@hoilab/ada-cli 0.84.17 → 0.84.19

package/dist/core/memory-engine/security.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"security.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/core/memory-engine/security.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;GASG;AAEH,MAAM,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,QAAQ,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG,YAAY,CAAC;AAEhE,MAAM,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAC1B,YAAY,GACZ,SAAS,GACT,mBAAmB,GACnB,WAAW,GACX,WAAW,GACX,QAAQ,GACR,UAAU,GACV,SAAS,GACT,WAAW,GACX,cAAc,CAAC;AAElB,MAAM,WAAW,iBAAiB;IACjC,gDAAgD;IAChD,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACjB,2BAA2B;IAC3B,UAAU,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC;IAChC,0DAA0D;IAC1D,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,sEAAsE;IACtE,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;CACpB;AA4ID;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,wBAAgB,iBAAiB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,GAAE,YAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAE,IAAI,GAAG,IAAW,GAAG,iBAAiB,CA+ChI;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,wBAAgB,eAAe,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,GAAE,YAAuB,GAAG,MAAM,CAmBpF","sourcesContent":["/**\n * Security & privacy classification for the Ada Memory Engine.\n *\n * Enterprise-grade guards:\n * - Credentials/secrets/payment data are ALWAYS blocked at every level.\n * - PII (email, phone, national IDs, IBAN, DOB) blocking depends on the\n *   configured privacy level (RGPD / AI Act friendly).\n * - Every rejection is written to the audit log with a reason.\n * - Prompt-injection/exfiltration patterns are always blocked.\n */\n\nexport type PrivacyLevel = \"strict\" | \"balanced\" | \"permissive\";\n\nexport type SensitiveCategory =\n\t| \"credential\"\n\t| \"payment\"\n\t| \"secret-assignment\"\n\t| \"pii-email\"\n\t| \"pii-phone\"\n\t| \"pii-id\"\n\t| \"pii-bank\"\n\t| \"pii-dob\"\n\t| \"injection\"\n\t| \"exfiltration\";\n\nexport interface SensitivityResult {\n\t/** True when the content must NOT be stored. */\n\tblocked: boolean;\n\t/** Categories detected. */\n\tcategories: SensitiveCategory[];\n\t/** Human-readable reason (in the configured language). */\n\treason: string;\n\t/** True when content contains permitted-but-noteworthy categories. */\n\tnoteworthy: boolean;\n}\n\ninterface Pattern {\n\tcategory: SensitiveCategory;\n\tpattern: RegExp;\n\t/** Always blocked regardless of privacy level. */\n\talways?: boolean;\n\t/** Blocked at this level and stricter. */\n\tblockAt?: PrivacyLevel;\n\t/** English reason label. */\n\tlabel: string;\n}\n\n// ─── Credentials & secrets — ALWAYS blocked ───\nconst ALWAYS_BLOCKED: Pattern[] = [\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bsk-ant-api\\S{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Anthropic API key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bsk-or-v1-\\S{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"OpenRouter API key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"OpenAI-style API key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\\b/, always: true, label: \"AWS access key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"GitHub personal token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bghu_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"GitHub user token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Slack token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bxapp-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Slack app token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bntn_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Notion token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}/, always: true, label: \"JWT token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /-----BEGIN\\s+(?:RSA\\s+|EC\\s+|OPENSSH\\s+)?PRIVATE\\s+KEY-----/, always: true, label: \"Private key block\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bBearer\\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{20,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"Bearer auth token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bapi[_-]?key\\s*[=:]\\s*[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"API key assignment\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\b(client|app|consumer)_?secret\\s*[=:]\\s*[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"OAuth client secret\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bwebhook[_-]?url\\s*[=:]\\s*https?:\\/\\/[^\\s]+/i, always: true, label: \"Webhook URL\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(password|passwd|pwd)\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{6,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"password value\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(?:contraseña|contraseña|clave)\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{6,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"contraseña valor\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(?:contraseña|password|passwd|pwd|clave)\\b[^\\n]{0,40}\\b\\d{6,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"password-like value\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(?:recuerda|guarda|memoriza|remember|save|store)\\b.{0,50}\\b(?:contraseña|password|passwd|pwd|clave|token|api[_-]?key)\\b/i, always: true, label: \"request to store a secret\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(secret|token|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key)\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{10,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"secret/token value\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\b(ANTHROPIC|OPENAI|OPENROUTER|GEMINI|DEEPSEEK|MISTRAL|AZURE)_?(API)?_?KEY\\b/i, always: true, label: \"provider API key env var\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bGITHUB_TOKEN\\b|\\bAWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\\b|\\bDATABASE_URL\\b/i, always: true, label: \"secret env var name\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /(?:mongodb|postgres|mysql|redis|amqp):\\/\\/[^\\s]*:[^\\s@]+@/, always: true, label: \"connection string with credentials\" },\n];\n\n// ─── Payment data — ALWAYS blocked ───\nconst PAYMENT: Pattern[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"payment\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:4\\d{3}|5[1-5]\\d{2}|3[47]\\d{2}|6(?:011|5\\d{2}))[\\s-]?\\d{4}[\\s-]?\\d{4}[\\s-]?\\d{4}\\b/,\n\t\talways: true,\n\t\tlabel: \"payment card number\",\n\t},\n\t{ category: \"payment\", pattern: /\\bcvv\\s*[=:]\\s*\\d{3,4}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"card verification value\" },\n\t{ category: \"payment\", pattern: /\\b(?:expiry|exp)\\s*[=:]\\s*(?:0[1-9]|1[0-2])\\/?\\d{2}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"card expiry\" },\n];\n\n// ─── PII — level-dependent ───\nconst PII: Pattern[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-email\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\\.[A-Za-z]{2,}\\b/,\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"personal email address\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-phone\",\n\t\tpattern: /(?:\\+\\d{1,3}[\\s-]?)?(?:\\(?\\d{2,4}\\)?[\\s-]?)?\\d{3}[\\s-]?\\d{3}[\\s-]?\\d{3,4}\\b/,\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"phone number\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-id\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b\\d{8}[A-Z]\\b|\\b[A-Z]\\d{7}[A-Z0-9]\\b/, // DNI / NIE (Spain)\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"national ID (DNI/NIE)\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-bank\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b[A-Z]{2}\\d{2}[A-Z0-9]{11,30}\\b/, // IBAN\n\t\tblockAt: \"balanced\",\n\t\tlabel: \"IBAN / bank account\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-dob\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:birth|birthday|born|nacimiento|fecha de nacimiento)\\s*[=:]\\s*(?:\\d{1,2}[\\/\\-.]\\d{1,2}[\\/\\-.]\\d{2,4})/i,\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"date of birth\",\n\t},\n];\n\n// ─── Prompt injection / exfiltration — ALWAYS blocked ───\nconst INJECTION: Pattern[] = [\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /ignore\\s+(previous|all|above|prior)\\s+instructions/i, always: true, label: \"prompt injection\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /you\\s+are\\s+now\\s+/i, always: true, label: \"role hijack\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /do\\s+not\\s+tell\\s+the\\s+user/i, always: true, label: \"deceptive instruction\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /disregard\\s+(your|all|any)\\s+(instructions|rules|guidelines)/i, always: true, label: \"instruction override\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /system\\s+prompt\\s+override/i, always: true, label: \"system prompt override\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /curl\\s+[^\\n]*(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|API)/i, always: true, label: \"credential exfiltration (curl)\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /wget\\s+[^\\n]*(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|API)/i, always: true, label: \"credential exfiltration (wget)\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /cat\\s+[^\\n]*(\\.env|credentials|\\.netrc|\\.pgpass|\\.npmrc|\\.pypirc)/i, always: true, label: \"secret file read\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /\\$HOME\\/\\.ssh|~\\/\\.ssh/i, always: true, label: \"SSH key path\" },\n];\n\nconst LEVEL_ORDER: Record<PrivacyLevel, number> = { strict: 0, balanced: 1, permissive: 2 };\n\nconst INVISIBLE_CHARS = new Set([\n\t\"\\u200b\", \"\\u200c\", \"\\u200d\", \"\\u2060\", \"\\ufeff\",\n\t\"\\u202a\", \"\\u202b\", \"\\u202c\", \"\\u202d\", \"\\u202e\",\n]);\n\nconst REASON_EN = {\n\tcredential: \"Looks like a credential or secret (secrets are never stored in memory)\",\n\tpayment: \"Looks like payment card data (never stored in memory)\",\n\t\"secret-assignment\": \"Looks like a password/secret/token value (never stored in memory)\",\n\t\"pii-email\": \"Looks like a personal email address (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-phone\": \"Looks like a phone number (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-id\": \"Looks like a national ID (DNI/NIE) (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-bank\": \"Looks like a bank account / IBAN (blocked by the privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-dob\": \"Looks like a date of birth (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\tinjection: \"Looks like a prompt-injection attempt (never stored)\",\n\texfiltration: \"Looks like data exfiltration (never stored)\",\n};\n\nconst REASON_ES: Record<SensitiveCategory, string> = {\n\tcredential: \"Parece una credencial o secreto (los secretos nunca se almacenan en memoria)\",\n\tpayment: \"Parecen datos de tarjeta de pago (nunca se almacenan en memoria)\",\n\t\"secret-assignment\": \"Parece una contraseña/secreto/token (nunca se almacena en memoria)\",\n\t\"pii-email\": \"Parece un correo electrónico personal (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\t\"pii-phone\": \"Parece un número de teléfono (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\t\"pii-id\": \"Parece un documento de identidad (DNI/NIE) (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\t\"pii-bank\": \"Parece una cuenta bancaria / IBAN (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad)\",\n\t\"pii-dob\": \"Parece una fecha de nacimiento (bloqueada por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\tinjection: \"Parece un intento de prompt injection (nunca se almacena)\",\n\texfiltration: \"Parece exfiltración de datos (nunca se almacena)\",\n};\n\nfunction testPattern(pattern: Pattern, content: string): boolean {\n\ttry {\n\t\treturn pattern.pattern.test(content);\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn false;\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify content against the security policy.