@holmes-lab/holmes-kit 0.35.3 โ†’ 0.35.4

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package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -5,6 +5,21 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
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  The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
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  and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
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  <!-- @implements A-SPEC-209 -->
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+ ## [0.35.4] - 2026-10-05
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+
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+ ### Security
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+
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+ - **Under autonomous approval the host-gated continuation is closed** (A-SPEC-718.3). On a client that does not
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+ advertise the MCP form dialog, `spec_approve` hands back an `approvalIntent` that the caller passes to
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+ `approval_commit` before retrying. The only person in that loop is the host's own tool confirmation, which the
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+ server cannot see; with a host allow rule, auto mode or bypass mode there is none, and the agent could commit its
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+ own intent and seal a spec the autonomy grader reserves for a person (measured on 0.35.3 for clients named codex,
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+ antigravity and claude-code). While autonomous approval is on, the continuation is now neither offered nor
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+ accepted: the request goes to the approval queue. With autonomous approval off nothing changes.
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+ Not changed, and still the operator's choice: with autonomy off, a host that confirms tools automatically lets the
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+ agent complete the continuation. Such seals are recorded under the actor `host-gated:<harness>`; search the
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+ provenance ledger for it to audit them.
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+
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  ## [0.35.3] - 2026-10-05
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  ### Security
package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ Measured at `173b99650442` (specs `sha256:215f84d4e9f4`) โ€” reproduce with `hol
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  ### ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Currently Supported Features (Production Features)
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  - **The protected store is recognised however a shell command spells it** *(new in 0.35.2 โ€” security fix, upgrade recommended)*: through 0.35.1 a path into `.ax/specs`, `.ax/ledger`, `.ax/approvals` or `.ax/state` written directly after a shell expansion, a variable, or a character the shell removes at run time was not seen as protected, so a removal, move or overwrite of governance state could pass the gate. The store spelling now counts wherever it appears in a command, and an output redirect to a computed target is not a read. Reads still pass. A directory that merely ends in `.ax` and has a child named like the store's is judged as the store. Limit: a path assembled so the spelling never appears in the command text is outside this rule.
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+ - **No in-session shortcut around a person while autonomy is on** *(new in 0.35.4 โ€” security fix, upgrade recommended)*: on a client without the MCP form dialog, the `approval_commit` continuation is no longer offered or accepted while autonomous approval is on โ€” the request goes to the approval queue. Its only human check is the host's own tool confirmation, which an allow rule or auto mode removes. With autonomy off it works as before; seals made through it are recorded as `host-gated:<harness>`.
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  - **An unanswered approval is held, never approved** *(new in 0.35.3 โ€” security fix, upgrade recommended)*: with autonomous approval on, an in-session approval dialog that ran out of time used to be recorded as an approval (actor `autonomous-timeout:<harness>`) โ€” for exactly the seals and critical-finding resolutions autonomy reserves for a person. An unanswered dialog now returns the request to the approval queue in every mode. To audit earlier sessions, search the provenance ledger for `autonomous-timeout`.
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  - **Approvals that fit how people work** *(new in 0.35.2)*: an approval for a request that carries the approved content's digest (a spec seal) no longer expires after 30 minutes โ€” it stays valid until used, revoked, or the content changes (`--ttl` still bounds it; requests without a digest keep the default). With autonomous approval on, a gate change declared `gate-behavior: tightens โ€” โ€ฆ` or `gate-behavior: wording โ€” โ€ฆ` is sealed without the operator; any other gate change still asks, and a seal handed to the operator says which rule handed it over. On a machine with a runtime registry the in-session approval dialog is reachable again, and `init`/`upgrade` no longer replace wiring the registry owns. Not yet changed: the in-session dialog's own time limit.
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  - **Separate development and consumer runtimes** *(new in 0.35.0)*: `runtime-binding setup` explicitly registers a checkout and its built package in an operator-owned registry. Normal Claude, Codex and Antigravity launches select that development package for the registered workspace; other workspaces select the configured release. Missing or conflicting bindings refuse with diagnosis instead of silently switching builds. Setup previews exact changes and requires authority for a changed installation; a validated unchanged plan needs no new grant. Normal migration preserves disabled hooks and native trust. `--activate-hooks` explicitly restores selected Holmes entries, while native trust and global disable switches still require native review. See [development runtime setup and recovery](docs/install-guide.md#development-and-consumer-runtime-binding) for the workflow and current approval limitation. Configuration readiness does not prove live three-harness enforcement.
