@hoilab/ada-cli 0.84.12 → 0.84.13

package/dist/core/memory-engine/scanner.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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* Content scanner — blocks prompt-injection, exfiltration and secret leaks\n * from ever being persisted into memory (pattern set captured from\n * pi-hermes-memory's content-scanner, which ported it from Hermes).\n */\n\ninterface ScanIssue {\n\tpattern: RegExp;\n\tid: string;\n\tseverity: \"high\" | \"medium\";\n}\n\nconst THREAT_PATTERNS: ScanIssue[] = [\n\t{ pattern: /ignore\\s+(previous|all|above|prior)\\s+instructions/i, id: \"prompt_injection\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /you\\s+are\\s+now\\s+/i, id: \"role_hijack\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /do\\s+not\\s+tell\\s+the\\s+user/i, id: \"deception_hide\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /system\\s+prompt\\s+override/i, id: \"sys_prompt_override\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /disregard\\s+(your|all|any)\\s+(instructions|rules|guidelines)/i, id: \"disregard_rules\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /act\\s+as\\s+(if|though)\\s+you\\s+(have\\s+no|don'?t\\s+have)\\s+(restrictions|limits|rules)/i, id: \"bypass_restrictions\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /curl\\s+[^\\n]*\\$\\{?\\w*(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|API)/i, id: \"exfil_curl\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /wget\\s+[^\\n]*\\$\\{?\\w*(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|API)/i, id: \"exfil_wget\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /cat\\s+[^\\n]*(\\.env|credentials|\\.netrc|\\.pgpass|\\.npmrc|\\.pypirc)/i, id: \"read_secrets\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /authorized_keys/i, id: \"ssh_backdoor\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /\\$HOME\\/\\.ssh|~\\/\\.ssh/i, id: \"ssh_access\", severity: \"high\" },\n];\n\nconst SECRET_PATTERNS: ScanIssue[] = [\n\t{ pattern: /\\bsk-ant-api\\S{10,}\\b/, id: \"anthropic_api_key\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /\\bsk-or-v1-\\S{10,}\\b/, id: \"openrouter_api_key\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /\\bsk-\\S{20,}\\b/, id: \"openai_api_key\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /\\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\\b/, id: \"aws_access_key\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /\\bghp_\\S{10,}\\b/, id: \"github_personal_token\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /\\bghu_\\S{10,}\\b/, id: \"github_user_token\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /\\bxoxb-\\S{10,}\\b/, id: \"slack_bot_token\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /\\bxapp-\\S{10,}\\b/, id: \"slack_app_token\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /\\bntn_\\S{10,}\\b/, id: \"notion_token\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /\\bBearer\\s+\\S{20,}\\b/, id: \"bearer_auth_token\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /-----BEGIN\\s+(?:RSA\\s+)?PRIVATE\\sKEY-----/, id: \"private_key_block\", severity: \"high\" },\n\t{ pattern: /\\bANTHROPIC_API_KEY\\b/, id: \"env_anthropic_key\", severity: \"medium\" },\n\t{ pattern: /\\bOPENAI_API_KEY\\b/, id: \"env_openai_key\", severity: \"medium\" },\n\t{ pattern: /\\bOPENROUTER_API_KEY\\b/, id: \"env_openrouter_key\", severity: \"medium\" },\n\t{ pattern: /\\bGITHUB_TOKEN\\b/, id: \"env_github_token\", severity: \"medium\" },\n\t{ pattern: /\\bAWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\\b/, id: \"env_aws_secret\", severity: \"medium\" },\n\t{ pattern: /\\bDATABASE_URL\\b/, id: \"env_database_url\", severity: \"medium\" },\n\t{ pattern: /\\bpassword\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{6,}\\b/i, id: \"password_assignment\", severity: \"medium\" },\n\t{ pattern: /\\bsecret\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{6,}\\b/i, id: \"secret_assignment\", severity: \"medium\" },\n\t{ pattern: /\\btoken\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{10,}\\b/i, id: \"token_assignment\", severity: \"medium\" },\n];\n\nconst INVISIBLE_CHARS = new Set([\n\t\"\\u200b\", \"\\u200c\", \"\\u200d\", \"\\u2060\", \"\\ufeff\",\n\t\"\\u202a\", \"\\u202b\", \"\\u202c\", \"\\u202d\", \"\\u202e\",\n]);\n\n/**\n * Scan memory content before persisting. Returns an error message when the\n * content must be rejected, or null when it is safe to store.\n */\nexport function scanContent(content: string): string | null {\n\tconst visible = [...content].filter((ch) => !INVISIBLE_CHARS.has(ch)).join(\"\");\n\tif (visible !== content) {\n\t\treturn \"Content contains invisible/zero-width characters and was rejected for safety.\";\n\t}\n\tfor (const issue of THREAT_PATTERNS) {\n\t\tif (issue.pattern.test(content)) {\n\t\t\treturn `Content was rejected: looks like prompt injection or data exfiltration (${issue.id}).`;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tfor (const issue of SECRET_PATTERNS) {\n\t\tif (issue.pattern.test(content)) {\n\t\t\treturn `Content was rejected: possible secret/credential detected (${issue.id}). Secrets are never stored in memory.`;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn null;\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/memory-engine/security.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/**
+ * Security & privacy classification for the Ada Memory Engine.
+ *
+ * Enterprise-grade guards:
+ * - Credentials/secrets/payment data are ALWAYS blocked at every level.
+ * - PII (email, phone, national IDs, IBAN, DOB) blocking depends on the
+ *   configured privacy level (RGPD / AI Act friendly).
+ * - Every rejection is written to the audit log with a reason.
+ * - Prompt-injection/exfiltration patterns are always blocked.
+ */
+export type PrivacyLevel = "strict" | "balanced" | "permissive";
+export type SensitiveCategory = "credential" | "payment" | "secret-assignment" | "pii-email" | "pii-phone" | "pii-id" | "pii-bank" | "pii-dob" | "injection" | "exfiltration";
+export interface SensitivityResult {
+    /** True when the content must NOT be stored. */
+    blocked: boolean;
+    /** Categories detected. */
+    categories: SensitiveCategory[];
+    /** Human-readable reason (in the configured language). */
+    reason: string;
+    /** True when content contains permitted-but-noteworthy categories. */
+    noteworthy: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Classify content against the security policy.
+ *
+ * @param content   Text to classify.
+ * @param level     Configured privacy level.
+ * @param locale    "es" or "en" for the reason language.
