e
|
|
759
|
+
.map((w) => w.replace(/^(?:--e[a-z]*=|-[a-zA-Z]*?e)/, '')).join(' ');
|
|
760
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.19 (item 2) — the s command's flags after its third delimiter, whatever the delimiter
|
|
761
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.24 (items 2, 3) — the e command is recognised by the character before it — an address's last
|
|
762
|
+
// character (a delimiter, a digit, $, !, ~, `,`, an I or M flag) or a command's start — with no nested quantifier, so
|
|
763
|
+
// the judgement is linear (245.23's address class took 2.7 s on 36 slashes). Measured against the 245.19 build by
|
|
764
|
+
// the differential corpus (sed-early-refusal-corpus.test.ts): no input it refused early passes here.
|
|
765
|
+
// Named limits, refused by the CLI and outside this early refusal: a custom-delimited address, GNU +N ranges, a script
|
|
766
|
+
// assembled at run time (one s command writing the command, another running it). It can refuse sed data that names
|
|
767
|
+
// the act: an input file named e, an i/a text of e, a pattern of " e ", a path ending in M or I before e.
|
|
768
|
+
// A-SPEC-245.25 (item 2) — 245.19's second alternative ORed back unchanged (it covered a command word attached to e:
|
|
769
|
+
// the 245.22-245.24 rewrites each fell below the 245.19 baseline); the s command takes ASCII punctuation delimiters
|
|
770
|
+
// only (item 4: many non-ASCII delimiters made the alternative quadratic). Named limits, refused by the CLI: no address
|
|
771
|
+
// or a line-number address with an attached command, `1e{ …;}`, an absolute path after e, an alphanumeric or
|
|
772
|
+
// non-ASCII delimiter. A-SPEC-245.26 (item 3) — and, passing since 245.19: the CLI word attached to a pattern
|
|
773
|
+
// address's e; a space or ! between the address and an attached command; an s command attached to an address; an s
|
|
774
|
+
// delimiter (@ ! % _ ~ ^) the CLI-word reading does not cut at. The early refusal's direction waits for the owner.
|
|
775
|
+
// A-SPEC-245.26 (item 2) — the same alternative in a form that does not backtrack quadratically on a long run of e
|
|
776
|
+
// (the review's equivalent: an e somewhere in the alphanumeric run after the slash, then the run to its end)
|
|
777
|
+
return !/(?:^|[\s;{}\/0-9$!~,IM])e(?:\s|$)|\/(?=[A-Za-z0-9]*e)[A-Za-z0-9]*(?:\s|$|;)|(?:^|[\s;{}])s([!-\/:-@[\]^_`{-~])(?:(?!\1).)*\1(?:(?!\1).)*\1[A-Za-z0-9]*e/.test(script);
|
|
778
|
+
}
|
|
779
|
+
/** @implements A-SPEC-245.24 (item 2) — consecutive words of one quoted span joined back with a space. */
|
|
780
|
+
function sedScriptWords(words, spans) {
|
|
781
|
+
const out = [];
|
|
782
|
+
words.forEach((w, k) => {
|
|
783
|
+
if (k > 0 && spans[k] !== undefined && spans[k] >= 0 && spans[k] === spans[k - 1])
|
|
784
|
+
out[out.length - 1] += ` ${w}`;
|
|
785
|
+
else
|
|
786
|
+
out.push(w);
|
|
787
|
+
});
|
|
788
|
+
return out;
|
|
789
|
+
}
|
|
790
|
+
/** A shell that reads its program from a pipe, a here-string or a process substitution. */
|
|
791
|
+
const SHELL_FED = /(?:[|(]|<<<)\s*(?:\S+\s+)*?(?:\S*\/)?(?:sh|bash|zsh|dash|ksh|mksh|ash|fish)\b|(?:^|[\s\/;&|(])(?:sh|bash|zsh|dash|ksh|mksh|ash|fish)\b[^|;&\n]*<<</;
|
|
792
|
+
/** A command word built at run time: an expansion or a substitution where a command starts. */
|
|
793
|
+
const RUNTIME_COMMAND_WORD = /(?:^|[;&|\n({]|\b(?:then|do|else|sudo|env|nohup|time|command|exec)\s)\s*["']?(?:\$[({A-Za-z_]|`)/;
|
|
794
|
+
/**
|
|
795
|
+
* @implements A-SPEC-245.19 (item 2) — the advisory an allowed Bash command carries when its text names the act and
|
|
796
|
+
* hands it to something that runs text: the CLI will refuse it from a session.
|
|
797
|
+
*/
|
|
798
|
+
function lockRecoverAdvisory(command) {
|
|
799
|
+
return lockRecoverTextRuns(command)
|
|
800
|
+
? '[Holmes-Kit] advisory: this command names holmes-kit lock recover and hands text to a shell or an interpreter — if it runs the recovery, the CLI refuses it from an agent session; the operator runs it from their own terminal (A-SPEC-245.19).'
|
|
801
|
+
: null;
|
|
802
|
+
}
|
|
803
|
+
function lockRecoverTextRuns(command) {
|
|
804
|
+
const text = command.replace(/["'\\]/g, '');
|
|
805
|
+
if (!/holmes-kit/i.test(text) || !/\block\b/.test(text) || !/\brecover\b/.test(text))
|
|
806
|
+
return false;
|
|
807
|
+
return interpreterSpawns(command) || SHELL_FED.test(command) || RUNTIME_COMMAND_WORD.test(command);
|
|
808
|
+
}
|
|
650
809
|
function startsHolmesServer(command) {
|
|
651
810
|
command = (0, shell_argument_roles_1.shellArgumentRoles)(command).serverText;
|
|
652
811
|
if (SERVER_RUNNERS.some((t) => t.test(command)))
|
|
@@ -668,10 +827,15 @@ function startsHolmesServer(command) {
|
|
|
668
827
|
* Round-1 A-SPEC-718's approval_commit exception is now the rule for every tool.
|
|
669
828
|
*/
|
|
670
829
|
function hookOutputFor(_toolName, out) {
|
|
671
|
-
|
|
830
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.23 (item 3) — a verdict's `refusal` is the deny site's own code; the harness never sees the field
|
|
831
|
+
// A-SPEC-245.25 — `request` is the run path's, never the harness's
|
|
832
|
+
const { permissionDecision, permissionDecisionReason, refusal, request: _request, ...rest } = out;
|
|
672
833
|
if (permissionDecision === 'deny') {
|
|
673
834
|
// @implements A-SPEC-777 — every deny carries its refusal code as one machine-readable line.
|
|
674
|
-
|
|
835
|
+
// A-SPEC-245.26 (4a) — a site that carries `refusal` but leaves it unset names no registered code: unclassified,
|
|
836
|
+
// never the reason's words
|
|
837
|
+
const code = 'refusal' in out ? (typeof refusal === 'string' ? refusal : '') : undefined;
|
|
838
|
+
return { hookEventName: 'PreToolUse', ...rest, permissionDecision, permissionDecisionReason: (0, refusal_codes_1.withRefusalLine)(permissionDecisionReason, code) };
|
|
675
839
|
}
|
|
676
840
|
const context = [typeof rest.additionalContext === 'string' ? rest.additionalContext : '', permissionDecisionReason ?? ''].filter((t) => t !== '').join('\n');
|
|
677
841
|
const { additionalContext: _c, ...others } = rest;
|
|
@@ -992,17 +1156,102 @@ function agentCliLaunch(command) {
|
|
|
992
1156
|
}
|
|
993
1157
|
/** @implements A-SPEC-774.9 — an interpreter that spawns an agent by name (the 774.2 rule, kept apart for reuse). */
|
|
994
1158
|
function interpreterSpawnsAgent(command) {
|
|
995
|
-
return
|
|
996
|
-
&& /\b(?:spawn|spawnSync|exec|execSync|execFile|execFileSync|subprocess|system|popen|Popen)\b/.test(command)
|
|
1159
|
+
return interpreterSpawns(command)
|
|
997
1160
|
&& /['"](?:claude|codex|gemini|agy|aider|cursor-agent|opencode|goose|qwen)(?:\.exe|\.cmd)?['"]/.test(command);
|
|
998
1161
|
}
|
|
1162
|
+
/** @implements A-SPEC-245.18 (item 4) — an interpreter with a spawn call: the half of 774.9's rule the lock-recover judgement reuses. */
|
|
1163
|
+
function interpreterSpawns(command) {
|
|
1164
|
+
return /\b(?:node|python[0-9.]*|ruby|perl|deno|bun|php)\b/.test(command)
|
|
1165
|
+
&& /\b(?:spawn|spawnSync|exec|execSync|execFile|execFileSync|subprocess|system|popen|Popen)\b/.test(command);
|
|
1166
|
+
}
|
|
1167
|
+
/**
|
|
1168
|
+
* @implements A-SPEC-774.67 — exactly the product's report command: the Holmes CLI (as installed, through npx, or the
|
|
1169
|
+
* package's bin under node), `report`, then only `--message <word>`, `--harness <harness>` and `--open`, each at most once.
|
|
1170
|
+
*/
|
|
1171
|
+
function isHolmesReport(rawWords, rawSpans = [], spanQuote = []) {
|
|
1172
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-774.68 — a word holding $ or a backtick is never text here: it may be a command substitution
|
|
1173
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-774.69 — unless its quoting keeps it text: wholly single-quoted, or wholly double-quoted with
|
|
1174
|
+
// neither $( nor a backtick (`'costs $5'`, `"home $HOME"`; review 18:43, F1.2-e)
|
|
1175
|
+
const text = (w, k) => {
|
|
1176
|
+
if (!/[$`]/.test(w))
|
|
1177
|
+
return true;
|
|
1178
|
+
const q = rawSpans[k] !== undefined && rawSpans[k] >= 0 ? spanQuote[rawSpans[k]] : undefined;
|
|
1179
|
+
return q === "'" || (q === '"' && !/\$\(|`/.test(w));
|
|
1180
|
+
};
|
|
1181
|
+
if (!rawWords.every(text))
|
|
1182
|
+
return false;
|
|
1183
|
+
// one quoted value is one word (`--message "ART-4 zero"`): words sharing a quoted span are joined
|
|
1184
|
+
const words = [];
|
|
1185
|
+
for (let k = 0; k < rawWords.length; k++) {
|
|
1186
|
+
if (k > 0 && rawSpans[k] !== undefined && rawSpans[k] >= 0 && rawSpans[k] === rawSpans[k - 1])
|
|
1187
|
+
words[words.length - 1] += ` ${rawWords[k]}`;
|
|
1188
|
+
else
|
|
1189
|
+
words.push(rawWords[k]);
|
|
1190
|
+
}
|
|
1191
|
+
let i = 0;
|
|
1192
|
+
if (words[0] === 'npx') {
|
|
1193
|
+
i = 1;
|
|
1194
|
+
if (words[i] === '-y' || words[i] === '--yes')
|
|
1195
|
+
i++;
|
|
1196
|
+
}
|
|
1197
|
+
const prog = words[i] ?? '';
|
|
1198
|
+
const isCli = prog === 'holmes-kit' || (words[0] === 'npx' && /^@holmes-lab\/holmes-kit(?:@[\w.-]+)?$/.test(prog));
|
|
1199
|
+
const isBin = words[0] === 'node' && i === 0 && /(?:^|\/)bin\/holmes-kit\.js$/.test(words[1] ?? '');
|
|
1200
|
+
if (isBin)
|
|
1201
|
+
i = 1;
|
|
1202
|
+
else if (!isCli)
|
|
1203
|
+
return false;
|
|
1204
|
+
if (words[i + 1] !== 'report')
|
|
1205
|
+
return false;
|
|
1206
|
+
const seen = new Set();
|
|
1207
|
+
for (let k = i + 2; k < words.length; k++) {
|
|
1208
|
+
const w = words[k];
|
|
1209
|
+
if (seen.has(w))
|
|
1210
|
+
return false;
|
|
1211
|
+
seen.add(w);
|
|
1212
|
+
if (w === '--open')
|
|
1213
|
+
continue;
|
|
1214
|
+
if (w === '--message' && k + 1 < words.length) {
|
|
1215
|
+
k++;
|
|
1216
|
+
continue;
|
|
1217
|
+
}
|
|
1218
|
+
if (w === '--harness' && /^(?:claude|codex|agy|antigravity)$/.test(words[k + 1] ?? '')) {
|
|
1219
|
+
k++;
|
|
1220
|
+
continue;
|
|
1221
|
+
}
|
|
1222
|
+
return false;
|
|
1223
|
+
}
|
|
1224
|
+
return true;
|
|
1225
|
+
}
|
|
999
1226
|
/** The words of every segment that launches an agent CLI (A-SPEC-774.5 §1), quote-aware. */
|
|
1000
1227
|
/**
|
|
1001
1228
|
* @implements A-SPEC-774.26 — with each word, the quoted span it came from (-1: unquoted or mixed), so the option check
|
|
1002
1229
|
* can tell a quoted prompt (`-p "… cut -d= …"`) from options, and a quoted program (`tmux new -d 'claude …'`) from both.
|
|
1003
1230
|
*/
|
|
1004
|
-
|
|
1231
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-774.88 — the program pattern is a parameter: the test runtime's kill seam reads shell strings for
|
|
1232
|
+
// kill, pkill and killall with the same word scanner (the default, and so the code gate, is unchanged)
|
|
1233
|
+
function agentLaunchSegments(command, depth = 0, program = AGENT_CLI) {
|
|
1005
1234
|
const found = [];
|
|
1235
|
+
const scan = scanShell(command); // @implements A-SPEC-774.75 — computed once, read by the substitution scan too
|
|
1236
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-774.68 — a command substitution runs whatever quoting surrounds it: its body is a command too
|
|
1237
|
+
const subs = substitutionBodies(command, scan);
|
|
1238
|
+
const nested = depth < 8 ? subs.bodies.flatMap((b) => agentLaunchSegments(b, depth + 1, program)) : [];
|
|
1239
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-774.69 — what the limits leave unread is judged a launch, with an option no list allows (F1.2-b)
|
|
1240
|
+
if (subs.overflow || (depth >= 8 && subs.bodies.length > 0))
|
|
1241
|
+
nested.push({ words: ['codex', '--holmes-unjudged-substitutions'], spans: [-1, -1] });
|
|
1242
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-774.72 — the one scanner; a here-document fed to anything but an inert text command (`bash <<'EOF'`)
|
|
1243
|
+
// runs its lines, which are judged as commands; an inert one's body (`cat <<'EOF'`) is data (A-SPEC-774.69)
|
|
1244
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-774.75 — unless it never ends: an unterminated body is judged as commands under any lead, and
|
|
1245
|
+
// here-documents nested past depth 8 are judged a launch, as substitutions are
|
|
1246
|
+
for (const h of scan.docs) {
|
|
1247
|
+
if (INERT_TEXT_COMMANDS.has(h.lead) && h.terminated)
|
|
1248
|
+
continue;
|
|
1249
|
+
if (depth >= 8) {
|
|
1250
|
+
nested.push({ words: ['codex', '--holmes-unjudged-here-documents'], spans: [-1, -1] });
|
|
1251
|
+
break;
|
|
1252
|
+
}
|
|
1253
|
+
nested.push(...agentLaunchSegments(command.slice(h.bodyStart, h.bodyEnd), depth + 1, program));
|
|
1254
|
+
}
|
|
1006
1255
|
// @implements A-SPEC-774.5 §1 — by WORD, not by wrapper. The wrapper list (774.2) was walked through by `tmux new -d
|
|
1007
1256
|
// '…'`, `script -q /dev/null …` and `watch …` (supervisor probe, 2026-10-17): launchers have no end. Quoting is
|
|
1008
1257
|
// removed first, so a program inside a quoted argument is read as words of the same segment; the exceptions are a
|
|
@@ -1012,44 +1261,74 @@ function agentLaunchSegments(command) {
|
|
|
1012
1261
|
const segs = [];
|
|
1013
1262
|
let cur = '';
|
|
1014
1263
|
let curSpans = [];
|
|
1015
|
-
let quote = null;
|
|
1016
1264
|
let span = -1;
|
|
1017
1265
|
let spans = 0;
|
|
1266
|
+
let open = false;
|
|
1267
|
+
let ansi = false; // the open span is $'…'
|
|
1268
|
+
let undecodable = false;
|
|
1269
|
+
const spanQuote = []; // @implements A-SPEC-774.69 — the quote kind of each quoted span, for the report exemption
|
|
1018
1270
|
const add = (s, at) => { for (const c of s) {
|
|
1019
1271
|
cur += c;
|
|
1020
1272
|
curSpans.push(at);
|
|
1021
1273
|
} };
|
|
1274
|
+
const cut = () => { segs.push({ text: cur, spanOf: curSpans }); cur = ''; curSpans = []; };
|
|
1275
|
+
const { kind } = scan;
|
|
1022
1276
|
for (let k = 0; k < command.length; k++) {
|
|
1023
1277
|
const ch = command[k];
|
|
1024
|
-
|
|
1025
|
-
|
|
1026
|
-
|
|
1027
|
-
|
|
1028
|
-
|
|
1029
|
-
|
|
1278
|
+
const t = kind[k];
|
|
1279
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-774.72 — quoting from the scan: a delimiter opens or closes a span (quoting joins, as the shell
|
|
1280
|
+
// does: cl'aude' is claude); $'…' is a single-quote span with its escapes decoded; comments and bodies are dropped
|
|
1281
|
+
if (t === 7 /* Ch.Delim */) {
|
|
1282
|
+
if (!open) {
|
|
1283
|
+
open = true;
|
|
1284
|
+
span = spans++;
|
|
1285
|
+
spanQuote[span] = ch === '"' ? '"' : "'";
|
|
1286
|
+
ansi = ch === '$';
|
|
1287
|
+
if (ansi)
|
|
1288
|
+
k++;
|
|
1030
1289
|
}
|
|
1031
1290
|
else
|
|
1032
|
-
|
|
1291
|
+
open = false;
|
|
1033
1292
|
continue;
|
|
1034
1293
|
}
|
|
1035
|
-
|
|
1036
|
-
|
|
1294
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-774.75 — inside $'…' an escape is decoded as bash 5 decodes it (`\x63odex` is codex); one that
|
|
1295
|
+
// names no character is judged a launch
|
|
1296
|
+
if (t === 8 /* Ch.Escape */ && open && ansi) {
|
|
1297
|
+
const d = ansiEscape(command, k + 1);
|
|
1298
|
+
if (d === null) {
|
|
1299
|
+
undecodable = true;
|
|
1300
|
+
k++;
|
|
1301
|
+
continue;
|
|
1302
|
+
}
|
|
1303
|
+
add(d.text, span);
|
|
1304
|
+
k += d.length;
|
|
1305
|
+
continue;
|
|
1306
|
+
}
|
|
1307
|
+
if (t === 8 /* Ch.Escape */) {
|
|
1308
|
+
const next = command[++k] ?? '';
|
|
1309
|
+
add(next, open ? span : -1);
|
|
1310
|
+
continue;
|
|
1311
|
+
}
|
|
1312
|
+
if (t === 1 /* Ch.Single */ || t === 2 /* Ch.Double */ || t === 3 /* Ch.Ansi */) {
|
|
1313
|
+
add(ch, span);
|
|
1037
1314
|
continue;
|
|
1038
1315
|
}
|
|
1039
|
-
if (
|
|
1040
|
-
quote = ch;
|
|
1041
|
-
span = spans++;
|
|
1316
|
+
if (t === 4 /* Ch.Comment */)
|
|
1042
1317
|
continue;
|
|
1043
|
-
|
|
1318
|
+
if (t === 5 /* Ch.Body */ || t === 6 /* Ch.QuotedBody */) {
|
|
1319
|
+
if (cur !== '')
|
|
1320
|
+
cut();
|
|
1321
|
+
continue;
|
|
1322
|
+
}
|
|
1044
1323
|
if (/[|;&\n()]/.test(ch)) {
|
|
1045
|
-
|
|
1046
|
-
cur = '';
|
|
1047
|
-
curSpans = [];
|
|
1324
|
+
cut();
|
|
1048
1325
|
continue;
|
|
1049
1326
|
}
|
|
1050
1327
|
add(ch, -1);
|
|
1051
1328
|
}
|
|
1052
1329
|
segs.push({ text: cur, spanOf: curSpans });
|
|
1330
|
+
if (undecodable)
|
|
1331
|
+
nested.push({ words: ['codex', '--holmes-unjudged-escape'], spans: [-1, -1] });
|
|
1053
1332
|
for (const seg of segs) {
|
|
1054
1333
|
// A quote of the other kind inside a quoted span stays in the text (`'… "claude -p x"'`); it is not part of a name.
