@holdpoint/types 0.1.0-alpha.1 → 0.1.0-alpha.11

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,40 @@
-/** Lifecycle hook that fires the check. Currently only "before_done". */
-type HookEvent = "before_done";
+/** npm package names recognised as first-party / well-known MCP servers. */
+declare const SECURITY_SCAN_PACKAGES: string[];
+/**
+ * Build the injected security-scan script body. The returned string defines
+ * `formatSecurityScan(root)` (plus its helpers) which returns a banner string or
+ * `null` when nothing noteworthy is found.
+ */
+declare function buildSecurityScanScript(): string;
+
+/**
+ * Lifecycle hook a check/action attaches to. `before_done` is the completion
+ * gate (default). The others let checks seed context or run earlier in the loop:
+ * - `session_start`  — a fresh session or resume
+ * - `message_submit` — every user prompt
+ * - `before_tool`    — immediately before a tool call (can block it)
+ * - `after_tool`     — immediately after a tool call (advisory)
+ * - `session_end`    — the session is ending (advisory)
+ * - `before_done`    — the completion gate; blocks finishing on failure
+ *
+ * Engine support varies; engines honor what they can and skip the rest.
+ */
+type HookEvent = "session_start" | "message_submit" | "before_tool" | "after_tool" | "session_end" | "before_done";
+/** Ordered list of all hook events, earliest-to-latest in the agent loop. */
+declare const HOOK_EVENTS: HookEvent[];
+/**
+ * Context-seeding behavior: inject text, file contents, and/or the current
+ * datetime as agent context at the check's hook point. An alternative to
+ * `cmd` (command) and `prompt` (agent instruction).
+ */
+interface InjectSpec {
+    /** Literal text injected as agent context. */
+    text?: string;
+    /** Repo-relative files whose contents are injected as context. */
+    files?: string[];
+    /** Inject the current date and time. */
+    datetime?: boolean;
+}
 /** Named file-scope filter. Custom regexes are plain strings not in this union. */
 type WhenScope = "frontend" | "backend" | "socket" | "visual" | "python" | "go" | "rust" | "java" | "ruby" | "database" | "prisma" | "testing" | "infra" | "ci" | "docs" | "structural";
 type ConditionOperator = "file_exists" | "file_contains" | "env_var_set" | "shell_returns_0";
@@ -26,9 +61,16 @@ interface CheckDef {
     cmd?: string;
     /** Structured prompt/instruction the agent must read and act on before finishing */
     prompt?: string;
+    /** Context-seeding behavior — inject text/files/datetime at the hook point */
+    inject?: InjectSpec;
     /** Reference to a ConditionDef id */
     conditionId?: string;
 }
+/** The effective hook of a check (`before_done` when unset). */
+declare function checkHook(check: CheckDef): HookEvent;
+/** A check's behavior kind, derived from which behavior field is set. */
+type CheckBehavior = "cmd" | "prompt" | "inject";
+declare function checkBehavior(check: CheckDef): CheckBehavior;
 interface HoldpointContext {
     guides: Record<string, string>;
 }
@@ -50,6 +92,34 @@ interface HoldpointConfig {
      * Paths are repo-root-relative. Useful for injecting MASTER_PROMPT.md, AGENT_CONTEXT.md, etc.
      */
     session_context_files?: string[];
+    /**
+     * Inject the current date and time into every prompt submission as `additionalContext`.
+     * Helps models avoid knowledge-cutoff confusion. Defaults to `true`; set to `false` to opt out.
+     */
+    inject_datetime?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Run the session-start security scan (unverified MCP servers + `audit`
+     * high/critical advisories) and inject its banner as session context.
+     * Defaults to `true`; set to `false` to skip the scan entirely — including the
+     * dependency-audit subprocess, which otherwise runs on session start.
+     */
+    security_scan?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Per-engine overrides. Values here win over engine defaults — useful when the
+     * project IS the holdpoint repo and should invoke the local CLI instead of npx.
+     */
+    engines?: {
+        claude?: {
+            stop_command?: string;
+            live_command?: string;
+        };
+        codex?: {
+            stop_command?: string;
+        };
+        copilot?: {
+            check_command?: string;
+        };
+    };
 }
 type CheckStatus = "pass" | "fail" | "skip" | "pending";
 interface CheckResult {
@@ -70,21 +140,41 @@ interface ValidationResult {
     valid: boolean;
     errors: ValidationError[];
 }
-type AgentType = "copilot" | "claude" | "cursor" | "unknown";
-type StackType = "typescript" | "python" | "go" | "nextjs" | "fullstack" | "unknown";
-type NodeKind = "trigger" | "filter" | "task" | "prompt" | "condition";
-interface CanvasNodeData {
-    [key: string]: unknown;
-    kind: NodeKind;
+type AgentType = "copilot" | "claude" | "cursor" | "codex" | "unknown";
+/** Result of a single check within a run (cmd or prompt). */
+interface CheckRunResult {
+    id: string;
     label: string;
-    /** Lifecycle hook on the trigger node */
-    on?: HookEvent;
-    /** File filter on the trigger node */
-    when?: string;
-    cmd?: string;
-    prompt?: string;
-    condition?: ConditionDef;
-    conditionId?: string;
+    /** "cmd" for automated checks, "prompt" for manual agent checks */
+    kind: "cmd" | "prompt";