+ */
+export declare function classifySensitive(content: string, level?: PrivacyLevel, locale?: "es" | "en"): SensitivityResult;
+//# sourceMappingURL=security.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/memory-engine/security.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"security.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/core/memory-engine/security.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;GASG;AAEH,MAAM,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,QAAQ,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG,YAAY,CAAC;AAEhE,MAAM,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAC1B,YAAY,GACZ,SAAS,GACT,mBAAmB,GACnB,WAAW,GACX,WAAW,GACX,QAAQ,GACR,UAAU,GACV,SAAS,GACT,WAAW,GACX,cAAc,CAAC;AAElB,MAAM,WAAW,iBAAiB;IACjC,gDAAgD;IAChD,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACjB,2BAA2B;IAC3B,UAAU,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC;IAChC,0DAA0D;IAC1D,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,sEAAsE;IACtE,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;CACpB;AAyID;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,wBAAgB,iBAAiB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,GAAE,YAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAE,IAAI,GAAG,IAAW,GAAG,iBAAiB,CA+ChI","sourcesContent":["/**\n * Security & privacy classification for the Ada Memory Engine.\n *\n * Enterprise-grade guards:\n * - Credentials/secrets/payment data are ALWAYS blocked at every level.\n * - PII (email, phone, national IDs, IBAN, DOB) blocking depends on the\n *   configured privacy level (RGPD / AI Act friendly).\n * - Every rejection is written to the audit log with a reason.\n * - Prompt-injection/exfiltration patterns are always blocked.\n */\n\nexport type PrivacyLevel = \"strict\" | \"balanced\" | \"permissive\";\n\nexport type SensitiveCategory =\n\t| \"credential\"\n\t| \"payment\"\n\t| \"secret-assignment\"\n\t| \"pii-email\"\n\t| \"pii-phone\"\n\t| \"pii-id\"\n\t| \"pii-bank\"\n\t| \"pii-dob\"\n\t| \"injection\"\n\t| \"exfiltration\";\n\nexport interface SensitivityResult {\n\t/** True when the content must NOT be stored. */\n\tblocked: boolean;\n\t/** Categories detected. */\n\tcategories: SensitiveCategory[];\n\t/** Human-readable reason (in the configured language). */\n\treason: string;\n\t/** True when content contains permitted-but-noteworthy categories. */\n\tnoteworthy: boolean;\n}\n\ninterface Pattern {\n\tcategory: SensitiveCategory;\n\tpattern: RegExp;\n\t/** Always blocked regardless of privacy level. */\n\talways?: boolean;\n\t/** Blocked at this level and stricter. */\n\tblockAt?: PrivacyLevel;\n\t/** English reason label. */\n\tlabel: string;\n}\n\n// ─── Credentials & secrets — ALWAYS blocked ───\nconst ALWAYS_BLOCKED: Pattern[] = [\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bsk-ant-api\\S{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Anthropic API key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bsk-or-v1-\\S{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"OpenRouter API key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"OpenAI-style API key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\\b/, always: true, label: \"AWS access key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"GitHub personal token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bghu_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"GitHub user token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Slack token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bxapp-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Slack app token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bntn_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Notion token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}/, always: true, label: \"JWT token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /-----BEGIN\\s+(?:RSA\\s+|EC\\s+|OPENSSH\\s+)?PRIVATE\\s+KEY-----/, always: true, label: \"Private key block\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bBearer\\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{20,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"Bearer auth token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bapi[_-]?key\\s*[=:]\\s*[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"API key assignment\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\b(client|app|consumer)_?secret\\s*[=:]\\s*[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"OAuth client secret\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bwebhook[_-]?url\\s*[=:]\\s*https?:\\/\\/[^\\s]+/i, always: true, label: \"Webhook URL\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(password|passwd|pwd)\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{6,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"password value\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(secret|token|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key)\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{10,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"secret/token value\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\b(ANTHROPIC|OPENAI|OPENROUTER|GEMINI|DEEPSEEK|MISTRAL|AZURE)_?(API)?_?KEY\\b/i, always: true, label: \"provider API key env var\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bGITHUB_TOKEN\\b|\\bAWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\\b|\\bDATABASE_URL\\b/i, always: true, label: \"secret env var name\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /(?:mongodb|postgres|mysql|redis|amqp):\\/\\/[^\\s]*:[^\\s@]+@/, always: true, label: \"connection string with credentials\" },\n];\n\n// ─── Payment data — ALWAYS blocked ───\nconst PAYMENT: Pattern[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"payment\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:4\\d{3}|5[1-5]\\d{2}|3[47]\\d{2}|6(?:011|5\\d{2}))[\\s-]?\\d{4}[\\s-]?\\d{4}[\\s-]?\\d{4}\\b/,\n\t\talways: true,\n\t\tlabel: \"payment card number\",\n\t},\n\t{ category: \"payment\", pattern: /\\bcvv\\s*[=:]\\s*\\d{3,4}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"card verification value\" },\n\t{ category: \"payment\", pattern: /\\b(?:expiry|exp)\\s*[=:]\\s*(?:0[1-9]|1[0-2])\\/?\\d{2}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"card expiry\" },\n];\n\n// ─── PII — level-dependent ───\nconst PII: Pattern[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-email\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\\.[A-Za-z]{2,}\\b/,\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"personal email address\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-phone\",\n\t\tpattern: /(?:\\+\\d{1,3}[\\s-]?)?(?:\\(?\\d{2,4}\\)?[\\s-]?)?\\d{3}[\\s-]?\\d{3}[\\s-]?\\d{3,4}\\b/,\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"phone number\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-id\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b\\d{8}[A-Z]\\b|\\b[A-Z]\\d{7}[A-Z0-9]\\b/, // DNI / NIE (Spain)\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"national ID (DNI/NIE)\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-bank\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b[A-Z]{2}\\d{2}[A-Z0-9]{11,30}\\b/, // IBAN\n\t\tblockAt: \"balanced\",\n\t\tlabel: \"IBAN / bank account\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-dob\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:birth|birthday|born|nacimiento|fecha de nacimiento)\\s*[=:]\\s*(?:\\d{1,2}[\\/\\-.]\\d{1,2}[\\/\\-.]