|
|
1055
1334
|
const rawWords = [];
|
|
@@ -1069,10 +1348,33 @@ function agentLaunchSegments(command) {
|
|
|
1069
1348
|
continue;
|
|
1070
1349
|
}
|
|
1071
1350
|
const s = seg.spanOf[k];
|
|
1351
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-774.69 — an unquoted ${IFS} or $IFS splits words, as field splitting does (F1.2-c)
|
|
1352
|
+
if (s === -1 && c === '$') {
|
|
1353
|
+
const ifs = /^\$(?:\{IFS\}|IFS(?![A-Za-z0-9_]))/.exec(seg.text.slice(k));
|
|
1354
|
+
if (ifs && seg.spanOf.slice(k, k + ifs[0].length).every((x) => x === -1)) {
|
|
1355
|
+
flush();
|
|
1356
|
+
k += ifs[0].length - 1;
|
|
1357
|
+
continue;
|
|
1358
|
+
}
|
|
1359
|
+
}
|
|
1072
1360
|
wspan = wspan === null ? s : wspan === s ? s : -1;
|
|
1073
1361
|
wcur += c;
|
|
1074
1362
|
}
|
|
1075
1363
|
flush();
|
|
1364
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-774.69 — an agent name followed by an expansion runs whatever the expansion holds: the name, then
|
|
1365
|
+
// an option no list allows
|
|
1366
|
+
const AGENT_BEFORE_EXPANSION = (w) => {
|
|
1367
|
+
const at = w.indexOf('$');
|
|
1368
|
+
if (at <= 0)
|
|
1369
|
+
return null;
|
|
1370
|
+
const name = w.slice(0, at);
|
|
1371
|
+
return program.test(name.split(/[\\/]/).pop() ?? name) ? name : null;
|
|
1372
|
+
};
|
|
1373
|
+
for (let r = rawWords.length - 1; r >= 0; r--) {
|
|
1374
|
+
const name = rawWords[r].span === -1 ? AGENT_BEFORE_EXPANSION(rawWords[r].w) : null;
|
|
1375
|
+
if (name !== null)
|
|
1376
|
+
rawWords.splice(r, 1, { w: name, span: -1 }, { w: '--holmes-unjudged-expansion', span: -1 });
|
|
1377
|
+
}
|
|
1076
1378
|
const words = rawWords.map((r) => r.w);
|
|
1077
1379
|
const wordSpans = rawWords.map((r) => r.span);
|
|
1078
1380
|
let i = 0;
|
|
@@ -1081,10 +1383,12 @@ function agentLaunchSegments(command) {
|
|
|
1081
1383
|
const rest = words.slice(i);
|
|
1082
1384
|
if (rest.length === 0)
|
|
1083
1385
|
continue;
|
|
1386
|
+
if (isHolmesReport(rest, wordSpans.slice(i), spanQuote))
|
|
1387
|
+
continue; // @implements A-SPEC-774.67 — the product's own report command
|
|
1084
1388
|
const base = (w) => w.split(/[\\/]/).pop() ?? w;
|
|
1085
1389
|
const pkgOf = (w) => (/^(@?[^@]+)/.exec(w) ?? ['', ''])[1];
|
|
1086
1390
|
// An option value names a program too (`git -c core.pager=claude`), so the text after the last `=` counts.
|
|
1087
|
-
const isAgent = (w) => [w, w.slice(w.lastIndexOf('=') + 1)].some((v) =>
|
|
1391
|
+
const isAgent = (w) => [w, w.slice(w.lastIndexOf('=') + 1)].some((v) => program.test(base(v)) || (program === AGENT_CLI && AGENT_PACKAGES.has(pkgOf(v))));
|
|
1088
1392
|
if (!rest.some(isAgent))
|
|
1089
1393
|
continue;
|
|
1090
1394
|
const lead = base(rest[0]);
|
|
@@ -1116,7 +1420,263 @@ function agentLaunchSegments(command) {
|
|
|
1116
1420
|
continue;
|
|
1117
1421
|
found.push({ words, spans: wordSpans }); // with the leading NAME=value words: the interactive allowlist judges them (774.11)
|
|
1118
1422
|
}
|
|
1119
|
-
return found;
|
|
1423
|
+
return [...found, ...nested];
|
|
1424
|
+
}
|
|
1425
|
+
/**
|
|
1426
|
+
* @implements A-SPEC-774.75 — one `$'…'` escape from `at` (the character after the backslash), as bash 5 decodes it: its
|
|
1427
|
+
* text and how many characters it consumed; null when it names no character (above U+10FFFF, a surrogate, `\c` at the end).
|
|
1428
|
+
*/
|
|
1429
|
+
function ansiEscape(text, at) {
|
|
1430
|
+
const n = text[at] ?? '';
|
|
1431
|
+
if (n === 'x' || n === 'u' || n === 'U') {
|
|
1432
|
+
const d = ((n === 'x' ? /^[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,2}/ : n === 'u' ? /^[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,4}/ : /^[0-9A-Fa-f]{1,8}/).exec(text.slice(at + 1, at + 9)) ?? [''])[0];
|
|
1433
|
+
if (d === '')
|
|
1434
|
+
return { text: `\\${n}`, length: 1 }; // no digits: as written
|
|
1435
|
+
const code = parseInt(d, 16);
|
|
1436
|
+
if (code > 0x10ffff || (code >= 0xd800 && code <= 0xdfff))
|
|
1437
|
+
return null;
|
|
1438
|
+
return { text: String.fromCodePoint(code), length: 1 + d.length };
|
|
1439
|
+
}
|
|
1440
|
+
if (n >= '0' && n <= '7') {
|
|
1441
|
+
const d = /^[0-7]{1,3}/.exec(text.slice(at, at + 3))[0];
|
|
1442
|
+
return { text: String.fromCharCode(parseInt(d, 8) & 0xff), length: d.length };
|
|
1443
|
+
}
|
|
1444
|
+
if (n === 'c')
|
|
1445
|
+
return at + 1 < text.length && text[at + 1] !== "'" ? { text: String.fromCharCode(text.charCodeAt(at + 1) & 0x1f), length: 2 } : null;
|
|
1446
|
+
const simple = { a: '\x07', b: '\b', e: '\x1b', E: '\x1b', f: '\f', n: '\n', r: '\r', t: '\t', v: '\v', '\\': '\\', "'": "'", '"': '"', '?': '?' };
|
|
1447
|
+
return { text: simple[n] ?? `\\${n}`, length: 1 };
|
|
1448
|
+
}
|
|
1449
|
+
/**
|
|
1450
|
+
* @implements A-SPEC-774.75 — a here-document's delimiter word from `at` (after `<<`): read to a blank or `;&|<>()`, its
|
|
1451
|
+
* quotes removed; any quoting makes the body quoted (`E"O"F` waits for `EOF`). Null when there is no word or a quote is
|
|
1452
|
+
* left open before the newline.
|
|
1453
|
+
*/
|
|
1454
|
+
function hereDocWord(text, at) {
|
|
1455
|
+
let i = at;
|
|
1456
|
+
const strip = text[i] === '-';
|
|
1457
|
+
if (strip)
|
|
1458
|
+
i++;
|
|
1459
|
+
while (text[i] === ' ' || text[i] === '\t')
|
|
1460
|
+
i++;
|
|
1461
|
+
const start = i;
|
|
1462
|
+
let delim = '';
|
|
1463
|
+
let quoted = false;
|
|
1464
|
+
while (i < text.length && !/[\s;&|<>()]/.test(text[i])) {
|
|
1465
|
+
const c = text[i];
|
|
1466
|
+
if (c === "'" || c === '"') {
|
|
1467
|
+
const close = text.indexOf(c, i + 1);
|
|
1468
|
+
const nl = text.indexOf('\n', i + 1);
|
|
1469
|
+
if (close < 0 || (nl >= 0 && nl < close))
|
|
1470
|
+
return null;
|
|
1471
|
+
delim += text.slice(i + 1, close);
|
|
1472
|
+
quoted = true;
|
|
1473
|
+
i = close + 1;
|
|
1474
|
+
continue;
|
|
1475
|
+
}
|
|
1476
|
+
if (c === '\\') {
|
|
1477
|
+
if (i + 1 >= text.length || text[i + 1] === '\n')
|
|
1478
|
+
return null;
|
|
1479
|
+
delim += text[i + 1];
|
|
1480
|
+
quoted = true;
|
|
1481
|
+
i += 2;
|
|
1482
|
+
continue;
|
|
1483
|
+
}
|
|
1484
|
+
delim += c;
|
|
1485
|
+
i++;
|
|
1486
|
+
}
|
|
1487
|
+
return i === start ? null : { delim, quoted, strip, end: i };
|
|
1488
|
+
}
|
|
1489
|
+
/**
|
|
1490
|
+
* @implements A-SPEC-774.72 — the one quote state machine (F1.3-e, f): single quotes, double quotes, `$'…'` with its
|
|
1491
|
+
* backslash escapes, a `#` comment from a word start to the newline, and here-document bodies after the newline that
|
|
1492
|
+
* ends their `<<` line. The substitution scan, the here-document list and the segment lexer all read this.
|
|
1493
|
+
*/
|
|
1494
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-774.81 — exported so each branch can be pinned directly
|
|
1495
|
+
function scanShell(command) {
|
|
1496
|
+
const kind = new Array(command.length).fill(0 /* Ch.Code */);
|
|
1497
|
+
const docs = [];
|
|
1498
|
+
const pending = [];
|
|
1499
|
+
let segStart = 0;
|
|
1500
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-774.75 — the separator before `#` must itself be unescaped (`a\ #x` is one word; a line
|
|
1501
|
+
// continuation is not taken to start a comment either, the conservative reading)
|
|
1502
|
+
const wordStart = (k) => k === 0 || (/[\s;&|()]/.test(command[k - 1]) && kind[k - 2] !== 8 /* Ch.Escape */);
|
|
1503
|
+
let inBacktick = false; // a comment inside backticks ends before the closing backtick
|
|
1504
|
+
let leadAt = -1; // a segment's lead word, read once per segment
|
|
1505
|
+
let lead = '';
|
|
1506
|
+
for (let k = 0; k < command.length; k++) {
|
|
1507
|
+
const ch = command[k];
|
|
1508
|
+
if (ch === '\\') {
|
|
1509
|
+
kind[k] = 8 /* Ch.Escape */;
|
|
1510
|
+
k++;
|
|
1511
|
+
continue;
|
|
1512
|
+
}
|
|
1513
|
+
if (ch === '`') {
|
|
1514
|
+
inBacktick = !inBacktick;
|
|
1515
|
+
continue;
|
|
1516
|
+
}
|
|
1517
|
+
if (ch === "'") {
|
|
1518
|
+
kind[k] = 7 /* Ch.Delim */;
|
|
1519
|
+
let j = k + 1;
|
|
1520
|
+
for (; j < command.length && command[j] !== "'"; j++)
|
|
1521
|
+
kind[j] = 1 /* Ch.Single */;
|
|
1522
|
+
if (j < command.length)
|
|
1523
|
+
kind[j] = 7 /* Ch.Delim */;
|
|
1524
|
+
k = j;
|
|
1525
|
+
continue;
|
|
1526
|
+
}
|
|
1527
|
+
if (ch === '$' && command[k + 1] === "'") {
|
|
1528
|
+
kind[k] = 7 /* Ch.Delim */;
|
|
1529
|
+
kind[k + 1] = 7 /* Ch.Delim */;
|
|
1530
|
+
let j = k + 2;
|
|
1531
|
+
for (; j < command.length && command[j] !== "'"; j++) {
|
|
1532
|
+
if (command[j] === '\\') {
|
|
1533
|
+
kind[j] = 8 /* Ch.Escape */;
|
|
1534
|
+
j++;
|
|
1535
|
+
if (j < command.length)
|
|
1536
|
+
kind[j] = 3 /* Ch.Ansi */;
|
|
1537
|
+
continue;
|
|
1538
|
+
}
|
|
1539
|
+
kind[j] = 3 /* Ch.Ansi */;
|
|
1540
|
+
}
|
|
1541
|
+
if (j < command.length)
|
|
1542
|
+
kind[j] = 7 /* Ch.Delim */;
|
|
1543
|
+
k = j;
|
|
1544
|
+
continue;
|
|
1545
|
+
}
|
|
1546
|
+
if (ch === '"') {
|
|
1547
|
+
kind[k] = 7 /* Ch.Delim */;
|
|
1548
|
+
let j = k + 1;
|
|
1549
|
+
for (; j < command.length && command[j] !== '"'; j++) {
|
|
1550
|
+
if (command[j] === '\\') {
|
|
1551
|
+
kind[j] = 8 /* Ch.Escape */;
|
|
1552
|
+
j++;
|
|
1553
|
+
if (j < command.length)
|
|
1554
|
+
kind[j] = 2 /* Ch.Double */;
|
|
1555
|
+
continue;
|
|
1556
|
+
}
|
|
1557
|
+
kind[j] = 2 /* Ch.Double */;
|
|
1558
|
+
}
|
|
1559
|
+
if (j < command.length)
|
|
1560
|
+
kind[j] = 7 /* Ch.Delim */;
|
|
1561
|
+
k = j;
|
|
1562
|
+
continue;
|
|
1563
|
+
}
|
|
1564
|
+
if (ch === '#' && wordStart(k)) {
|
|
1565
|
+
let j = k;
|
|
1566
|
+
for (; j < command.length && command[j] !== '\n' && !(inBacktick && command[j] === '`'); j++)
|
|
1567
|
+
kind[j] = 4 /* Ch.Comment */;
|
|
1568
|
+
k = j - 1;
|
|
1569
|
+
continue;
|
|
1570
|
+
}
|
|
1571
|
+
if (/[|;&()]/.test(ch)) {
|
|
1572
|
+
segStart = k + 1;
|
|
1573
|
+
continue;
|
|
1574
|
+
}
|
|
1575
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-774.75 — `<<<` is a here-string, never a here-document at its second `<`
|
|
1576
|
+
if (ch === '<' && command[k + 1] === '<' && command[k + 2] === '<') {
|
|
1577
|
+
k += 2;
|
|
1578
|
+
continue;
|
|
1579
|
+
}
|
|
1580
|
+
if (ch === '<' && command[k + 1] === '<') {
|
|
1581
|
+
const w = hereDocWord(command, k + 2);
|
|
1582
|
+
if (w) {
|
|
1583
|
+
if (leadAt !== segStart) {
|
|
1584
|
+
leadAt = segStart;
|
|
1585
|
+
lead = ((/^\s*(\S*)/.exec(command.slice(segStart, k)) ?? ['', ''])[1]).split('/').pop() ?? '';
|
|
1586
|
+
}
|
|
1587
|
+
pending.push({ delim: w.delim, quoted: w.quoted, strip: w.strip, lead });
|
|
1588
|
+
k = w.end - 1;
|
|
1589
|
+
}
|
|
1590
|
+
continue;
|
|
1591
|
+
}
|
|
1592
|
+
if (ch === '\n') {
|
|
1593
|
+
segStart = k + 1;
|
|
1594
|
+
let at = k + 1;
|
|
1595
|
+
for (const h of pending.splice(0)) {
|
|
1596
|
+
let line = at;
|
|
1597
|
+
let bodyEnd = command.length;
|
|
1598
|
+
let next = command.length;
|
|
1599
|
+
let terminated = false;
|
|
1600
|
+
for (;;) {
|
|
1601
|
+
const nl = command.indexOf('\n', line);
|
|
1602
|
+
const text = command.slice(line, nl < 0 ? command.length : nl);
|
|
1603
|
+
if ((h.strip ? text.replace(/^\t+/, '') : text) === h.delim) {
|
|
1604
|
+
bodyEnd = line;
|
|
1605
|
+
next = nl < 0 ? command.length : nl + 1;
|
|
1606
|
+
terminated = true;
|
|
1607
|
+
break;
|
|
1608
|
+
}
|
|
1609
|
+
if (nl < 0)
|
|
1610
|
+
break;
|
|
1611
|
+
line = nl + 1;
|
|
1612
|
+
}
|
|
1613
|
+
for (let b = at; b < next; b++)
|
|
1614
|
+
kind[b] = b < bodyEnd && !h.quoted ? 5 /* Ch.Body */ : 6 /* Ch.QuotedBody */;
|
|
1615
|
+
docs.push({ bodyStart: at, bodyEnd, next, quoted: h.quoted, lead: h.lead, terminated });
|
|
1616
|
+
at = next;
|
|
1617
|
+
}
|
|
1618
|
+
if (at > k + 1) {
|
|
1619
|
+
k = at - 1;
|
|
1620
|
+
segStart = at;
|
|
1621
|
+
}
|
|
1622
|
+
}
|
|
1623
|
+
}
|
|
1624
|
+
return { kind, docs };
|
|
1625
|
+
}
|
|
1626
|
+
/**
|
|
1627
|
+
* @implements A-SPEC-774.68 — the bodies of the command substitutions outside single quotes: `$(…)` to its balanced `)`
|
|
1628
|
+
* and `` `…` `` to the next unescaped backtick, each to the end of the text when unclosed; nested bodies are found when
|
|
1629
|
+
* their body is judged in turn.
|
|
1630
|
+
* @implements A-SPEC-774.69 — read as the shell quotes: an apostrophe inside double quotes is a character, `$'…'` ends at
|
|
1631
|
+
* its first unescaped `'`, an unquoted here-document body is text in which substitutions run and a quoted one is skipped.
|
|
1632
|
+
* At most 64; `overflow` says a 65th was left unread, which the caller judges as a launch (review 18:43, F1.2-a, b).