\n *\n * @param content   Text to classify.\n * @param level     Configured privacy level.\n * @param locale    \"es\" or \"en\" for the reason language.\n */\nexport function classifySensitive(content: string, level: PrivacyLevel = \"strict\", locale: \"es\" | \"en\" = \"es\"): SensitivityResult {\n\tconst categories = new Set<SensitiveCategory>();\n\tconst reasons: string[] = [];\n\tconst labels: string[] = [];\n\n\t// Invisible characters are always suspicious (injection vectors).\n\tif ([...content].some((ch) => INVISIBLE_CHARS.has(ch))) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tblocked: true,\n\t\t\tcategories: [\"injection\"],\n\t\t\treason: locale === \"es\"\n\t\t\t\t? \"El contenido contiene caracteres invisibles/zero-width y fue rechazado por seguridad.\"\n\t\t\t\t: \"Content contains invisible/zero-width characters and was rejected for security.\",\n\t\t\tnoteworthy: true,\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\tconst allPatterns = [...ALWAYS_BLOCKED, ...PAYMENT, ...PII, ...INJECTION];\n\tfor (const pattern of allPatterns) {\n\t\tif (!testPattern(pattern, content)) continue;\n\t\tconst levelIdx = LEVEL_ORDER[level];\n\t\tconst blockAtIdx = pattern.blockAt ? LEVEL_ORDER[pattern.blockAt] : 0;\n\t\tconst blocked = pattern.always === true || levelIdx <= blockAtIdx;\n\t\tcategories.add(pattern.category);\n\t\tif (blocked) {\n\t\t\tlabels.push(pattern.label);\n\t\t\tif (!reasons.includes(pattern.category)) reasons.push(pattern.category);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif (reasons.length > 0) {\n\t\tconst localeMap = locale === \"es\" ? REASON_ES : REASON_EN;\n\t\tconst detail = reasons.map((r) => localeMap[r as SensitiveCategory]).join(\"; \");\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tblocked: true,\n\t\t\tcategories: [...categories],\n\t\t\treason: detail,\n\t\t\tnoteworthy: true,\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tblocked: false,\n\t\tcategories: [...categories],\n\t\treason: \"\",\n\t\tnoteworthy: categories.size > 0,\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * Redact sensitive data from user text so it never reaches the LLM, the\n * session file, or the chat transcript. Only high-confidence patterns are\n * redacted (credentials, payment data, explicit secret assignments, and\n * PII like emails / national IDs / IBANs / DOB).\n */\nexport function redactSensitive(text: string, level: PrivacyLevel = \"strict\"): string {\n\tlet out = text;\n\tconst levelIdx = LEVEL_ORDER[level];\n\tfor (const pattern of [...ALWAYS_BLOCKED, ...PAYMENT, ...PII]) {\n\t\tif (pattern.category === \"pii-phone\") {\n\t\t\t// Phone redaction requires separators or a + prefix to avoid\n\t\t\t// mangling ordinary numbers in code.\n\t\t\tif (!/(?:\\+|\\s|\\()?\\d{3}[\\s.-]\\d{3}[\\s.-]\\d{3,4}/.test(text)) continue;\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst blockAtIdx = pattern.blockAt ? LEVEL_ORDER[pattern.blockAt] : 0;\n\t\tconst active = pattern.always === true || levelIdx <= blockAtIdx;\n\t\tif (!active) continue;\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tout = out.replace(pattern.pattern, (match) => \"█\".repeat(Math.min(match.length, 14)));\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// A bad pattern must never break redaction.\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn out;\n}\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"security.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/core/memory-engine/security.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;GASG;AAEH,MAAM,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,QAAQ,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG,YAAY,CAAC;AAEhE,MAAM,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAC1B,YAAY,GACZ,SAAS,GACT,mBAAmB,GACnB,WAAW,GACX,WAAW,GACX,QAAQ,GACR,UAAU,GACV,SAAS,GACT,WAAW,GACX,cAAc,CAAC;AAElB,MAAM,WAAW,iBAAiB;IACjC,gDAAgD;IAChD,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACjB,2BAA2B;IAC3B,UAAU,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC;IAChC,0DAA0D;IAC1D,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,sEAAsE;IACtE,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;CACpB;AAsJD;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,wBAAgB,iBAAiB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,GAAE,YAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAE,IAAI,GAAG,IAAW,GAAG,iBAAiB,CA+ChI;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,wBAAgB,eAAe,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,GAAE,YAAuB,GAAG,MAAM,CAmBpF","sourcesContent":["/**\n * Security & privacy classification for the Ada Memory Engine.\n *\n * Enterprise-grade guards:\n * - Credentials/secrets/payment data are ALWAYS blocked at every level.\n * - PII (email, phone, national IDs, IBAN, DOB) blocking depends on the\n *   configured privacy level (RGPD / AI Act friendly).\n * - Every rejection is written to the audit log with a reason.\n * - Prompt-injection/exfiltration patterns are always blocked.\n */\n\nexport type PrivacyLevel = \"strict\" | \"balanced\" | \"permissive\";\n\nexport type SensitiveCategory =\n\t| \"credential\"\n\t| \"payment\"\n\t| \"secret-assignment\"\n\t| \"pii-email\"\n\t| \"pii-phone\"\n\t| \"pii-id\"\n\t| \"pii-bank\"\n\t| \"pii-dob\"\n\t| \"injection\"\n\t| \"exfiltration\";\n\nexport interface SensitivityResult {\n\t/** True when the content must NOT be stored. */\n\tblocked: boolean;\n\t/** Categories detected. */\n\tcategories: SensitiveCategory[];\n\t/** Human-readable reason (in the configured language). */\n\treason: string;\n\t/** True when content contains permitted-but-noteworthy categories. */\n\tnoteworthy: boolean;\n}\n\ninterface Pattern {\n\tcategory: SensitiveCategory;\n\tpattern: RegExp;\n\t/** Always blocked regardless of privacy level. */\n\talways?: boolean;\n\t/** Blocked at this level and stricter. */\n\tblockAt?: PrivacyLevel;\n\t/** English reason label. */\n\tlabel: string;\n}\n\n// ─── Credentials & secrets — ALWAYS blocked ───\nconst ALWAYS_BLOCKED: Pattern[] = [\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bsk-ant-api\\S{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Anthropic API key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bsk-or-v1-\\S{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"OpenRouter API key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"OpenAI-style API key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\\b/, always: true, label: \"AWS access key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"GitHub personal token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bghu_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"GitHub user token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Slack token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bxapp-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Slack app token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bntn_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Notion token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}/, always: true, label: \"JWT token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /-----BEGIN\\s+(?:RSA\\s+|EC\\s+|OPENSSH\\s+)?PRIVATE\\s+KEY-----/, always: true, label: \"Private key block\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bBearer\\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{20,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"Bearer auth token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bapi[_-]?key\\s*[=:]\\s*[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"API key assignment\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\b(client|app|consumer)_?secret\\s*[=:]\\s*[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"OAuth client secret\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bwebhook[_-]?url\\s*[=:]\\s*https?:\\/\\/[^\\s]+/i, always: true, label: \"Webhook URL\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(password|passwd|pwd)\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{6,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"password value\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(?:contraseña|contraseña|clave)\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{6,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"contraseña valor\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(?:contraseña|password|passwd|pwd|clave)\\b[^\\n]{0,40}\\b\\d{6,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"password-like value\" },\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"secret-assignment\",\n\t\t// Secret keyword followed by a value on the same line: the match spans\n\t\t// keyword + value so redaction never leaves the value exposed. The\n\t\t// value must be an alnum token (≥4 chars) containing a digit or symbol,\n\t\t// which avoids false positives like \"contraseña por defecto\".\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:contraseña|password|passwd|pwd|clave|token|api[_-]?key|secret)\\b[^\\n]{0,40}\\b(?=[A-Za-z0-9_\\-!@#$%^&*]*\\d)[A-Za-z0-9_\\-!@#$%^&*]{4,}/i,\n\t\talways: true,\n\t\tlabel: \"secret value after keyword\",\n\t},\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(?:recuerda|guarda|memoriza|remember|save|store)\\b.{0,50}\\b(?:contraseña|password|passwd|pwd|clave|token|api[_-]?key)\\b/i, always: true, label: \"request to store a secret\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(secret|token|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key)\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{10,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"secret/token value\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\b(ANTHROPIC|OPENAI|OPENROUTER|GEMINI|DEEPSEEK|MISTRAL|AZURE)_?