+    /** "pass" | "fail" | "skip" for cmd checks; "shown" for prompt checks displayed to agent */
+    status: "pass" | "fail" | "skip" | "shown";
+    output?: string;
+    exitCode?: number;
+    skipReason?: string;
+}
+/** A single holdpoint check run recorded after `holdpoint check` completes. */
+interface CheckRun {
+    /** Full HEAD commit SHA, or null if not in a git repo / no commits. */
+    sha: string | null;
+    /** First 8 chars of sha, or null. */
+    shortSha: string | null;
+    /** ISO 8601 timestamp. */
+    timestamp: string;
+    /** Changed files used for trigger matching. Empty array means "all checks ran". */
+    files: string[];
+    results: CheckRunResult[];
+    summary: {
+        passed: number;
+        failed: number;
+        skipped: number;
+        shown: number;
+    };
+}
+/** Contents of `.holdpoint/check-reports.json` — list of recent check runs. */
+interface CheckReports {
+    /** Runs ordered newest-first. Capped at 50 entries. */
+    runs: CheckRun[];
 }
 
-export type { AgentType, CanvasNodeData, CheckDef, CheckResult, CheckStatus, ConditionDef, ConditionOperator, HoldpointConfig, HoldpointContext, HookEvent, NodeKind, StackType, ValidationError, ValidationResult, WhenScope };
+export { type AgentType, type CheckBehavior, type CheckDef, type CheckReports, type CheckResult, type CheckRun, type CheckRunResult, type CheckStatus, type ConditionDef, type ConditionOperator, HOOK_EVENTS, type HoldpointConfig, type HoldpointContext, type HookEvent, type InjectSpec, SECURITY_SCAN_PACKAGES, type ValidationError, type ValidationResult, type WhenScope, buildSecurityScanScript, checkBehavior, checkHook };

package/dist/index.js

@@ -1 +1,311 @@
+// src/scan.ts
+var SECURITY_SCAN_PACKAGES = [
+  "@anthropic-ai/mcp-server-brave-search",
+  "@anthropic-ai/mcp-server-fetch",
+  "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem",
+  "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github",
+  "@modelcontextprotocol/server-gitlab",
+  "@modelcontextprotocol/server-google-maps",
+  "@modelcontextprotocol/server-postgres",
+  "@modelcontextprotocol/server-slack",
+  "@modelcontextprotocol/server-memory",
+  "@modelcontextprotocol/server-puppeteer",
+  "@modelcontextprotocol/server-sequential-thinking",
+  "@modelcontextprotocol/server-everything"
+];
+function buildSecurityScanScript() {
+  return `
+// Generated from @holdpoint/types buildSecurityScanScript \u2014 do not edit by hand.
+const SECURITY_SCAN_VERIFIED = new Set(${JSON.stringify(SECURITY_SCAN_PACKAGES)});
+const SECURITY_SCAN_SEVERITIES = new Set(["high", "critical"]);
+function securityScanReadJson(path) {
+  try { return JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, "utf8")); } catch { return undefined; }
+}
+function securityScanStringArray(value) {
+  return Array.isArray(value) ? value.filter((entry) => typeof entry === "string") : [];
+}
+function securityScanPackageName(value) {
+  const normalized = String(value || "").replace(/\\\\/g, "/");
+  const idx = normalized.lastIndexOf("node_modules/");
+  if (idx >= 0) {
+    const parts = normalized.slice(idx + "node_modules/".length).split("/").filter(Boolean);
+    if (parts[0] && parts[0].startsWith("@") && parts[1]) return parts[0] + "/" + parts[1];
+    return parts[0];
+  }
+  if (normalized.startsWith("@")) {
+    const parts = normalized.split("/");
+    return parts[0] && parts[1] ? parts[0] + "/" + parts[1] : undefined;
+  }
+  if (!normalized.includes("/") && /^[a-z0-9@._-]+$/i.test(normalized)) return normalized;
+  return undefined;
+}
+function securityScanMcpEntries(config) {
+  if (!config || typeof config !== "object") return [];
+  const servers = config.mcpServers || config.servers;
+  if (!servers || typeof servers !== "object" || Array.isArray(servers)) return [];
+  return Object.entries(servers).map(([key, raw]) => {
+    const server = raw && typeof raw === "object" && !Array.isArray(raw) ? raw : {};
+    return {
+      key,
+      name: typeof server.name === "string" ? server.name : undefined,
+      command: typeof server.command === "string" ? server.command : undefined,
+      args: securityScanStringArray(server.args),
+    };
+  });
+}
+// Strip a leading version/dist-tag from a package spec, leaving the bare name.
+// "@scope/name@1.2.3" -> "@scope/name"; "pkg@latest" -> "pkg". Leaves paths/urls alone.
+function securityScanStripVersion(spec) {
+  const s = String(spec || "");
+  if (!s) return s;
+  if (s.startsWith("@")) {
+    // Scoped: keep through the "@scope/name" segment, then cut at a later "@".
+    const slash = s.indexOf("/");
+    if (slash < 0) return s;
+    const rest = s.slice(slash + 1);
+    const at = rest.indexOf("@");
+    return at >= 0 ? s.slice(0, slash + 1 + at) : s;
+  }
+  const at = s.indexOf("@");
+  return at > 0 ? s.slice(0, at) : s;
+}
+// Pick the first non-flag argument from args, skipping anything starting with "-".
+function securityScanFirstNonFlag(args, startIndex) {
+  for (let i = startIndex || 0; i < args.length; i++) {
+    const a = args[i];
+    if (typeof a === "string" && a && !a.startsWith("-")) return a;
+  }
+  return undefined;
+}
+// Derive the single package that will actually execute, from command + args ONLY.
+// Returns { pkg, checkable } where checkable indicates the pkg is an npm name we
+// can look up in the verified registry. NEVER consults entry.name or unrelated args.