|
|
1633
|
+
*/
|
|
1634
|
+
function substitutionBodies(command, scan = scanShell(command)) {
|
|
1635
|
+
const out = [];
|
|
1636
|
+
let overflow = false;
|
|
1637
|
+
const take = (body) => { if (out.length >= 64)
|
|
1638
|
+
overflow = true;
|
|
1639
|
+
else
|
|
1640
|
+
out.push(body); };
|
|
1641
|
+
const { kind } = scan; // @implements A-SPEC-774.72 — the one scanner (774.75: handed over, not computed again)
|
|
1642
|
+
/** `$(…)` from `k` (at `$`), or a backtick span from `k`; the index of its last character. */
|
|
1643
|
+
const substitutionAt = (text, k) => {
|
|
1644
|
+
if (text[k] === '$') {
|
|
1645
|
+
let depth = 0;
|
|
1646
|
+
let j = k + 1;
|
|
1647
|
+
for (; j < text.length; j++) {
|
|
1648
|
+
if (text[j] === '\\') {
|
|
1649
|
+
j++;
|
|
1650
|
+
continue;
|
|
1651
|
+
}
|
|
1652
|
+
if (text[j] === '(')
|
|
1653
|
+
depth++;
|
|
1654
|
+
else if (text[j] === ')' && --depth === 0)
|
|
1655
|
+
break;
|
|
1656
|
+
}
|
|
1657
|
+
take(text.slice(k + 2, j));
|
|
1658
|
+
return j;
|
|
1659
|
+
}
|
|
1660
|
+
let j = k + 1;
|
|
1661
|
+
while (j < text.length && text[j] !== '`')
|
|
1662
|
+
j += text[j] === '\\' ? 2 : 1;
|
|
1663
|
+
take(text.slice(k + 1, j));
|
|
1664
|
+
return j;
|
|
1665
|
+
};
|
|
1666
|
+
for (let k = 0; k < command.length; k++) {
|
|
1667
|
+
const t = kind[k];
|
|
1668
|
+
if (t === 8 /* Ch.Escape */) {
|
|
1669
|
+
k++;
|
|
1670
|
+
continue;
|
|
1671
|
+
}
|
|
1672
|
+
// substitutions run in code, in double quotes and in an unquoted here-document body; nowhere else
|
|
1673
|
+
if (t !== 0 /* Ch.Code */ && t !== 2 /* Ch.Double */ && t !== 5 /* Ch.Body */)
|
|
1674
|
+
continue;
|
|
1675
|
+
const ch = command[k];
|
|
1676
|
+
if ((ch === '$' && command[k + 1] === '(') || ch === '`')
|
|
1677
|
+
k = substitutionAt(command, k);
|
|
1678
|
+
}
|
|
1679
|
+
return { bodies: out, overflow };
|
|
1120
1680
|
}
|
|
1121
1681
|
function dumpsEnvInCommandPosition(command, depth = 0) {
|
|
1122
1682
|
if (depth > 3)
|
|
@@ -1273,8 +1833,8 @@ function shellPatchOf(command) {
|
|
|
1273
1833
|
const PATCH_MARKERS = ['apply_patch', 'applypatch', '*** begin patch', '*** add file:', '*** update file:', '*** delete file:', '*** move to:'];
|
|
1274
1834
|
/** Whether a text shows a marker once its quotes and backslashes are removed and its letters lowered. Substring tests only. */
|
|
1275
1835
|
function patchMarked(text) {
|
|
1276
|
-
// A backslash before a line feed is a line continuation: the shell removes both, so both are removed here.
|
|
1277
|
-
const plain =
|
|
1836
|
+
// A backslash before a line feed is a line continuation: the shell removes both, so both are removed here (A-SPEC-794.52).
|
|
1837
|
+
const plain = (0, line_continuation_1.joinLineContinuations)(text).split('"').join('').split("'").join('').split('\\').join('').toLowerCase();
|
|
1278
1838
|
// `$'…'` and `$"…"` leave their `$` behind once the quotes are gone (`apply$'_patch'` reads `apply$_patch`), so the
|
|
1279
1839
|
// text is tested with the dollars removed as well.
|
|
1280
1840
|
const undollared = plain.split('$').join('');
|
|
@@ -1491,7 +2051,8 @@ function normalizeHookInput(raw, host = process.platform) {
|
|
|
1491
2051
|
}
|
|
1492
2052
|
}
|
|
1493
2053
|
const sessionId = str(r.session_id);
|
|
1494
|
-
|
|
2054
|
+
const agentId = str(r.agent_id);
|
|
2055
|
+
return { tool_name: psShell !== undefined ? 'Bash' : str(r.tool_name) ?? '', tool_input: out, ...(cwd === undefined ? {} : { cwd }), ...(sessionId ? { session_id: sessionId } : {}), ...(agentId ? { agent_id: agentId } : {}), ...(malformed ? { malformed: true } : {}),
|
|
1495
2056
|
...(ps !== null && 'unjudgeable' in ps ? { powershellUnjudgeable: ps.unjudgeable } : {}),
|
|
1496
2057
|
...(codexPs !== null ? { codexPowerShell: codexPs } : {}),
|
|
1497
2058
|
...(patchUnreadable ? { patchUnreadable: true } : {}), ...(shellMarked && !otherUnreadable ? { patchUnreadableCause: 'shell-marker' } : {}),
|
|
@@ -1531,8 +2092,20 @@ function preEditEvidenceGate(o) {
|
|
|
1531
2092
|
return null;
|
|
1532
2093
|
if (o.covered)
|
|
1533
2094
|
return null;
|
|
1534
|
-
const
|
|
1535
|
-
|
|
2095
|
+
const evidence = (0, impact_gate_1.loadEditEvidence)(o.projectRoot, o.relPath, o.declaredDigest, o.currentHead);
|
|
2096
|
+
const verdict = (0, impact_gate_1.evaluateEditEvidence)(evidence);
|
|
2097
|
+
const decision = (0, impact_gate_1.preEditEvidenceDecision)(verdict, o.mode);
|
|
2098
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-333.4 — a clean allow clears the file from the commit reminder (recorded with the final allow)
|
|
2099
|
+
if (decision === null && verdict.decision === 'allow' && o.advisory)
|
|
2100
|
+
(0, advisory_line_1.adviseClean)(o.projectRoot, o.advisory, o.relPath);
|
|
2101
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-333.2 — only a warn allow is shaped; a deny is said in full and touches no store
|
|
2102
|
+
if (decision?.permissionDecision !== 'allow' || !o.advisory)
|
|
2103
|
+
return decision;
|
|
2104
|
+
const detail = (0, advisory_line_1.advisoryDetail)({ artifactDigest: evidence.artifactDigest, traceGaps: evidence.traceGaps, head: o.currentHead, codes: verdict.reasons.map((r) => r.code) });
|
|
2105
|
+
const said = (0, advisory_line_1.adviseWarn)(o.projectRoot, o.advisory, verdict, o.relPath, detail, decision.permissionDecisionReason ?? '');
|
|
2106
|
+
if (said === undefined)
|
|
2107
|
+
return decision;
|
|
2108
|
+
return said === null ? { permissionDecision: 'allow' } : { ...decision, permissionDecisionReason: said };
|
|
1536
2109
|
}
|
|
1537
2110
|
function decideOnGateError(opts) {
|
|
1538
2111
|
if (opts.bypass) {
|
|
@@ -1544,6 +2117,7 @@ function decideOnGateError(opts) {
|
|
|
1544
2117
|
// spec chain that was never the problem.
|
|
1545
2118
|
return {
|
|
1546
2119
|
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
2120
|
+
refusal: 'gate.unjudgeable', // A-SPEC-245.24 (item 1) — the message is the error's, so the code is the site's
|
|
1547
2121
|
permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] cannot judge due to an internal error — the gate does not allow when it cannot decide: ${opts.message}`
|
|
1548
2122
|
+ ' → check the install with `holmes-kit doctor`. To let it through by operator judgment, set HOLMES_GATE_BYPASS=1 in the environment (an out-of-band channel a session cannot set itself).',
|
|
1549
2123
|
};
|
|
@@ -1635,8 +2209,85 @@ function wiredSpecsDir(argv, env) {
|
|
|
1635
2209
|
}
|
|
1636
2210
|
/** Default spec root. Used to tell "never governed" apart from an explicitly configured HOLMES_SPECS. */
|
|
1637
2211
|
exports.DEFAULT_SPECS_DIR = '.ax/specs';
|
|
2212
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-222.4, A-SPEC-222.6 — the anchor-move judgment; A-SPEC-222.9 (SD1 1) moved it to succession-guard,
|
|
2213
|
+
// re-exported here for its callers
|
|
2214
|
+
var succession_guard_1 = require("../spec/succession-guard");
|
|
2215
|
+
Object.defineProperty(exports, "anchorMoveOnly", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return succession_guard_1.anchorMoveOnly; } });
|
|
1638
2216
|
// @implements A-SPEC-100.2
|
|
1639
|
-
|
|
2217
|
+
/**
|
|
2218
|
+
* @implements A-SPEC-245.2 — the grants one judgement resolved, settled once at its final decision. Each branch that
|
|
2219
|
+
* resolves a grant holds it here instead of spending it: an `.ax/roles` Write spent its grant at the roles branch and
|
|
2220
|
+
* was then denied by the protected-directory branch, which resolved the same approval again and found it gone (one
|
|
2221
|
+
* grant: denied and gone; two: allowed and both gone — measured).
|
|
2222
|
+
*/
|
|
2223
|
+
/**
|
|
2224
|
+
* @implements A-SPEC-245.4 — the settlement is an explicit value in `opts`, settled once at the FINAL decision: the
|
|
2225
|
+
* entry point creates it and settles it after the plan-scope, stage, role and run-refusal passes (each can still turn
|
|
2226
|
+
* the allow into a deny, and a run-stage deny spent the grant of an act that never happened), and the counterfactual
|
|
2227
|
+
* audit reading passes one that never spends. A caller that passes none is settled at this function's return.
|
|
2228
|
+
*/
|
|
2229
|
+
function settleVerdict(verdict, settlement) {
|
|
2230
|
+
const allowed = verdict.permissionDecision === 'allow';
|
|
2231
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.9 (1b-2) — in the hook's worker, the spend is the main thread's (settleOnMainThread)
|
|
2232
|
+
const pending = settlement.pending();
|
|
2233
|
+
const outcome = allowed && settlement.spends && (pending.held.length > 0 || pending.env.length > 0)
|
|
2234
|
+
? settlement.adopt((mainThreadSettler ?? settleOnMainThread)(pending))
|
|
2235
|
+
: settlement.settle(allowed);
|
|
2236
|
+
if (outcome === 'settled')
|
|
2237
|
+
return verdict;
|
|
2238
|
+
if (outcome === 'refused') {
|
|
2239
|
+
// A-SPEC-245.24 (item 1) — a spent, revoked or conflicting single-use approval needs a new one from the person
|
|
2240
|
+
return { ...verdict, permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'approval.required', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${settlement.refusal ?? 'the single-use approval could not be spent once'} (A-SPEC-245.9)` };
|
|
2241
|
+
}
|
|
2242
|
+
return { ...verdict, permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'grant.in-use', permissionDecisionReason: '[Holmes-Kit] the approval grant this act needs is in use by another act — nothing was spent and nothing was done; retry (A-SPEC-245.4)' };
|
|
2243
|
+
}
|
|
2244
|
+
/**
|
|
2245
|
+
* @implements A-SPEC-245.9 (1b-2) — set in the hook's worker: hands a final allow's pending spends to the main thread and
|
|
2246
|
+
* waits for its answer. The worker can be terminated at the deadline at any instruction; the main thread is not.
|
|
2247
|
+
*/
|
|
2248
|
+
let mainThreadSettler = null;
|
|
2249
|
+
/** @implements A-SPEC-245.9 (1b-2) — the main thread's half: settle the pending spends here and answer. */
|
|
2250
|
+
function settleOnMainThread(p) {
|
|
2251
|
+
// test seam (A-SPEC-245.15, 6c): which thread spent — a boolean switch writing one fixed file inside the judged project
|
|
2252
|
+
// (the pending spends' root, where `.ax` exists), never a path taken from the environment
|
|
2253
|
+
const probeRoot = [...p.held, ...p.env][0]?.root;
|
|
2254
|
+
if (process.env.HOLMES_HOOK_TEST_SPEND_THREAD === '1' && probeRoot && fs.existsSync(path.join(probeRoot, '.ax'))) {
|
|
2255
|
+
try {
|
|
2256
|
+
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(probeRoot, '.ax', 'state'), { recursive: true });
|
|
2257
|
+
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(probeRoot, '.ax', 'state', 'spend-thread-probe'), require('node:worker_threads').isMainThread ? 'main' : 'worker');
|
|
2258
|
+
}
|
|
2259
|
+
catch { /* a seam */ }
|
|
2260
|
+
}
|
|
2261
|
+
const s = approval_grants_1.GrantSettlement.fromPending(p);
|
|
2262
|
+
const outcome = s.settle(true);
|
|
2263
|
+
return { outcome, committed: [...s.committed], ...(s.refusal !== undefined ? { refusal: s.refusal } : {}) };
|
|
2264
|
+
}
|
|
2265
|
+
/** @implements A-SPEC-245.4 (f) — the approval an audit line names: a grant this decision spent, else the counterfactual's environment approval. */
|
|
2266
|
+
function auditApprovalFor(envApproval, counterfactualDenied, settlement) {
|
|
2267
|
+
return settlement.committed[0] ?? (counterfactualDenied ? envApproval : undefined);
|
|
2268
|
+
}
|
|
2269
|
+
function evaluateHook(...args) {
|
|
2270
|
+
const [input, specsDir, opts] = args;
|
|
2271
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.26 (item 1) — a nested reading is one that shares the top reading's `filed` holder (through
|
|
2272
|
+
// `...opts`); a caller's settlement is not that sign: runHookProcess gives one, and taking it for a nested reading lost
|
|
2273
|
+
// the filed request (no run wait) and the advisory on the path every harness runs
|
|
2274
|
+
if (opts.filed !== undefined)
|
|
2275
|
+
return judgeHook(input, specsDir, opts);
|
|
2276
|
+
const filed = {};
|
|
2277
|
+
const settlement = opts.settlement ?? new approval_grants_1.GrantSettlement();
|
|
2278
|
+
const judged = judgeHook(input, specsDir, { ...opts, settlement, filed });
|
|
2279
|
+
// the caller that brought its own settlement settles it (runHookProcess, after the run path); otherwise it is settled here
|
|
2280
|
+
const settled = opts.settlement !== undefined ? judged : settleVerdict(judged, settlement);
|
|
2281
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.25 (item 5a) — a deny carries the request the gate filed; the run path waits on that id only
|
|
2282
|
+
const verdict = settled.permissionDecision === 'deny' && filed.request !== undefined ? { ...settled, request: filed.request } : settled;
|
|
2283
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.19 (item 2) — an allowed command whose text names the act carries the advisory
|
|
2284
|
+
const advice = input.tool_name === 'Bash' && verdict.permissionDecision === 'allow' && typeof input.tool_input.command === 'string'
|
|
2285
|
+
? lockRecoverAdvisory(input.tool_input.command) : null;
|
|
2286
|
+
if (advice === null)
|
|
2287
|
+
return verdict;
|
|
2288
|
+
return { ...verdict, permissionDecisionReason: [verdict.permissionDecisionReason, advice].filter((t) => typeof t === 'string' && t !== '').join('\n') };
|
|
2289
|
+
}
|
|
2290
|
+
function judgeHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
1640
2291
|
// @implements A-SPEC-790.2 — a Codex shell payload on Windows: the Bash reading first (a denial there is the decision,
|
|
1641
2292
|
// and nothing more is filed); then the PowerShell text Codex actually runs. Only ever stricter than the Bash reading.
|
|
1642
2293
|
const codexPs = input.codexPowerShell;
|
|
@@ -1650,7 +2301,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
1650
2301
|
return bashVerdict;
|
|
1651
2302
|
if ('unjudgeable' in codexPs) {
|
|
1652
2303
|
const who = codexPs.harness === 'antigravity' ? 'an Antigravity' : 'a Codex';
|
|
1653
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${who} command that PowerShell runs and the gate cannot judge (${codexPs.unjudgeable}) is refused (REQ-790)` };
|
|
2304
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'gate.unjudgeable', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${who} command that PowerShell runs and the gate cannot judge (${codexPs.unjudgeable}) is refused (REQ-790)` };
|
|
1654
2305
|
}
|
|
1655
2306
|
return evaluateHook({ ...bashInput, tool_input: { ...bashInput.tool_input, command: codexPs.shell } }, specsDir, { ...opts, carriedApprovals: { command: String(bashInput.tool_input?.command ?? ''), reading: codexPs.shell, approvals: spent } });
|
|
1656
2307
|
}
|
|
@@ -1666,13 +2317,14 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
1666
2317
|
// @implements A-SPEC-790 — a PowerShell command whose text cannot be read is refused rather than judged.
|
|
1667
2318
|
const psUnjudgeable = input.powershellUnjudgeable;
|
|
1668
2319
|
if (psUnjudgeable !== undefined) {
|
|
1669
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] a PowerShell command that cannot be judged (${psUnjudgeable}) is refused (REQ-790)` };
|
|
2320
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'gate.unjudgeable', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] a PowerShell command that cannot be judged (${psUnjudgeable}) is refused (REQ-790)` };
|
|
1670
2321
|
}
|
|
1671
2322
|
if (input.patchUnreadable) {
|
|
1672
2323
|
const cause = input;
|
|
1673
2324
|
// @implements A-SPEC-769.7 — four conditions, four sentences: shell marker, no-op update, and (below) the
|
|
1674
2325
|
// path-missing sentence for a payload whose targets cannot be read; non-application has its own site.
|
|
1675
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
2326
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: cause.patchUnreadableCause === 'shell-marker' || cause.patchUnreadableCause === 'no-op' ? 'patch.unreadable' : 'target.unresolvable',
|
|
2327
|
+
permissionDecisionReason: cause.patchUnreadableCause === 'shell-marker'
|
|
1676
2328
|
? SHELL_MARKED_REASON : cause.patchUnreadableCause === 'no-op' ? patchNoopReason(cause.patchNoopPaths ?? []) : PATCH_UNREADABLE_REASON };
|
|
1677
2329
|
}
|
|
1678
2330
|
const patchTargets = input.tool_input.patch_targets;
|
|
@@ -1696,7 +2348,8 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
1696
2348
|
return null;
|
|
1697
2349
|
}
|
|
1698
2350
|
};
|
|
1699
|
-
|
|
2351
|
+
// A-SPEC-245.24 (item 1) — each deny with its code: an unreadable target, or a patch that does not apply
|
|
2352
|
+
const judged = (file, r) => r === null ? { deny: PATCH_UNREADABLE_REASON, refusal: 'target.unresolvable' } : 'failure' in r ? { deny: patchNotAppliedReason(file, r.failure), refusal: 'patch.unreadable' } : { content: r.result };
|
|
1700
2353
|
// @implements A-SPEC-163.3 (rule 1), A-SPEC-163.4 (rule 5) — two targets on one file have no one result: the tool
|
|
1701
2354
|
// applies them in sequence, the gate reads the disk once. One file is one key whatever link or letter case names it.
|
|
1702
2355
|
// (What a shell could rewrite is settled before this point: only the one quoted-heredoc form reaches here.)