(API)?_?KEY\\b/i, always: true, label: \"provider API key env var\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bGITHUB_TOKEN\\b|\\bAWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\\b|\\bDATABASE_URL\\b/i, always: true, label: \"secret env var name\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /(?:mongodb|postgres|mysql|redis|amqp):\\/\\/[^\\s]*:[^\\s@]+@/, always: true, label: \"connection string with credentials\" },\n];\n\n// ─── Payment data — ALWAYS blocked ───\nconst PAYMENT: Pattern[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"payment\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:4\\d{3}|5[1-5]\\d{2}|3[47]\\d{2}|6(?:011|5\\d{2}))[\\s-]?\\d{4}[\\s-]?\\d{4}[\\s-]?\\d{4}\\b/,\n\t\talways: true,\n\t\tlabel: \"payment card number\",\n\t},\n\t{ category: \"payment\", pattern: /\\bcvv\\s*[=:]\\s*\\d{3,4}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"card verification value\" },\n\t{ category: \"payment\", pattern: /\\b(?:expiry|exp)\\s*[=:]\\s*(?:0[1-9]|1[0-2])\\/?\\d{2}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"card expiry\" },\n];\n\n// ─── PII — level-dependent ───\nconst PII: Pattern[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-email\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\\.[A-Za-z]{2,}\\b/,\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"personal email address\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-phone\",\n\t\tpattern: /(?:\\+\\d{1,3}[\\s-]?)?(?:\\(?\\d{2,4}\\)?[\\s-]?)?\\d{3}[\\s-]?\\d{3}[\\s-]?\\d{3,4}\\b/,\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"phone number\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-id\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b\\d{8}[A-Z]\\b|\\b[A-Z]\\d{7}[A-Z0-9]\\b/, // DNI / NIE (Spain)\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"national ID (DNI/NIE)\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-bank\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b[A-Z]{2}\\d{2}[A-Z0-9]{11,30}\\b/, // IBAN\n\t\tblockAt: \"balanced\",\n\t\tlabel: \"IBAN / bank account\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-dob\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:birth|birthday|born|nacimiento|fecha de nacimiento)\\s*[=:]\\s*(?:\\d{1,2}[\\/\\-.]\\d{1,2}[\\/\\-.]\\d{2,4})/i,\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"date of birth\",\n\t},\n];\n\n// ─── Prompt injection / exfiltration — ALWAYS blocked ───\nconst INJECTION: Pattern[] = [\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /ignore\\s+(previous|all|above|prior)\\s+instructions/i, always: true, label: \"prompt injection\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /you\\s+are\\s+now\\s+/i, always: true, label: \"role hijack\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /do\\s+not\\s+tell\\s+the\\s+user/i, always: true, label: \"deceptive instruction\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /disregard\\s+(your|all|any)\\s+(instructions|rules|guidelines)/i, always: true, label: \"instruction override\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /system\\s+prompt\\s+override/i, always: true, label: \"system prompt override\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /curl\\s+[^\\n]*(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|API)/i, always: true, label: \"credential exfiltration (curl)\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /wget\\s+[^\\n]*(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|API)/i, always: true, label: \"credential exfiltration (wget)\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /cat\\s+[^\\n]*(\\.env|credentials|\\.netrc|\\.pgpass|\\.npmrc|\\.pypirc)/i, always: true, label: \"secret file read\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /\\$HOME\\/\\.ssh|~\\/\\.ssh/i, always: true, label: \"SSH key path\" },\n];\n\nconst LEVEL_ORDER: Record<PrivacyLevel, number> = { strict: 0, balanced: 1, permissive: 2 };\n\nconst INVISIBLE_CHARS = new Set([\n\t\"\\u200b\", \"\\u200c\", \"\\u200d\", \"\\u2060\", \"\\ufeff\",\n\t\"\\u202a\", \"\\u202b\", \"\\u202c\", \"\\u202d\", \"\\u202e\",\n]);\n\nconst REASON_EN = {\n\tcredential: \"Looks like a credential or secret (secrets are never stored in memory)\",\n\tpayment: \"Looks like payment card data (never stored in memory)\",\n\t\"secret-assignment\": \"Looks like a password/secret/token value (never stored in memory)\",\n\t\"pii-email\": \"Looks like a personal email address (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-phone\": \"Looks like a phone number (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-id\": \"Looks like a national ID (DNI/NIE) (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-bank\": \"Looks like a bank account / IBAN (blocked by the privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-dob\": \"Looks like a date of birth (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\tinjection: \"Looks like a prompt-injection attempt (never stored)\",\n\texfiltration: \"Looks like data exfiltration (never stored)\",\n};\n\nconst REASON_ES: Record<SensitiveCategory, string> = {\n\tcredential: \"Parece una credencial o secreto (los secretos nunca se almacenan en memoria)\",\n\tpayment: \"Parecen datos de tarjeta de pago (nunca se almacenan en memoria)\",\n\t\"secret-assignment\": \"Parece una contraseña/secreto/token (nunca se almacena en memoria)\",\n\t\"pii-email\": \"Parece un correo electrónico personal (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\t\"pii-phone\": \"Parece un número de teléfono (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\t\"pii-id\": \"Parece un documento de identidad (DNI/NIE) (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\t\"pii-bank\": \"Parece una cuenta bancaria / IBAN (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad)\",\n\t\"pii-dob\": \"Parece una fecha de nacimiento (bloqueada por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\tinjection: \"Parece un intento de prompt injection (nunca se almacena)\",\n\texfiltration: \"Parece exfiltración de datos (nunca se almacena)\",\n};\n\nfunction testPattern(pattern: Pattern, content: string): boolean {\n\ttry {\n\t\treturn pattern.pattern.test(content);\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn false;\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify content against the security policy.\n *\n * @param content   Text to classify.\n * @param level     Configured privacy level.\n * @param locale    \"es\" or \"en\" for the reason language.\n */\nexport function classifySensitive(content: string, level: PrivacyLevel = \"strict\", locale: \"es\" | \"en\" = \"es\"): SensitivityResult {\n\tconst categories = new Set<SensitiveCategory>();\n\tconst reasons: string[] = [];\n\tconst labels: string[] = [];\n\n\t// Invisible characters are always suspicious (injection vectors).\n\tif ([...content].some((ch) => INVISIBLE_CHARS.has(ch))) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tblocked: true,\n\t\t\tcategories: [\"injection\"],\n\t\t\treason: locale === \"es\"\n\t\t\t\t? \"El contenido contiene caracteres invisibles/zero-width y fue rechazado por seguridad.\"\n\t\t\t\t: \"Content contains invisible/zero-width characters and was rejected for security.\",\n\t\t\tnoteworthy: true,\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\tconst allPatterns = [...ALWAYS_BLOCKED, ...PAYMENT, ...PII, ...INJECTION];\n\tfor (const pattern of allPatterns) {\n\t\tif (!testPattern(pattern, content)) continue;\n\t\tconst levelIdx = LEVEL_ORDER[level];\n\t\tconst blockAtIdx = pattern.blockAt ? LEVEL_ORDER[pattern.blockAt] : 0;\n\t\tconst blocked = pattern.always === true || levelIdx <= blockAtIdx;\n\t\tcategories.add(pattern.category);\n\t\tif (blocked) {\n\t\t\tlabels.push(pattern.label);\n\t\t\tif (!reasons.includes(pattern.category)) reasons.push(pattern.category);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif (reasons.length > 0) {\n\t\tconst localeMap = locale === \"es\" ? REASON_ES : REASON_EN;\n\t\tconst detail = reasons.map((r) => localeMap[r as SensitiveCategory]).join(\"; \");\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tblocked: true,\n\t\t\tcategories: [...categories],\n\t\t\treason: detail,\n\t\t\tnoteworthy: true,\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tblocked: false,\n\t\tcategories: [...categories],\n\t\treason: \"\",\n\t\tnoteworthy: categories.size > 0,\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * Redact sensitive data from user text so it never reaches the LLM, the\n * session file, or the chat transcript. Only high-confidence patterns are\n * redacted (credentials, payment data, explicit secret assignments, and\n * PII like emails / national IDs / IBANs / DOB).\n */\nexport function redactSensitive(text: string, level: PrivacyLevel = \"strict\"): string {\n\tlet out = text;\n\tconst levelIdx = LEVEL_ORDER[level];\n\tfor (const pattern of [...ALWAYS_BLOCKED, ...PAYMENT, ...PII]) {\n\t\tif (pattern.category === \"pii-phone\") {\n\t\t\t// Phone redaction requires separators or a + prefix to avoid\n\t\t\t// mangling ordinary numbers in code.\n\t\t\tif (!/(?:\\+|\\s|\\()?\\d{3}[\\s.-]\\d{3}[\\s.-]\\d{3,4}/.test(text)) continue;\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst blockAtIdx = pattern.blockAt ? LEVEL_ORDER[pattern.blockAt] : 0;\n\t\tconst active = pattern.always === true || levelIdx <= blockAtIdx;\n\t\tif (!active) continue;\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tout = out.replace(pattern.pattern, (match) => \"█\".repeat(Math.min(match.length, 14)));\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// A bad pattern must never break redaction.\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn out;\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/memory-engine/security.js

@@ -28,6 +28,16 @@ const ALWAYS_BLOCKED = [
     { category: "secret-assignment", pattern: /\b(password|passwd|pwd)\s*[=:]\s*\S{6,}\b/i, always: true, label: "password value" },
     { category: "secret-assignment", pattern: /\b(?:contraseña|contraseña|clave)\s*[=:]\s*\S{6,}\b/i, always: true, label: "contraseña valor" },
     { category: "secret-assignment", pattern: /\b(?:contraseña|password|passwd|pwd|clave)\b[^\n]{0,40}\b\d{6,}\b/i, always: true, label: "password-like value" },
+    {
+        category: "secret-assignment",
+        // Secret keyword followed by a value on the same line: the match spans
+        // keyword + value so redaction never leaves the value exposed. The
+        // value must be an alnum token (≥4 chars) containing a digit or symbol,
+        // which avoids false positives like "contraseña por defecto".