+function securityScanExecutedPackage(entry) {
+  const command = entry.command;
+  const args = entry.args || [];
+  if (!command) return { pkg: undefined, checkable: false };
+  const base = securityScanPackageName(command);
+  if (command === "npx" || command === "bunx") {
+    const target = securityScanFirstNonFlag(args, 0);
+    if (!target) return { pkg: undefined, checkable: false };
+    return { pkg: securityScanStripVersion(target), checkable: true };
+  }
+  if ((command === "pnpm" || command === "yarn") && args[0] === "dlx") {
+    const target = securityScanFirstNonFlag(args, 1);
+    if (!target) return { pkg: undefined, checkable: false };
+    return { pkg: securityScanStripVersion(target), checkable: true };
+  }
+  if (command === "uvx") {
+    // Python/uv package \u2014 not resolvable to an npm name.
+    const target = securityScanFirstNonFlag(args, 0);
+    return { pkg: target ? securityScanStripVersion(target) : undefined, checkable: false };
+  }
+  if (command === "node" || base === "node") {
+    const script = securityScanFirstNonFlag(args, 0);
+    const pkg = script ? securityScanPackageName(script) : undefined;
+    return pkg ? { pkg, checkable: true } : { pkg: undefined, checkable: false };
+  }
+  // Command is itself a path / binary.
+  return base ? { pkg: base, checkable: true } : { pkg: undefined, checkable: false };
+}
+function securityScanMcp(root) {
+  const results = [];
+  for (const file of [join(root, ".mcp.json"), join(root, ".claude/mcp.json")]) {
+    if (!existsSync(file)) continue;
+    for (const entry of securityScanMcpEntries(securityScanReadJson(file))) {
+      const executed = securityScanExecutedPackage(entry);
+      const verified = executed.checkable && executed.pkg ? SECURITY_SCAN_VERIFIED.has(executed.pkg) : false;
+      results.push({ server: entry.name || entry.key, verified, checkable: executed.checkable });
+    }
+  }
+  return results;
+}
+// Returns { pm, cmd } where pm is the display label and cmd is the full audit
+// command string, or null when no lockfile is present.
+function securityScanPackageManager(root) {
+  if (existsSync(join(root, "pnpm-lock.yaml"))) return { pm: "pnpm", cmd: "pnpm audit --json" };
+  if (existsSync(join(root, "yarn.lock"))) {
+    // Yarn Berry (v2+) has no "yarn audit --json"; it uses "yarn npm audit".
+    let berry = existsSync(join(root, ".yarnrc.yml"));
+    if (!berry) {
+      const pkg = securityScanReadJson(join(root, "package.json"));
+      const pm = pkg && typeof pkg.packageManager === "string" ? pkg.packageManager : "";
+      const m = /^yarn@(\\d+)/.exec(pm);
+      if (m && Number(m[1]) >= 2) berry = true;
+    }
+    return berry
+      ? { pm: "yarn", cmd: "yarn npm audit --all --json" }
+      : { pm: "yarn", cmd: "yarn audit --json" };
+  }
+  if (existsSync(join(root, "package-lock.json")) || existsSync(join(root, "npm-shrinkwrap.json"))) {
+    return { pm: "npm", cmd: "npm audit --json" };
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+function securityScanFirstTitle(value) {
+  if (typeof value === "string") return value;
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+    for (const entry of value) {
+      const title = securityScanFirstTitle(entry);
+      if (title) return title;
+    }
+  }
+  if (value && typeof value === "object" && typeof value.title === "string") return value.title;
+  return undefined;
+}
+// #7: For npm v7+ transitive vulns, "via" is an array of STRINGS naming parent
+// packages \u2014 those must never become the advisory title. Resolve a "via" value to
+// a safe title: object entries with a string .title are real advisories; an array
+// of plain strings falls back to "Vulnerable dependency (via <parent>)" so a raw
+// package name never lands in the title slot.
+function securityScanTitleFromVia(via) {
+  const objectTitle = securityScanFirstTitle(
+    Array.isArray(via)
+      ? via.filter((entry) => entry && typeof entry === "object")
+      : via && typeof via === "object" ? via : undefined,
+  );
+  if (objectTitle) return objectTitle;
+  const parents = securityScanStringArray(Array.isArray(via) ? via : [via]);
+  if (parents.length > 0) return "Vulnerable dependency (via " + parents[0] + ")";
+  return undefined;
+}
+function securityScanAddFinding(findings, seen, name, severity, title) {
+  if (!name || typeof severity !== "string") return;
+  const normalizedSeverity = severity.toLowerCase();
+  if (!SECURITY_SCAN_SEVERITIES.has(normalizedSeverity)) return;
+  const normalizedTitle = securityScanFirstTitle(title) || "Security advisory";
+  const key = name + "\\0" + normalizedSeverity + "\\0" + normalizedTitle;
+  if (seen.has(key)) return;
+  seen.add(key);
+  findings.push({ name, severity: normalizedSeverity, title: normalizedTitle });
+}
+function securityScanParseAudit(raw) {
+  const findings = [];
+  const seen = new Set();
+  const parseOne = (data) => {
+    if (!data || typeof data !== "object") return;
+    if (data.vulnerabilities && typeof data.vulnerabilities === "object") {
+      for (const [name, vuln] of Object.entries(data.vulnerabilities)) {
+        if (!vuln || typeof vuln !== "object") continue;
+        // #7: resolve "via" safely so string-parent names never become the title.