|
|
@@ -1704,7 +2357,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
1704
2357
|
for (const t of patchTargets) {
|
|
1705
2358
|
const file = patchFileKey(at(t.path));
|
|
1706
2359
|
if (files.has(file))
|
|
1707
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: PATCH_UNREADABLE_REASON };
|
|
2360
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'target.unresolvable', permissionDecisionReason: PATCH_UNREADABLE_REASON };
|
|
1708
2361
|
files.add(file);
|
|
1709
2362
|
}
|
|
1710
2363
|
for (const t of patchTargets) {
|
|
@@ -1714,13 +2367,13 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
1714
2367
|
else if (t.kind === 'update' && t.movedTo === undefined) {
|
|
1715
2368
|
const j = judged(at(t.path), resultOf(at(t.path), t.hunk ?? ''));
|
|
1716
2369
|
if ('deny' in j)
|
|
1717
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: j.deny };
|
|
2370
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: j.refusal, permissionDecisionReason: j.deny };
|
|
1718
2371
|
content = j.content;
|
|
1719
2372
|
}
|
|
1720
2373
|
else if (t.kind === 'move') {
|
|
1721
2374
|
const j = judged(at(t.from ?? t.path), t.from === undefined ? null : resultOf(at(t.from), t.hunk ?? ''));
|
|
1722
2375
|
if ('deny' in j)
|
|
1723
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: j.deny };
|
|
2376
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: j.refusal, permissionDecisionReason: j.deny };
|
|
1724
2377
|
content = j.content;
|
|
1725
2378
|
}
|
|
1726
2379
|
// Judged as a patch tool's write whichever tool carried the patch, so the shell branch below is not re-entered.
|
|
@@ -1750,7 +2403,22 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
1750
2403
|
}
|
|
1751
2404
|
return fullCache;
|
|
1752
2405
|
};
|
|
1753
|
-
const hintOrRoute = (req, extra) => (fullEntry() !== null ? (0, full_autonomy_1.fullModeRefusalTail)(req.kind) : (
|
|
2406
|
+
const hintOrRoute = (req, extra) => (fullEntry() !== null ? (0, full_autonomy_1.fullModeRefusalTail)(req.kind) : fileHint(req, extra));
|
|
2407
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.25 (item 5a) — the request the gate filed (or found already pending: the queue drops the
|
|
2408
|
+
// duplicate, and its hint then names no id), recorded for the verdict by its own id, never read from text
|
|
2409
|
+
function fileHint(req, extra) {
|
|
2410
|
+
const hint = (0, approval_queue_1.queueHint)(opts.projectRoot, req, extra);
|
|
2411
|
+
if (opts.filed !== undefined) {
|
|
2412
|
+
// A-SPEC-245.26 (4b) — the id the queue derives from the request itself, never one parsed from the hint
|
|
2413
|
+
const id = (0, approval_queue_1.approvalRequestId)(req.kind, req.target);
|
|
2414
|
+
if (hint !== '' || (0, approval_queue_1.readQueue)(opts.projectRoot).pending.some((p) => p.id === id))
|
|
2415
|
+
opts.filed.request = id;
|
|
2416
|
+
}
|
|
2417
|
+
return hint;
|
|
2418
|
+
}
|
|
2419
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.24 (item 1) — the code of a deny that ends with hintOrRoute: under a full profile the tail is
|
|
2420
|
+
// the full-autonomy refusal (nothing was filed), otherwise the site's own code
|
|
2421
|
+
const routeCode = (base) => (fullEntry() !== null ? 'full-autonomy.refused' : base);
|
|
1754
2422
|
// @implements A-SPEC-125.4
|
|
1755
2423
|
// Bash/shell risk gate: this branch runs BEFORE the Write/Edit phaseCheck logic below and
|
|
1756
2424
|
// is intentionally fail-CLOSED — a classifier throw on the Bash surface denies, never
|
|
@@ -1768,7 +2436,30 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
1768
2436
|
// shapes of repeated separators took 2.4–6.1 s at 256 KB, their cost spread over every segment of every rule (measured).
|
|
1769
2437
|
const segmentsOnce = (0, write_target_2.shellSegments)(command, shellBase);
|
|
1770
2438
|
if (segmentsOnce.length > SHELL_SEGMENTS_MAX) {
|
|
1771
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] a shell command of ${segmentsOnce.length} segments is too large to judge (more than ${SHELL_SEGMENTS_MAX}) — refused rather than judged; split it into smaller commands (A-SPEC-728)` };
|
|
2439
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'gate.unjudgeable', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] a shell command of ${segmentsOnce.length} segments is too large to judge (more than ${SHELL_SEGMENTS_MAX}) — refused rather than judged; split it into smaller commands (A-SPEC-728)` };
|
|
2440
|
+
}
|
|
2441
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-792.14 — a push cannot carry a spec change no grant accounts for off the machine
|
|
2442
|
+
// A-SPEC-794.52, A-SPEC-794.53 — a push written across a line continuation is still a push; comments and
|
|
2443
|
+
// here-document bodies go first, in the order the flag judgement reads. A-SPEC-794.54 — only a command that names git
|
|
2444
|
+
// and push is read further (the reader only removes text and a `$` before a quote, so it adds no word), and one the
|
|
2445
|
+
// reader cannot finish is read whole
|
|
2446
|
+
const joined = (0, line_continuation_1.joinLineContinuations)(command);
|
|
2447
|
+
if (/\bgit\b/.test(joined) && /\bpush\b/.test(joined) && /\bgit\b[^;&|\n]*\bpush\b/.test((0, line_continuation_1.joinLineContinuations)((0, unresolved_write_1.readableText)(command)))) {
|
|
2448
|
+
try {
|
|
2449
|
+
const seam = require('../governance/spec-seam').unexplainedSpecChanges(opts.projectRoot, specsDir);
|
|
2450
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-222.15 (item 5) — a scan finding is refused with its own reason and no unstage or reset advice
|
|
2451
|
+
const scans = seam.filter((u) => u.where === 'scan');
|
|
2452
|
+
if (scans.length > 0) {
|
|
2453
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'governance.path', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] push refused: the spec seam could not judge the governance store's specs — ${scans.map((u) => u.detail ?? 'the scan could not finish').join('; ')} (A-SPEC-792.14)` };
|
|
2454
|
+
}
|
|
2455
|
+
if (seam.length > 0) {
|
|
2456
|
+
const named = seam.slice(0, 5).map((u) => u.where === 'index' ? `staged ${u.path}` : `commit ${(u.commit ?? '').slice(0, 12)} changes ${u.path}`).join('; ');
|
|
2457
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'governance.path', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] push refused: changes to the governance store's specs entered the index or a commit with no granted staging act (${named}) — unstage them, move the branch back past the commit, or stage them again with the plain git add the gate files for approval_ask (A-SPEC-792.14)` };
|
|
2458
|
+
}
|
|
2459
|
+
}
|
|
2460
|
+
catch {
|
|
2461
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'governance.path', permissionDecisionReason: '[Holmes-Kit] push refused: the governance store\'s spec seam could not be judged (A-SPEC-792.14)' };
|
|
2462
|
+
}
|
|
1772
2463
|
}
|
|
1773
2464
|
// Git-aware rm signals (H1): resolved only when a resolver is injected (the CLI wires the real
|
|
1774
2465
|
// git-backed one; unit tests omit it and exercise the pure static path). Fail-open: a throwing
|
|
@@ -1805,9 +2496,9 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
1805
2496
|
catch (e) {
|
|
1806
2497
|
// @implements A-SPEC-728 (rule 44) — a classifier bound says what it is: too large to judge, not a classifier failure.
|
|
1807
2498
|
if (e instanceof RangeError && /too large to judge/.test(e.message)) {
|
|
1808
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${e.message} — refused rather than judged; split it into smaller commands (A-SPEC-728)` };
|
|
2499
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'gate.unjudgeable', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${e.message} — refused rather than judged; split it into smaller commands (A-SPEC-728)` };
|
|
1809
2500
|
}
|
|
1810
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: '[Holmes-Kit] risk classification failed on a shell command — denied (fail-closed)' };
|
|
2501
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'gate.unjudgeable', permissionDecisionReason: '[Holmes-Kit] risk classification failed on a shell command — denied (fail-closed)' };
|
|
1811
2502
|
}
|
|
1812
2503
|
// @implements A-SPEC-133
|
|
1813
2504
|
// Hard-hitl needs an approval that COVERS this specific command (scope + not expired), and if
|
|
@@ -1828,52 +2519,105 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
1828
2519
|
const legacySessionApproval = approval?.scope === undefined
|
|
1829
2520
|
&& (0, risk_gate_1.approvalCovers)(approval, { kind: 'config-write', target: command }, nowTs);
|
|
1830
2521
|
let hardHitlCovered = false;
|
|
2522
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-792.32 — the staging approvals this act carries, recorded only at the final allow
|
|
2523
|
+
let autonomousStaging = null;
|
|
2524
|
+
let personStaging = false;
|
|
2525
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-794.49 — REQ-792: push and publish follow the profile's flags, and no grant lifts it
|
|
2526
|
+
const outwardEntry = fullEntry();
|
|
2527
|
+
const outwardRoute = outwardEntry === null ? null : (0, full_autonomy_1.fullModeOutwardRefusal)((0, risk_classifier_1.outwardActsOf)(command), outwardEntry);
|
|
2528
|
+
if (outwardRoute !== null) {
|
|
2529
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'full-autonomy.refused', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] hard-hitl risk: a push or a publish is irreversible and outward — refused${(0, full_autonomy_1.fullModeRefusalTail)('shell', outwardRoute)}` };
|
|
2530
|
+
}
|
|
1831
2531
|
if (assessment.level === 'hard-hitl') {
|
|
1832
2532
|
// @implements A-SPEC-245 — env first, then the grant files. The grant's mandatory nonce rides
|
|
1833
2533
|
// the SAME atomic ledger consumption below, so hard-hitl single-use needs no new machinery.
|
|
1834
2534
|
const resolved = resolveForCommand('shell');
|
|
1835
2535
|
const covers = resolved !== undefined;
|
|
1836
|
-
|
|
2536
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.24 (item 1, R1) — the reasons quote agent-chosen names (an alias, a hook name), so the code
|
|
2537
|
+
// is the site's: approval.required, or the full-autonomy refusal on the full-profile paths
|
|
2538
|
+
const deny = (why, refusal = 'approval.required') => ({
|
|
1837
2539
|
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
2540
|
+
refusal,
|
|
1838
2541
|
permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] hard-hitl risk: ${assessment.reasons.join('; ')} — ${why}`,
|
|
1839
2542
|
});
|
|
1840
2543
|
// @implements A-SPEC-244 — the refusal itself files the review request. The queue kind is the
|
|
1841
2544
|
// approval SCOPE kind ('shell'), so the reviewing CLI can mint a covering grant mechanically.
|
|
1842
2545
|
hardHitlCovered = covers;
|
|
1843
|
-
const
|
|
1844
|
-
|
|
2546
|
+
const fullScope = covers ? null : fullEntry();
|
|
2547
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-792.28 — H2-a: governance staging under a full profile is approved by machine conditions
|
|
2548
|
+
// (autonomous-shell.ts judges; this records), and a failed condition is named on today's path
|
|
2549
|
+
let h2Note = '';
|
|
2550
|
+
if (fullScope !== null) {
|
|
2551
|
+
const auto = require('../governance/autonomous-shell');
|
|
2552
|
+
if (auto.governanceStagingOnly(assessment.reasons)) {
|
|
2553
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-792.31 — the verdict is told where the spec store is
|
|
2554
|
+
const specsRel = path.relative(opts.projectRoot, specsDir).split(path.sep).join('/');
|
|
2555
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-792.32 — one base (the shell's), and the stop lifted only by a caller's programmatic option
|
|
2556
|
+
const verdict = auto.autonomousShellVerdict({ command, root: opts.projectRoot, shellStaging: (0, config_1.loadConfig)(opts.projectRoot).autonomy.shellStaging, specsRel,
|
|
2557
|
+
base: shellBase, specStaging: opts.autonomySpecStaging === true }, auto.realShellDeps(opts.projectRoot));
|
|
2558
|
+
if (verdict.ok) {
|
|
2559
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-792.32 — approved here, recorded at the final allow (every later Bash gate first), and
|
|
2560
|
+
// what is recorded is the verdict's proven (path, blob) pairs, computed from the bytes it proved
|
|
2561
|
+
autonomousStaging = { scope: fullScope.scope, paths: verdict.paths, proven: verdict.proven, conditions: verdict.conditions };
|
|
2562
|
+
hardHitlCovered = true;
|
|
2563
|
+
}
|
|
2564
|
+
else
|
|
2565
|
+
h2Note = ` (autonomous shell approval: ${verdict.failed} — ${verdict.detail})`;
|
|
2566
|
+
}
|
|
2567
|
+
}
|
|
2568
|
+
if (autonomousStaging === null) {
|
|
1845
2569
|
// @implements A-SPEC-792.5 — a full scope approves a scoped destructive act after a recovery point and refuses
|
|
1846
2570
|
// every other act at once; nothing is filed, so a run never waits on it.
|
|
1847
|
-
|
|
1848
|
-
|
|
1849
|
-
|
|
1850
|
-
|
|
1851
|
-
if (v.
|
|
1852
|
-
|
|
1853
|
-
|
|
1854
|
-
|
|
1855
|
-
|
|
2571
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-792.10 — except spec staging, which goes to the person's form like it does without a profile.
|
|
2572
|
+
const v = fullScope === null ? null
|
|
2573
|
+
: (0, full_autonomy_1.fullModeShellVerdict)({ command, reasons: assessment.reasons, cwd: shellBase, workspace: opts.projectRoot, scratchRoot: (0, scratch_root_1.trustedScratchRoot)(), entry: fullScope });
|
|
2574
|
+
const full = v === null || v.outcome === 'ask' ? null : fullScope;
|
|
2575
|
+
if (full !== null && v !== null && v.outcome !== 'ask') {
|
|
2576
|
+
if (v.outcome === 'refuse')
|
|
2577
|
+
return deny(`refused${h2Note}${(0, full_autonomy_1.fullModeRefusalTail)('shell', v.route)}`, 'full-autonomy.refused');
|
|
2578
|
+
let recoveryRef;
|
|
2579
|
+
if (v.recovery) {
|
|
2580
|
+
const r = (0, full_autonomy_1.writeRecoveryRef)(opts.projectRoot, nowTs);
|
|
2581
|
+
if ('error' in r)
|
|
2582
|
+
return deny(`refused${(0, full_autonomy_1.fullModeRefusalTail)('shell', r.error)}`, 'full-autonomy.refused');
|
|
2583
|
+
recoveryRef = r.ref;
|
|
2584
|
+
}
|
|
2585
|
+
try {
|
|
2586
|
+
new ledger_store_1.FileLedgerStore(path.join(opts.projectRoot, '.ax', 'ledger')).append({
|
|
2587
|
+
ts: nowTs, actor: `full-autonomy:${full.scope}`, kind: 'full-autonomy-approved',
|
|
2588
|
+
summary: `hard-hitl shell act approved under full autonomy${recoveryRef ? ` (recovery ${recoveryRef})` : ''}`.slice(0, 200),
|
|
2589
|
+
inputs: [crypto.createHash('sha256').update(command).digest('hex')],
|
|
2590
|
+
rationale: assessment.reasons.join('; ').slice(0, 300),
|
|
2591
|
+
});
|
|
2592
|
+
}
|
|
2593
|
+
catch { /* the act is approved; the audit row is best effort like the other gate records */ }
|
|
2594
|
+
hardHitlCovered = true;
|
|
1856
2595
|
}
|
|
1857
|
-
|
|
1858
|
-
|
|
1859
|
-
|
|
1860
|
-
|
|
1861
|
-
|
|
1862
|
-
|
|
1863
|
-
|
|
2596
|
+
else if (!covers) {
|
|
2597
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-564.2 — the base reason's length rides along so the refusal record
|
|
2598
|
+
// knows the FULL feedback cost (base + hint), not just the hint's half.
|
|
2599
|
+
const base = `requires an approval that covers this command${h2Note}`;
|
|
2600
|
+
const refused = deny(base
|
|
2601
|
+
+ fileHint({ kind: 'shell', target: command, why: assessment.reasons.join('; ') }, { baseReasonBytes: base.length }));
|
|
2602
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-794.55 — staging spec files by their paths is a request for a person, not a read gone wrong:
|
|
2603
|
+
// the person's route comes first, and the classifier's reason follows unchanged
|
|
2604
|
+
if ((0, full_autonomy_1.onlyStagesSpecs)(command, shellBase, opts.projectRoot)) {
|
|
2605
|
+
refused.permissionDecisionReason = refused.permissionDecisionReason.replace('[Holmes-Kit] hard-hitl risk: ', '[Holmes-Kit] hard-hitl risk: staging spec files is a person\'s decision — call approval_ask with the request id below so the person decides in the session form, then retry this same command once; the gate\'s reading: ');
|
|
2606
|
+
}
|
|
2607
|
+
return refused;
|
|
2608
|
+
}
|
|
2609
|
+
else {
|
|
2610
|
+
pendingApprovals.push(resolved);
|
|
2611
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-792.13 — a granted act that stages records what it stages, so the seam can tell it apart (a
|
|
2612
|
+
// literal spec path is refused as an opaque .ax act before the staging rule names it)
|
|
2613
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-792.15 — only an act the gate judged as spec staging (or an opaque .ax act): an unrelated
|
|
2614
|
+
// approval that merely holds the words grants nothing
|
|
2615
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-792.32 — recorded at the final allow, after every later Bash gate
|
|
2616
|
+
if (/\bgit\b/.test(command) && /\b(?:add|stage|commit)\b/.test(command)
|
|
2617
|
+
&& assessment.reasons.some((r) => /^staging command reaches changed files in the protected \.ax spec store|^staging command reaches another replica's ledger file|^shell command over a protected \.ax governance path/.test(r))) {
|
|
2618
|
+
personStaging = true;
|
|
2619
|
+
}
|
|
1864
2620
|
}
|
|
1865
|
-
catch { /* the act is approved; the audit row is best effort like the other gate records */ }
|
|
1866
|
-
hardHitlCovered = true;
|
|
1867
|
-
}
|
|
1868
|
-
else if (!covers) {
|
|
1869
|
-
// @implements A-SPEC-564.2 — the base reason's length rides along so the refusal record
|
|
1870
|
-
// knows the FULL feedback cost (base + hint), not just the hint's half.
|
|
1871
|
-
const base = 'requires an approval that covers this command';
|
|
1872
|
-
return deny(base
|
|
1873
|
-
+ (0, approval_queue_1.queueHint)(opts.projectRoot, { kind: 'shell', target: command, why: assessment.reasons.join('; ') }, { baseReasonBytes: base.length }));
|
|
1874
|
-
}
|
|
1875
|
-
else {
|
|
1876
|
-
pendingApprovals.push(resolved);
|
|
1877
2621
|
}
|
|
1878
2622
|
}
|
|
1879
2623
|
// Bash BYPASS gates (adversarial review: `cat > evil.ts` created ungoverned files, `echo x >
|
|
@@ -1979,6 +2723,16 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
1979
2723
|
// request id is printed: none exists until the operator runs the command, which files it.
|
|
1980
2724
|
// @implements A-SPEC-753.3 — the exact grammar first; otherwise any command of the line that applies. The
|
|
1981
2725
|
// operator part is that one command as written, not the whole line.