+        pattern: /\b(?:contraseña|password|passwd|pwd|clave|token|api[_-]?key|secret)\b[^\n]{0,40}\b(?=[A-Za-z0-9_\-!@#$%^&*]*\d)[A-Za-z0-9_\-!@#$%^&*]{4,}/i,
+        always: true,
+        label: "secret value after keyword",
+    },
     { category: "secret-assignment", pattern: /\b(?:recuerda|guarda|memoriza|remember|save|store)\b.{0,50}\b(?:contraseña|password|passwd|pwd|clave|token|api[_-]?key)\b/i, always: true, label: "request to store a secret" },
     { category: "secret-assignment", pattern: /\b(secret|token|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key)\s*[=:]\s*\S{10,}\b/i, always: true, label: "secret/token value" },
     { category: "credential", pattern: /\b(ANTHROPIC|OPENAI|OPENROUTER|GEMINI|DEEPSEEK|MISTRAL|AZURE)_?(API)?_?KEY\b/i, always: true, label: "provider API key env var" },

package/dist/core/memory-engine/security.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* Security & privacy classification for the Ada Memory Engine.\n *\n * Enterprise-grade guards:\n * - Credentials/secrets/payment data are ALWAYS blocked at every level.\n * - PII (email, phone, national IDs, IBAN, DOB) blocking depends on the\n *   configured privacy level (RGPD / AI Act friendly).\n * - Every rejection is written to the audit log with a reason.\n * - Prompt-injection/exfiltration patterns are always blocked.\n */\n\nexport type PrivacyLevel = \"strict\" | \"balanced\" | \"permissive\";\n\nexport type SensitiveCategory =\n\t| \"credential\"\n\t| \"payment\"\n\t| \"secret-assignment\"\n\t| \"pii-email\"\n\t| \"pii-phone\"\n\t| \"pii-id\"\n\t| \"pii-bank\"\n\t| \"pii-dob\"\n\t| \"injection\"\n\t| \"exfiltration\";\n\nexport interface SensitivityResult {\n\t/** True when the content must NOT be stored. */\n\tblocked: boolean;\n\t/** Categories detected. */\n\tcategories: SensitiveCategory[];\n\t/** Human-readable reason (in the configured language). */\n\treason: string;\n\t/** True when content contains permitted-but-noteworthy categories. */\n\tnoteworthy: boolean;\n}\n\ninterface Pattern {\n\tcategory: SensitiveCategory;\n\tpattern: RegExp;\n\t/** Always blocked regardless of privacy level. */\n\talways?: boolean;\n\t/** Blocked at this level and stricter. */\n\tblockAt?: PrivacyLevel;\n\t/** English reason label. */\n\tlabel: string;\n}\n\n// ─── Credentials & secrets — ALWAYS blocked ───\nconst ALWAYS_BLOCKED: Pattern[] = [\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bsk-ant-api\\S{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Anthropic API key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bsk-or-v1-\\S{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"OpenRouter API key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"OpenAI-style API key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\\b/, always: true, label: \"AWS access key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"GitHub personal token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bghu_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"GitHub user token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Slack token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bxapp-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Slack app token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bntn_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Notion token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}/, always: true, label: \"JWT token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /-----BEGIN\\s+(?:RSA\\s+|EC\\s+|OPENSSH\\s+)?PRIVATE\\s+KEY-----/, always: true, label: \"Private key block\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bBearer\\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{20,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"Bearer auth token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bapi[_-]?key\\s*[=:]\\s*[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"API key assignment\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\b(client|app|consumer)_?secret\\s*[=:]\\s*[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"OAuth client secret\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bwebhook[_-]?url\\s*[=:]\\s*https?:\\/\\/[^\\s]+/i, always: true, label: \"Webhook URL\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(password|passwd|pwd)\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{6,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"password value\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(?:contraseña|contraseña|clave)\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{6,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"contraseña valor\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(?:contraseña|password|passwd|pwd|clave)\\b[^\\n]{0,40}\\b\\d{6,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"password-like value\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(?:recuerda|guarda|memoriza|remember|save|store)\\b.{0,50}\\b(?:contraseña|password|passwd|pwd|clave|token|api[_-]?key)\\b/i, always: true, label: \"request to store a secret\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(secret|token|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key)\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{10,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"secret/token value\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\b(ANTHROPIC|OPENAI|OPENROUTER|GEMINI|DEEPSEEK|MISTRAL|AZURE)_?(API)?_?KEY\\b/i, always: true, label: \"provider API key env var\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bGITHUB_TOKEN\\b|\\bAWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\\b|\\bDATABASE_URL\\b/i, always: true, label: \"secret env var name\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /(?:mongodb|postgres|mysql|redis|amqp):\\/\\/[^\\s]*:[^\\s@]+@/, always: true, label: \"connection string with credentials\" },\n];\n\n// ─── Payment data — ALWAYS blocked ───\nconst PAYMENT: Pattern[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"payment\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:4\\d{3}|5[1-5]\\d{2}|3[47]\\d{2}|6(?:011|5\\d{2}))[\\s-]?\\d{4}[\\s-]?\\d{4}[\\s-]?\\d{4}\\b/,\n\t\talways: true,\n\t\tlabel: \"payment card number\",\n\t},\n\t{ category: \"payment\", pattern: /\\bcvv\\s*[=:]\\s*\\d{3,4}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"card verification value\" },\n\t{ category: \"payment\", pattern: /\\b(?:expiry|exp)\\s*[=:]\\s*(?:0[1-9]|1[0-2])\\/?\\d{2}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"card expiry\" },\n];\n\n// ─── PII — level-dependent ───\nconst PII: Pattern[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-email\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\\.[A-Za-z]{2,}\\b/,\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"personal email address\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-phone\",\n\t\tpattern: /(?:\\+\\d{1,3}[\\s-]?)?(?:\\(?\\d{2,4}\\)?[\\s-]?)?\\d{3}[\\s-]?\\d{3}[\\s-]?\\d{3,4}\\b/,\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"phone number\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-id\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b\\d{8}[A-Z]\\b|\\b[A-Z]\\d{7}[A-Z0-9]\\b/, // DNI / NIE (Spain)\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"national ID (DNI/NIE)\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-bank\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b[A-Z]{2}\\d{2}[A-Z0-9]{11,30}\\b/, // IBAN\n\t\tblockAt: \"balanced\",\n\t\tlabel: \"IBAN / bank account\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-dob\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:birth|birthday|born|nacimiento|fecha de nacimiento)\\s*[=:]\\s*(?:\\d{1,2}[\\/\\-.]\\d{1,2}[\\/\\-.]\\d{2,4})/i,\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"date of birth\",\n\t},\n];\n\n// ─── Prompt injection / exfiltration — ALWAYS blocked ───\nconst INJECTION: Pattern[] = [\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /ignore\\s+(previous|all|above|prior)\\s+instructions/i, always: true, label: \"prompt injection\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /you\\s+are\\s+now\\s+/i, always: true, label: \"role hijack\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /do\\s+not\\s+tell\\s+the\\s+user/i, always: true, label: \"deceptive instruction\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /disregard\\s+(your|all|any)\\s+(instructions|rules|guidelines)/i, always: true, label: \"instruction override\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /system\\s+prompt\\s+override/i, always: true, label: \"system prompt override\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /curl\\s+[^\\n]*(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|API)/i, always: true, label: \"credential exfiltration (curl)\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /wget\\s+[^\\n]*(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|API)/i, always: true, label: \"credential exfiltration (wget)\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /cat\\s+[^\\n]*(\\.env|credentials|\\.netrc|\\.pgpass|\\.npmrc|\\.pypirc)/i, always: true, label: \"secret file read\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /\\$HOME\\/\\.ssh|~\\/\\.ssh/i, always: true, label: \"SSH key path\" },\n];\n\nconst LEVEL_ORDER: Record<PrivacyLevel, number> = { strict: 0, balanced: 1, permissive: 2 };\n\nconst INVISIBLE_CHARS = new Set([\n\t\"\\u200b\", \"\\u200c\", \"\\u200d\", \"\\u2060\", \"\\ufeff\",\n\t\"\\u202a\", \"\\u202b\", \"\\u202c\", \"\\u202d\", \"\\u202e\",\n]);\n\nconst REASON_EN = {\n\tcredential: \"Looks like a credential or secret (secrets are never stored in memory)\",\n\tpayment: \"Looks like payment card data (never stored in memory)\",\n\t\"secret-assignment\": \"Looks like a password/secret/token value (never stored in memory)\",\n\t\"pii-email\": \"Looks like a personal email address (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-phone\": \"Looks like a phone number (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-id\": \"Looks like a national ID (DNI/NIE) (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-bank\": \"Looks like a bank account / IBAN (blocked by the privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-dob\": \"Looks like a date of birth (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\tinjection: \"Looks like a prompt-injection attempt (never stored)\",\n\texfiltration: \"Looks like data exfiltration (never stored)\",\n};\n\nconst REASON_ES: Record<SensitiveCategory, string> = {\n\tcredential: \"Parece una credencial o secreto (los secretos nunca se almacenan en memoria)\",\n\tpayment: \"Parecen datos de tarjeta de pago (nunca se almacenan en memoria)\",\n\t\"secret-assignment\": \"Parece una contraseña/secreto/token (nunca se almacena en memoria)\",\n\t\"pii-email\": \"Parece un correo electrónico personal (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\t\"pii-phone\": \"Parece un número de teléfono (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\t\"pii-id\": \"Parece un documento de identidad (DNI/NIE) (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\t\"pii-bank\": \"Parece una cuenta bancaria / IBAN (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad)\",\n\t\"pii-dob\": \"Parece una fecha de nacimiento (bloqueada por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\tinjection: \"Parece un intento de prompt injection (nunca se almacena)\",\n\texfiltration: \"Parece exfiltración de datos (nunca se almacena)\",\n};\n\nfunction testPattern(pattern: Pattern, content: string): boolean {\n\ttry {\n\t\treturn pattern.pattern.test(content);\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn false;\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify content against the security policy.