\\d{2,4})/i,\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"date of birth\",\n\t},\n];\n\n// ─── Prompt injection / exfiltration — ALWAYS blocked ───\nconst INJECTION: Pattern[] = [\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /ignore\\s+(previous|all|above|prior)\\s+instructions/i, always: true, label: \"prompt injection\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /you\\s+are\\s+now\\s+/i, always: true, label: \"role hijack\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /do\\s+not\\s+tell\\s+the\\s+user/i, always: true, label: \"deceptive instruction\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /disregard\\s+(your|all|any)\\s+(instructions|rules|guidelines)/i, always: true, label: \"instruction override\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /system\\s+prompt\\s+override/i, always: true, label: \"system prompt override\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /curl\\s+[^\\n]*(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|API)/i, always: true, label: \"credential exfiltration (curl)\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /wget\\s+[^\\n]*(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|API)/i, always: true, label: \"credential exfiltration (wget)\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /cat\\s+[^\\n]*(\\.env|credentials|\\.netrc|\\.pgpass|\\.npmrc|\\.pypirc)/i, always: true, label: \"secret file read\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /\\$HOME\\/\\.ssh|~\\/\\.ssh/i, always: true, label: \"SSH key path\" },\n];\n\nconst LEVEL_ORDER: Record<PrivacyLevel, number> = { strict: 0, balanced: 1, permissive: 2 };\n\nconst INVISIBLE_CHARS = new Set([\n\t\"\\u200b\", \"\\u200c\", \"\\u200d\", \"\\u2060\", \"\\ufeff\",\n\t\"\\u202a\", \"\\u202b\", \"\\u202c\", \"\\u202d\", \"\\u202e\",\n]);\n\nconst REASON_EN = {\n\tcredential: \"Looks like a credential or secret (secrets are never stored in memory)\",\n\tpayment: \"Looks like payment card data (never stored in memory)\",\n\t\"secret-assignment\": \"Looks like a password/secret/token value (never stored in memory)\",\n\t\"pii-email\": \"Looks like a personal email address (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-phone\": \"Looks like a phone number (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-id\": \"Looks like a national ID (DNI/NIE) (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-bank\": \"Looks like a bank account / IBAN (blocked by the privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-dob\": \"Looks like a date of birth (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\tinjection: \"Looks like a prompt-injection attempt (never stored)\",\n\texfiltration: \"Looks like data exfiltration (never stored)\",\n};\n\nconst REASON_ES: Record<SensitiveCategory, string> = {\n\tcredential: \"Parece una credencial o secreto (los secretos nunca se almacenan en memoria)\",\n\tpayment: \"Parecen datos de tarjeta de pago (nunca se almacenan en memoria)\",\n\t\"secret-assignment\": \"Parece una contraseña/secreto/token (nunca se almacena en memoria)\",\n\t\"pii-email\": \"Parece un correo electrónico personal (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\t\"pii-phone\": \"Parece un número de teléfono (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\t\"pii-id\": \"Parece un documento de identidad (DNI/NIE) (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\t\"pii-bank\": \"Parece una cuenta bancaria / IBAN (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad)\",\n\t\"pii-dob\": \"Parece una fecha de nacimiento (bloqueada por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\tinjection: \"Parece un intento de prompt injection (nunca se almacena)\",\n\texfiltration: \"Parece exfiltración de datos (nunca se almacena)\",\n};\n\nfunction testPattern(pattern: Pattern, content: string): boolean {\n\ttry {\n\t\treturn pattern.pattern.test(content);\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn false;\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify content against the security policy.\n *\n * @param content   Text to classify.\n * @param level     Configured privacy level.\n * @param locale    \"es\" or \"en\" for the reason language.\n */\nexport function classifySensitive(content: string, level: PrivacyLevel = \"strict\", locale: \"es\" | \"en\" = \"es\"): SensitivityResult {\n\tconst categories = new Set<SensitiveCategory>();\n\tconst reasons: string[] = [];\n\tconst labels: string[] = [];\n\n\t// Invisible characters are always suspicious (injection vectors).\n\tif ([...content].some((ch) => INVISIBLE_CHARS.has(ch))) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tblocked: true,\n\t\t\tcategories: [\"injection\"],\n\t\t\treason: locale === \"es\"\n\t\t\t\t? \"El contenido contiene caracteres invisibles/zero-width y fue rechazado por seguridad.\"\n\t\t\t\t: \"Content contains invisible/zero-width characters and was rejected for security.\",\n\t\t\tnoteworthy: true,\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\tconst allPatterns = [...ALWAYS_BLOCKED, ...PAYMENT, ...PII, ...INJECTION];\n\tfor (const pattern of allPatterns) {\n\t\tif (!testPattern(pattern, content)) continue;\n\t\tconst levelIdx = LEVEL_ORDER[level];\n\t\tconst blockAtIdx = pattern.blockAt ? LEVEL_ORDER[pattern.blockAt] : 0;\n\t\tconst blocked = pattern.always === true || levelIdx <= blockAtIdx;\n\t\tcategories.add(pattern.category);\n\t\tif (blocked) {\n\t\t\tlabels.push(pattern.label);\n\t\t\tif (!reasons.includes(pattern.category)) reasons.push(pattern.category);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif (reasons.length > 0) {\n\t\tconst localeMap = locale === \"es\" ? REASON_ES : REASON_EN;\n\t\tconst detail = reasons.map((r) => localeMap[r as SensitiveCategory]).join(\"; \");\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tblocked: true,\n\t\t\tcategories: [...categories],\n\t\t\treason: detail,\n\t\t\tnoteworthy: true,\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tblocked: false,\n\t\tcategories: [...categories],\n\t\treason: \"\",\n\t\tnoteworthy: categories.size > 0,\n\t};\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/memory-engine/security.js

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+/**
+ * Security & privacy classification for the Ada Memory Engine.
+ *
+ * Enterprise-grade guards:
+ * - Credentials/secrets/payment data are ALWAYS blocked at every level.
+ * - PII (email, phone, national IDs, IBAN, DOB) blocking depends on the
+ *   configured privacy level (RGPD / AI Act friendly).
+ * - Every rejection is written to the audit log with a reason.
+ * - Prompt-injection/exfiltration patterns are always blocked.
+ */
+// ─── Credentials & secrets — ALWAYS blocked ───
+const ALWAYS_BLOCKED = [
+    { category: "credential", pattern: /\bsk-ant-api\S{10,}\b/, always: true, label: "Anthropic API key" },
+    { category: "credential", pattern: /\bsk-or-v1-\S{10,}\b/, always: true, label: "OpenRouter API key" },
+    { category: "credential", pattern: /\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b/, always: true, label: "OpenAI-style API key" },
+    { category: "credential", pattern: /\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/, always: true, label: "AWS access key" },
+    { category: "credential", pattern: /\bghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b/, always: true, label: "GitHub personal token" },
+    { category: "credential", pattern: /\bghu_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b/, always: true, label: "GitHub user token" },
+    { category: "credential", pattern: /\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\b/, always: true, label: "Slack token" },
+    { category: "credential", pattern: /\bxapp-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\b/, always: true, label: "Slack app token" },