|
|
2726
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.9 (1b-5) — the operator's act, refused here in every harness's spelling
|
|
2727
|
+
if (lockRecoverAct(command)) {
|
|
2728
|
+
return {
|
|
2729
|
+
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
2730
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.22 (item 5) — the act's name only: the agent's words chose the refusal code (a
|
|
2731
|
+
// command holding "this run stopped" was coded run.stopped), and A-SPEC-792.1 spells no command for a person
|
|
2732
|
+
permissionDecisionReason: '[Holmes-Kit] holmes-kit lock recover retires a lock another process may hold — the operator runs it, not the session (A-SPEC-245.9).',
|
|
2733
|
+
refusal: 'operator-act.refused', // A-SPEC-245.23 (item 3)
|
|
2734
|
+
};
|
|
2735
|
+
}
|
|
1982
2736
|
const installerExact = legacySessionApproval ? null : (0, shell_argument_roles_1.installerInvocationOf)(command);
|
|
1983
2737
|
const installerApply = legacySessionApproval ? null
|
|
1984
2738
|
: installerExact === 'apply' ? command
|
|
@@ -1986,12 +2740,14 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
1986
2740
|
if (installerApply !== null) {
|
|
1987
2741
|
return {
|
|
1988
2742
|
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
2743
|
+
refusal: 'launch.refused', // A-SPEC-245.24
|
|
1989
2744
|
permissionDecisionReason: '[Holmes-Kit] runtime-binding setup/remove changes which Holmes build governs a workspace (governance wiring); the operator runs it, not the session. It prints the request id to approve; after the grant the operator runs the same command again. Use --dry-run to preview it here. Operator: ' + installerApply,
|
|
1990
2745
|
};
|
|
1991
2746
|
}
|
|
1992
2747
|
if (!legacySessionApproval && startsHolmesServer(command)) {
|
|
1993
2748
|
return {
|
|
1994
2749
|
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
2750
|
+
refusal: 'launch.refused', // A-SPEC-245.24
|
|
1995
2751
|
permissionDecisionReason: '[Holmes-Kit] the command starts the Holmes MCP server (or loads its handlers) itself — a copy the agent drives could answer its own approval (A-SPEC-732). The harness starts the server; use its tools. To run it by operator judgment, an approval that covers this command is required.',
|
|
1996
2752
|
};
|
|
1997
2753
|
}
|
|
@@ -2013,7 +2769,8 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2013
2769
|
if (!hint && (0, approval_queue_1.readQueue)(opts.projectRoot).pending.some((request) => request.id === id)) {
|
|
2014
2770
|
hint = ` — approval request ${id} is pending; retry after operator approval`;
|
|
2015
2771
|
}
|
|
2016
|
-
|
|
2772
|
+
// A-SPEC-245.24 (item 1) — a launch with a gate-off setting or in a run is a launch; the others read secrets
|
|
2773
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: routeCode(GATE_OFF !== null || AGENT_LAUNCH ? 'launch.refused' : 'secret.access'), permissionDecisionReason: reason
|
|
2017
2774
|
+ (hint || ' — could not persist the approval request; ask the operator to check the project approval queue storage') };
|
|
2018
2775
|
}
|
|
2019
2776
|
pendingApprovals.push(resolved);
|
|
@@ -2025,7 +2782,8 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2025
2782
|
// `cp`, `mv`, `install`, `ln -f`, `dd of=`, `rsync` and `sed -i` write the same file just as
|
|
2026
2783
|
// well. A gate that names one syntax for an act is a gate over that syntax, not over the act.
|
|
2027
2784
|
const CODE_EXT = '(?:ts|tsx|mts|cts|js|jsx|mjs|cjs|py|go|rs|java|kt|cs|cc|cxx|cpp|hh|hpp|rb|php|swift)';
|
|
2028
|
-
|
|
2785
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-792.35 — and what git runs: .git/config, .git/info/*, .git/hooks/* and any .gitattributes
|
|
2786
|
+
const CONFIG_FILE = '(?:\\.claude[\\\\/]settings[\\w.-]*\\.json|\\.mcp\\.json|\\.env(?!\\.(?:example|sample|template|dist))(?:\\.[\\w-]+)?|\\.git[\\\\/](?:config|(?:info|hooks)[\\\\/][\\w.-]+)|\\.gitattributes)';
|
|
2029
2787
|
// @implements A-SPEC-448
|
|
2030
2788
|
// Paths an INTERPRETER one-liner writes. The residual both shell rules recorded, closed by
|
|
2031
2789
|
// asking for the evidence of a write rather than for an interpreter's name near a pattern.
|
|
@@ -2124,7 +2882,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2124
2882
|
}
|
|
2125
2883
|
return out;
|
|
2126
2884
|
};
|
|
2127
|
-
const TOO_MANY_CANDIDATES = { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] a shell command with more than ${SHELL_CANDIDATES_MAX} distinct write targets is too large to judge — refused rather than judged; split it into smaller commands (A-SPEC-728)` };
|
|
2885
|
+
const TOO_MANY_CANDIDATES = { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'gate.unjudgeable', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] a shell command with more than ${SHELL_CANDIDATES_MAX} distinct write targets is too large to judge — refused rather than judged; split it into smaller commands (A-SPEC-728)` };
|
|
2128
2886
|
const isTilde = (p) => p === '~' || p.startsWith('~/');
|
|
2129
2887
|
// Relative candidate in a segment whose base is unknowable (dynamic cd argument): 'unknown',
|
|
2130
2888
|
// and the caller fails CLOSED — but only when such a candidate exists, so `cd "$X" && npm
|
|
@@ -2190,13 +2948,15 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2190
2948
|
// tell reading from writing costs more than the hole it closes; the same residual is already
|
|
2191
2949
|
// recorded for the code-write rule below.
|
|
2192
2950
|
if (configWrite) {
|
|
2193
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: registry_1.MESSAGES.INTEGRITY_CONFIG_EDIT('.claude/settings, .env, .mcp.json', 'A-SPEC-191') };
|
|
2951
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'approval.required', permissionDecisionReason: registry_1.MESSAGES.INTEGRITY_CONFIG_EDIT('.claude/settings, .env, .mcp.json, .git/config, .git/info, .git/hooks, .gitattributes', 'A-SPEC-191, A-SPEC-792.35') };
|
|
2194
2952
|
}
|
|
2195
2953
|
// @implements A-SPEC-728 — the harness config that loads THIS session's gate also lives outside
|
|
2196
2954
|
// the project: `~/.claude/settings*.json` and Codex's user-level `config.toml`/`hooks.json`
|
|
2197
2955
|
// (the only place codex-cli 0.155 loads Holmes from). Judged by identity after `~`/`$HOME`/
|
|
2198
2956
|
// `$CODEX_HOME` expansion, so no spelling is a door.
|
|
2199
|
-
|
|
2957
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-792.39 — and the user's global git config and attributes (`~/.gitconfig`,
|
|
2958
|
+
// `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/git/config`, `…/git/attributes`), which name programs every git child runs.
|
|
2959
|
+
const CODEX_FILE = String.raw `(?:config\.toml|hooks\.json|\.gitconfig|git[\\/](?:config|attributes))`;
|
|
2200
2960
|
const userCfgCands = [...cfgCandidates];
|
|
2201
2961
|
const CODEX_REDIRECT = new RegExp(`(?:>{1,2}|\\btee\\b(?:\\s+-a)?\\s)\\s*${pathAlt(CODEX_FILE)}`, 'g');
|
|
2202
2962
|
for (const seg of segments) {
|
|
@@ -2204,13 +2964,13 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2204
2964
|
collectPaths(seg, WRITE_VERB, CODEX_FILE, userCfgCands);
|
|
2205
2965
|
collectPaths(seg, /\bsed\b/, CODEX_FILE, userCfgCands, /\s-i\b/);
|
|
2206
2966
|
}
|
|
2207
|
-
const USER_CFG_RE = /(?:config\.toml|hooks\.json|settings[\w.-]*\.json)$/;
|
|
2967
|
+
const USER_CFG_RE = /(?:config\.toml|hooks\.json|settings[\w.-]*\.json|\.gitconfig|git[\\/](?:config|attributes))$/;
|
|
2208
2968
|
userCfgCands.push(...interpreterWrites.filter((p) => USER_CFG_RE.test(p)).flatMap(expandInterp));
|
|
2209
2969
|
const userCfgList = distinct(userCfgCands);
|
|
2210
2970
|
if (userCfgList === null)
|
|
2211
2971
|
return TOO_MANY_CANDIDATES;
|
|
2212
2972
|
const userCfgKind = userCfgList
|
|
2213
|
-
.map((c) => (c.base === null ? ((0, write_target_2.absoluteKindOf)(c.raw) !== null || /^(?:~|\$\{?(?:HOME|CODEX_HOME)\b)/.test(c.raw) ? (0, write_target_2.userHarnessConfigKindOf)(c.raw, opts.projectRoot) : null) : (0, write_target_2.userHarnessConfigKindOf)(c.raw, c.base)))
|
|
2973
|
+
.map((c) => (c.base === null ? ((0, write_target_2.absoluteKindOf)(c.raw) !== null || /^(?:~|\$\{?(?:HOME|CODEX_HOME|XDG_CONFIG_HOME)\b)/.test(c.raw) ? (0, write_target_2.userHarnessConfigKindOf)(c.raw, opts.projectRoot) : null) : (0, write_target_2.userHarnessConfigKindOf)(c.raw, c.base)))
|
|
2214
2974
|
.find((k) => k !== null);
|
|
2215
2975
|
// One config-write approval (env or a granted queue request for this exact command) lifts both
|
|
2216
2976
|
// rules below; the refusal files that request, as the Write/Edit config gate does.
|
|
@@ -2220,7 +2980,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2220
2980
|
pendingApprovals.push(r);
|
|
2221
2981
|
return null;
|
|
2222
2982
|
}
|
|
2223
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${why} — an out-of-band approval that includes config-write is required (A-SPEC-728)`
|
|
2983
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: routeCode('approval.required'), permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${why} — an out-of-band approval that includes config-write is required (A-SPEC-728)`
|
|
2224
2984
|
+ hintOrRoute({ kind: 'config-write', target: command, why }) }; // A-SPEC-792.5
|
|
2225
2985
|
};
|
|
2226
2986
|
let configWriteLifted = false;
|
|
@@ -2241,7 +3001,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2241
3001
|
if (act && act.includes(write_target_1.PROJECT_CAPS_LABEL)) {
|
|
2242
3002
|
const onDisk = (0, project_caps_1.readProjectCaps)(opts.projectRoot);
|
|
2243
3003
|
if ((0, run_mode_1.runMode)(process.env, opts.projectRoot, input.cwd, input.session_id).run) {
|
|
2244
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${act}: a run cannot change a project cap in ax.config.json, and a shell write to it cannot be read — the caps are the owner's and stay fixed for the run (A-SPEC-476.3)` };
|
|
3004
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'cap.run-fixed', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${act}: a run cannot change a project cap in ax.config.json, and a shell write to it cannot be read — the caps are the owner's and stay fixed for the run (A-SPEC-476.3)` };
|
|
2245
3005
|
}
|
|
2246
3006
|
if (!(0, project_caps_1.capsAtWidest)(onDisk)) {
|
|
2247
3007
|
const refusal = liftByConfigWrite(`${act}: ax.config.json sets a project cap (semantic.maxTier ${onDisk.semantic}, autonomy.ceiling ${onDisk.ceiling}) and a shell write to it cannot be read — raising or removing a cap is the owner's act (A-SPEC-476.3)`);
|
|
@@ -2415,7 +3175,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2415
3175
|
// @implements A-SPEC-774.10 — a legacy policy outside a run keeps the 0.35.25 freedom for WRITE_OTHER.
|
|
2416
3176
|
const issue = (0, role_policy_1.roleCheck)((0, phase_1.classifyAction)(judgedPath(c).replace(/\\/g, '/'), undefined, shellClassify) ?? 'WRITE_OTHER', shellIdentity, shellPolicy, { run: (0, run_mode_1.runMode)(process.env, opts.projectRoot, input.cwd, input.session_id).run });
|
|
2417
3177
|
if (issue)
|
|
2418
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: issue };
|
|
3178
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'role.refused', permissionDecisionReason: issue };
|
|
2419
3179
|
}
|
|
2420
3180
|
}
|
|
2421
3181
|
// @implements A-SPEC-774.23 — a scoped run's shell writes stay inside its plan, as its file tool writes do.
|
|
@@ -2424,7 +3184,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2424
3184
|
.filter((c) => judgeCand(c, [opts.projectRoot]) === 'in').map((c) => path.resolve(opts.projectRoot, judgedPath(c)));
|
|
2425
3185
|
const outside = (0, run_plan_scope_1.planScopeRefusal)({ projectRoot: opts.projectRoot, specsDir, env: process.env, cwd: input.cwd, sessionId: input.session_id }, inProject);
|
|
2426
3186
|
if (outside)
|
|
2427
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: outside };
|
|
3187
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'scope.outside', permissionDecisionReason: outside };
|
|
2428
3188
|
}
|
|
2429
3189
|
// @implements A-SPEC-747.4 — a write whose destination or command word is computed at run time (xargs input, find's
|
|
2430
3190
|
// `{}`, a variable, an IFS join) never reached the literal-destination rule above: 19 such writes to code files
|
|
@@ -2446,7 +3206,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2446
3206
|
computedWrite = 'computed command';
|
|
2447
3207
|
}
|
|
2448
3208
|
if (computedWrite !== null && readSpecsSync(specsDir).length > 0) {
|
|
2449
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `${SHELL_CODE_WRITE_REASON} (its target is computed at run time: ${computedWrite}, A-SPEC-747.4)` };
|
|
3209
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'shell.code-write', permissionDecisionReason: `${SHELL_CODE_WRITE_REASON} (its target is computed at run time: ${computedWrite}, A-SPEC-747.4)` };
|
|
2450
3210
|
}
|
|
2451
3211
|
const codeList = distinct([...candidates, ...interpreterWrites.flatMap(expandInterp)].filter(governedCode));
|
|
2452
3212
|
// Rule 43: only a governed project judges this list — an ungoverned one was refused for nothing it would check.
|
|
@@ -2459,7 +3219,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2459
3219
|
// has never depended on governance); code candidates stay dormant on a spec-less repo.
|
|
2460
3220
|
const UNRESOLVED_BASE_DENY = '[Holmes-Kit] shell write to a relative path cannot be located: an earlier cd has a target the gate cannot resolve statically (dynamic argument) — use an absolute path, the gated Write/Edit tools, or out-of-band approval';
|
|
2461
3221
|
if (cfgVerdicts.includes('unknown')) {
|
|
2462
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: UNRESOLVED_BASE_DENY };
|
|
3222
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'target.unresolvable', permissionDecisionReason: UNRESOLVED_BASE_DENY };
|
|
2463
3223
|
}
|
|
2464
3224
|
if (codeVerdicts.includes('in') || codeVerdicts.includes('unknown')) {
|
|
2465
3225
|
// @implements A-SPEC-550.1 — governance is "specs EXIST", not "a spec is approved". The old
|
|
@@ -2470,15 +3230,16 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2470
3230
|
const governed = readSpecsSync(specsDir).length > 0;
|
|
2471
3231
|
if (governed) {
|
|
2472
3232
|
return codeVerdicts.includes('in')
|
|
2473
|
-
? { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: SHELL_CODE_WRITE_REASON }
|
|
2474
|
-
: { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: UNRESOLVED_BASE_DENY };
|
|
3233
|
+
? { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'shell.code-write', permissionDecisionReason: SHELL_CODE_WRITE_REASON }
|
|
3234
|
+
: { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'target.unresolvable', permissionDecisionReason: UNRESOLVED_BASE_DENY };
|
|
2475
3235
|
}
|
|
2476
3236
|
}
|
|
2477
3237
|
}
|
|
2478
3238
|
// @implements A-SPEC-790.8 — a carried approval was spent by the first reading; only the others are spent here.
|
|
2479
3239
|
const spendable = pendingApprovals.flatMap((p) => (p.source === 'carried' ? [] : [p]));
|
|
2480
3240
|
if (spendable.length > 0) {
|
|
2481
|
-
|
|
3241
|
+
// A-SPEC-245.24 (item 1) — a single-use approval that cannot be spent once needs a new one from the person
|
|
3242
|
+
const deny = (why) => ({ permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'approval.required',
|
|
2482
3243
|
permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${why}` });
|
|
2483
3244
|
// @implements A-SPEC-477.1 — a later invalid approval must not spend an earlier valid one.
|
|
2484
3245
|
// Validate the complete set, then check all replays and append under ONE existing ledger hold.
|
|
@@ -2489,41 +3250,58 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2489
3250
|
const ledgerFile = (0, ledger_store_2.writerChainFile)(path.join(opts.projectRoot, '.ax', 'ledger'));
|
|
2490
3251
|
const unique = new Map(spendable.filter(({ approval }) => !!approval.nonce)
|
|
2491
3252
|
.map(({ approval }) => [approval.nonce, approval]));
|
|
2492
|
-
|
|
3253
|
+
// A read: a conflict or a replay denies here with its reason; the spend itself is the settlement's, below
|
|
3254
|
+
try {
|
|
2493
3255
|
const conflict = (0, ledger_store_2.ledgerConflictReason)(path.dirname(ledgerFile));
|
|
2494
3256
|
if (conflict)
|
|
2495
|
-
return conflict;
|
|
3257
|
+
return deny(conflict);
|
|
2496
3258
|
const consumed = (0, ledger_store_2.nonceConsumedIn)(ledgerFile);
|
|
2497
3259
|
if ([...unique.keys()].some(consumed))
|
|
2498
|
-
return 'single-use approval already consumed (replay)';
|
|
2499
|
-
return null;
|
|
2500
|
-
};
|
|
2501
|
-
try {
|
|
2502
|
-
const chain = new provenance_chain_1.ProvenanceChain(ledgerFile);
|
|
2503
|
-
const failure = unique.size === 0 ? check() : (0, ledger_lock_1.withLedgerLock)(ledgerFile, () => {
|
|
2504
|
-
const reason = check();
|
|
2505
|
-
if (reason)
|
|
2506
|
-
return reason;
|
|
2507
|
-
for (const [nonce, acting] of unique)
|
|
2508
|
-
chain.appendInsideLock({
|
|
2509
|
-
ts: nowTs, actor: acting.actor, kind: 'nonce-consumed',
|
|
2510
|
-
summary: `consumed single-use approval for: ${(0, provenance_chain_1.redactTarget)('command', command)}`.slice(0, 200),
|
|
2511
|
-
inputs: [(0, provenance_chain_1.nonceFingerprint)(nonce)], rationale: acting.rationale, authorization: (0, provenance_chain_1.authorizationRef)(acting.actor, acting.token),
|
|
2512
|
-
});
|
|
2513
|
-
return null;
|
|
2514
|
-
}, { onStaleBreak: chain.staleBreakRecorder() });
|
|
2515
|
-
if (failure)
|
|
2516
|
-
return deny(failure);
|
|
3260
|
+
return deny('single-use approval already consumed (replay)');
|
|
2517
3261
|
}
|
|
2518
3262
|
catch (err) {
|
|
2519
|
-
return deny(`could not
|
|
3263
|
+
return deny(`could not read the ledger to judge the single-use approval (${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)})`);
|
|
2520
3264
|
}
|
|
3265
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.9 (1b-2) — every single-use approval of this act, a grant's or the environment's, is
|
|
3266
|
+
// spent when the decision is final, on the hook's main thread, through spendApprovals (GrantSettlement.settle)
|
|
3267
|
+
if (opts.settlement === undefined && unique.size > 0)
|
|
3268
|
+
return deny('no settlement holds this single-use approval — it cannot be spent once, so it is denied');
|
|
2521
3269
|
for (const { source, approval } of spendable) {
|
|
2522
|
-
if (
|
|
2523
|
-
|
|
3270
|
+
if (!approval.nonce)
|
|
3271
|
+
continue;
|
|
3272
|
+
if (source === 'grant')
|
|
3273
|
+
opts.settlement?.hold(opts.projectRoot, approval.nonce, approval); // A-SPEC-245.2, A-SPEC-245.4
|
|
3274
|
+
else
|
|
3275
|
+
opts.settlement?.holdEnv(opts.projectRoot, approval.nonce, approval, `consumed single-use approval for: ${(0, provenance_chain_1.redactTarget)('command', command)}`.slice(0, 200));
|
|
2524
3276
|
}
|
|
2525
3277
|
opts.onApprovalsSpent?.(spendable.map(({ approval }) => approval));
|
|
2526
3278
|
}
|
|
3279
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-792.32 — the one place a staging approval is recorded: every Bash gate has passed, the act is
|
|
3280
|
+
// allowed. The autonomous record is the verdict's proven pairs; the person path's names only its add segments.