\n *\n * @param content   Text to classify.\n * @param level     Configured privacy level.\n * @param locale    \"es\" or \"en\" for the reason language.\n */\nexport function classifySensitive(content: string, level: PrivacyLevel = \"strict\", locale: \"es\" | \"en\" = \"es\"): SensitivityResult {\n\tconst categories = new Set<SensitiveCategory>();\n\tconst reasons: string[] = [];\n\tconst labels: string[] = [];\n\n\t// Invisible characters are always suspicious (injection vectors).\n\tif ([...content].some((ch) => INVISIBLE_CHARS.has(ch))) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tblocked: true,\n\t\t\tcategories: [\"injection\"],\n\t\t\treason: locale === \"es\"\n\t\t\t\t? \"El contenido contiene caracteres invisibles/zero-width y fue rechazado por seguridad.\"\n\t\t\t\t: \"Content contains invisible/zero-width characters and was rejected for security.\",\n\t\t\tnoteworthy: true,\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\tconst allPatterns = [...ALWAYS_BLOCKED, ...PAYMENT, ...PII, ...INJECTION];\n\tfor (const pattern of allPatterns) {\n\t\tif (!testPattern(pattern, content)) continue;\n\t\tconst levelIdx = LEVEL_ORDER[level];\n\t\tconst blockAtIdx = pattern.blockAt ? LEVEL_ORDER[pattern.blockAt] : 0;\n\t\tconst blocked = pattern.always === true || levelIdx <= blockAtIdx;\n\t\tcategories.add(pattern.category);\n\t\tif (blocked) {\n\t\t\tlabels.push(pattern.label);\n\t\t\tif (!reasons.includes(pattern.category)) reasons.push(pattern.category);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif (reasons.length > 0) {\n\t\tconst localeMap = locale === \"es\" ? REASON_ES : REASON_EN;\n\t\tconst detail = reasons.map((r) => localeMap[r as SensitiveCategory]).join(\"; \");\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tblocked: true,\n\t\t\tcategories: [...categories],\n\t\t\treason: detail,\n\t\t\tnoteworthy: true,\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tblocked: false,\n\t\tcategories: [...categories],\n\t\treason: \"\",\n\t\tnoteworthy: categories.size > 0,\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * Redact sensitive data from user text so it never reaches the LLM, the\n * session file, or the chat transcript. Only high-confidence patterns are\n * redacted (credentials, payment data, explicit secret assignments, and\n * PII like emails / national IDs / IBANs / DOB).\n */\nexport function redactSensitive(text: string, level: PrivacyLevel = \"strict\"): string {\n\tlet out = text;\n\tconst levelIdx = LEVEL_ORDER[level];\n\tfor (const pattern of [...ALWAYS_BLOCKED, ...PAYMENT, ...PII]) {\n\t\tif (pattern.category === \"pii-phone\") {\n\t\t\t// Phone redaction requires separators or a + prefix to avoid\n\t\t\t// mangling ordinary numbers in code.\n\t\t\tif (!/(?:\\+|\\s|\\()?\\d{3}[\\s.-]\\d{3}[\\s.-]\\d{3,4}/.test(text)) continue;\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst blockAtIdx = pattern.blockAt ? LEVEL_ORDER[pattern.blockAt] : 0;\n\t\tconst active = pattern.always === true || levelIdx <= blockAtIdx;\n\t\tif (!active) continue;\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tout = out.replace(pattern.pattern, (match) => \"█\".repeat(Math.min(match.length, 14)));\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// A bad pattern must never break redaction.\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn out;\n}\n"]}
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* Security & privacy classification for the Ada Memory Engine.\n *\n * Enterprise-grade guards:\n * - Credentials/secrets/payment data are ALWAYS blocked at every level.\n * - PII (email, phone, national IDs, IBAN, DOB) blocking depends on the\n *   configured privacy level (RGPD / AI Act friendly).\n * - Every rejection is written to the audit log with a reason.\n * - Prompt-injection/exfiltration patterns are always blocked.\n */\n\nexport type PrivacyLevel = \"strict\" | \"balanced\" | \"permissive\";\n\nexport type SensitiveCategory =\n\t| \"credential\"\n\t| \"payment\"\n\t| \"secret-assignment\"\n\t| \"pii-email\"\n\t| \"pii-phone\"\n\t| \"pii-id\"\n\t| \"pii-bank\"\n\t| \"pii-dob\"\n\t| \"injection\"\n\t| \"exfiltration\";\n\nexport interface SensitivityResult {\n\t/** True when the content must NOT be stored. */\n\tblocked: boolean;\n\t/** Categories detected. */\n\tcategories: SensitiveCategory[];\n\t/** Human-readable reason (in the configured language). */\n\treason: string;\n\t/** True when content contains permitted-but-noteworthy categories. */\n\tnoteworthy: boolean;\n}\n\ninterface Pattern {\n\tcategory: SensitiveCategory;\n\tpattern: RegExp;\n\t/** Always blocked regardless of privacy level. */\n\talways?: boolean;\n\t/** Blocked at this level and stricter. */\n\tblockAt?: PrivacyLevel;\n\t/** English reason label. */\n\tlabel: string;\n}\n\n// ─── Credentials & secrets — ALWAYS blocked ───\nconst ALWAYS_BLOCKED: Pattern[] = [\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bsk-ant-api\\S{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Anthropic API key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bsk-or-v1-\\S{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"OpenRouter API key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"OpenAI-style API key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\\b/, always: true, label: \"AWS access key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"GitHub personal token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bghu_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"GitHub user token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Slack token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bxapp-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Slack app token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bntn_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Notion token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}/, always: true, label: \"JWT token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /-----BEGIN\\s+(?:RSA\\s+|EC\\s+|OPENSSH\\s+)?PRIVATE\\s+KEY-----/, always: true, label: \"Private key block\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bBearer\\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{20,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"Bearer auth token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bapi[_-]?key\\s*[=:]\\s*[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"API key assignment\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\b(client|app|consumer)_?secret\\s*[=:]\\s*[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"OAuth client secret\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bwebhook[_-]?url\\s*[=:]\\s*https?:\\/\\/[^\\s]+/i, always: true, label: \"Webhook URL\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(password|passwd|pwd)\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{6,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"password value\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(?:contraseña|contraseña|clave)\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{6,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"contraseña valor\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(?:contraseña|password|passwd|pwd|clave)\\b[^\\n]{0,40}\\b\\d{6,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"password-like value\" },\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"secret-assignment\",\n\t\t// Secret keyword followed by a value on the same line: the match spans\n\t\t// keyword + value so redaction never leaves the value exposed. The\n\t\t// value must be an alnum token (≥4 chars) containing a digit or symbol,\n\t\t// which avoids false positives like \"contraseña por defecto\".\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:contraseña|password|passwd|pwd|clave|token|api[_-]?key|secret)\\b[^\\n]{0,40}\\b(?=[A-Za-z0-9_\\-!@#$%^&*]*\\d)[A-Za-z0-9_\\-!@#$%^&*]{4,}/i,\n\t\talways: true,\n\t\tlabel: \"secret value after keyword\",\n\t},\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(?:recuerda|guarda|memoriza|remember|save|store)\\b.{0,50}\\b(?:contraseña|password|passwd|pwd|clave|token|api[_-]?key)\\b/i, always: true, label: \"request to store a secret\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(secret|token|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key)\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{10,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"secret/token value\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\b(ANTHROPIC|OPENAI|OPENROUTER|GEMINI|DEEPSEEK|MISTRAL|AZURE)_?(API)?_?KEY\\b/i, always: true, label: \"provider API key env var\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bGITHUB_TOKEN\\b|\\bAWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\\b|\\bDATABASE_URL\\b/i, always: true, label: \"secret env var name\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /(?:mongodb|postgres|mysql|redis|amqp):\\/\\/[^\\s]*:[^\\s@]+@/, always: true, label: \"connection string with credentials\" },\n];\n\n// ─── Payment data — ALWAYS blocked ───\nconst PAYMENT: Pattern[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"payment\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:4\\d{3}|5[1-5]\\d{2}|3[47]\\d{2}|6(?:011|5\\d{2}))[\\s-]?\\d{4}[\\s-]?\\d{4}[\\s-]?\\d{4}\\b/,\n\t\talways: true,\n\t\tlabel: \"payment card number\",\n\t},\n\t{ category: \"payment\", pattern: /\\bcvv\\s*[=:]\\s*\\d{3,4}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"card verification value\" },\n\t{ category: \"payment\", pattern: /\\b(?:expiry|exp)\\s*[=:]\\s*(?:0[1-9]|1[0-2])\\/?\\d{2}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"card expiry\" },\n];\n\n// ─── PII — level-dependent ───\nconst PII: Pattern[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-email\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\\.[A-Za-z]{2,}\\b/,\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"personal email address\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-phone\",\n\t\tpattern: /(?:\\+\\d{1,3}[\\s-]?)?(?:\\(?\\d{2,4}\\)?[\\s-]?)?\\d{3}[\\s-]?\\d{3}[\\s-]?