@@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ Measured at `173b99650442` (specs `sha256:215f84d4e9f4`) โ€” reproduce with `hol
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  - ๐Ÿšฆ **The gate only ever denies** *(changed in 0.31.0)*: an action Holmes does not deny is left to your harness's own permission flow โ€” Claude Code and Codex get no permission decision, Antigravity gets `ask` (or `allow` for a read inside the workspace that git does not ignore). Earlier versions answered `allow`, which Claude Code treats as "bypassing permission prompt", so anything the shell model missed ran unconfirmed. In Claude Code's default mode you now see its confirmations again, as without Holmes.
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  - ๐Ÿช **The Codex gate loads again on codex-cli 0.155** *(new in 0.31.0)*: plugin hooks were removed upstream, so `init --agent codex` wires the Holmes PreToolUse and Stop kernels into the user-level `$CODEX_HOME/hooks.json`, keeps every hook it does not own, and `--remove` takes away only its own groups. Codex runs a user hook only after you trust it once with `/hooks`; Holmes never forges that trust, and `doctor` says so instead of claiming enforcement.
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  - ๐Ÿงญ **The shell gate judges by identity, from where the command really runs** *(new in 0.31.0)*: wiring files, the whole `.ax` store and the files inside it are protected as shell WORDS resolved against each segment's real base โ€” a `cd` moves the base only when it is certain to have run, an uncertain or expanded one (`cd .a?`, a link made in the same command, `cd "$X"`) leaves it unknown and the command is judged at every base it could have produced, and the base starts at the harness's own working directory (the payload `cwd`, a Codex `workdir`), not the project root. Every evaluation runs under a fail-closed deadline wall. The Codex oracle asks the installed Codex whether your config loads โ€” locally, over copies, with plugins and every proxy closed, `sqlite_home`/`analytics`/`otel` isolated from the user copy alone, and a verdict it could not obtain labelled `approximate`. Source walkers skip nested git working trees only when git says the tree is not the project's, read regular files only, and ask git once per scan; every reader on a gate path is linear in its input.
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- - ๐ŸชŸ **Approval stays inside the agent session** *(new in 0.29.0)*: Claude Code, Codex, and Antigravity use the same capability-negotiated route. Holmes opens a direct MCP form only when that live client advertises `elicitation.form`; otherwise it exposes one sensitive, challenge-bound `approval_commit` continuation in the same agent session. The host may render its native tool confirmation, but its arrival is recorded as `host-gated`, never claimed as proof that a human answered. The server issues an opaque, memory-only intent bound to the action kind, target, subject digest, workspace and MCP run; only one matching retry can consume it. No `config.toml` value or persisted `HOLMES_APPROVAL` is authority. The `holmes-kit approve` TUI is recovery-only when a session cannot present approval. Under autonomous mode, eligible low-risk work stays automatic and an ordinary unclassified HITL request queues without interrupting the agent; high-risk or irreversible work is shown in the session and waits for an answer. Timeout, cancel, deny, malformed and unavailable outcomes never approve *(timeout: since 0.35.3)*.
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+ - ๐ŸชŸ **Approval stays inside the agent session** *(new in 0.29.0)*: Claude Code, Codex, and Antigravity use the same capability-negotiated route. Holmes opens a direct MCP form only when that live client advertises `elicitation.form`; otherwise it exposes one sensitive, challenge-bound `approval_commit` continuation in the same agent session *(not while autonomous approval is on, since 0.35.4 โ€” the request is queued instead)*. The host may render its native tool confirmation, but its arrival is recorded as `host-gated`, never claimed as proof that a human answered. The server issues an opaque, memory-only intent bound to the action kind, target, subject digest, workspace and MCP run; only one matching retry can consume it. No `config.toml` value or persisted `HOLMES_APPROVAL` is authority. The `holmes-kit approve` TUI is recovery-only when a session cannot present approval. Under autonomous mode, eligible low-risk work stays automatic and an ordinary unclassified HITL request queues without interrupting the agent; high-risk or irreversible work is shown in the session and waits for an answer. Timeout, cancel, deny, malformed and unavailable outcomes never approve *(timeout: since 0.35.3)*.