+    { category: "credential", pattern: /\bntn_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b/, always: true, label: "Notion token" },
+    { category: "credential", pattern: /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}/, always: true, label: "JWT token" },
+    { category: "credential", pattern: /-----BEGIN\s+(?:RSA\s+|EC\s+|OPENSSH\s+)?PRIVATE\s+KEY-----/, always: true, label: "Private key block" },
+    { category: "credential", pattern: /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{20,}\b/i, always: true, label: "Bearer auth token" },
+    { category: "credential", pattern: /\bapi[_-]?key\s*[=:]\s*[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\b/i, always: true, label: "API key assignment" },
+    { category: "credential", pattern: /\b(client|app|consumer)_?secret\s*[=:]\s*[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\b/i, always: true, label: "OAuth client secret" },
+    { category: "credential", pattern: /\bwebhook[_-]?url\s*[=:]\s*https?:\/\/[^\s]+/i, always: true, label: "Webhook URL" },
+    { category: "secret-assignment", pattern: /\b(password|passwd|pwd)\s*[=:]\s*\S{6,}\b/i, always: true, label: "password value" },
+    { category: "secret-assignment", pattern: /\b(secret|token|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key)\s*[=:]\s*\S{10,}\b/i, always: true, label: "secret/token value" },
+    { category: "credential", pattern: /\b(ANTHROPIC|OPENAI|OPENROUTER|GEMINI|DEEPSEEK|MISTRAL|AZURE)_?(API)?_?KEY\b/i, always: true, label: "provider API key env var" },
+    { category: "credential", pattern: /\bGITHUB_TOKEN\b|\bAWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\b|\bDATABASE_URL\b/i, always: true, label: "secret env var name" },
+    { category: "credential", pattern: /(?:mongodb|postgres|mysql|redis|amqp):\/\/[^\s]*:[^\s@]+@/, always: true, label: "connection string with credentials" },
+];
+// ─── Payment data — ALWAYS blocked ───
+const PAYMENT = [
+    {
+        category: "payment",
+        pattern: /\b(?:4\d{3}|5[1-5]\d{2}|3[47]\d{2}|6(?:011|5\d{2}))[\s-]?\d{4}[\s-]?\d{4}[\s-]?\d{4}\b/,
+        always: true,
+        label: "payment card number",
+    },
+    { category: "payment", pattern: /\bcvv\s*[=:]\s*\d{3,4}\b/i, always: true, label: "card verification value" },
+    { category: "payment", pattern: /\b(?:expiry|exp)\s*[=:]\s*(?:0[1-9]|1[0-2])\/?\d{2}\b/i, always: true, label: "card expiry" },
+];
+// ─── PII — level-dependent ───
+const PII = [
+    {
+        category: "pii-email",
+        pattern: /\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\.[A-Za-z]{2,}\b/,
+        blockAt: "strict",
+        label: "personal email address",
+    },
+    {
+        category: "pii-phone",
+        pattern: /(?:\+\d{1,3}[\s-]?)?(?:\(?\d{2,4}\)?[\s-]?)?\d{3}[\s-]?\d{3}[\s-]?\d{3,4}\b/,
+        blockAt: "strict",
+        label: "phone number",
+    },
+    {
+        category: "pii-id",
+        pattern: /\b\d{8}[A-Z]\b|\b[A-Z]\d{7}[A-Z0-9]\b/, // DNI / NIE (Spain)
+        blockAt: "strict",
+        label: "national ID (DNI/NIE)",
+    },
+    {
+        category: "pii-bank",
+        pattern: /\b[A-Z]{2}\d{2}[A-Z0-9]{11,30}\b/, // IBAN
+        blockAt: "balanced",
+        label: "IBAN / bank account",
+    },
+    {
+        category: "pii-dob",
+        pattern: /\b(?:birth|birthday|born|nacimiento|fecha de nacimiento)\s*[=:]\s*(?:\d{1,2}[\/\-.]\d{1,2}[\/\-.]\d{2,4})/i,
+        blockAt: "strict",
+        label: "date of birth",
+    },
+];
+// ─── Prompt injection / exfiltration — ALWAYS blocked ───
+const INJECTION = [
+    { category: "injection", pattern: /ignore\s+(previous|all|above|prior)\s+instructions/i, always: true, label: "prompt injection" },
+    { category: "injection", pattern: /you\s+are\s+now\s+/i, always: true, label: "role hijack" },
+    { category: "injection", pattern: /do\s+not\s+tell\s+the\s+user/i, always: true, label: "deceptive instruction" },
+    { category: "injection", pattern: /disregard\s+(your|all|any)\s+(instructions|rules|guidelines)/i, always: true, label: "instruction override" },
+    { category: "injection", pattern: /system\s+prompt\s+override/i, always: true, label: "system prompt override" },
+    { category: "exfiltration", pattern: /curl\s+[^\n]*(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|API)/i, always: true, label: "credential exfiltration (curl)" },
+    { category: "exfiltration", pattern: /wget\s+[^\n]*(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|API)/i, always: true, label: "credential exfiltration (wget)" },
+    { category: "exfiltration", pattern: /cat\s+[^\n]*(\.env|credentials|\.netrc|\.pgpass|\.npmrc|\.pypirc)/i, always: true, label: "secret file read" },
+    { category: "exfiltration", pattern: /\$HOME\/\.ssh|~\/\.ssh/i, always: true, label: "SSH key path" },
+];
+const LEVEL_ORDER = { strict: 0, balanced: 1, permissive: 2 };
+const INVISIBLE_CHARS = new Set([
+    "\u200b", "\u200c", "\u200d", "\u2060", "\ufeff",
+    "\u202a", "\u202b", "\u202c", "\u202d", "\u202e",
+]);
+const REASON_EN = {
+    credential: "Looks like a credential or secret (secrets are never stored in memory)",
+    payment: "Looks like payment card data (never stored in memory)",
+    "secret-assignment": "Looks like a password/secret/token value (never stored in memory)",
+    "pii-email": "Looks like a personal email address (blocked by the strict privacy level)",
+    "pii-phone": "Looks like a phone number (blocked by the strict privacy level)",
+    "pii-id": "Looks like a national ID (DNI/NIE) (blocked by the strict privacy level)",
+    "pii-bank": "Looks like a bank account / IBAN (blocked by the privacy level)",
+    "pii-dob": "Looks like a date of birth (blocked by the strict privacy level)",
+    injection: "Looks like a prompt-injection attempt (never stored)",
+    exfiltration: "Looks like data exfiltration (never stored)",
+};
+const REASON_ES = {
+    credential: "Parece una credencial o secreto (los secretos nunca se almacenan en memoria)",
+    payment: "Parecen datos de tarjeta de pago (nunca se almacenan en memoria)",
+    "secret-assignment": "Parece una contraseña/secreto/token (nunca se almacena en memoria)",
+    "pii-email": "Parece un correo electrónico personal (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)",
+    "pii-phone": "Parece un número de teléfono (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)",
+    "pii-id": "Parece un documento de identidad (DNI/NIE) (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)",
+    "pii-bank": "Parece una cuenta bancaria / IBAN (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad)",
+    "pii-dob": "Parece una fecha de nacimiento (bloqueada por el nivel de privacidad estricto)",
+    injection: "Parece un intento de prompt injection (nunca se almacena)",
+    exfiltration: "Parece exfiltración de datos (nunca se almacena)",
+};
+function testPattern(pattern, content) {
+    try {
+        return pattern.pattern.test(content);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Classify content against the security policy.
+ *
+ * @param content   Text to classify.
+ * @param level     Configured privacy level.
+ * @param locale    "es" or "en" for the reason language.
+ */
+export function classifySensitive(content, level = "strict", locale = "es") {
+    const categories = new Set();
+    const reasons = [];
+    const labels = [];
+    // Invisible characters are always suspicious (injection vectors).
+    if ([...content].some((ch) => INVISIBLE_CHARS.has(ch))) {
+        return {
+            blocked: true,
+            categories: ["injection"],
+            reason: locale === "es"
+                ? "El contenido contiene caracteres invisibles/zero-width y fue rechazado por seguridad."