\\d{3,4}\\b/,\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"phone number\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-id\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b\\d{8}[A-Z]\\b|\\b[A-Z]\\d{7}[A-Z0-9]\\b/, // DNI / NIE (Spain)\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"national ID (DNI/NIE)\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-bank\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b[A-Z]{2}\\d{2}[A-Z0-9]{11,30}\\b/, // IBAN\n\t\tblockAt: \"balanced\",\n\t\tlabel: \"IBAN / bank account\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-dob\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:birth|birthday|born|nacimiento|fecha de nacimiento)\\s*[=:]\\s*(?:\\d{1,2}[\\/\\-.]\\d{1,2}[\\/\\-.]\\d{2,4})/i,\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"date of birth\",\n\t},\n];\n\n// ─── Prompt injection / exfiltration — ALWAYS blocked ───\nconst INJECTION: Pattern[] = [\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /ignore\\s+(previous|all|above|prior)\\s+instructions/i, always: true, label: \"prompt injection\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /you\\s+are\\s+now\\s+/i, always: true, label: \"role hijack\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /do\\s+not\\s+tell\\s+the\\s+user/i, always: true, label: \"deceptive instruction\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /disregard\\s+(your|all|any)\\s+(instructions|rules|guidelines)/i, always: true, label: \"instruction override\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /system\\s+prompt\\s+override/i, always: true, label: \"system prompt override\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /curl\\s+[^\\n]*(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|API)/i, always: true, label: \"credential exfiltration (curl)\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /wget\\s+[^\\n]*(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|API)/i, always: true, label: \"credential exfiltration (wget)\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /cat\\s+[^\\n]*(\\.env|credentials|\\.netrc|\\.pgpass|\\.npmrc|\\.pypirc)/i, always: true, label: \"secret file read\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /\\$HOME\\/\\.ssh|~\\/\\.ssh/i, always: true, label: \"SSH key path\" },\n];\n\nconst LEVEL_ORDER: Record<PrivacyLevel, number> = { strict: 0, balanced: 1, permissive: 2 };\n\nconst INVISIBLE_CHARS = new Set([\n\t\"\\u200b\", \"\\u200c\", \"\\u200d\", \"\\u2060\", \"\\ufeff\",\n\t\"\\u202a\", \"\\u202b\", \"\\u202c\", \"\\u202d\", \"\\u202e\",\n]);\n\nconst REASON_EN = {\n\tcredential: \"Looks like a credential or secret (secrets are never stored in memory)\",\n\tpayment: \"Looks like payment card data (never stored in memory)\",\n\t\"secret-assignment\": \"Looks like a password/secret/token value (never stored in memory)\",\n\t\"pii-email\": \"Looks like a personal email address (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-phone\": \"Looks like a phone number (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-id\": \"Looks like a national ID (DNI/NIE) (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-bank\": \"Looks like a bank account / IBAN (blocked by the privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-dob\": \"Looks like a date of birth (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\tinjection: \"Looks like a prompt-injection attempt (never stored)\",\n\texfiltration: \"Looks like data exfiltration (never stored)\",\n};\n\nconst REASON_ES: Record<SensitiveCategory, string> = {\n\tcredential: \"Parece una credencial o secreto (los secretos nunca se almacenan en memoria)\",\n\tpayment: \"Parecen datos de tarjeta de pago (nunca se almacenan en memoria)\",\n\t\"secret-assignment\": \"Parece una contraseña/secreto/token (nunca se almacena en memoria)\",\n\t\"pii-email\": \"Parece un correo electrónico personal (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\t\"pii-phone\": \"Parece un número de teléfono (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\t\"pii-id\": \"Parece un documento de identidad (DNI/NIE) (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\t\"pii-bank\": \"Parece una cuenta bancaria / IBAN (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad)\",\n\t\"pii-dob\": \"Parece una fecha de nacimiento (bloqueada por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\tinjection: \"Parece un intento de prompt injection (nunca se almacena)\",\n\texfiltration: \"Parece exfiltración de datos (nunca se almacena)\",\n};\n\nfunction testPattern(pattern: Pattern, content: string): boolean {\n\ttry {\n\t\treturn pattern.pattern.test(content);\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn false;\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify content against the security policy.\n *\n * @param content   Text to classify.\n * @param level     Configured privacy level.\n * @param locale    \"es\" or \"en\" for the reason language.\n */\nexport function classifySensitive(content: string, level: PrivacyLevel = \"strict\", locale: \"es\" | \"en\" = \"es\"): SensitivityResult {\n\tconst categories = new Set<SensitiveCategory>();\n\tconst reasons: string[] = [];\n\tconst labels: string[] = [];\n\n\t// Invisible characters are always suspicious (injection vectors).\n\tif ([...content].some((ch) => INVISIBLE_CHARS.has(ch))) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tblocked: true,\n\t\t\tcategories: [\"injection\"],\n\t\t\treason: locale === \"es\"\n\t\t\t\t? \"El contenido contiene caracteres invisibles/zero-width y fue rechazado por seguridad.\"\n\t\t\t\t: \"Content contains invisible/zero-width characters and was rejected for security.\",\n\t\t\tnoteworthy: true,\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\tconst allPatterns = [...ALWAYS_BLOCKED, ...PAYMENT, ...PII, ...INJECTION];\n\tfor (const pattern of allPatterns) {\n\t\tif (!testPattern(pattern, content)) continue;\n\t\tconst levelIdx = LEVEL_ORDER[level];\n\t\tconst blockAtIdx = pattern.blockAt ? LEVEL_ORDER[pattern.blockAt] : 0;\n\t\tconst blocked = pattern.always === true || levelIdx <= blockAtIdx;\n\t\tcategories.add(pattern.category);\n\t\tif (blocked) {\n\t\t\tlabels.push(pattern.label);\n\t\t\tif (!reasons.includes(pattern.category)) reasons.push(pattern.category);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif (reasons.length > 0) {\n\t\tconst localeMap = locale === \"es\" ? REASON_ES : REASON_EN;\n\t\tconst detail = reasons.map((r) => localeMap[r as SensitiveCategory]).join(\"; \");\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tblocked: true,\n\t\t\tcategories: [...categories],\n\t\t\treason: detail,\n\t\t\tnoteworthy: true,\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tblocked: false,\n\t\tcategories: [...categories],\n\t\treason: \"\",\n\t\tnoteworthy: categories.size > 0,\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * Redact sensitive data from user text so it never reaches the LLM, the\n * session file, or the chat transcript. Only high-confidence patterns are\n * redacted (credentials, payment data, explicit secret assignments, and\n * PII like emails / national IDs / IBANs / DOB).\n */\nexport function redactSensitive(text: string, level: PrivacyLevel = \"strict\"): string {\n\tlet out = text;\n\tconst levelIdx = LEVEL_ORDER[level];\n\tfor (const pattern of [...ALWAYS_BLOCKED, ...PAYMENT, ...PII]) {\n\t\tif (pattern.category === \"pii-phone\") {\n\t\t\t// Phone redaction requires separators or a + prefix to avoid\n\t\t\t// mangling ordinary numbers in code.\n\t\t\tif (!/(?:\\+|\\s|\\()?\\d{3}[\\s.-]\\d{3}[\\s.-]\\d{3,4}/.test(text)) continue;\n\t\t}\n\t\tconst blockAtIdx = pattern.blockAt ? LEVEL_ORDER[pattern.blockAt] : 0;\n\t\tconst active = pattern.always === true || levelIdx <= blockAtIdx;\n\t\tif (!active) continue;\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tout = out.replace(pattern.pattern, (match) => \"█\".repeat(Math.min(match.length, 14)));\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t// A bad pattern must never break redaction.\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn out;\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/memory-engine/vault.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+/**
+ * Ada Secure Vault — encrypted secret storage.
+ *
+ * - Project vault: AES-256-GCM encrypted at rest under
+ *   <agentDir>/vault/<project-hash>/vault.json; the key is derived from the
+ *   user passphrase with scrypt (never stored).
+ * - Session vault: per-conversation secrets kept ONLY in process memory
+ *   (never written to disk).
+ * - Values are exposed to the LLM only through @vault:<name> expansion in
+ *   the user's prompt, and the persisted session file stores the redacted
+ *   form (the expansion is stripped before persistence).
+ *
+ * Zero native dependencies: node:crypto works on Node and Bun.
+ */
+import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
+export interface VaultSecret {
+    name: string;
+    value: string;
+    note?: string;
+    category?: string;
+    created: string;
+    updated: string;
+}
+export interface VaultListEntry {
+    name: string;
+    note?: string;
+    category?: string;
+    created: string;
+    updated: string;
+    source: "project" | "session";
+}
+/** Reference syntax in user prompts: @vault:<name>. */
+export declare const VAULT_REF_PATTERN: RegExp;
+export interface VaultExpansion {
+    text: string;
+    /** Names that were expanded (empty when none). */
+    expanded: string[];
+    /** Names referenced but missing (not expanded). */
+    missing: string[];
+}
+/**
+ * Expand @vault:<name> references in a prompt. The returned text is what the
+ * LLM receives; the ORIGINAL input (redacted) is what gets persisted.
+ */
+export declare function expandVaultRefs(text: string, vault: VaultManager | null): VaultExpansion;
+export declare class SessionVault {
+    private entries;
+    add(name: string, value: string): void;
+    get(name: string): string | null;
+    remove(name: string): boolean;
+    has(name: string): boolean;
+    list(): string[];
+    clear(): void;
+}
+export declare class ProjectVault {
+    private secrets;
+    private key;
+    private constructor();
+    /** Create a new empty project vault (writes the encrypted file). */
+    static create(filePath: string, passphrase: string): Promise<ProjectVault>;
+    /** Open an existing vault. Throws on wrong passphrase. */
+    static open(filePath: string, passphrase: string): Promise<ProjectVault>;
+    add(name: string, value: string, note?: string, category?: string): void;
+    update(name: string, value: string, note?: string, category?: string): boolean;
+    get(name: string): string | null;
+    remove(name: string): boolean;
+    has(name: string): boolean;
+    list(): VaultListEntry[];
+    get entryCount(): number;
+    save(filePath: string, salt?: Buffer): Promise<void>;
+}
+export declare class VaultManager {
+    private projectVault;
+    readonly sessionVault: SessionVault;
+    private vaultDir;
+    private projectHash;
+    constructor(agentDir: string, projectHash: string | null);
+    get vaultPath(): string;
+    get isUnlocked(): boolean;
+    /** True when a project vault file already exists. */
+    exists(): boolean;
+    /**
+     * Unlock (or create) the project vault with the user passphrase.
+     * Returns false on wrong passphrase.