+        const title = vuln.via !== undefined ? securityScanTitleFromVia(vuln.via) : vuln.title;
+        securityScanAddFinding(findings, seen, name, vuln.severity, title);
+      }
+    }
+    if (data.advisories && typeof data.advisories === "object") {
+      for (const advisory of Object.values(data.advisories)) {
+        if (!advisory || typeof advisory !== "object") continue;
+        securityScanAddFinding(findings, seen, advisory.module_name, advisory.severity, advisory.title);
+      }
+    }
+    if (data.type === "auditAdvisory" && data.data && data.data.advisory) {
+      const advisory = data.data.advisory;
+      securityScanAddFinding(findings, seen, advisory.module_name, advisory.severity, advisory.title);
+    }
+  };
+  try { parseOne(JSON.parse(raw)); }
+  catch {
+    for (const line of String(raw || "").split(/\\r?\\n/)) {
+      if (!line.trim()) continue;
+      try { parseOne(JSON.parse(line)); } catch {}
+    }
+  }
+  // #4: sort by severity (critical outranks high) BEFORE capping so criticals are
+  // never dropped by insertion order. Comparator is stable for equal severities.
+  const rank = (s) => (s === "critical" ? 0 : 1);
+  findings.sort((a, b) => rank(a.severity) - rank(b.severity));
+  return findings.slice(0, 5);
+}
+function securityScanAudit(root) {
+  const manager = securityScanPackageManager(root);
+  if (!manager) return { pm: null, findings: [] };
+  const pm = manager.pm;
+  try {
+    const stdout = execSync(manager.cmd, {
+      cwd: root,
+      encoding: "utf8",
+      stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"],
+      maxBuffer: 1024 * 1024 * 10,
+      timeout: 8000,
+    });
+    return { pm, findings: securityScanParseAudit(stdout) };
+  } catch (err) {
+    const stdout = err && typeof err.stdout === "string" ? err.stdout : "";
+    if (stdout.trim()) {
+      // #6: non-zero exit with JSON on stdout is the normal "vulns found" path.
+      return { pm, findings: securityScanParseAudit(stdout) };
+    }
+    // #6: timeout / error with no usable stdout \u2014 return a sentinel so the banner
+    // can distinguish "audit didn't complete" from "clean repo".
+    return { pm, findings: [], error: "timeout" };
+  }
+}
+function formatSecurityScan(root) {
+  const mcp = securityScanMcp(root);
+  // #1/#11: npm-checkable servers not in the registry are genuinely unreviewed;
+  // non-checkable (uvx/python/unresolvable) servers get a calmer, separate group.
+  const unverified = mcp.filter((entry) => !entry.verified && entry.checkable !== false);
+  const nonCheckable = mcp.filter((entry) => entry.checkable === false);
+  const audit = securityScanAudit(root);
+  const auditDidNotComplete = audit.error && audit.findings.length === 0;
+  if (
+    unverified.length === 0 &&
+    nonCheckable.length === 0 &&
+    audit.findings.length === 0 &&
+    !auditDidNotComplete
+  ) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  const lines = ["\u26A0 Holdpoint Security Scan", ""];
+  if (unverified.length > 0) {
+    lines.push("MCP servers \u2014 unverified:");
+    for (const entry of unverified) lines.push("  \u2022 " + entry.server + " (source unknown \u2014 review before trusting)");
+    lines.push("");
+  }
+  if (nonCheckable.length > 0) {
+    lines.push("MCP servers \u2014 source not checkable (non-npm):");
+    for (const entry of nonCheckable) lines.push("  \u2022 " + entry.server + " (can't verify automatically \u2014 review the source)");
+    lines.push("");
+  }
+  if (audit.findings.length > 0) {
+    lines.push((audit.pm || "npm") + " audit \u2014 high/critical:");
+    for (const dep of audit.findings) lines.push("  \u2022 " + dep.name + " \xB7 " + dep.title + " (" + dep.severity + ")");
+    lines.push("");
+  } else if (auditDidNotComplete) {
+    // #6: surface an incomplete audit so a timeout no longer looks like a clean repo.
+    const pm = audit.pm || "npm";
+    lines.push((audit.pm || "npm") + " audit \u2014 high/critical:");
+    lines.push("  \u2022 dependency audit did not complete (timeout) \u2014 run \`" + pm + " audit\` manually");
+    lines.push("");
+  }
+  lines.push("Review these before allowing the agent to install dependencies or invoke tools.");
+  return lines.join("\\n");
+}
+`;
+}
+
+// src/index.ts
+var HOOK_EVENTS = [
+  "session_start",
+  "message_submit",
+  "before_tool",
+  "after_tool",
+  "session_end",
+  "before_done"
+];
+function checkHook(check) {
+  return check.on ?? "before_done";
+}
+function checkBehavior(check) {
+  if (check.cmd !== void 0) return "cmd";
+  if (check.inject !== void 0) return "inject";
+  return "prompt";
+}
+export {
+  HOOK_EVENTS,
+  SECURITY_SCAN_PACKAGES,
+  buildSecurityScanScript,
+  checkBehavior,
+  checkHook
+};