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  - ๐Ÿงพ **A new prompt is checked against governed intent before it becomes a new spec** *(new in 0.29.0)*: `requirement_triage` reads the approved REQ/H-SPEC/A-SPEC/T-SPEC lineage, a receipt-bound current RTM graph, source and requirement-document semantic coverage, code anchors, and exact-HEAD execution evidence before recommending `fulfilled`, `existing-change`, `new`, or `ambiguous`. BM25 is always present; a verified local BGE-M3 cache and explicit Gemini opt-in add candidates and also enter the ranking score, so when lexical evidence is weak or tied a semantic match can decide which lineage leads โ€” every such answer shows its semantic coverage, and a run that used no semantic score says `lexicalOnly: true`. A cold, stale, unreadable, failed, partial, or absent lane remains visible as ambiguity; a workspace with no semantic tier, or with transfer switched off by `HOLMES_NO_SEMANTIC_WARM`, runs **lexical-only** โ€” it can still author a new REQ, and the answer and its evidence say `lexicalOnly: true` (set it in the environment of both your harness โ€” its hooks spawn the background refresh โ€” and the Holmes MCP server; a refresh recorded as suppressed also keeps triage from embedding. The switch stops automatic transfer: the background refresh embeds neither source nor requirement documents, and `requirement_triage` does not embed the prompt; tools you invoke explicitly under an opted-in cloud tier โ€” `maintenance_analyze`, `issue_localize`, `rtm_reindex` โ€” still embed their query or index as before). The detached refresh worker warms both versioned semantic populations under existing cloud-consent rules; a persisted v2 artifact binds prompt, workspace, HEAD, and receipt generation. New REQ creation โ€” through `spec_create` or `spec_slice_init` โ€” verifies that evidence at one shared MCP boundary, so no supported harness or tool can bypass it.
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  - ๐Ÿงญ **One governed operating contract survives every harness** *(new in 0.28.0)*: the common managed block in `AGENTS.md` carries the same No Spec, No Code rules to Claude Code, Codex CLI, and Antigravity while leaving the repository's own rules outside the block intact. `holmes-kit guidance check` names a stale or locally conflicted managed block, `guidance refresh` first plans the change and then replaces only the Holmes-owned region, and `doctor` runs the same check. An installer or upgrader cannot silently discard local guidance.
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  - ๐Ÿงท **A worktree can prove which workspace the MCP server serves before an edit** *(new in 0.28.0)*: `workspace_preflight` returns the bound root/store identity and reports a foreign caller as a mismatch without registering, rebinding, or writing anything. `holmes-kit doctor --agent claude|codex|antigravity` checks each harness's local wiring prerequisites and states that preparation is not evidence of live hook enforcement. This is paired with a packaged Superpowers compatibility playbook that preserves Holmes specifications, RED/GREEN evidence, review closure, and finish/reconciliation requirements through the corresponding Superpowers workflow. Fixture and subprocess coverage preserve neighboring configuration and foreign-root isolation; live linked-worktree and paid-harness acceptance remain explicitly unverified until observed.
package/dist/.build-id CHANGED
@@ -1 +1 @@
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- 39b711d0-muupj0n0
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+ 3c807953-muurfu01
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {
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  Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
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  exports.createSpecApprovalHandlers = createSpecApprovalHandlers;
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  exports.readProjectFile = readProjectFile;
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- // @implements A-SPEC-718.1, A-SPEC-718.2, A-SPEC-718, A-SPEC-551.1, A-SPEC-551.2, A-SPEC-627.1, A-SPEC-622, A-SPEC-100.2, A-SPEC-128, A-SPEC-132, A-SPEC-133, A-SPEC-151, A-SPEC-188, A-SPEC-189, A-SPEC-244, A-SPEC-245, A-SPEC-729
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+ // @implements A-SPEC-718.3, A-SPEC-718.1, A-SPEC-718.2, A-SPEC-718, A-SPEC-551.1, A-SPEC-551.2, A-SPEC-627.1, A-SPEC-622, A-SPEC-100.2, A-SPEC-128, A-SPEC-132, A-SPEC-133, A-SPEC-151, A-SPEC-188, A-SPEC-189, A-SPEC-244, A-SPEC-245, A-SPEC-729
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  // @implements A-SPEC-631, A-SPEC-733
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  const fs = __importStar(require("node:fs"));
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  const compat_impact_1 = require("../../spec/compat-impact");
@@ -134,7 +134,22 @@ function createSpecApprovalHandlers(context) {
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  const targetSubject = (0, spec_digest_1.specDigest)(target.spec);
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  // A host-gated commit is a continuation of this exact original action. It is checked
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  // before presentation and is memory-only, so a bare retry never carries authority.