+                : "Content contains invisible/zero-width characters and was rejected for security.",
+            noteworthy: true,
+        };
+    }
+    const allPatterns = [...ALWAYS_BLOCKED, ...PAYMENT, ...PII, ...INJECTION];
+    for (const pattern of allPatterns) {
+        if (!testPattern(pattern, content))
+            continue;
+        const levelIdx = LEVEL_ORDER[level];
+        const blockAtIdx = pattern.blockAt ? LEVEL_ORDER[pattern.blockAt] : 0;
+        const blocked = pattern.always === true || levelIdx <= blockAtIdx;
+        categories.add(pattern.category);
+        if (blocked) {
+            labels.push(pattern.label);
+            if (!reasons.includes(pattern.category))
+                reasons.push(pattern.category);
+        }
+    }
+    if (reasons.length > 0) {
+        const localeMap = locale === "es" ? REASON_ES : REASON_EN;
+        const detail = reasons.map((r) => localeMap[r]).join("; ");
+        return {
+            blocked: true,
+            categories: [...categories],
+            reason: detail,
+            noteworthy: true,
+        };
+    }
+    return {
+        blocked: false,
+        categories: [...categories],
+        reason: "",
+        noteworthy: categories.size > 0,
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=security.js.map

package/dist/core/memory-engine/security.js.map

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* Security & privacy classification for the Ada Memory Engine.\n *\n * Enterprise-grade guards:\n * - Credentials/secrets/payment data are ALWAYS blocked at every level.\n * - PII (email, phone, national IDs, IBAN, DOB) blocking depends on the\n *   configured privacy level (RGPD / AI Act friendly).\n * - Every rejection is written to the audit log with a reason.\n * - Prompt-injection/exfiltration patterns are always blocked.\n */\n\nexport type PrivacyLevel = \"strict\" | \"balanced\" | \"permissive\";\n\nexport type SensitiveCategory =\n\t| \"credential\"\n\t| \"payment\"\n\t| \"secret-assignment\"\n\t| \"pii-email\"\n\t| \"pii-phone\"\n\t| \"pii-id\"\n\t| \"pii-bank\"\n\t| \"pii-dob\"\n\t| \"injection\"\n\t| \"exfiltration\";\n\nexport interface SensitivityResult {\n\t/** True when the content must NOT be stored. */\n\tblocked: boolean;\n\t/** Categories detected. */\n\tcategories: SensitiveCategory[];\n\t/** Human-readable reason (in the configured language). */\n\treason: string;\n\t/** True when content contains permitted-but-noteworthy categories. */\n\tnoteworthy: boolean;\n}\n\ninterface Pattern {\n\tcategory: SensitiveCategory;\n\tpattern: RegExp;\n\t/** Always blocked regardless of privacy level. */\n\talways?: boolean;\n\t/** Blocked at this level and stricter. */\n\tblockAt?: PrivacyLevel;\n\t/** English reason label. */\n\tlabel: string;\n}\n\n// ─── Credentials & secrets — ALWAYS blocked ───\nconst ALWAYS_BLOCKED: Pattern[] = [\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bsk-ant-api\\S{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Anthropic API key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bsk-or-v1-\\S{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"OpenRouter API key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"OpenAI-style API key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\\b/, always: true, label: \"AWS access key\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"GitHub personal token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bghu_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"GitHub user token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Slack token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bxapp-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Slack app token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bntn_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\\b/, always: true, label: \"Notion token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}/, always: true, label: \"JWT token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /-----BEGIN\\s+(?:RSA\\s+|EC\\s+|OPENSSH\\s+)?PRIVATE\\s+KEY-----/, always: true, label: \"Private key block\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bBearer\\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{20,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"Bearer auth token\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bapi[_-]?key\\s*[=:]\\s*[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"API key assignment\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\b(client|app|consumer)_?secret\\s*[=:]\\s*[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"OAuth client secret\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bwebhook[_-]?url\\s*[=:]\\s*https?:\\/\\/[^\\s]+/i, always: true, label: \"Webhook URL\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(password|passwd|pwd)\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{6,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"password value\" },\n\t{ category: \"secret-assignment\", pattern: /\\b(secret|token|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key)\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{10,}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"secret/token value\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\b(ANTHROPIC|OPENAI|OPENROUTER|GEMINI|DEEPSEEK|MISTRAL|AZURE)_?(API)?_?KEY\\b/i, always: true, label: \"provider API key env var\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /\\bGITHUB_TOKEN\\b|\\bAWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY\\b|\\bDATABASE_URL\\b/i, always: true, label: \"secret env var name\" },\n\t{ category: \"credential\", pattern: /(?:mongodb|postgres|mysql|redis|amqp):\\/\\/[^\\s]*:[^\\s@]+@/, always: true, label: \"connection string with credentials\" },\n];\n\n// ─── Payment data — ALWAYS blocked ───\nconst PAYMENT: Pattern[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"payment\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:4\\d{3}|5[1-5]\\d{2}|3[47]\\d{2}|6(?:011|5\\d{2}))[\\s-]?\\d{4}[\\s-]?\\d{4}[\\s-]?\\d{4}\\b/,\n\t\talways: true,\n\t\tlabel: \"payment card number\",\n\t},\n\t{ category: \"payment\", pattern: /\\bcvv\\s*[=:]\\s*\\d{3,4}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"card verification value\" },\n\t{ category: \"payment\", pattern: /\\b(?:expiry|exp)\\s*[=:]\\s*(?:0[1-9]|1[0-2])\\/?\\d{2}\\b/i, always: true, label: \"card expiry\" },\n];\n\n// ─── PII — level-dependent ───\nconst PII: Pattern[] = [\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-email\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\\.[A-Za-z]{2,}\\b/,\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"personal email address\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-phone\",\n\t\tpattern: /(?:\\+\\d{1,3}[\\s-]?)?(?:\\(?\\d{2,4}\\)?[\\s-]?)?\\d{3}[\\s-]?\\d{3}[\\s-]?\\d{3,4}\\b/,\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"phone number\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-id\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b\\d{8}[A-Z]\\b|\\b[A-Z]\\d{7}[A-Z0-9]\\b/, // DNI / NIE (Spain)\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"national ID (DNI/NIE)\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-bank\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b[A-Z]{2}\\d{2}[A-Z0-9]{11,30}\\b/, // IBAN\n\t\tblockAt: \"balanced\",\n\t\tlabel: \"IBAN / bank account\",\n\t},\n\t{\n\t\tcategory: \"pii-dob\",\n\t\tpattern: /\\b(?:birth|birthday|born|nacimiento|fecha de nacimiento)\\s*[=:]\\s*(?:\\d{1,2}[\\/\\-.]\\d{1,2}[\\/\\-.]