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":[],"sourcesContent":[],"mappings":"","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/scan.ts","../src/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// ─── Session security scan (shared source) ───────────────────────────────────\n//\n// This is the SINGLE source of truth for the session-start security scan that\n// every engine injects as a `node -e` hook. Engines import `SECURITY_SCAN_PACKAGES`\n// and `buildSecurityScanScript()` from here and embed the returned string into\n// their generated context script. The CLI's `holdpoint update` regenerates the\n// per-engine hook files (.codex/.cursor/.github) from the engine output, so a fix\n// here propagates everywhere after a build + update.\n//\n// The returned string is plain ES that runs synchronously inside the hook process.\n// It assumes `readFileSync`, `existsSync`, `join`, and `execSync` are already in\n// scope (the engine context script imports them before embedding this block).\n\n/** npm package names recognised as first-party / well-known MCP servers. */\nexport const SECURITY_SCAN_PACKAGES = [\n  \"@anthropic-ai/mcp-server-brave-search\",\n  \"@anthropic-ai/mcp-server-fetch\",\n  \"@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem\",\n  \"@modelcontextprotocol/server-github\",\n  \"@modelcontextprotocol/server-gitlab\",\n  \"@modelcontextprotocol/server-google-maps\",\n  \"@modelcontextprotocol/server-postgres\",\n  \"@modelcontextprotocol/server-slack\",\n  \"@modelcontextprotocol/server-memory\",\n  \"@modelcontextprotocol/server-puppeteer\",\n  \"@modelcontextprotocol/server-sequential-thinking\",\n  \"@modelcontextprotocol/server-everything\",\n];\n\n/**\n * Build the injected security-scan script body. The returned string defines\n * `formatSecurityScan(root)` (plus its helpers) which returns a banner string or\n * `null` when nothing noteworthy is found.\n */\nexport function buildSecurityScanScript(): string {\n  return `\n// Generated from @holdpoint/types buildSecurityScanScript — do not edit by hand.\nconst SECURITY_SCAN_VERIFIED = new Set(${JSON.stringify(SECURITY_SCAN_PACKAGES)});\nconst SECURITY_SCAN_SEVERITIES = new Set([\"high\", \"critical\"]);\nfunction securityScanReadJson(path) {\n  try { return JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, \"utf8\")); } catch { return undefined; }\n}\nfunction securityScanStringArray(value) {\n  return Array.isArray(value) ? value.filter((entry) => typeof entry === \"string\") : [];\n}\nfunction securityScanPackageName(value) {\n  const normalized = String(value || \"\").replace(/\\\\\\\\/g, \"/\");\n  const idx = normalized.lastIndexOf(\"node_modules/\");\n  if (idx >= 0) {\n    const parts = normalized.slice(idx + \"node_modules/\".length).split(\"/\").filter(Boolean);\n    if (parts[0] && parts[0].startsWith(\"@\") && parts[1]) return parts[0] + \"/\" + parts[1];\n    return parts[0];\n  }\n  if (normalized.startsWith(\"@\")) {\n    const parts = normalized.split(\"/\");\n    return parts[0] && parts[1] ? parts[0] + \"/\" + parts[1] : undefined;\n  }\n  if (!normalized.includes(\"/\") && /^[a-z0-9@._-]+$/i.test(normalized)) return normalized;\n  return undefined;\n}\nfunction securityScanMcpEntries(config) {\n  if (!config || typeof config !== \"object\") return [];\n  const servers = config.mcpServers || config.servers;\n  if (!servers || typeof servers !== \"object\" || Array.isArray(servers)) return [];\n  return Object.entries(servers).map(([key, raw]) => {\n    const server = raw && typeof raw === \"object\" && !Array.isArray(raw) ? raw : {};\n    return {\n      key,\n      name: typeof server.name === \"string\" ? server.name : undefined,\n      command: typeof server.command === \"string\" ? server.command : undefined,\n      args: securityScanStringArray(server.args),\n    };\n  });\n}\n// Strip a leading version/dist-tag from a package spec, leaving the bare name.\n// \"@scope/name@1.2.3\" -> \"@scope/name\"; \"pkg@latest\" -> \"pkg\". Leaves paths/urls alone.\nfunction securityScanStripVersion(spec) {\n  const s = String(spec || \"\");\n  if (!s) return s;\n  if (s.startsWith(\"@\")) {\n    // Scoped: keep through the \"@scope/name\" segment, then cut at a later \"@\".\n    const slash = s.indexOf(\"/\");\n    if (slash < 0) return s;\n    const rest = s.slice(slash + 1);\n    const at = rest.indexOf(\"@\");\n    return at >= 0 ? s.slice(0, slash + 1 + at) : s;\n  }\n  const at = s.indexOf(\"@\");\n  return at > 0 ? s.slice(0, at) : s;\n}\n// Pick the first non-flag argument from args, skipping anything starting with \"-\".\nfunction securityScanFirstNonFlag(args, startIndex) {\n  for (let i = startIndex || 0; i < args.length; i++) {\n    const a = args[i];\n    if (typeof a === \"string\" && a && !a.startsWith(\"-\")) return a;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n// Derive the single package that will actually execute, from command + args ONLY.\n// Returns { pkg, checkable } where checkable indicates the pkg is an npm name we\n// can look up in the verified registry. NEVER consults entry.name or unrelated args.\nfunction securityScanExecutedPackage(entry) {\n  const command = entry.command;\n  const args = entry.args || [];\n  if (!command) return { pkg: undefined, checkable: false };\n  const base = securityScanPackageName(command);\n  if (command === \"npx\" || command === \"bunx\") {\n    const target = securityScanFirstNonFlag(args, 0);\n    if (!target) return { pkg: undefined, checkable: false };\n    return { pkg: securityScanStripVersion(target), checkable: true };\n  }\n  if ((command === \"pnpm\" || command === \"yarn\") && args[0] === \"dlx\") {\n    const target = securityScanFirstNonFlag(args, 1);\n    if (!target) return { pkg: undefined, checkable: false };\n    return { pkg: securityScanStripVersion(target), checkable: true };\n  }\n  if (command === \"uvx\") {\n    // Python/uv package — not resolvable to an npm name.\n    const target = securityScanFirstNonFlag(args, 0);\n    return { pkg: target ? securityScanStripVersion(target) : undefined, checkable: false };\n  }\n  if (command === \"node\" || base === \"node\") {\n    const script = securityScanFirstNonFlag(args, 0);\n    const pkg = script ? securityScanPackageName(script) : undefined;\n    return pkg ? { pkg, checkable: true } : { pkg: undefined, checkable: false };\n  }\n  // Command is itself a path / binary.