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- const hostApproval = bindingOk() ? context.consumeHostApproval({ kind: action.kind, target: action.target, subject: targetSubject, root: a.root }) : undefined;
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+ // @implements A-SPEC-553.1 โ€” autonomy is the out-of-band env switch OR a valid, non-expired
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+ // session envelope marker under this project's `.ax/state/` (which an agent cannot write).
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+ // @implements A-SPEC-732 (round 2) โ€” at the PROJECT root: a raw root under .ax/specs let a planted
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+ // marker switch autonomy on.
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+ const autonomyRoot = (() => { try {
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+ return context.projectRootOf(a.root ?? store.specsRoot);
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+ }
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+ catch {
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+ return undefined;
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+ } })();
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+ const autonomyOn = (0, autonomy_1.autonomousApprovalEnabled)(process.env, autonomyRoot, new Date().toISOString());
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+ // @implements A-SPEC-718.3 โ€” the continuation's only person is the host's own tool confirmation, which
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+ // the server cannot see and an allow rule or auto mode removes. Under autonomous approval โ€” the posture
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+ // in which nobody is at the keyboard โ€” it is neither spent here nor offered below (measured: the caller
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+ // committed its own intent and sealed an operator-graded spec).
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+ const hostApproval = !autonomyOn && bindingOk() ? context.consumeHostApproval({ kind: action.kind, target: action.target, subject: targetSubject, root: a.root }) : undefined;
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  if (hostApproval) {
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  approveResolved = { approval: hostApproval, source: 'elicitation' };
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  decidedSubject = targetSubject;
@@ -150,17 +165,6 @@ function createSpecApprovalHandlers(context) {
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  // A-SPEC-532.2). With autonomy off, every HITL spec uses the established elicitor path.
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  // With autonomy on, A-SPEC-718 preserves that UI only for known high-risk/architecture
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  // exceptions; an unclassified upstream request is intentionally queued instead.
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- // @implements A-SPEC-553.1 โ€” autonomy is the out-of-band env switch OR a valid, non-expired
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- // session envelope marker under this project's `.ax/state/` (which an agent cannot write).
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- // @implements A-SPEC-732 (round 2) โ€” at the PROJECT root: a raw root under .ax/specs let a planted
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- // marker switch autonomy on.
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- const autonomyRoot = (() => { try {
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- return context.projectRootOf(a.root ?? store.specsRoot);
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- }
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- catch {
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- return undefined;
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- } })();
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- const autonomyOn = (0, autonomy_1.autonomousApprovalEnabled)(process.env, autonomyRoot, new Date().toISOString());
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  // @implements A-SPEC-587 โ€” an upstream REQ/H-SPEC is graded by the A-SPECs beneath it, so
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  // the store is consulted for its descendants (only then: the list is a cost the auto-grade
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  // A-SPEC/T-SPEC path does not pay). Unknown scope (none yet) keeps the human answer.
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  // decision in any mode: the expiry is reported and the request stays in the queue.
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  elicitExpiredMs = out.waitedMs;
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  }
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- else if (out.kind === 'silent' && context.approvalAdapter().kind === 'host-gated-tool' && bindingOk()) {
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+ else if (out.kind === 'silent' && !autonomyOn && context.approvalAdapter().kind === 'host-gated-tool' && bindingOk()) {
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  // The adapter's sensitive `approval_commit` invocation is rendered in the same agent
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  // session. Its complete immutable payload is what the host shows and what the server
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  // checks before a retry can consume it; it is never a config/env authorization.
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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  {
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  "//": "@implements A-SPEC-209",
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  "name": "@holmes-lab/holmes-kit",
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- "version": "0.35.3",
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+ "version": "0.35.4",
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  "description": "Holmes-Kit โ€” deterministic Agentic Software Engineering (ASE) harness with causal traceability (spec chain + D-CPG + RTM + phase guardrail)",
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  "main": "dist/holmes/mcp/server.js",
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  "types": "dist/holmes/mcp/server.d.ts",