|
|
3281
|
+
if (autonomousStaging !== null) {
|
|
3282
|
+
const a = autonomousStaging;
|
|
3283
|
+
const sha = (t) => crypto.createHash('sha256').update(t).digest('hex');
|
|
3284
|
+
try {
|
|
3285
|
+
new ledger_store_1.FileLedgerStore(path.join(opts.projectRoot, '.ax', 'ledger')).append({
|
|
3286
|
+
ts: nowTs, actor: `full-autonomy:${a.scope}`, kind: 'autonomous-shell-approved',
|
|
3287
|
+
summary: `governance staging approved by machine conditions (${a.paths.length} path(s))`,
|
|
3288
|
+
inputs: [`command:${sha(command)}`, `paths:${sha(a.paths.join('\n'))}`, `count:${a.paths.length}`, ...Object.entries(a.conditions).map(([k, x]) => `${k}:${x}`)],
|
|
3289
|
+
rationale: 'A-SPEC-792.28: grammar, provenance, integrity and reversibility each held',
|
|
3290
|
+
});
|
|
3291
|
+
}
|
|
3292
|
+
catch { /* the act is approved by its conditions; the audit row is best effort like the other gate records */ }
|
|
3293
|
+
(0, approval_queue_1.appendQueueEvent)(opts.projectRoot, { event: 'auto-approved', id: (0, approval_queue_1.approvalRequestId)('shell', command), kind: 'shell', target: command.slice(0, 500) });
|
|
3294
|
+
try {
|
|
3295
|
+
require('../governance/spec-seam').recordProvenGrant(opts.projectRoot, specsDir, a.proven);
|
|
3296
|
+
}
|
|
3297
|
+
catch { /* unrecorded: the seam then reports the staged change, which fails closed at Stop */ }
|
|
3298
|
+
}
|
|
3299
|
+
if (personStaging) {
|
|
3300
|
+
try {
|
|
3301
|
+
require('../governance/spec-seam').recordGrantedStaging(opts.projectRoot, specsDir, command, shellBase);
|
|
3302
|
+
}
|
|
3303
|
+
catch { /* unrecorded: the seam then reports the staged change, which fails closed at Stop */ }
|
|
3304
|
+
}
|
|
2527
3305
|
// @implements A-SPEC-774.13 — an allowed interactive launch inherits this session's authority variables; a hook
|
|
2528
3306
|
// cannot change a command's environment, so it names them (never their values) and gives the operator's re-run.
|
|
2529
3307
|
if (agentCliLaunch(command) && !(0, run_mode_1.runMode)(process.env, opts.projectRoot, input.cwd, input.session_id).run) {
|
|
@@ -2544,15 +3322,17 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2544
3322
|
const foreign = input.tool_input.foreign_paths ?? (0, write_target_2.foreignMcpPaths)(input.tool_name, input.tool_input);
|
|
2545
3323
|
if (foreign && (foreign.paths.length > 0 || foreign.unresolvable.length > 0)) {
|
|
2546
3324
|
if (foreign.unresolvable.length > 0) {
|
|
2547
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${input.tool_name} names ${foreign.unresolvable[0].slice(0, 120)} — a location the gate cannot resolve to a file, so it cannot be judged and is refused (A-SPEC-776)
|
|
3325
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${input.tool_name} names ${foreign.unresolvable[0].slice(0, 120)} — a location the gate cannot resolve to a file, so it cannot be judged and is refused (A-SPEC-776)`, refusal: 'target.unresolvable' }; // A-SPEC-245.23
|
|
2548
3326
|
}
|
|
2549
3327
|
if (foreign.paths.length > 64) {
|
|
2550
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${input.tool_name} names more than 64 paths — too many to judge, refused rather than judged (A-SPEC-776)` };
|
|
3328
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'gate.unjudgeable', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${input.tool_name} names more than 64 paths — too many to judge, refused rather than judged (A-SPEC-776)` };
|
|
2551
3329
|
}
|
|
2552
3330
|
for (const fp of foreign.paths) {
|
|
2553
3331
|
const v = evaluateHook({ tool_name: 'Write', tool_input: { file_path: fp, content: '' }, ...(input.cwd === undefined ? {} : { cwd: input.cwd }) }, specsDir, opts);
|
|
2554
3332
|
if (v.permissionDecision === 'deny') {
|
|
2555
|
-
|
|
3333
|
+
// A-SPEC-245.23 (item 3) — the nested verdict's code, from its own site or its own text, before the path is prefixed
|
|
3334
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${input.tool_name} → ${fp.slice(0, 120)}: ${v.permissionDecisionReason ?? ''}`,
|
|
3335
|
+
refusal: (0, refusal_codes_1.refusalFor)(v.permissionDecisionReason ?? '', v.refusal).code };
|
|
2556
3336
|
}
|
|
2557
3337
|
}
|
|
2558
3338
|
}
|
|
@@ -2576,6 +3356,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2576
3356
|
// has to recognise.
|
|
2577
3357
|
return {
|
|
2578
3358
|
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
3359
|
+
refusal: 'target.unresolvable', // A-SPEC-245.24
|
|
2579
3360
|
permissionDecisionReason: '[Holmes-Kit] cannot read the edit target path, so it cannot be judged (file_path missing or not a string)',
|
|
2580
3361
|
};
|
|
2581
3362
|
}
|
|
@@ -2590,6 +3371,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2590
3371
|
if (writesCode && !p) {
|
|
2591
3372
|
return {
|
|
2592
3373
|
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
3374
|
+
refusal: 'target.unresolvable', // A-SPEC-245.24
|
|
2593
3375
|
permissionDecisionReason: '[Holmes-Kit] cannot read the edit target path, so it cannot be judged (file_path missing or not a string)'
|
|
2594
3376
|
+ ' — there is no way to check whether an unnamed file overwrites an approved spec, so it is not allowed.',
|
|
2595
3377
|
};
|
|
@@ -2615,7 +3397,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2615
3397
|
// is not bounded by a count at all; it ends at the filesystem root, which always terminates.
|
|
2616
3398
|
// `canonicalPath` (realpathSync.native), not the JS realpath: the root arrives canonicalised by
|
|
2617
3399
|
// root.ts, which expands Windows 8.3 aliases; the JS realpath does not. Measured 2026-08-23 on
|
|
2618
|
-
// the built hook — an in-project target spelled through `%TEMP%`'s alias (`C:\Users\
|
|
3400
|
+
// the built hook — an in-project target spelled through `%TEMP%`'s alias (`C:\Users\FIRSTL~1\…`)
|
|
2619
3401
|
// resolved to a string the long-name root did not contain, and took the "outside → allow" exit
|
|
2620
3402
|
// below. Both sides must go through the one canonicaliser, or an alias is a free pass.
|
|
2621
3403
|
// @implements A-SPEC-728 (rule 37) — the nearest ancestor that resolves is found by halving (whether an ancestor
|
|
@@ -2669,6 +3451,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2669
3451
|
// nothing to govern"; an undecidable target is refused, not allowed.
|
|
2670
3452
|
return {
|
|
2671
3453
|
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
3454
|
+
refusal: 'target.unresolvable', // A-SPEC-245.24
|
|
2672
3455
|
permissionDecisionReason: '[Holmes-Kit] a network path (UNC) cannot be resolved to a local filesystem identity,'
|
|
2673
3456
|
+ ' so it cannot be judged inside or outside the project — an untellable target is not allowed.'
|
|
2674
3457
|
+ ' Put the project on a local drive, or use a drive-letter-mapped path.',
|
|
@@ -2722,11 +3505,11 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2722
3505
|
return { permissionDecision: 'allow' };
|
|
2723
3506
|
const userResolved = (0, approval_grants_1.resolveApproval)(opts.projectRoot, weApproval, { kind: 'config-write', target: norm }, nowTs);
|
|
2724
3507
|
if (userResolved === undefined) {
|
|
2725
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${userKind} is a hook/approval config — it can forge HOLMES_APPROVAL or turn governance off, so an out-of-band approval that includes config-write is required`
|
|
3508
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: routeCode('approval.required'), permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${userKind} is a hook/approval config — it can forge HOLMES_APPROVAL or turn governance off, so an out-of-band approval that includes config-write is required`
|
|
2726
3509
|
+ hintOrRoute({ kind: 'config-write', target: norm, why: `writing ${userKind}` }) }; // A-SPEC-792.5
|
|
2727
3510
|
}
|
|
2728
3511
|
if (userResolved.source === 'grant' && userResolved.approval.nonce)
|
|
2729
|
-
|
|
3512
|
+
opts.settlement?.hold(opts.projectRoot, userResolved.approval.nonce, userResolved.approval); // A-SPEC-245.2
|
|
2730
3513
|
return { permissionDecision: 'allow' };
|
|
2731
3514
|
}
|
|
2732
3515
|
norm = canonical;
|
|
@@ -2739,6 +3522,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2739
3522
|
if (norm.includes('\u0000')) {
|
|
2740
3523
|
return {
|
|
2741
3524
|
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
3525
|
+
refusal: 'target.unresolvable', // A-SPEC-245.24
|
|
2742
3526
|
permissionDecisionReason: '[Holmes-Kit] the edit target path contains a NUL byte, so which file it is cannot be judged'
|
|
2743
3527
|
+ ' — a target whose name cannot be pinned down is not allowed.',
|
|
2744
3528
|
};
|
|
@@ -2767,13 +3551,15 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2767
3551
|
if (rolesResolved === undefined) {
|
|
2768
3552
|
return {
|
|
2769
3553
|
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
3554
|
+
refusal: routeCode('approval.required'), // A-SPEC-245.24
|
|
2770
3555
|
permissionDecisionReason: '[Holmes-Kit] the role policy (.ax/roles/) defines the very authority this gate enforces —'
|
|
2771
3556
|
+ ' an agent cannot change it itself. An out-of-band approval that includes config-write is required.'
|
|
2772
3557
|
+ hintOrRoute({ kind: 'config-write', target: norm, why: 'writing the role policy (.ax/roles/)' }), // A-SPEC-792.5
|
|
2773
3558
|
};
|
|
2774
3559
|
}
|
|
3560
|
+
// A-SPEC-245.2: held, not spent — the protected-directory branch below resolves this same grant again
|
|
2775
3561
|
if (rolesResolved.source === 'grant' && rolesResolved.approval.nonce)
|
|
2776
|
-
|
|
3562
|
+
opts.settlement?.hold(opts.projectRoot, rolesResolved.approval.nonce, rolesResolved.approval);
|
|
2777
3563
|
}
|
|
2778
3564
|
// @implements A-SPEC-191 §22 — ask by identity. A spelling regex was defeated by a single in-project link.
|
|
2779
3565
|
// @implements A-SPEC-728 — a project that itself sits in a harness home still protects those files.
|
|
@@ -2789,11 +3575,11 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2789
3575
|
// @implements A-SPEC-193 §8 — name what was blocked. Baking a list into the sentence makes the
|
|
2790
3576
|
// wording false as harnesses grow (REQ-155: a diagnosis that points at the wrong file has negative value).
|
|
2791
3577
|
const kindName = configKind ?? (0, write_target_2.protectedKindOf)(opts.projectRoot, norm) ?? 'config';
|
|
2792
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${kindName} is a hook/approval config — it can forge HOLMES_APPROVAL or turn governance off, so an out-of-band approval that includes config-write is required`
|
|
3578
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: routeCode('approval.required'), permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${kindName} is a hook/approval config — it can forge HOLMES_APPROVAL or turn governance off, so an out-of-band approval that includes config-write is required`
|
|
2793
3579
|
+ hintOrRoute({ kind: 'config-write', target: norm, why: `writing ${kindName}` }) }; // A-SPEC-792.5
|
|
2794
3580
|
}
|
|
2795
3581
|
if (cfgResolved.source === 'grant' && cfgResolved.approval.nonce)
|
|
2796
|
-
|
|
3582
|
+
opts.settlement?.hold(opts.projectRoot, cfgResolved.approval.nonce, cfgResolved.approval); // A-SPEC-245.2
|
|
2797
3583
|
}
|
|
2798
3584
|
// @implements A-SPEC-476.3 — the owner's caps in ax.config.json narrow this agent: raising or removing one is the owner's
|
|
2799
3585
|
// act (owner decision 2026-10-19), lowering stays free, and in a run no write changes one.
|
|
@@ -2801,16 +3587,16 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2801
3587
|
const capsAct = projectCapsWriteAct(opts.projectRoot, input);
|
|
2802
3588
|
if (capsAct !== null) {
|
|
2803
3589
|
if ((0, run_mode_1.runMode)(process.env, opts.projectRoot, input.cwd, input.session_id).run) {
|
|
2804
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] a run cannot change a project cap in ax.config.json (${capsAct}) — the caps are the owner's and stay fixed for the run (A-SPEC-476.3)` };
|
|
3590
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'cap.run-fixed', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] a run cannot change a project cap in ax.config.json (${capsAct}) — the caps are the owner's and stay fixed for the run (A-SPEC-476.3)` };
|
|
2805
3591
|
}
|
|
2806
3592
|
if (capsAct !== 'lowered') {
|
|
2807
3593
|
const capsResolved = (0, approval_grants_1.resolveApproval)(opts.projectRoot, weApproval, { kind: 'config-write', target: norm }, nowTs);
|
|
2808
3594
|
if (capsResolved === undefined) {
|
|
2809
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] this write raises or removes a project cap in ax.config.json (${capsAct}) — a cap narrows this agent, so only the owner lifts it: an out-of-band approval that includes config-write is required (A-SPEC-476.3)`
|
|
3595
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: routeCode('approval.required'), permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] this write raises or removes a project cap in ax.config.json (${capsAct}) — a cap narrows this agent, so only the owner lifts it: an out-of-band approval that includes config-write is required (A-SPEC-476.3)`
|
|
2810
3596
|
+ hintOrRoute({ kind: 'config-write', target: norm, why: `raising a project cap (${capsAct})` }) }; // A-SPEC-792.5
|
|
2811
3597
|
}
|
|
2812
3598
|
if (capsResolved.source === 'grant' && capsResolved.approval.nonce)
|
|
2813
|
-
|
|
3599
|
+
opts.settlement?.hold(opts.projectRoot, capsResolved.approval.nonce, capsResolved.approval); // A-SPEC-245.2
|
|
2814
3600
|
}
|
|
2815
3601
|
}
|
|
2816
3602
|
}
|
|
@@ -2836,7 +3622,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2836
3622
|
// legacy reading uses the same value.