\n  return base ? { pkg: base, checkable: true } : { pkg: undefined, checkable: false };\n}\nfunction securityScanMcp(root) {\n  const results = [];\n  for (const file of [join(root, \".mcp.json\"), join(root, \".claude/mcp.json\")]) {\n    if (!existsSync(file)) continue;\n    for (const entry of securityScanMcpEntries(securityScanReadJson(file))) {\n      const executed = securityScanExecutedPackage(entry);\n      const verified = executed.checkable && executed.pkg ? SECURITY_SCAN_VERIFIED.has(executed.pkg) : false;\n      results.push({ server: entry.name || entry.key, verified, checkable: executed.checkable });\n    }\n  }\n  return results;\n}\n// Returns { pm, cmd } where pm is the display label and cmd is the full audit\n// command string, or null when no lockfile is present.\nfunction securityScanPackageManager(root) {\n  if (existsSync(join(root, \"pnpm-lock.yaml\"))) return { pm: \"pnpm\", cmd: \"pnpm audit --json\" };\n  if (existsSync(join(root, \"yarn.lock\"))) {\n    // Yarn Berry (v2+) has no \"yarn audit --json\"; it uses \"yarn npm audit\".\n    let berry = existsSync(join(root, \".yarnrc.yml\"));\n    if (!berry) {\n      const pkg = securityScanReadJson(join(root, \"package.json\"));\n      const pm = pkg && typeof pkg.packageManager === \"string\" ? pkg.packageManager : \"\";\n      const m = /^yarn@(\\\\d+)/.exec(pm);\n      if (m && Number(m[1]) >= 2) berry = true;\n    }\n    return berry\n      ? { pm: \"yarn\", cmd: \"yarn npm audit --all --json\" }\n      : { pm: \"yarn\", cmd: \"yarn audit --json\" };\n  }\n  if (existsSync(join(root, \"package-lock.json\")) || existsSync(join(root, \"npm-shrinkwrap.json\"))) {\n    return { pm: \"npm\", cmd: \"npm audit --json\" };\n  }\n  return null;\n}\nfunction securityScanFirstTitle(value) {\n  if (typeof value === \"string\") return value;\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n    for (const entry of value) {\n      const title = securityScanFirstTitle(entry);\n      if (title) return title;\n    }\n  }\n  if (value && typeof value === \"object\" && typeof value.title === \"string\") return value.title;\n  return undefined;\n}\n// #7: For npm v7+ transitive vulns, \"via\" is an array of STRINGS naming parent\n// packages — those must never become the advisory title. Resolve a \"via\" value to\n// a safe title: object entries with a string .title are real advisories; an array\n// of plain strings falls back to \"Vulnerable dependency (via <parent>)\" so a raw\n// package name never lands in the title slot.\nfunction securityScanTitleFromVia(via) {\n  const objectTitle = securityScanFirstTitle(\n    Array.isArray(via)\n      ? via.filter((entry) => entry && typeof entry === \"object\")\n      : via && typeof via === \"object\" ? via : undefined,\n  );\n  if (objectTitle) return objectTitle;\n  const parents = securityScanStringArray(Array.isArray(via) ? via : [via]);\n  if (parents.length > 0) return \"Vulnerable dependency (via \" + parents[0] + \")\";\n  return undefined;\n}\nfunction securityScanAddFinding(findings, seen, name, severity, title) {\n  if (!name || typeof severity !== \"string\") return;\n  const normalizedSeverity = severity.toLowerCase();\n  if (!SECURITY_SCAN_SEVERITIES.has(normalizedSeverity)) return;\n  const normalizedTitle = securityScanFirstTitle(title) || \"Security advisory\";\n  const key = name + \"\\\\0\" + normalizedSeverity + \"\\\\0\" + normalizedTitle;\n  if (seen.has(key)) return;\n  seen.add(key);\n  findings.push({ name, severity: normalizedSeverity, title: normalizedTitle });\n}\nfunction securityScanParseAudit(raw) {\n  const findings = [];\n  const seen = new Set();\n  const parseOne = (data) => {\n    if (!data || typeof data !== \"object\") return;\n    if (data.vulnerabilities && typeof data.vulnerabilities === \"object\") {\n      for (const [name, vuln] of Object.entries(data.vulnerabilities)) {\n        if (!vuln || typeof vuln !== \"object\") continue;\n        // #7: resolve \"via\" safely so string-parent names never become the title.\n        const title = vuln.via !== undefined ? securityScanTitleFromVia(vuln.via) : vuln.title;\n        securityScanAddFinding(findings, seen, name, vuln.severity, title);\n      }\n    }\n    if (data.advisories && typeof data.advisories === \"object\") {\n      for (const advisory of Object.values(data.advisories)) {\n        if (!advisory || typeof advisory !== \"object\") continue;\n        securityScanAddFinding(findings, seen, advisory.module_name, advisory.severity, advisory.title);\n      }\n    }\n    if (data.type === \"auditAdvisory\" && data.data && data.data.advisory) {\n      const advisory = data.data.advisory;\n      securityScanAddFinding(findings, seen, advisory.module_name, advisory.severity, advisory.title);\n    }\n  };\n  try { parseOne(JSON.parse(raw)); }\n  catch {\n    for (const line of String(raw || \"\").split(/\\\\r?\\\\n/)) {\n      if (!line.trim()) continue;\n      try { parseOne(JSON.parse(line)); } catch {}\n    }\n  }\n  // #4: sort by severity (critical outranks high) BEFORE capping so criticals are\n  // never dropped by insertion order. Comparator is stable for equal severities.\n  const rank = (s) => (s === \"critical\" ? 