\\d{2,4})/i,\n\t\tblockAt: \"strict\",\n\t\tlabel: \"date of birth\",\n\t},\n];\n\n// ─── Prompt injection / exfiltration — ALWAYS blocked ───\nconst INJECTION: Pattern[] = [\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /ignore\\s+(previous|all|above|prior)\\s+instructions/i, always: true, label: \"prompt injection\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /you\\s+are\\s+now\\s+/i, always: true, label: \"role hijack\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /do\\s+not\\s+tell\\s+the\\s+user/i, always: true, label: \"deceptive instruction\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /disregard\\s+(your|all|any)\\s+(instructions|rules|guidelines)/i, always: true, label: \"instruction override\" },\n\t{ category: \"injection\", pattern: /system\\s+prompt\\s+override/i, always: true, label: \"system prompt override\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /curl\\s+[^\\n]*(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|API)/i, always: true, label: \"credential exfiltration (curl)\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /wget\\s+[^\\n]*(KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL|API)/i, always: true, label: \"credential exfiltration (wget)\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /cat\\s+[^\\n]*(\\.env|credentials|\\.netrc|\\.pgpass|\\.npmrc|\\.pypirc)/i, always: true, label: \"secret file read\" },\n\t{ category: \"exfiltration\", pattern: /\\$HOME\\/\\.ssh|~\\/\\.ssh/i, always: true, label: \"SSH key path\" },\n];\n\nconst LEVEL_ORDER: Record<PrivacyLevel, number> = { strict: 0, balanced: 1, permissive: 2 };\n\nconst INVISIBLE_CHARS = new Set([\n\t\"\\u200b\", \"\\u200c\", \"\\u200d\", \"\\u2060\", \"\\ufeff\",\n\t\"\\u202a\", \"\\u202b\", \"\\u202c\", \"\\u202d\", \"\\u202e\",\n]);\n\nconst REASON_EN = {\n\tcredential: \"Looks like a credential or secret (secrets are never stored in memory)\",\n\tpayment: \"Looks like payment card data (never stored in memory)\",\n\t\"secret-assignment\": \"Looks like a password/secret/token value (never stored in memory)\",\n\t\"pii-email\": \"Looks like a personal email address (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-phone\": \"Looks like a phone number (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-id\": \"Looks like a national ID (DNI/NIE) (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-bank\": \"Looks like a bank account / IBAN (blocked by the privacy level)\",\n\t\"pii-dob\": \"Looks like a date of birth (blocked by the strict privacy level)\",\n\tinjection: \"Looks like a prompt-injection attempt (never stored)\",\n\texfiltration: \"Looks like data exfiltration (never stored)\",\n};\n\nconst REASON_ES: Record<SensitiveCategory, string> = {\n\tcredential: \"Parece una credencial o secreto (los secretos nunca se almacenan en memoria)\",\n\tpayment: \"Parecen datos de tarjeta de pago (nunca se almacenan en memoria)\",\n\t\"secret-assignment\": \"Parece una contraseña/secreto/token (nunca se almacena en memoria)\",\n\t\"pii-email\": \"Parece un correo electrónico personal (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\t\"pii-phone\": \"Parece un número de teléfono (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\t\"pii-id\": \"Parece un documento de identidad (DNI/NIE) (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\t\"pii-bank\": \"Parece una cuenta bancaria / IBAN (bloqueado por el nivel de privacidad)\",\n\t\"pii-dob\": \"Parece una fecha de nacimiento (bloqueada por el nivel de privacidad estricto)\",\n\tinjection: \"Parece un intento de prompt injection (nunca se almacena)\",\n\texfiltration: \"Parece exfiltración de datos (nunca se almacena)\",\n};\n\nfunction testPattern(pattern: Pattern, content: string): boolean {\n\ttry {\n\t\treturn pattern.pattern.test(content);\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn false;\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify content against the security policy.\n *\n * @param content   Text to classify.\n * @param level     Configured privacy level.\n * @param locale    \"es\" or \"en\" for the reason language.\n */\nexport function classifySensitive(content: string, level: PrivacyLevel = \"strict\", locale: \"es\" | \"en\" = \"es\"): SensitivityResult {\n\tconst categories = new Set<SensitiveCategory>();\n\tconst reasons: string[] = [];\n\tconst labels: string[] = [];\n\n\t// Invisible characters are always suspicious (injection vectors).\n\tif ([...content].some((ch) => INVISIBLE_CHARS.has(ch))) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tblocked: true,\n\t\t\tcategories: [\"injection\"],\n\t\t\treason: locale === \"es\"\n\t\t\t\t? \"El contenido contiene caracteres invisibles/zero-width y fue rechazado por seguridad.\"\n\t\t\t\t: \"Content contains invisible/zero-width characters and was rejected for security.\",\n\t\t\tnoteworthy: true,\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\tconst allPatterns = [...ALWAYS_BLOCKED, ...PAYMENT, ...PII, ...INJECTION];\n\tfor (const pattern of allPatterns) {\n\t\tif (!testPattern(pattern, content)) continue;\n\t\tconst levelIdx = LEVEL_ORDER[level];\n\t\tconst blockAtIdx = pattern.blockAt ? LEVEL_ORDER[pattern.blockAt] : 0;\n\t\tconst blocked = pattern.always === true || levelIdx <= blockAtIdx;\n\t\tcategories.add(pattern.category);\n\t\tif (blocked) {\n\t\t\tlabels.push(pattern.label);\n\t\t\tif (!reasons.includes(pattern.category)) reasons.push(pattern.category);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif (reasons.length > 0) {\n\t\tconst localeMap = locale === \"es\" ? REASON_ES : REASON_EN;\n\t\tconst detail = reasons.map((r) => localeMap[r as SensitiveCategory]).join(\"; \");\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tblocked: true,\n\t\t\tcategories: [...categories],\n\t\t\treason: detail,\n\t\t\tnoteworthy: true,\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tblocked: false,\n\t\tcategories: [...categories],\n\t\treason: \"\",\n\t\tnoteworthy: categories.size > 0,\n\t};\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/memory-engine/session-indexer.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/**
+ * SessionIndexer — indexes past conversations (layer 3c) from the session
+ * JSONL files written by session-manager.ts.
+ *
+ * - Incremental backfill: meta.json tracks per-file size+mtime, so only
+ *   changed files are re-parsed on startup.
+ * - Live indexing: messages are upserted as they are emitted.
+ * - The index is a derived artifact; it can be rebuilt at any time.
+ */
+export interface ParsedSessionFile {
+    sessionId: string;
+    cwd: string | null;
+    sessionName: string | null;
+    messages: Array<{
+        id: string;
+        role: "user" | "assistant";
+        content: string;
+        timestamp: string;
+    }>;
+}
+export interface SessionIndexerOptions {
+    /** Agent root (~/.ada/agent). Sessions live under <agentDir>/sessions. */
+    agentDir: string;
+    /** Directory for the engine index artifacts. */
+    indexDir: string;
+}
+/** Extract message text from the JSONL line's message.content array. */
+export declare function extractText(content: unknown): string;
+export declare function parseSessionFile(content: string): ParsedSessionFile | null;
+export interface SessionHit {
+    sessionId: string;
+    sessionName: string | null;
+    project: string;
+    role: "user" | "assistant";
+    content: string;
+    timestamp: string;
+    score: number;
+}
+export declare class SessionIndexer {
+    private index;
+    private meta;
+    private metaPath;
+    private indexFilePath;
+    private agentDir;
+    constructor(options: SessionIndexerOptions);
+    load(): Promise<void>;
+    private listSessionFiles;
+    /**
+     * Incremental backfill: index files whose size/mtime changed since the
+     * last run. Returns the number of files indexed.