|
|
2837
3623
|
const specRoleIssue = (0, role_policy_1.roleCheck)(specAction, new identity_1.EnvIdentityProvider().current(), specPolicy, { run: (0, run_mode_1.runMode)(process.env, opts.projectRoot, input.cwd, input.session_id).run });
|
|
2838
3624
|
if (specRoleIssue)
|
|
2839
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: specRoleIssue };
|
|
3625
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'role.refused', permissionDecisionReason: specRoleIssue };
|
|
2840
3626
|
}
|
|
2841
3627
|
// F1: a spec cannot SELF-APPROVE. `status: approved` is what unlocks every downstream gate
|
|
2842
3628
|
// (phaseCheck trusts the on-disk status). If the incoming write promotes a spec to approved and it
|
|
@@ -2854,7 +3640,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2854
3640
|
const specWriteCovered = (0, risk_gate_1.approvalCovers)(weApproval, { kind: 'spec-write', target: norm }, nowTs);
|
|
2855
3641
|
if (incomingSetsApproved(input.tool_input) && !specWriteCovered) {
|
|
2856
3642
|
if (!onDiskApproved) {
|
|
2857
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: registry_1.MESSAGES.SEAL_SELF_APPROVAL_RESTRICTED(path.basename(p, '.md'), 'A-SPEC-133') };
|
|
3643
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'spec.protected', permissionDecisionReason: registry_1.MESSAGES.SEAL_SELF_APPROVAL_RESTRICTED(path.basename(p, '.md'), 'A-SPEC-133') };
|
|
2858
3644
|
}
|
|
2859
3645
|
}
|
|
2860
3646
|
// @implements A-SPEC-728 (rule 39) — and judged on the RESULT too: an Edit of `draft` into `approved` carries no
|
|
@@ -2876,7 +3662,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2876
3662
|
catch { /* not a spec the store would read as approved */ }
|
|
2877
3663
|
}
|
|
2878
3664
|
if (approvedAfter || edited === TOO_LARGE) {
|
|
2879
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: edited === TOO_LARGE
|
|
3665
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: edited === TOO_LARGE ? 'gate.unjudgeable' : 'spec.protected', permissionDecisionReason: edited === TOO_LARGE
|
|
2880
3666
|
? `[Holmes-Kit] a spec edit too large to judge (its result passes ${EDIT_RESULT_MAX / (1024 * 1024)} MiB, or its edits pass ${EDIT_REPLACEMENTS_MAX / (1024 * 1024)} M replacements or ${EDIT_WORK_MAX / (1024 * 1024)} MiB of work) — refused rather than judged (A-SPEC-728)`
|
|
2881
3667
|
: registry_1.MESSAGES.SEAL_SELF_APPROVAL_RESTRICTED(path.basename(p, '.md'), 'A-SPEC-133') };
|
|
2882
3668
|
}
|
|
@@ -2890,9 +3676,113 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2890
3676
|
if (onDiskApproved && !specWriteCovered) {
|
|
2891
3677
|
return {
|
|
2892
3678
|
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
3679
|
+
refusal: 'spec.protected', // A-SPEC-245.24
|
|
2893
3680
|
permissionDecisionReason: registry_1.MESSAGES.SEAL_APPROVED_SPEC_MUTATION(path.basename(p, '.md'), undefined, 'A-SPEC-132'),
|
|
2894
3681
|
};
|
|
2895
3682
|
}
|
|
3683
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-222.10 — H-B: a retired spec keeps the seal it was approved with, and its successor and anchor
|
|
3684
|
+
// moves are judged on it, so its sealed content and seal fields are as protected as an approved spec's (the rule
|
|
3685
|
+
// above ran only for `approved`, and an Edit rewrote an outdated body together with a recomputed approved_digest)
|
|
3686
|
+
if (!specWriteCovered) {
|
|
3687
|
+
let disk = null;
|
|
3688
|
+
try {
|
|
3689
|
+
disk = fs.existsSync(p) ? fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8') : null;
|
|
3690
|
+
}
|
|
3691
|
+
catch {
|
|
3692
|
+
disk = null;
|
|
3693
|
+
}
|
|
3694
|
+
let before = null;
|
|
3695
|
+
try {
|
|
3696
|
+
before = disk !== null ? (0, spec_parser_1.parseSpec)(disk) : null;
|
|
3697
|
+
}
|
|
3698
|
+
catch {
|
|
3699
|
+
before = null;
|
|
3700
|
+
}
|
|
3701
|
+
const edited = editedResult(disk, input.tool_input);
|
|
3702
|
+
let after = null;
|
|
3703
|
+
if (typeof edited === 'string') {
|
|
3704
|
+
try {
|
|
3705
|
+
after = (0, spec_parser_1.parseSpec)(edited);
|
|
3706
|
+
}
|
|
3707
|
+
catch {
|
|
3708
|
+
after = null;
|
|
3709
|
+
}
|
|
3710
|
+
}
|
|
3711
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-222.12 — N2: and its status, both ways: an edit that leaves `outdated` (to rewrite the body
|
|
3712
|
+
// and come back) or enters it (a retirement is spec_retire's) is refused like a body change
|
|
3713
|
+
// A-SPEC-222.13 (low b): a new file written as outdated enters it too
|
|
3714
|
+
// A-SPEC-222.14 (low b): new means no file on disk; one whose YAML does not parse keeps its `status:` line
|
|
3715
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-222.15 (item 2) — read from the first frontmatter block only, a trailing comment allowed (a
|
|
3716
|
+
// body line retired a spec by hand, and refused a legitimate repair)
|
|
3717
|
+
const { lenientFrontmatter } = require('../spec/succession-guard');
|
|
3718
|
+
const beforeOutdated = before !== null ? before.status === 'outdated'
|
|
3719
|
+
: disk !== null ? lenientFrontmatter(disk)?.status === 'outdated' : false;
|
|
3720
|
+
const statusMoves = after !== null && beforeOutdated !== (after.status === 'outdated');
|
|
3721
|
+
if (statusMoves) {
|
|
3722
|
+
return {
|
|
3723
|
+
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
3724
|
+
refusal: 'spec.protected',
|
|
3725
|
+
permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${path.basename(p, '.md')}: a spec leaves or enters \`outdated\` only through the tools — spec_retire retires it, spec_unseal reopens it with a person's approval (A-SPEC-222.12)`,
|
|
3726
|
+
};
|
|
3727
|
+
}
|
|
3728
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-222.15 (item 1) — a retired spec whose YAML does not parse has no `before` to compare: its
|
|
3729
|
+
// repair is allowed only back to a seal the trusted ledger records (222.14 let a rewrite with a recomputed digest
|
|
3730
|
+
// through here)
|
|
3731
|
+
if (before === null && disk !== null && beforeOutdated) {
|
|
3732
|
+
const id = path.basename(p, '.md');
|
|
3733
|
+
let toSeal = false;
|
|
3734
|
+
if (edited !== TOO_LARGE && after !== null) {
|
|
3735
|
+
const digest = (0, spec_digest_1.specDigest)(after);
|
|
3736
|
+
if (after.frontmatter.approved_digest === digest) {
|
|
3737
|
+
try {
|
|
3738
|
+
toSeal = require('../governance/recorded-pairs').recordedPairsPort(opts.projectRoot).approved(id, digest);
|
|
3739
|
+
}
|
|
3740
|
+
catch {
|
|
3741
|
+
toSeal = false;
|
|
3742
|
+
}
|
|
3743
|
+
}
|
|
3744
|
+
}
|
|
3745
|
+
if (!toSeal) {
|
|
3746
|
+
return {
|
|
3747
|
+
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
3748
|
+
refusal: 'spec.protected',
|
|
3749
|
+
permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${id} is retired (outdated) and its frontmatter does not parse: a repair is allowed only back to the seal the ledger records for it, whole and parsing — a change goes through spec_unseal and a person (A-SPEC-222.15)`,
|
|
3750
|
+
};
|
|
3751
|
+
}
|
|
3752
|
+
}
|
|
3753
|
+
if (before !== null && before.status === 'outdated') {
|
|
3754
|
+
const sealOfSpec = (s) => JSON.stringify(spec_digest_1.SEAL_FIELDS.map((k) => s.frontmatter[k] ?? null));
|
|
3755
|
+
const changed = edited === TOO_LARGE || (after !== null && ((0, spec_digest_1.specDigest)(after) !== (0, spec_digest_1.specDigest)(before) || sealOfSpec(after) !== sealOfSpec(before)));
|
|
3756
|
+
if (changed) {
|
|
3757
|
+
return {
|
|
3758
|
+
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
3759
|
+
refusal: 'spec.protected',
|
|
3760
|
+
permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${path.basename(p, '.md')} is retired (outdated): its sealed content and seal fields are kept as approved — successors and anchor moves are judged on them; a change goes through spec_unseal and a person (A-SPEC-222.10)`,
|
|
3761
|
+
};
|
|
3762
|
+
}
|
|
3763
|
+
}
|
|
3764
|
+
}
|
|
3765
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-222.8 — N2: who succeeds a spec is the tools' record, never a hand edit (the route is spec_retire)
|
|
3766
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-222.9 — SD1 1: judged in succession-guard; the gate only asks
|
|
3767
|
+
{
|
|
3768
|
+
let disk = null;
|
|
3769
|
+
try {
|
|
3770
|
+
disk = fs.existsSync(p) ? fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8') : null;
|
|
3771
|
+
}
|
|
3772
|
+
catch {
|
|
3773
|
+
disk = null;
|
|
3774
|
+
}
|
|
3775
|
+
const edited = editedResult(disk, input.tool_input);
|
|
3776
|
+
const { successionFieldEditRefusal } = require('../spec/succession-guard');
|
|
3777
|
+
const why = successionFieldEditRefusal(disk, edited === TOO_LARGE ? 'too-large' : edited, path.basename(p, '.md'), typeof input.tool_input.new_string === 'string' ? input.tool_input.new_string : undefined);
|
|
3778
|
+
if (why !== null) {
|
|
3779
|
+
return {
|
|
3780
|
+
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
3781
|
+
refusal: 'spec.protected', // A-SPEC-245.24
|
|
3782
|
+
permissionDecisionReason: why,
|
|
3783
|
+
};
|
|
3784
|
+
}
|
|
3785
|
+
}
|
|
2896
3786
|
// @implements A-SPEC-792.9 — a write that would leave the spec unreadable is refused with the parse error, whatever
|
|
2897
3787
|
// approval is held. G0 HB-r5: a Write broke REQ-100's YAML, the repair Edit was then refused as a new REQ (below),
|
|
2898
3788
|
// and the run ended asking a person. A file already unreadable on disk is judged as before.
|
|
@@ -2918,6 +3808,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2918
3808
|
if (broken !== null && (disk === null || parseError(disk) === null)) {
|
|
2919
3809
|
return {
|
|
2920
3810
|
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
3811
|
+
refusal: 'spec.unreadable', // A-SPEC-245.24
|
|
2921
3812
|
permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] the write would leave ${path.basename(p, '.md')} unreadable to the spec store (${broken}) — nothing was written; fix the frontmatter in this same write (a value holding ' or : goes in double quotes, or in a >- block)`,
|
|
2922
3813
|
};
|
|
2923
3814
|
}
|
|
@@ -2930,6 +3821,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2930
3821
|
if (newReq !== null) {
|
|
2931
3822
|
return {
|
|
2932
3823
|
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
3824
|
+
refusal: 'spec.not-approved', // A-SPEC-245.24 — the remedy is the tool, not a person
|
|
2933
3825
|
permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${newReq} — a new REQ is created only by spec_create(type='REQ') or spec_slice_init with triage_evidence from requirement_triage(persist:true) (A-SPEC-729). Editing an existing REQ's body stays free.`,
|
|
2934
3826
|
};
|
|
2935
3827
|
}
|
|
@@ -2942,6 +3834,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2942
3834
|
if (assessment.level === 'hard-hitl' && !(0, risk_gate_1.isValidApproval)(opts.approval)) {
|
|
2943
3835
|
return {
|
|
2944
3836
|
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
3837
|
+
refusal: 'spec.protected', // A-SPEC-245.24 — the reasons quote spec text; the code is the site's
|
|
2945
3838
|
permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] high blast-radius spec edit: ${assessment.reasons.join('; ')} — requires out-of-band approval`,
|
|
2946
3839
|
};
|
|
2947
3840
|
}
|
|
@@ -2960,7 +3853,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
2960
3853
|
const otherPolicy = (0, role_policy_1.loadRolePolicy)(opts.projectRoot);
|
|
2961
3854
|
// @implements A-SPEC-774.10 — read strictly only in a run or under a vocabulary-2 policy.
|
|
2962
3855
|
const otherIssue = otherPolicy === null ? null : (0, role_policy_1.roleCheck)('WRITE_OTHER', new identity_1.EnvIdentityProvider().current(), otherPolicy, { run: (0, run_mode_1.runMode)(process.env, opts.projectRoot, input.cwd, input.session_id).run });
|
|
2963
|
-
return otherIssue ? { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: otherIssue } : { permissionDecision: 'allow' };
|
|
3856
|
+
return otherIssue ? { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'role.refused', permissionDecisionReason: otherIssue } : { permissionDecision: 'allow' };
|
|
2964
3857
|
}
|
|
2965
3858
|
// Read specs synchronously via a fresh walk (hook must be sync)
|
|
2966
3859
|
const specs = readSpecsSync(specsDir);
|
|
@@ -3010,6 +3903,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
3010
3903
|
if (violations.length > 0) {
|
|
3011
3904
|
return {
|
|
3012
3905
|
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
3906
|
+
refusal: 'architecture.violation', // A-SPEC-245.24
|
|
3013
3907
|
permissionDecisionReason: '[Holmes-Kit] structural-constraint violation — a shape an approved C-SPEC forbids:\n'
|
|
3014
3908
|
+ violations.map((v) => ' - ' + v).join('\n')
|
|
3015
3909
|
+ '\n' + proposed_content_1.CSPEC_GATE_LIMITS,
|
|
@@ -3036,12 +3930,12 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
3036
3930
|
previous = fs.readFileSync(norm, 'utf8');
|
|
3037
3931
|
}
|
|
3038
3932
|
catch {
|
|
3039
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] cannot read ${relPath} to judge its anchors — the write is refused rather than judged by its own payload
|
|
3933
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] cannot read ${relPath} to judge its anchors — the write is refused rather than judged by its own payload`, refusal: 'target.unresolvable' }; // A-SPEC-245.23
|
|
3040
3934
|
}
|
|
3041
3935
|
}
|
|
3042
3936
|
const edited = editedResult(previous ?? null, ti166);
|
|
3043
3937
|
if (edited === TOO_LARGE) {
|
|
3044
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] the result of this write to ${relPath} is too large to judge its anchors
|
|
3938
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] the result of this write to ${relPath} is too large to judge its anchors`, refusal: 'gate.unjudgeable' }; // A-SPEC-245.23
|
|
3045
3939
|
}
|
|
3046
3940
|
// An edit that does not apply: the incoming fragments are judged (over-inclusion is the safe direction).
|
|
3047
3941
|
const leaves = edited ?? [ti166.content, ti166.new_string, ...(Array.isArray(ti166.edits)
|
|
@@ -3156,6 +4050,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
3156
4050
|
? ` (${(0, tspec_state_1.listOrCount)(hidden.flatMap(([, ids]) => ids), tspec_state_1.ID_BUDGET, 'items', Infinity)} require individual verification due to distinct reasons)` : '');
|
|
3157
4051
|
return {
|
|
3158
4052
|
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
4053
|
+
refusal: 'spec.not-approved', // A-SPEC-245.24
|
|
3159
4054
|
permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit Gate Refusal] Target specification ${(0, tspec_state_1.listOrCount)(unapproved, tspec_state_1.ID_BUDGET, 'spec(s)', Infinity)} is not approved`
|
|
3160
4055
|
+ ` — Claiming unapproved specifications in existing or new files is prohibited.${why}`,
|
|
3161
4056
|
};
|
|
@@ -3192,7 +4087,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
3192
4087
|
if (ungovernedPolicy !== null) {
|
|
3193
4088
|
const issue = (0, role_policy_1.roleCheck)(action, new identity_1.EnvIdentityProvider().current(), ungovernedPolicy, { run: (0, run_mode_1.runMode)(process.env, opts.projectRoot, input.cwd, input.session_id).run });
|
|
3194
4089
|
if (issue)
|
|
3195
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: issue };
|
|
4090
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'role.refused', permissionDecisionReason: issue };
|
|
3196
4091
|
}
|
|
3197
4092
|
return { permissionDecision: 'allow' };
|
|
3198
4093
|
}
|
|
@@ -3222,7 +4117,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
3222
4117
|
// second id passed). The shared parser is consumed through `stripStringLiterals`, the same
|
|
3223
4118
|
// preprocessing the claim gate got in S-504.1, so a fixture string anchor no longer governs.
|
|
3224
4119
|
// Disk-anchor precedence is preserved as a set: a non-empty disk set governs, else the payload.
|
|
3225
|
-
const {
|
|
4120
|
+
const { anchorSpecIdsFor } = require('../rtm/anchor-ids');
|
|
3226
4121
|
const uniq = (xs) => [...new Set(xs)];
|
|
3227
4122
|
// @implements A-SPEC-529.2 — the preprocessing branches on FILE FORMAT. A-SPEC-529.1 stripped
|
|
3228
4123
|
// string literals so a code fixture like `const s = "@implements A-SPEC-999"` could not become
|
|
@@ -3231,10 +4126,9 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
3231
4126
|
// 2026-09-03, a release package.json edit was refused with "A-SPEC(unspecified)". Code formats
|
|
3232
4127
|
// (line-comment anchors) still strip; JSON/YAML/TOML/config and unknown extensions read raw
|
|
3233
4128
|
// (over-inclusion is safe — an anchored-but-unapproved id is still refused downstream).
|
|
3234
|
-
|
|
3235
|
-
const
|
|
3236
|
-
const
|
|
3237
|
-
const payloadGovIds = uniq(govAnchorIds(govPrep([input.tool_input.content ?? '', input.tool_input.new_string ?? ''].join('\n'))));
|
|
4129
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-222.8 — the per-format reading lives in anchor-ids, shared with the census and the move judgment
|
|
4130
|
+
const diskGovIds = uniq(anchorSpecIdsFor(relPath, onDiskContent));
|
|
4131
|
+
const payloadGovIds = uniq(anchorSpecIdsFor(relPath, [input.tool_input.content ?? '', input.tool_input.new_string ?? ''].join('\n')));
|
|
3238
4132
|
const governingIds = diskGovIds.length > 0 ? diskGovIds : payloadGovIds;
|
|
3239
4133
|
// The single "primary" id kept for message templates and phaseCheck's targetAspecId default: the
|
|
3240
4134
|
// first governing id, which is exactly what `m?.[1]` used to be for a single-anchor file.
|
|
@@ -3286,7 +4180,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
3286
4180
|
// @implements A-SPEC-133 — the override is authorized by a token covering the code write.
|
|
3287
4181
|
const codeWriteCovered = (0, risk_gate_1.approvalCovers)(weApproval, { kind: 'code-write', target: relPath }, nowTs);
|
|
3288
4182
|
if (staleTarget && !codeWriteCovered) {
|
|
3289
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${staleTarget} — re-approve with spec_approve, then proceed` };
|
|
4183
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'spec.not-approved', permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${staleTarget} — re-approve with spec_approve, then proceed` };
|
|
3290
4184
|
}
|
|
3291
4185
|
// @implements A-SPEC-152
|
|
3292
4186
|
// Role gate — BEFORE the spec gate on purpose: if this identity may not perform the action at all,
|
|
@@ -3305,7 +4199,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
3305
4199
|
// role-override approval lifts a role refusal. Interactively a code-write approval still lifts it (0.35.25).
|
|
3306
4200
|
const roleOverride = (0, risk_gate_1.approvalCovers)(weApproval, { kind: 'role-override', target: relPath }, nowTs);
|
|
3307
4201
|
if (roleIssue && !roleOverride && (roleRun || !codeWriteCovered)) {
|
|
3308
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: roleIssue };
|
|
4202
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'role.refused', permissionDecisionReason: roleIssue };
|
|
3309
4203
|
}
|
|
3310
4204
|
// @implements A-SPEC-134
|
|
3311
4205
|
// Constitution-debt gate: after the Stop gate gave up its block cap on an unresolved constitution,
|
|
@@ -3340,6 +4234,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
3340
4234
|
}
|
|
3341
4235
|
return {
|
|
3342
4236
|
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
4237
|
+
refusal: 'constitution.debt', // A-SPEC-245.24
|
|
3343
4238
|
permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] constitution-debt outstanding (${debt.join(', ')}) — resolve the constitution (a clean turn clears it) before writing new code, or supply a covering approval`
|
|
3344
4239
|
+ (hint || ' — could not persist the approval request; ask the operator to check the project approval queue storage'),
|
|
3345
4240
|
};
|
|
@@ -3349,7 +4244,49 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
3349
4244
|
// verdict, and its id flows into the refusal template (so the author sees the anchor that is
|
|
3350
4245
|
// actually unsatisfied, not merely the first one on the file). An empty set keeps the prior
|
|
3351
4246
|
// single call with an undefined target. Deterministic: governing-set order is document order.
|
|
3352
|
-
|
|
4247
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-222.4 — the exit from a retired anchor (AU1-b, owner decision 2026-10-25): an Edit whose only
|
|
4248
|
+
// change moves an outdated X to its sealed superseded_by Y on @implements lines is judged under Y, not X; every other
|
|
4249
|
+
// gate still runs. Without it the file refused every edit, the anchor move included (run-exec.ts line 28).
|
|
4250
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-222.6 — judged on the file: the edit applied to the disk text (absent, or not unique without
|
|
4251
|
+
// replace_all, is no result and no move), and Y must qualify as X's successor (sealed, lineage, coverage)
|
|
4252
|
+
const moveResult = (() => {
|
|
4253
|
+
if (input.tool_name !== 'Edit')
|
|
4254
|
+
return null;
|
|
4255
|
+
const o = input.tool_input.old_string;
|
|
4256
|
+
if (typeof o !== 'string' || o === '' || typeof input.tool_input.new_string !== 'string')
|
|
4257
|
+
return null;
|
|
4258
|
+
if (input.tool_input.replace_all !== true && onDiskContent.indexOf(o) !== onDiskContent.lastIndexOf(o))
|
|
4259
|
+
return null;
|
|
4260
|
+
const r = editedResult(onDiskContent, input.tool_input);
|
|
4261
|
+
return typeof r === 'string' ? r : null;
|
|
4262
|
+
})();
|
|
4263
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-222.8 — N2: a successor counts only as the ledger recorded it (a hand-written one moves nothing)
|
|
4264
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-222.9 — H1, H3, SD1 1/2: judged in succession-guard, on the trusted record the port reads
|
|
4265
|
+
const moveVerdict = require('../spec/succession-guard').movedAnchors({ before: onDiskContent, after: moveResult, governingIds, relPath }, { specs, resolveSpec: (id) => resolveSpec(id) ?? undefined,
|
|
4266
|
+
record: () => require('../governance/recorded-pairs').recordedPairsPort(projectRoot) });
|
|
4267
|
+
const movedAnchors = moveVerdict.moves;
|
|
4268
|
+
const movedTo = (id) => movedAnchors.find((m) => m.x === id)?.y ?? id;
|
|
4269
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-222.4 — an allowed anchor move is on the record (no person decided it; the conditions did), on
|
|
4270
|
+
// every allow path after the phase gate
|
|
4271
|
+
const recordMovedAnchors = () => {
|
|
4272
|
+
for (const mv of movedAnchors) {
|
|
4273
|
+
try {
|
|
4274
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-222.6 — F4: the successor digest and the result hash; autonomous (no person decided it),
|
|
4275
|
+
// directive none (none is needed: the conditions decide, with or without full autonomy). L2: once per result.