0 : 1);\n  findings.sort((a, b) => rank(a.severity) - rank(b.severity));\n  return findings.slice(0, 5);\n}\nfunction securityScanAudit(root) {\n  const manager = securityScanPackageManager(root);\n  if (!manager) return { pm: null, findings: [] };\n  const pm = manager.pm;\n  try {\n    const stdout = execSync(manager.cmd, {\n      cwd: root,\n      encoding: \"utf8\",\n      stdio: [\"ignore\", \"pipe\", \"pipe\"],\n      maxBuffer: 1024 * 1024 * 10,\n      timeout: 8000,\n    });\n    return { pm, findings: securityScanParseAudit(stdout) };\n  } catch (err) {\n    const stdout = err && typeof err.stdout === \"string\" ? err.stdout : \"\";\n    if (stdout.trim()) {\n      // #6: non-zero exit with JSON on stdout is the normal \"vulns found\" path.\n      return { pm, findings: securityScanParseAudit(stdout) };\n    }\n    // #6: timeout / error with no usable stdout — return a sentinel so the banner\n    // can distinguish \"audit didn't complete\" from \"clean repo\".\n    return { pm, findings: [], error: \"timeout\" };\n  }\n}\nfunction formatSecurityScan(root) {\n  const mcp = securityScanMcp(root);\n  // #1/#11: npm-checkable servers not in the registry are genuinely unreviewed;\n  // non-checkable (uvx/python/unresolvable) servers get a calmer, separate group.\n  const unverified = mcp.filter((entry) => !entry.verified && entry.checkable !== false);\n  const nonCheckable = mcp.filter((entry) => entry.checkable === false);\n  const audit = securityScanAudit(root);\n  const auditDidNotComplete = audit.error && audit.findings.length === 0;\n  if (\n    unverified.length === 0 &&\n    nonCheckable.length === 0 &&\n    audit.findings.length === 0 &&\n    !auditDidNotComplete\n  ) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  const lines = [\"⚠ Holdpoint Security Scan\", \"\"];\n  if (unverified.length > 0) {\n    lines.push(\"MCP servers — unverified:\");\n    for (const entry of unverified) lines.push(\"  • \" + entry.server + \" (source unknown — review before trusting)\");\n    lines.push(\"\");\n  }\n  if (nonCheckable.length > 0) {\n    lines.push(\"MCP servers — source not checkable (non-npm):\");\n    for (const entry of nonCheckable) lines.push(\"  • \" + entry.server + \" (can't verify automatically — review the source)\");\n    lines.push(\"\");\n  }\n  if (audit.findings.length > 0) {\n    lines.push((audit.pm || \"npm\") + \" audit — high/critical:\");\n    for (const dep of audit.findings) lines.push(\"  • \" + dep.name + \" · \" + dep.title + \" (\" + dep.severity + \")\");\n    lines.push(\"\");\n  } else if (auditDidNotComplete) {\n    // #6: surface an incomplete audit so a timeout no longer looks like a clean repo.\n    const pm = audit.pm || \"npm\";\n    lines.push((audit.pm || \"npm\") + \" audit — high/critical:\");\n    lines.push(\"  • dependency audit did not complete (timeout) — run \\`\" + pm + \" audit\\` manually\");\n    lines.push(\"\");\n  }\n  lines.push(\"Review these before allowing the agent to install dependencies or invoke tools.\");\n  return lines.join(\"\\\\n\");\n}\n`;\n}\n","export { SECURITY_SCAN_PACKAGES, buildSecurityScanScript } from \"./scan.js\";\n\n// ─── Hook & when types ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Lifecycle hook a check/action attaches to. `before_done` is the completion\n * gate (default). The others let checks seed context or run earlier in the loop:\n * - `session_start`  — a fresh session or resume\n * - `message_submit` — every user prompt\n * - `before_tool`    — immediately before a tool call (can block it)\n * - `after_tool`     — immediately after a tool call (advisory)\n * - `session_end`    — the session is ending (advisory)\n * - `before_done`    — the completion gate; blocks finishing on failure\n *\n * Engine support varies; engines honor what they can and skip the rest.\n */\nexport type HookEvent =\n  | \"session_start\"\n  | \"message_submit\"\n  | \"before_tool\"\n  | \"after_tool\"\n  | \"session_end\"\n  | \"before_done\";\n\n/** Ordered list of all hook events, earliest-to-latest in the agent loop. */\nexport const HOOK_EVENTS: HookEvent[] = [\n  \"session_start\",\n  \"message_submit\",\n  \"before_tool\",\n  \"after_tool\",\n  \"session_end\",\n  \"before_done\",\n];\n\n/**\n * Context-seeding behavior: inject text, file contents, and/or the current\n * datetime as agent context at the check's hook point. An alternative to\n * `cmd` (command) and `prompt` (agent instruction).\n */\nexport interface InjectSpec {\n  /** Literal text injected as agent context. */\n  text?: string;\n  /** Repo-relative files whose contents are injected as context. */\n  files?: string[];\n  /** Inject the current date and time. */\n  datetime?: boolean;\n}\n\n/** Named file-scope filter. Custom regexes are plain strings not in this union. */\nexport type WhenScope =\n  // Web / app layers\n  | \"frontend\"\n  | \"backend\"\n  | \"socket\"\n  | \"visual\"\n  // Languages\n  | \"python\"\n  | \"go\"\n  | \"rust\"\n  | \"java\"\n  | \"ruby\"\n  // Cross-cutting concerns\n  | \"database\"\n  | \"prisma\"\n  | \"testing\"\n  | \"infra\"\n  | \"ci\"\n  | \"docs\"\n  // Project structure / dependency manifests\n  | \"structural\";\n\n// ─── Condition types ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport type ConditionOperator = \"file_exists\" | \"file_contains\" | \"env_var_set\" | \"shell_returns_0\";\n\nexport interface ConditionDef {\n  id: string;\n  operator: ConditionOperator;\n  /** Path glob for file_exists / file_contains */\n  path?: string;\n  /** Substring to look for in file_contains */\n  contains?: string;\n  /** Env var name for env_var_set */\n  envVar?: string;\n  /** Shell command for shell_returns_0 */\n  cmd?: string;\n}\n\n// ─── Check types ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface CheckDef {\n  id: string;\n  label: string;\n  /** Lifecycle hook — defaults to \"before_done\" when absent */\n  on?: HookEvent;\n  /** File filter: a named WhenScope or a regex string. Absent = run always. */\n  when?: string;\n  /** Shell command — task (runs automatically) */\n  cmd?: string;\n  /** Structured prompt/instruction the agent must read and act on before finishing */\n  prompt?: string;\n  /** Context-seeding behavior — inject text/files/datetime at the hook point */\n  inject?: InjectSpec;\n  /** Reference to a ConditionDef id */\n  conditionId?: string;\n}\n\n/** The effective hook of a check (`before_done` when unset). */\nexport function checkHook(check: CheckDef): HookEvent {\n  return check.on ?? \"before_done\";\n}\n\n/** A check's behavior kind, derived from which behavior field is set. */\nexport type CheckBehavior = \"cmd\" | \"prompt\" | \"inject\";\n\nexport function checkBehavior(check: CheckDef): CheckBehavior {\n  if (check.cmd !== undefined) return \"cmd\";\n  if (check.inject !== undefined) return \"inject\";\n  return \"prompt\";\n}\n\n// ─── Top-level config ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface HoldpointContext {\n  guides: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\nexport interface HoldpointConfig {\n  version: number;\n  context: HoldpointContext;\n  conditions: ConditionDef[];\n  /** All checks — each has `on`, optional `when`, and either `cmd` (task) or `prompt` (agent instruction). */\n  checks: CheckDef[];\n  /**\n   * Named regex patterns for use in `when:` fields.\n   * Keys are human-readable names (e.g. \"checks-file\", \"api-routes\").\n   * Values are regex strings matched against changed file paths.\n   * Built-in scope names (frontend, backend, structural, etc.) cannot be overridden here.\n   */\n  patterns?: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * Files to inject as `additionalContext` at the start of every agent session.\n   * Paths are repo-root-relative. Useful for injecting MASTER_PROMPT.md, AGENT_CONTEXT.md, etc.\n   */\n  session_context_files?: string[];\n  /**\n   * Inject the current date and time into every prompt submission as `additionalContext`.\n   * Helps models avoid knowledge-cutoff confusion. Defaults to `true`; set to `false` to opt out.\n   */\n  inject_datetime?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Run the session-start security scan (unverified MCP servers + `audit`\n   * high/critical advisories) and inject its banner as session context.\n   * Defaults to `true`; set to `false` to skip the scan entirely — including the\n   * dependency-audit subprocess, which otherwise runs on session start.\n   */\n  security_scan?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Per-engine overrides. Values here win over engine defaults — useful when the\n   * project IS the holdpoint repo and should invoke the local CLI instead of npx.\n   */\n  engines?: {\n    claude?: { stop_command?: string; live_command?: string };\n    codex?: { stop_command?: string };\n    copilot?: { check_command?: string };\n  };\n}\n\n// ─── Runtime result types ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport type CheckStatus = \"pass\" | \"fail\" | \"skip\" | \"pending\";\n\nexport interface CheckResult {\n  check: CheckDef;\n  status: CheckStatus;\n  /** stdout/stderr from a deterministic check */\n  output?: string;\n  /** Exit code from a deterministic check */\n  exitCode?: number;\n  /** Human-readable reason for skip */\n  skipReason?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ValidationError {\n  path: string;\n  message: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ValidationResult {\n  valid: boolean;\n  errors: ValidationError[];\n}\n\n// ─── Agent detection ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport type AgentType = \"copilot\" | \"claude\" | \"cursor\" | \"codex\" | \"unknown\";\n\n// ─── Check run report types ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Result of a single check within a run (cmd or prompt). */\nexport interface CheckRunResult {\n  id: string;\n  label: string;\n  /** \"cmd\" for automated checks, \"prompt\" for manual agent checks */\n  kind: \"cmd\" | \"prompt\";\n  /** \"pass\" | \"fail\" | \"skip\" for cmd checks; \"shown\" for prompt checks displayed to agent */\n  status: \"pass\" | \"fail\" | \"skip\" | \"shown\";\n  output?: string;\n  exitCode?: number;\n  skipReason?: string;\n}\n\n/** A single holdpoint check run recorded after `holdpoint check` completes. */\nexport interface CheckRun {\n  /** Full HEAD commit SHA, or null if not in a git repo / no commits. */\n  sha: string | null;\n  /** First 8 chars of sha, or null. */\n  shortSha: string | null;\n  /** ISO 8601 timestamp. */\n  timestamp: string;\n  /** Changed files used for trigger matching. 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package/package.json

@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
 {
   "name": "@holdpoint/types",
-  "version": "0.1.0-alpha.1",
+  "version": "0.1.0-alpha.11",
   "publishConfig": {
-    "access": "public",
-    "tag": "alpha"
+    "access": "public"
   },
   "description": "Shared TypeScript types for Holdpoint",
   "homepage": "https://holdpoint.dev",
@@ -44,7 +43,7 @@
   ],
   "devDependencies": {
     "tsup": "^8.3.5",
-    "typescript": "^5.7.2"
+    "typescript": "^6.0.3"
   },
   "scripts": {
     "build": "tsup",