+     */
+    unlock(passphrase: string): Promise<boolean>;
+    lock(): void;
+    add(name: string, value: string, note?: string, category?: string): boolean;
+    update(name: string, value: string, note?: string): boolean;
+    remove(name: string): boolean;
+    getSecret(name: string): string | null;
+    sessionAdd(name: string, value: string): void;
+    sessionRemove(name: string): boolean;
+    list(): VaultListEntry[];
+    status(): {
+        unlocked: boolean;
+        vaultPath: string;
+        exists: boolean;
+        projectCount: number;
+        sessionCount: number;
+    };
+}
+export { existsSync };
+//# sourceMappingURL=vault.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/memory-engine/vault.d.ts.map

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the key is derived from the\n *   user passphrase with scrypt (never stored).\n * - Session vault: per-conversation secrets kept ONLY in process memory\n *   (never written to disk).\n * - Values are exposed to the LLM only through @vault:<name> expansion in\n *   the user's prompt, and the persisted session file stores the redacted\n *   form (the expansion is stripped before persistence).\n *\n * Zero native dependencies: node:crypto works on Node and Bun.\n */\n\nimport { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, randomBytes, scryptSync } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport { readFile, writeFile, mkdir } from \"node:fs/promises\";\nimport { existsSync } from \"node:fs\";\nimport { dirname, join } from \"node:path\";\n\nexport interface VaultSecret {\n\tname: string;\n\tvalue: string;\n\tnote?: string;\n\tcategory?: string;\n\tcreated: string;\n\tupdated: string;\n}\n\nexport interface VaultListEntry {\n\tname: string;\n\tnote?: string;\n\tcategory?: string;\n\tcreated: string;\n\tupdated: string;\n\tsource: \"project\" | \"session\";\n}\n\nconst KDF_N = 32768;\nconst KDF_R = 8;\nconst KDF_P = 1;\nconst KEY_LENGTH = 32;\n\ninterface VaultFilePayload {\n\tversion: 1;\n\tkdf: \"scrypt\";\n\tN: number;\n\tr: number;\n\tp: number;\n\tsalt: string; // base64\n\tiv: string; // base64\n\ttag: string; // base64 (GCM auth tag)\n\tdata: string; // base64 (AES-256-GCM ciphertext of the JSON entries)\n}\n\nfunction deriveKey(passphrase: string, salt: Buffer, N = KDF_N, r = KDF_R, p = KDF_P): Buffer {\n\treturn scryptSync(passphrase, salt, KEY_LENGTH, { N, r, p, maxmem: 128 * 1024 * 1024 });\n}\n\nfunction encryptPayload(payload: VaultSecret[], key: Buffer): { iv: Buffer; tag: Buffer; data: Buffer } {\n\tconst iv = randomBytes(12);\n\tconst cipher = createCipheriv(\"aes-256-gcm\", key, iv);\n\tconst data = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(JSON.stringify(payload), \"utf-8\"), cipher.final()]);\n\tconst tag = cipher.getAuthTag();\n\treturn { iv, tag, data };\n}\n\nfunction decryptPayload(file: VaultFilePayload, key: Buffer): VaultSecret[] {\n\tconst decipher = createDecipheriv(\"aes-256-gcm\", key, Buffer.from(file.iv, \"base64\"));\n\tdecipher.setAuthTag(Buffer.from(file.tag, \"base64\"));\n\tconst plain = Buffer.concat([\n\t\tdecipher.update(Buffer.from(file.data, \"base64\")),\n\t\tdecipher.final(), // throws on wrong passphrase (auth failure)\n\t]);\n\treturn JSON.parse(plain.toString(\"utf-8\")) as VaultSecret[];\n}\n\n/** Reference syntax in user prompts: @vault:<name>. */\nexport const VAULT_REF_PATTERN = /@vault:([A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)/g;\n\nexport interface VaultExpansion {\n\ttext: string;\n\t/** Names that were expanded (empty when none). */\n\texpanded: string[];\n\t/** Names referenced but missing (not expanded). */\n\tmissing: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Expand @vault:<name> references in a prompt. The returned text is what the\n * LLM receives; the ORIGINAL input (redacted) is what gets persisted.\n */\nexport function expandVaultRefs(text: string, vault: VaultManager | null): VaultExpansion {\n\tconst expanded: string[] = [];\n\tconst missing: string[] = [];\n\tif (!vault) {\n\t\tfor (const match of text.matchAll(VAULT_REF_PATTERN)) {\n\t\t\tmissing.push(match[1]);\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn { text, expanded, missing };\n\t}\n\tconst out = text.replace(VAULT_REF_PATTERN, (_full, name: string) => {\n\t\tconst value = vault.getSecret(name);\n\t\tif (value !== null) {\n\t\t\texpanded.push(name);\n\t\t\treturn value;\n\t\t}\n\t\tmissing.push(name);\n\t\treturn _full; // leave the reference intact so the user sees it failed\n\t});\n\treturn { text: out, expanded, missing };\n}\n\nexport class SessionVault {\n\tprivate entries = new Map<string, string>();\n\n\tadd(name: string, value: string): void {\n\t\tthis.entries.set(name, value);\n\t}\n\n\tget(name: string): string | null {\n\t\treturn this.entries.get(name) ?? null;\n\t}\n\n\tremove(name: string): boolean {\n\t\treturn this.entries.delete(name);\n\t}\n\n\thas(name: string): boolean {\n\t\treturn this.entries.has(name);\n\t}\n\n\tlist(): string[] {\n\t\treturn [...this.entries.keys()].sort();\n\t}\n\n\tclear(): void {\n\t\tthis.entries.clear();\n\t}\n}\n\nexport class ProjectVault {\n\tprivate secrets: Map<string, VaultSecret>;\n\tprivate key: Buffer;\n\n\tprivate constructor(key: Buffer, secrets: Map<string, VaultSecret>) {\n\t\tthis.key = key;\n\t\tthis.secrets = secrets;\n\t}\n\n\t/** Create a new empty project vault (writes the encrypted file). */\n\tstatic async create(filePath: string, passphrase: string): Promise<ProjectVault> {\n\t\tconst salt = randomBytes(16);\n\t\tconst key = deriveKey(passphrase, salt);\n\t\tconst vault = new ProjectVault(key, new Map());\n\t\tawait vault.save(filePath, salt);\n\t\treturn vault;\n\t}\n\n\t/** Open an existing vault. Throws on wrong passphrase. */\n\tstatic async open(filePath: string, passphrase: string): Promise<ProjectVault> {\n\t\tconst raw = await readFile(filePath, \"utf-8\");\n\t\tconst file = JSON.parse(raw) as VaultFilePayload;\n\t\tconst key = deriveKey(passphrase, Buffer.from(file.salt, \"base64\"), file.N, file.r, file.p);\n\t\tconst secrets = decryptPayload(file, key);\n\t\treturn new ProjectVault(\n\t\t\tkey,\n\t\t\tnew Map(secrets.map((s) => [s.name, s])),\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\tadd(name: string, value: string, note?: string, category?: string): void {\n\t\tconst now = new Date().toISOString();\n\t\tthis.secrets.set(name, { name, value, note, category, created: now, updated: now });\n\t}\n\n\tupdate(name: string, value: string, note?: string, category?: string): boolean {\n\t\tconst existing = this.secrets.get(name);\n\t\tif (!existing) return false;\n\t\tconst now = new Date().toISOString();\n\t\tthis.secrets.set(name, {\n\t\t\t...existing,\n\t\t\tvalue,\n\t\t\tnote: note ?? existing.note,\n\t\t\tcategory: category ?? existing.category,\n\t\t\tupdated: now,\n\t\t});\n\t\treturn true;\n\t}\n\n\tget(name: string): string | null {\n\t\treturn this.secrets.get(name)?.value ?? null;\n\t}\n\n\tremove(name: string): boolean {\n\t\treturn this.secrets.delete(name);\n\t}\n\n\thas(name: string): boolean {\n\t\treturn this.secrets.has(name);\n\t}\n\n\tlist(): VaultListEntry[] {\n\t\treturn [...this.secrets.values()]\n\t\t\t.map((s) => ({\n\t\t\t\tname: s.name,\n\t\t\t\tnote: s.note,\n\t\t\t\tcategory: s.category,\n\t\t\t\tcreated: s.created,\n\t\t\t\tupdated: s.updated,\n\t\t\t\tsource: \"project\" as const,\n\t\t\t}))\n\t\t\t.sort((a, b) => a.name.localeCompare(b.name));\n\t}\n\n\tget entryCount(): number {\n\t\treturn this.secrets.size;\n\t}\n\n\tasync save(filePath: string, salt?: Buffer): Promise<void> {\n\t\tconst { iv, tag, data } = encryptPayload([...this.secrets.values()], this.key);\n\t\tconst payload: VaultFilePayload = {\n\t\t\tversion: 1,\n\t\t\tkdf: \"scrypt\",\n\t\t\tN: KDF_N,\n\t\t\tr: KDF_R,\n\t\t\tp: KDF_P,\n\t\t\tsalt: (salt ?? randomBytes(16)).toString(\"base64\"),\n\t\t\tiv: iv.toString(\"base64\"),\n\t\t\ttag: tag.toString(\"base64\"),\n\t\t\tdata: data.toString(\"base64\"),\n\t\t};\n\t\tawait mkdir(dirname(filePath), { recursive: true });\n\t\tawait writeFile(filePath, JSON.stringify(payload, null, 1), \"utf-8\");\n\t}\n}\n\nexport class VaultManager {\n\tprivate projectVault: ProjectVault | null = null;\n\treadonly sessionVault = new SessionVault();\n\tprivate vaultDir: string;\n\tprivate projectHash: string;\n\n\tconstructor(agentDir: string, projectHash: string | null) {\n\t\tthis.vaultDir = join(agentDir, \"vault\");\n\t\tthis.projectHash = projectHash ?? \"global\";\n\t}\n\n\tget vaultPath(): string {\n\t\treturn join(this.vaultDir, this.projectHash, \"vault.json\");\n\t}\n\n\tget isUnlocked(): boolean {\n\t\treturn this.projectVault !== null;\n\t}\n\n\t/** True when a project vault file already exists. */\n\texists(): boolean {\n\t\treturn existsSync(this.vaultPath);\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Unlock (or create) the project vault with the user passphrase.\n\t * Returns false on wrong passphrase.\n\t */\n\tasync unlock(passphrase: string): Promise<boolean> {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tif (this.exists()) {\n\t\t\t\tthis.projectVault = await ProjectVault.open(this.vaultPath, passphrase);\n\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\tthis.projectVault = await ProjectVault.create(this.vaultPath, passphrase);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn true;\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\tthis.projectVault = null;\n\t\t\treturn false;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tlock(): void {\n\t\tthis.projectVault = null;\n\t}\n\n\t// ─── Project vault operations (require unlock) ───\n\n\tadd(name: string, value: string, note?: string, category?: string): boolean {\n\t\tif (!this.projectVault || !name.trim() || !value) return false;\n\t\tthis.projectVault.add(name.trim(), value, note, category);\n\t\tvoid this.projectVault.save(this.vaultPath).catch(() => {});\n\t\treturn true;\n\t}\n\n\tupdate(name: string, value: string, note?: string): boolean {\n\t\tif (!this.projectVault) return false;\n\t\tconst ok = this.projectVault.update(name, value, note);\n\t\tif (ok) void this.projectVault.save(this.vaultPath).catch(() => {});\n\t\treturn ok;\n\t}\n\n\tremove(name: string): boolean {\n\t\tif (!this.projectVault) return false;\n\t\tconst ok = this.projectVault.remove(name);\n\t\tif (ok) void this.projectVault.save(this.vaultPath).catch(() => {});\n\t\treturn ok;\n\t}\n\n\t// ─── Lookup (project first, then session) ───\n\n\tgetSecret(name: string): string | null {\n\t\tconst fromProject = this.projectVault?.get(name) ?? null;\n\t\tif (fromProject !== null) return fromProject;\n\t\treturn this.sessionVault.get(name);\n\t}\n\n\t// ─── Session vault (memory only) ───\n\n\tsessionAdd(name: string, value: string): void {\n\t\tthis.sessionVault.add(name, value);\n\t}\n\n\tsessionRemove(name: string): boolean {\n\t\treturn this.sessionVault.remove(name);\n\t}\n\n\t// ─── Listing ───\n\n\tlist(): VaultListEntry[] {\n\t\tconst entries: VaultListEntry[] = [];\n\t\tif (this.projectVault) entries.push(...this.projectVault.list());\n\t\tfor (const name of this.sessionVault.list()) {\n\t\t\tentries.push({\n\t\t\t\tname,\n\t\t\t\tcreated: \"\",\n\t\t\t\tupdated: \"\",\n\t\t\t\tsource: \"session\",\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn entries.sort((a, b) => a.name.localeCompare(b.name));\n\t}\n\n\tstatus(): {\n\t\tunlocked: boolean;\n\t\tvaultPath: string;\n\t\texists: boolean;\n\t\tprojectCount: number;\n\t\tsessionCount: number;\n\t} {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tunlocked: this.isUnlocked,\n\t\t\tvaultPath: this.vaultPath,\n\t\t\texists: this.exists(),\n\t\t\tprojectCount: this.projectVault?.entryCount ?? 0,\n\t\t\tsessionCount: this.sessionVault.list().length,\n\t\t};\n\t}\n}\n\nexport { existsSync };\n"]}

package/dist/core/memory-engine/vault.js

@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+/**
+ * Ada Secure Vault — encrypted secret storage.