|
|
4276
|
+
const inputs = [relPath, mv.x, mv.y, `successor-digest:${mv.digest}`, `after-sha256:${mv.after}`, 'autonomous', 'directive:none'];
|
|
4277
|
+
const store = new ledger_store_1.FileLedgerStore(path.join(projectRoot, '.ax', 'ledger'));
|
|
4278
|
+
if (store.loadAll().some((e) => e.kind === 'anchor-moved' && JSON.stringify(e.inputs) === JSON.stringify(inputs)))
|
|
4279
|
+
continue;
|
|
4280
|
+
store.append({
|
|
4281
|
+
ts: nowTs, actor: 'holmes-kit', kind: 'anchor-moved', inputs,
|
|
4282
|
+
summary: `moved the anchor of ${relPath} from retired ${mv.x} to its sealed successor ${mv.y}`.slice(0, 200),
|
|
4283
|
+
rationale: 'autonomous anchor move: the edit changes only the @implements id, to the outdated spec\'s superseded_by (A-SPEC-222.4)',
|
|
4284
|
+
});
|
|
4285
|
+
}
|
|
4286
|
+
catch { /* the record is best effort; the gate already judged the edit */ }
|
|
4287
|
+
}
|
|
4288
|
+
};
|
|
4289
|
+
const phaseTargets = governingIds.length > 0 ? [...new Set(governingIds.map(movedTo))] : [undefined];
|
|
3353
4290
|
let failedTarget;
|
|
3354
4291
|
let res = (0, phase_1.phaseCheck)(action, { specs, targetAspecId: phaseTargets[0] });
|
|
3355
4292
|
for (const tid of phaseTargets) {
|
|
@@ -3372,8 +4309,10 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
3372
4309
|
const prescriptiveGuide = ` — Next Action (DO NOT write workaround scripts in /tmp): Step 1: Call 'spec_next({})' to verify slice state. Step 2: Call 'spec_approve({ id: "${targetSpecId}" })' to seal spec. Step 3: Ensure '// @implements ${targetSpecId}' is on line 1 of target file.`;
|
|
3373
4310
|
return {
|
|
3374
4311
|
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
4312
|
+
refusal: 'spec.not-approved', // A-SPEC-245.24 — the phase gate's refusal: no approved chain for the target
|
|
3375
4313
|
permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit Gate Refusal] ${res.remediation?.message} -> ${res.remediation?.next_action} (${res.remediation?.discipline})${prescriptiveGuide}`
|
|
3376
|
-
+ (lost ? `\n${governance_history_1.GOVERNANCE_LOST_HINT}` : '')
|
|
4314
|
+
+ (lost ? `\n${governance_history_1.GOVERNANCE_LOST_HINT}` : '')
|
|
4315
|
+
+ (moveVerdict.note ? `\n[Holmes-Kit] ${moveVerdict.note}` : ''), // A-SPEC-222.9 — the ignored record is named
|
|
3377
4316
|
};
|
|
3378
4317
|
}
|
|
3379
4318
|
// @implements A-SPEC-508.1
|
|
@@ -3436,7 +4375,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
3436
4375
|
if (afterSites.length > beforeSites.length && others.length > 0) {
|
|
3437
4376
|
const why = `[Holmes-Kit] the gate refused admitting ${relPath} to ${refused.join(', ')} within the last 2 hours; adding an anchor to ${others.join(', ')} instead is anchor self-selection — widen ${refused.join(', ')}'s Files to Touch (a spec amendment), or supply a covering approval`;
|
|
3438
4377
|
if (writeClassify.strict)
|
|
3439
|
-
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', permissionDecisionReason: why };
|
|
4378
|
+
return { permissionDecision: 'deny', refusal: 'scope.outside', permissionDecisionReason: why };
|
|
3440
4379
|
scopeWarnings = [scopeWarnings, why].filter(Boolean).join('\n');
|
|
3441
4380
|
}
|
|
3442
4381
|
}
|
|
@@ -3448,6 +4387,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
3448
4387
|
.map((f) => `${relPath} is anchored to ${f.id} but falls outside its 'Files to Touch' scope (${f.reason})`).join('; ');
|
|
3449
4388
|
return {
|
|
3450
4389
|
permissionDecision: 'deny',
|
|
4390
|
+
refusal: 'scope.outside', // A-SPEC-245.24
|
|
3451
4391
|
permissionDecisionReason: `[Holmes-Kit] ${failed} — extend that section first (spec edit is allowed), add it as a test under the anchored spec, or supply out-of-band approval`
|
|
3452
4392
|
+ (scopeWarnings ? `\n${scopeWarnings}` : ''),
|
|
3453
4393
|
};
|
|
@@ -3481,8 +4421,11 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
3481
4421
|
// vouching for itself.
|
|
3482
4422
|
declaredDigest: process.env.HOLMES_EVIDENCE?.trim() || null,
|
|
3483
4423
|
currentHead: evidenceHead,
|
|
4424
|
+
...(opts.advisory ? { advisory: opts.advisory } : {}),
|
|
3484
4425
|
});
|
|
3485
4426
|
if (evidenceDecision) {
|
|
4427
|
+
if (evidenceDecision.permissionDecision === 'allow')
|
|
4428
|
+
recordMovedAnchors();
|
|
3486
4429
|
// @implements A-SPEC-508.1 — an allow-with-reason from the evidence gate must not swallow
|
|
3487
4430
|
// the anchor-deletion warning: both ride the same reason field, newline-joined.
|
|
3488
4431
|
if (scopeWarnings && evidenceDecision.permissionDecision === 'allow') {
|
|
@@ -3491,6 +4434,7 @@ function evaluateHook(input, specsDir, opts) {
|
|
|
3491
4434
|
return evidenceDecision;
|
|
3492
4435
|
}
|
|
3493
4436
|
}
|
|
4437
|
+
recordMovedAnchors();
|
|
3494
4438
|
// @implements A-SPEC-508.1 — anchor-deletion warnings ride the allow (allow-with-reason, the
|
|
3495
4439
|
// same channel A-SPEC-278 uses): the write proceeds, but the RTM loss is on the record.
|
|
3496
4440
|
if (scopeWarnings)
|
|
@@ -3608,9 +4552,23 @@ if (require.main === module) {
|
|
|
3608
4552
|
const wired = wiredSpecsDir(process.argv, process.env);
|
|
3609
4553
|
return path.isAbsolute(wired) ? wired : path.join(hookProjectRoot, wired);
|
|
3610
4554
|
})();
|
|
4555
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.4 — held through every pass below, settled once after the last one
|
|
4556
|
+
const settlement = new approval_grants_1.GrantSettlement();
|
|
4557
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-333.2, A-SPEC-333.4 — the session reading these warnings; records wait for the final decision
|
|
4558
|
+
// below. Compression only where the compaction signal is observed (Claude Code); elsewhere only the ledger row.
|
|
4559
|
+
const rawFields = (rawHookInput !== null && typeof rawHookInput === 'object' ? rawHookInput : {});
|
|
4560
|
+
const advisoryHarness = (0, heartbeat_1.hookHarnessOf)(rawHookInput, process.env);
|
|
4561
|
+
const advisory = input.session_id
|
|
4562
|
+
? { session: input.session_id, ...(input.agent_id ? { agent: input.agent_id } : {}), pending: [],
|
|
4563
|
+
compress: advisoryHarness === 'claude', harness: advisoryHarness ?? '', // A-SPEC-333.9 — the ledger names it
|
|
4564
|
+
...(typeof rawFields.transcript_path === 'string' ? { transcriptPath: rawFields.transcript_path } : {}),
|
|
4565
|
+
...(typeof rawFields.tool_use_id === 'string' ? { toolUseId: rawFields.tool_use_id } : {}) }
|
|
4566
|
+
: undefined;
|
|
3611
4567
|
const judged = evaluateHook(input, specsDirWired, {
|
|
3612
4568
|
projectRoot: hookProjectRoot,
|
|
3613
4569
|
approval: readApprovalFromEnv(),
|
|
4570
|
+
settlement,
|
|
4571
|
+
...(advisory ? { advisory } : {}),
|
|
3614
4572
|
// Round 17: rm targets resolve from the directory the shell runs in (inside the project).
|
|
3615
4573
|
resolveRmSignals: (command) => resolveRmSignals(command, (0, write_target_2.shellBaseFor)(hookProjectRoot, input.tool_input.workdir, input.cwd), hookProjectRoot, specsDirWired),
|
|
3616
4574
|
resolveStagedStore: (command) => resolveStagedStore(command, hookProjectRoot, specsDirWired),
|
|
@@ -3631,9 +4589,13 @@ if (require.main === module) {
|
|
|
3631
4589
|
tool: input.tool_name, toolInput: input.tool_input })
|
|
3632
4590
|
: staged;
|
|
3633
4591
|
// @implements A-SPEC-778 — in a run, refusals are logged and a repeated code stops the run; elsewhere unchanged.
|
|
3634
|
-
const
|
|
4592
|
+
const settled = settleVerdict((hookRoot.anchored
|
|
3635
4593
|
? (0, run_refusals_1.applyRunRefusalStop)(roled, { projectRoot: hookProjectRoot, env: process.env, cwd: input.cwd, sessionId: input.session_id, tool: input.tool_name })
|
|
3636
|
-
: judged);
|
|
4594
|
+
: judged), settlement);
|
|
4595
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-333.4 — an allowed `git commit` in a Claude session names the files still warned (information only)
|
|
4596
|
+
const reminder = advisory?.compress && settled.permissionDecision === 'allow' && input.tool_name === 'Bash'
|
|
4597
|
+
&& (0, advisory_line_1.isGitCommit)(input.tool_input?.command ?? '') ? (0, advisory_line_1.commitReminder)(hookProjectRoot, advisory) : null;
|
|
4598
|
+
const out = reminder ? { ...settled, permissionDecisionReason: [settled.permissionDecisionReason, reminder].filter(Boolean).join('\n') } : settled;
|
|
3637
4599
|
io.out(JSON.stringify({ hookSpecificOutput: hookOutputFor(input.tool_name, out) }));
|
|
3638
4600
|
// N3 provenance: record the audit-critical decision classes on the tamper-evident chain —
|
|
3639
4601
|
// every DENY, and every ALLOW that was unlocked by an out-of-band approval. Fail-open: a
|
|
@@ -3658,16 +4620,21 @@ if (require.main === module) {
|
|
|
3658
4620
|
// recorded as approved under a token that had expired in 2000. Under a session key that made
|
|
3659
4621
|
// the whole log 'approved-action' and hid the real openings. Ask the counterfactual instead:
|
|
3660
4622
|
// would this same call have been denied with no approval in hand?
|
|
4623
|
+
// A-SPEC-333.2, A-SPEC-333.4 — invariant: this re-ask never carries `advisory`. It reads no warning store and adds
|
|
4624
|
+
// nothing to `advisory.pending`, so only what the decision above said can be recorded below.
|
|
3661
4625
|
const withoutApproval = out.permissionDecision === 'allow' && valid
|
|
3662
4626
|
? evaluateHook(input, specsDirWired, {
|
|
3663
4627
|
projectRoot: hookProjectRoot,
|
|
3664
4628
|
approval: undefined,
|
|
4629
|
+
settlement: approval_grants_1.GrantSettlement.counterfactual(), // A-SPEC-245.4 — a reading, not a decision: spends nothing
|
|
3665
4630
|
// A-SPEC-734 (round 17): the same base, project and spec directory as the decision it re-asks.
|
|
3666
4631
|
resolveRmSignals: (command) => resolveRmSignals(command, (0, write_target_2.shellBaseFor)(hookProjectRoot, input.tool_input.workdir, input.cwd), hookProjectRoot, specsDirWired),
|
|
3667
4632
|
resolveStagedStore: (command) => resolveStagedStore(command, hookProjectRoot, specsDirWired),
|
|
3668
4633
|
})
|
|
3669
4634
|
: undefined;
|
|
3670
|
-
|
|
4635
|
+
// A-SPEC-245.4 (f): a grant this decision spent unlocked the act too, and the line names that grant's actor
|
|
4636
|
+
const acting = out.permissionDecision === 'allow' ? auditApprovalFor(approval, withoutApproval?.permissionDecision === 'deny', settlement) : undefined;
|
|
4637
|
+
const unlocked = acting !== undefined;
|
|
3671
4638
|
if (out.permissionDecision === 'deny' || unlocked) {
|
|
3672
4639
|
const target = input.tool_input?.file_path
|
|
3673
4640
|
? (0, provenance_chain_1.redactTarget)('path', input.tool_input.file_path)
|
|
@@ -3675,7 +4642,7 @@ if (require.main === module) {
|
|
|
3675
4642
|
// @implements A-SPEC-148 — writes go to THIS replica's chain; the legacy file is read-only now.
|
|
3676
4643
|
new ledger_store_1.FileLedgerStore(path.join(hookProjectRoot, path.dirname(provenance_chain_1.PROVENANCE_FILE))).append({
|
|
3677
4644
|
ts: new Date().toISOString(),
|
|
3678
|
-
actor:
|
|
4645
|
+
actor: acting ? acting.actor : 'agent',
|
|
3679
4646
|
kind: out.permissionDecision === 'deny' ? 'gate-deny' : 'approved-action',
|
|
3680
4647
|
// REDACTED. Both fields used to carry the raw command; an audit of this repository's own
|
|
3681
4648
|
// ledger found 15 of 29 records leaking absolute home paths and 6 matching secret-ish
|
|
@@ -3689,18 +4656,24 @@ if (require.main === module) {
|
|
|
3689
4656
|
// @implements A-SPEC-133 — a master-key use becomes an audit line: the approval's
|
|
3690
4657
|
// narrowing (or its absence) travels with the record (r7-191: promised, never shipped).
|
|
3691
4658
|
inputs: [input.tool_name, target,
|
|
3692
|
-
...(
|
|
4659
|
+
...(acting ? [(0, provenance_chain_1.approvalMarkers)(acting)] : []), // one item, last position — the marker cannot split and self-contradict
|
|
3693
4660
|
].filter(Boolean),
|
|
3694
4661
|
// round-9: a deny inherited the actor/rationale/authorization of an ambient approval that
|
|
3695
4662
|
// did NOT cover it, so the audit line credited an authorizer who authorized nothing.
|
|
3696
|
-
rationale:
|
|
4663
|
+
rationale: acting ? acting.rationale : '',
|
|
3697
4664
|
// NEVER the raw token (review #1): a fingerprint identifies the credential without
|
|
3698
4665
|
// storing the replayable secret; invalid approval attempts record nothing of it.
|
|
3699
|
-
authorization:
|
|
4666
|
+
authorization: acting ? (0, provenance_chain_1.authorizationRef)(acting.actor, acting.token) : '',
|
|
3700
4667
|
});
|
|
3701
4668
|
}
|
|
3702
4669
|
}
|
|
3703
4670
|
catch { /* provenance must never break the gate */ }
|
|
4671
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-333.2, A-SPEC-333.4 — the last act before the return: recorded only now, and only what this
|
|
4672
|
+
// allow actually carried (a deny records nothing)
|
|
4673
|
+
try {
|
|
4674
|
+
(0, advisory_line_1.commitAdvisory)(hookProjectRoot, advisory, out);
|
|
4675
|
+
}
|
|
4676
|
+
catch { /* an unrecorded warning is said again */ }
|
|
3704
4677
|
if (out.permissionDecision === 'deny') {
|
|
3705
4678
|
// Belt-and-suspenders: Claude Code's exit-code-2 contract feeds STDERR back to the
|
|
3706
4679
|
// model as the block reason, while permissionDecisionReason in the stdout JSON is
|
|
@@ -3782,7 +4755,18 @@ if (require.main === module) {
|
|
|
3782
4755
|
process.exit(r.code);
|
|
3783
4756
|
};
|
|
3784
4757
|
if (!isMainThread) {
|
|
3785
|
-
|
|
4758
|
+
// @implements A-SPEC-245.9 (1b-2) — a final allow's spends cross to the main thread; the worker waits for its answer
|
|
4759
|
+
const { MessageChannel, receiveMessageOnPort } = require('node:worker_threads');
|
|
4760
|
+
mainThreadSettler = (p) => {
|
|
4761
|
+
const flag = new Int32Array(new SharedArrayBuffer(4));
|
|
4762
|
+
const { port1, port2 } = new MessageChannel();
|
|
4763
|
+
parentPort.postMessage({ type: 'settle', pending: p, flag, port: port2 }, [port2]);
|
|
4764
|
+
Atomics.wait(flag, 0, 0, HOOK_DEADLINE_MS());
|
|
4765
|
+
const answer = receiveMessageOnPort(port1)?.message;
|
|
4766
|
+
port1.close();
|
|
4767
|
+
return answer ?? { outcome: 'refused', committed: [], refusal: 'the main thread did not answer the spend in time — nothing was done' };
|
|
4768
|
+
};
|
|
4769
|
+
parentPort.postMessage({ type: 'result', result: collect(workerData.buf) });
|
|
3786
4770
|
}
|
|
3787
4771
|
else {
|
|
3788
4772
|
let buf = '';
|
|
@@ -3810,7 +4794,29 @@ if (require.main === module) {
|
|
|
3810
4794
|
void worker.terminate();
|
|
3811
4795
|
done(gateErrorOutcome(`the gate could not reach a verdict within ${Math.round(deadline / 1000)} s — a command or content too complex to judge in time`));
|
|
3812
4796
|
}, deadline);
|
|
3813
|
-
worker.
|
|
4797
|
+
worker.on('message', (m) => {
|
|
4798
|
+
if (m.type === 'result') {
|
|
4799
|
+
done(m.result);
|
|
4800
|
+
return;
|
|
4801
|
+
}
|
|
4802
|
+
// A-SPEC-245.9 (1b-2): the spend runs here, on the main thread; a deadline that ends the worker after it
|
|
4803
|
+
// answers the gate-error deny, and an approval then stays spent with nothing done (fail-closed)
|
|
4804
|
+
let answer;
|
|
4805
|
+
if (settled)
|
|
4806
|
+
answer = { outcome: 'refused', committed: [], refusal: 'the gate already answered — nothing was spent' };
|
|
4807
|
+
else {
|
|
4808
|
+
try {
|
|
4809
|
+
answer = settleOnMainThread(m.pending);
|
|
4810
|
+
}
|
|
4811
|
+
catch (e) {
|
|
4812
|
+
answer = { outcome: 'refused', committed: [], refusal: `the spend failed: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}` };
|
|
4813
|
+
}
|
|
4814
|
+
}
|
|
4815
|
+
m.port.postMessage(answer);
|
|
4816
|
+
m.port.close();
|
|
4817
|
+
Atomics.store(m.flag, 0, 1);
|
|
4818
|
+
Atomics.notify(m.flag, 0);
|
|
4819
|
+
});
|
|
3814
4820
|
worker.once('error', (e) => done(gateErrorOutcome(`the gate stopped without a verdict: ${e.message}`)));
|
|
3815
4821
|
worker.once('exit', (code) => { if (!settled)
|
|
3816
4822
|
done(gateErrorOutcome(`the gate stopped without a verdict (exit ${code})`)); });
|