+     */
+    backfillIncremental(): Promise<number>;
+    /** Live upsert of a single message (called on message_end). */
+    upsertMessage(message: {
+        id: string;
+        sessionId: string;
+        role: "user" | "assistant";
+        content: string;
+        timestamp: string;
+        cwd?: string | null;
+        sessionName?: string | null;
+    }): void;
+    search(query: string, options?: {
+        project?: string | null;
+        role?: "user" | "assistant";
+        limit?: number;
+    }): SessionHit[];
+    /** Persist index + metadata. */
+    save(): Promise<void>;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=session-indexer.d.ts.map

package/dist/core/memory-engine/session-indexer.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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Sessions live under <agentDir>/sessions. */\n\tagentDir: string;\n\t/** Directory for the engine index artifacts. */\n\tindexDir: string;\n}\n\ninterface FileMeta {\n\tsize: number;\n\tmtimeMs: number;\n}\n\ninterface SessionMetaFile {\n\tversion: 1;\n\tfiles: Record<string, FileMeta>;\n}\n\n/** Extract message text from the JSONL line's message.content array. */\nexport function extractText(content: unknown): string {\n\tif (typeof content === \"string\") return content;\n\tif (!Array.isArray(content)) return \"\";\n\tconst parts: string[] = [];\n\tfor (const block of content) {\n\t\tif (block && typeof block === \"object\" && (block as { type?: string }).type === \"text\") {\n\t\t\tconst text = (block as { text?: unknown }).text;\n\t\t\tif (typeof text === \"string\") parts.push(text);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn parts.join(\"\\n\");\n}\n\nexport function parseSessionFile(content: string): ParsedSessionFile | null {\n\tlet sessionId: string | null = null;\n\tlet cwd: string | null = null;\n\tlet sessionName: string | null = null;\n\tconst messages: ParsedSessionFile[\"messages\"] = [];\n\n\tfor (const line of content.split(\"\\n\")) {\n\t\tconst trimmed = line.trim();\n\t\tif (!trimmed) continue;\n\t\tlet entry: Record<string, unknown>;\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tentry = JSON.parse(trimmed) as Record<string, unknown>;\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\tcontinue;\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (!entry || typeof entry !== \"object\") continue;\n\n\t\tif (entry.type === \"session\") {\n\t\t\tif (typeof entry.id === \"string\") sessionId = entry.id;\n\t\t\tif (typeof entry.cwd === \"string\") cwd = entry.cwd;\n\t\t\tif (typeof entry.name === \"string\" && entry.name) sessionName = entry.name;\n\t\t\tcontinue;\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (entry.type === \"session_name\" && typeof entry.name === \"string\") {\n\t\t\tsessionName = entry.name;\n\t\t\tcontinue;\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (entry.type !== \"message\") continue;\n\n\t\tconst msg = entry.message as { role?: unknown; content?: unknown; timestamp?: unknown } | undefined;\n\t\tif (!msg || typeof msg !== \"object\") continue;\n\t\tconst role = msg.role;\n\t\tif (role !== \"user\" && role !== \"assistant\") continue;\n\t\tconst text = extractText(msg.content);\n\t\tif (!text.trim()) continue;\n\t\tconst messageId = typeof entry.id === \"string\" ? entry.id : `${sessionId ?? \"?\"}:${messages.length}`;\n\t\tmessages.push({\n\t\t\tid: messageId,\n\t\t\trole,\n\t\t\tcontent: text.slice(0, 4000),\n\t\t\ttimestamp: typeof entry.timestamp === \"string\" ? entry.timestamp : String(Date.now()),\n\t\t});\n\t}\n\n\tif (!sessionId) return null;\n\treturn { sessionId, cwd, sessionName, messages };\n}\n\nfunction sessionRoot(agentDir: string): string {\n\treturn join(agentDir, \"sessions\");\n}\n\nexport interface SessionHit {\n\tsessionId: string;\n\tsessionName: string | null;\n\tproject: string;\n\trole: \"user\" | \"assistant\";\n\tcontent: string;\n\ttimestamp: string;\n\tscore: number;\n}\n\nexport class SessionIndexer {\n\tprivate index: InvertedIndex;\n\tprivate meta: SessionMetaFile = { version: 1, files: {} };\n\tprivate metaPath: string;\n\tprivate indexFilePath: string;\n\tprivate agentDir: string;\n\n\tconstructor(options: SessionIndexerOptions) {\n\t\tthis.agentDir = options.agentDir;\n\t\tthis.metaPath = join(options.indexDir, \"sessions-meta.json\");\n\t\tthis.indexFilePath = join(options.indexDir, \"sessions.idx.json\");\n\t\tthis.index = new InvertedIndex(\"sessions\");\n\t}\n\n\tasync load(): Promise<void> {\n\t\tawait this.index.load(this.indexFilePath);\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tconst raw = await readFile(this.metaPath, \"utf-8\");\n\t\t\tconst parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as SessionMetaFile;\n\t\t\tif (parsed.version === 1) this.meta = parsed;\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\tthis.meta = { version: 1, files: {} };\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tprivate async listSessionFiles(): Promise<string[]> {\n\t\tconst root = sessionRoot(this.agentDir);\n\t\tconst out: string[] = [];\n\t\tconst walk = async (dir: string): Promise<void> => {\n\t\t\tlet entries;\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tentries = await readdir(dir, { withFileTypes: true });\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tfor (const entry of entries) {\n\t\t\t\tconst full = join(dir, entry.name);\n\t\t\t\tif (entry.isDirectory()) {\n\t\t\t\t\tawait walk(full);\n\t\t\t\t} else if (entry.name.endsWith(\".jsonl\")) {\n\t\t\t\t\tout.push(full);\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t};\n\t\tawait walk(root);\n\t\treturn out.sort();\n\t}\n\n\t/**\n\t * Incremental backfill: index files whose size/mtime changed since the\n\t * last run. Returns the number of files indexed.\n\t */\n\tasync backfillIncremental(): Promise<number> {\n\t\tconst files = await this.listSessionFiles();\n\t\tlet indexed = 0;\n\t\tfor (const file of files) {\n\t\t\tlet st;\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tst = await stat(file);\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst rel = relative(this.agentDir, file);\n\t\t\tconst previous = this.meta.files[rel];\n\t\t\tif (previous && previous.size === st.size && previous.mtimeMs === st.mtimeMs) {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tlet content: string;\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\tcontent = await readFile(file, \"utf-8\");\n\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\tcontinue;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tconst parsed = parseSessionFile(content);\n\t\t\tif (!parsed) continue;\n\t\t\tfor (const msg of parsed.messages) {\n\t\t\t\tthis.index.upsert(\n\t\t\t\t\t`${parsed.sessionId}:${msg.id}`,\n\t\t\t\t\tmsg.content,\n\t\t\t\t\t{ role: msg.role, timestamp: msg.timestamp, cwd: parsed.cwd, sessionId: parsed.sessionId, sessionName: parsed.sessionName },\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tthis.meta.files[rel] = { size: st.size, mtimeMs: st.mtimeMs };\n\t\t\tindexed++;\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn indexed;\n\t}\n\n\t/** Live upsert of a single message (called on message_end). */\n\tupsertMessage(message: {\n\t\tid: string;\n\t\tsessionId: string;\n\t\trole: \"user\" | \"assistant\";\n\t\tcontent: string;\n\t\ttimestamp: string;\n\t\tcwd?: string | null;\n\t\tsessionName?: string | null;\n\t}): void {\n\t\tif (!message.content.trim()) return;\n\t\tthis.index.upsert(\n\t\t\t`${message.sessionId}:${message.id}`,\n\t\t\tmessage.content.slice(0, 4000),\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\trole: message.role,\n\t\t\t\ttimestamp: message.timestamp,\n\t\t\t\tcwd: message.cwd ?? null,\n\t\t\t\tsessionId: message.sessionId,\n\t\t\t\tsessionName: message.sessionName ?? null,\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\tsearch(query: string, options: { project?: string | null; role?: \"user\" | \"assistant\"; limit?: number } = {}): SessionHit[] {\n\t\tconst limit = options.limit ?? 10;\n\t\tconst results = this.index.search(query, limit * 8, 0.15);\n\t\tconst out: SessionHit[] = [];\n\t\tfor (const result of results) {\n\t\t\tconst meta = this.index.getDocMeta(result.id);\n\t\t\tif (!meta) continue;\n\t\t\tif (options.project && meta.cwd !== options.project) continue;\n\t\t\tif (options.role && meta.role !== options.role) continue;\n\t\t\tout.push({\n\t\t\t\tsessionId: (meta.sessionId as string) ?? \"\",\n\t\t\t\tsessionName: (meta.sessionName as string | null) ?? null,\n\t\t\t\tproject: (meta.cwd as string) ?? \"\",\n\t\t\t\trole: (meta.role as \"user\" | \"assistant\") ?? \"user\",\n\t\t\t\tcontent: result.snippet,\n\t\t\t\ttimestamp: (meta.timestamp as string) ?? \"\",\n\t\t\t\tscore: result.score,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t\tif (out.length >= limit) break;\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn out;\n\t}\n\n\t/** Persist index + metadata. */\n\tasync save(): Promise<void> {\n\t\tawait mkdir(this.metaPath.replace(/[^/]+$/, \"\"), { recursive: true });\n\t\tawait this.index.save(this.indexFilePath);\n\t\tawait writeFile(this.metaPath, JSON.stringify(this.meta), \"utf-8\");\n\t}\n}\n"]}

package/dist/core/memory-engine/session-indexer.js

@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+/**
+ * SessionIndexer — indexes past conversations (layer 3c) from the session
+ * JSONL files written by session-manager.ts.