+ *
+ * - Project vault: AES-256-GCM encrypted at rest under
+ *   <agentDir>/vault/<project-hash>/vault.json; the key is derived from the
+ *   user passphrase with scrypt (never stored).
+ * - Session vault: per-conversation secrets kept ONLY in process memory
+ *   (never written to disk).
+ * - Values are exposed to the LLM only through @vault:<name> expansion in
+ *   the user's prompt, and the persisted session file stores the redacted
+ *   form (the expansion is stripped before persistence).
+ *
+ * Zero native dependencies: node:crypto works on Node and Bun.
+ */
+import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, randomBytes, scryptSync } from "node:crypto";
+import { readFile, writeFile, mkdir } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
+import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
+const KDF_N = 32768;
+const KDF_R = 8;
+const KDF_P = 1;
+const KEY_LENGTH = 32;
+function deriveKey(passphrase, salt, N = KDF_N, r = KDF_R, p = KDF_P) {
+    return scryptSync(passphrase, salt, KEY_LENGTH, { N, r, p, maxmem: 128 * 1024 * 1024 });
+}
+function encryptPayload(payload, key) {
+    const iv = randomBytes(12);
+    const cipher = createCipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key, iv);
+    const data = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(JSON.stringify(payload), "utf-8"), cipher.final()]);
+    const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
+    return { iv, tag, data };
+}
+function decryptPayload(file, key) {
+    const decipher = createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key, Buffer.from(file.iv, "base64"));
+    decipher.setAuthTag(Buffer.from(file.tag, "base64"));
+    const plain = Buffer.concat([
+        decipher.update(Buffer.from(file.data, "base64")),
+        decipher.final(), // throws on wrong passphrase (auth failure)
+    ]);
+    return JSON.parse(plain.toString("utf-8"));
+}
+/** Reference syntax in user prompts: @vault:<name>. */
+export const VAULT_REF_PATTERN = /@vault:([A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)/g;
+/**
+ * Expand @vault:<name> references in a prompt. The returned text is what the
+ * LLM receives; the ORIGINAL input (redacted) is what gets persisted.
+ */
+export function expandVaultRefs(text, vault) {
+    const expanded = [];
+    const missing = [];
+    if (!vault) {
+        for (const match of text.matchAll(VAULT_REF_PATTERN)) {
+            missing.push(match[1]);
+        }
+        return { text, expanded, missing };
+    }
+    const out = text.replace(VAULT_REF_PATTERN, (_full, name) => {
+        const value = vault.getSecret(name);
+        if (value !== null) {
+            expanded.push(name);
+            return value;
+        }
+        missing.push(name);
+        return _full; // leave the reference intact so the user sees it failed
+    });
+    return { text: out, expanded, missing };
+}
+export class SessionVault {
+    entries = new Map();
+    add(name, value) {
+        this.entries.set(name, value);
+    }
+    get(name) {
+        return this.entries.get(name) ?? null;
+    }
+    remove(name) {
+        return this.entries.delete(name);
+    }
+    has(name) {
+        return this.entries.has(name);
+    }
+    list() {
+        return [...this.entries.keys()].sort();
+    }
+    clear() {
+        this.entries.clear();
+    }
+}
+export class ProjectVault {
+    secrets;
+    key;
+    constructor(key, secrets) {
+        this.key = key;
+        this.secrets = secrets;
+    }
+    /** Create a new empty project vault (writes the encrypted file). */
+    static async create(filePath, passphrase) {
+        const salt = randomBytes(16);
+        const key = deriveKey(passphrase, salt);
+        const vault = new ProjectVault(key, new Map());
+        await vault.save(filePath, salt);
+        return vault;
+    }
+    /** Open an existing vault. Throws on wrong passphrase. */
+    static async open(filePath, passphrase) {
+        const raw = await readFile(filePath, "utf-8");
+        const file = JSON.parse(raw);
+        const key = deriveKey(passphrase, Buffer.from(file.salt, "base64"), file.N, file.r, file.p);
+        const secrets = decryptPayload(file, key);
+        return new ProjectVault(key, new Map(secrets.map((s) => [s.name, s])));
+    }
+    add(name, value, note, category) {
+        const now = new Date().toISOString();
+        this.secrets.set(name, { name, value, note, category, created: now, updated: now });
+    }
+    update(name, value, note, category) {
+        const existing = this.secrets.get(name);
+        if (!existing)
+            return false;
+        const now = new Date().toISOString();
+        this.secrets.set(name, {
+            ...existing,
+            value,
+            note: note ?? existing.note,
+            category: category ?? existing.category,
+            updated: now,
+        });
+        return true;
+    }
+    get(name) {
+        return this.secrets.get(name)?.value ?? null;
+    }
+    remove(name) {
+        return this.secrets.delete(name);
+    }
+    has(name) {
+        return this.secrets.has(name);
+    }
+    list() {
+        return [...this.secrets.values()]
+            .map((s) => ({
+            name: s.name,
+            note: s.note,
+            category: s.category,
+            created: s.created,
+            updated: s.updated,
+            source: "project",
+        }))
+            .sort((a, b) => a.name.localeCompare(b.name));
+    }
+    get entryCount() {
+        return this.secrets.size;
+    }
+    async save(filePath, salt) {
+        const { iv, tag, data } = encryptPayload([...this.secrets.values()], this.key);
+        const payload = {
+            version: 1,
+            kdf: "scrypt",
+            N: KDF_N,
+            r: KDF_R,
+            p: KDF_P,
+            salt: (salt ?? randomBytes(16)).toString("base64"),
+            iv: iv.toString("base64"),
+            tag: tag.toString("base64"),
+            data: data.toString("base64"),
+        };
+        await mkdir(dirname(filePath), { recursive: true });
+        await writeFile(filePath, JSON.stringify(payload, null, 1), "utf-8");
+    }
+}
+export class VaultManager {
+    projectVault = null;
+    sessionVault = new SessionVault();
+    vaultDir;
+    projectHash;
+    constructor(agentDir, projectHash) {
+        this.vaultDir = join(agentDir, "vault");
+        this.projectHash = projectHash ?? "global";
+    }
+    get vaultPath() {
+        return join(this.vaultDir, this.projectHash, "vault.json");
+    }
+    get isUnlocked() {
+        return this.projectVault !== null;
+    }
+    /** True when a project vault file already exists. */
+    exists() {
+        return existsSync(this.vaultPath);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Unlock (or create) the project vault with the user passphrase.
+     * Returns false on wrong passphrase.
+     */
+    async unlock(passphrase) {
+        try {
+            if (this.exists()) {
+                this.projectVault = await ProjectVault.open(this.vaultPath, passphrase);
+            }
+            else {
+                this.projectVault = await ProjectVault.create(this.vaultPath, passphrase);
+            }
+            return true;
+        }
+        catch {
+            this.projectVault = null;
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+    lock() {
+        this.projectVault = null;
+    }
+    // ─── Project vault operations (require unlock) ───
+    add(name, value, note, category) {
+        if (!this.projectVault || !name.trim() || !value)
+            return false;
+        this.projectVault.add(name.trim(), value, note, category);
+        void this.projectVault.save(this.vaultPath).catch(() => { });
+        return true;
+    }
+    update(name, value, note) {
+        if (!this.projectVault)
+            return false;
+        const ok = this.projectVault.update(name, value, note);
+        if (ok)
+            void this.projectVault.save(this.vaultPath).catch(() => { });
+        return ok;
+    }
+    remove(name) {
+        if (!this.projectVault)
+            return false;
+        const ok = this.projectVault.remove(name);
+        if (ok)
+            void this.projectVault.save(this.vaultPath).catch(() => { });
+        return ok;
+    }
+    // ─── Lookup (project first, then session) ───
+    getSecret(name) {
+        const fromProject = this.projectVault?.get(name) ?? null;
+        if (fromProject !== null)
+            return fromProject;
+        return this.sessionVault.get(name);
+    }
+    // ─── Session vault (memory only) ───
+    sessionAdd(name, value) {
+        this.sessionVault.add(name, value);
+    }
+    sessionRemove(name) {
+        return this.sessionVault.remove(name);
+    }
+    // ─── Listing ───
+    list() {
+        const entries = [];
+        if (this.projectVault)
+            entries.push(...this.projectVault.list());
+        for (const name of this.sessionVault.list()) {
+            entries.push({
+                name,
+                created: "",
+                updated: "",
+                source: "session",
+            });
+        }
+        return entries.sort((a, b) => a.name.localeCompare(b.name));
+    }
+    status() {
+        return {
+            unlocked: this.isUnlocked,
+            vaultPath: this.vaultPath,
+            exists: this.exists(),
+            projectCount: this.projectVault?.entryCount ?? 0,
+            sessionCount: this.sessionVault.list().length,
+        };
+    }
+}
+export { existsSync };
+//# sourceMappingURL=vault.js.map