+ *
+ * - Incremental backfill: meta.json tracks per-file size+mtime, so only
+ *   changed files are re-parsed on startup.
+ * - Live indexing: messages are upserted as they are emitted.
+ * - The index is a derived artifact; it can be rebuilt at any time.
+ */
+import { readFile, writeFile, mkdir, stat, readdir } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { join, relative } from "node:path";
+import { InvertedIndex } from "./inverted-index.js";
+/** Extract message text from the JSONL line's message.content array. */
+export function extractText(content) {
+    if (typeof content === "string")
+        return content;
+    if (!Array.isArray(content))
+        return "";
+    const parts = [];
+    for (const block of content) {
+        if (block && typeof block === "object" && block.type === "text") {
+            const text = block.text;
+            if (typeof text === "string")
+                parts.push(text);
+        }
+    }
+    return parts.join("\n");
+}
+export function parseSessionFile(content) {
+    let sessionId = null;
+    let cwd = null;
+    let sessionName = null;
+    const messages = [];
+    for (const line of content.split("\n")) {
+        const trimmed = line.trim();
+        if (!trimmed)
+            continue;
+        let entry;
+        try {
+            entry = JSON.parse(trimmed);
+        }
+        catch {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object")
+            continue;
+        if (entry.type === "session") {
+            if (typeof entry.id === "string")
+                sessionId = entry.id;
+            if (typeof entry.cwd === "string")
+                cwd = entry.cwd;
+            if (typeof entry.name === "string" && entry.name)
+                sessionName = entry.name;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (entry.type === "session_name" && typeof entry.name === "string") {
+            sessionName = entry.name;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (entry.type !== "message")
+            continue;
+        const msg = entry.message;
+        if (!msg || typeof msg !== "object")
+            continue;
+        const role = msg.role;
+        if (role !== "user" && role !== "assistant")
+            continue;
+        const text = extractText(msg.content);
+        if (!text.trim())
+            continue;
+        const messageId = typeof entry.id === "string" ? entry.id : `${sessionId ?? "?"}:${messages.length}`;
+        messages.push({
+            id: messageId,
+            role,
+            content: text.slice(0, 4000),
+            timestamp: typeof entry.timestamp === "string" ? entry.timestamp : String(Date.now()),
+        });
+    }
+    if (!sessionId)
+        return null;
+    return { sessionId, cwd, sessionName, messages };
+}
+function sessionRoot(agentDir) {
+    return join(agentDir, "sessions");
+}
+export class SessionIndexer {
+    index;
+    meta = { version: 1, files: {} };
+    metaPath;
+    indexFilePath;
+    agentDir;
+    constructor(options) {
+        this.agentDir = options.agentDir;
+        this.metaPath = join(options.indexDir, "sessions-meta.json");
+        this.indexFilePath = join(options.indexDir, "sessions.idx.json");
+        this.index = new InvertedIndex("sessions");
+    }
+    async load() {
+        await this.index.load(this.indexFilePath);
+        try {
+            const raw = await readFile(this.metaPath, "utf-8");
+            const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
+            if (parsed.version === 1)
+                this.meta = parsed;
+        }
+        catch {
+            this.meta = { version: 1, files: {} };
+        }
+    }
+    async listSessionFiles() {
+        const root = sessionRoot(this.agentDir);
+        const out = [];
+        const walk = async (dir) => {
+            let entries;
+            try {
+                entries = await readdir(dir, { withFileTypes: true });
+            }
+            catch {
+                return;
+            }
+            for (const entry of entries) {
+                const full = join(dir, entry.name);
+                if (entry.isDirectory()) {
+                    await walk(full);
+                }
+                else if (entry.name.endsWith(".jsonl")) {
+                    out.push(full);
+                }
+            }
+        };
+        await walk(root);
+        return out.sort();
+    }
+    /**
+     * Incremental backfill: index files whose size/mtime changed since the
+     * last run. Returns the number of files indexed.
+     */
+    async backfillIncremental() {
+        const files = await this.listSessionFiles();
+        let indexed = 0;
+        for (const file of files) {
+            let st;
+            try {
+                st = await stat(file);
+            }
+            catch {
+                continue;
+            }
+            const rel = relative(this.agentDir, file);
+            const previous = this.meta.files[rel];
+            if (previous && previous.size === st.size && previous.mtimeMs === st.mtimeMs) {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let content;
+            try {
+                content = await readFile(file, "utf-8");
+            }
+            catch {
+                continue;
+            }
+            const parsed = parseSessionFile(content);
+            if (!parsed)
+                continue;
+            for (const msg of parsed.messages) {
+                this.index.upsert(`${parsed.sessionId}:${msg.id}`, msg.content, { role: msg.role, timestamp: msg.timestamp, cwd: parsed.cwd, sessionId: parsed.sessionId, sessionName: parsed.sessionName });
+            }
+            this.meta.files[rel] = { size: st.size, mtimeMs: st.mtimeMs };
+            indexed++;
+        }
+        return indexed;
+    }
+    /** Live upsert of a single message (called on message_end). */
+    upsertMessage(message) {
+        if (!message.content.trim())
+            return;
+        this.index.upsert(`${message.sessionId}:${message.id}`, message.content.slice(0, 4000), {
+            role: message.role,
+            timestamp: message.timestamp,
+            cwd: message.cwd ?? null,
+            sessionId: message.sessionId,
+            sessionName: message.sessionName ?? null,
+        });
+    }
+    search(query, options = {}) {
+        const limit = options.limit ?? 10;
+        const results = this.index.search(query, limit * 8, 0.15);
+        const out = [];
+        for (const result of results) {
+            const meta = this.index.getDocMeta(result.id);
+            if (!meta)
+                continue;
+            if (options.project && meta.cwd !== options.project)
+                continue;
+            if (options.role && meta.role !== options.role)
+                continue;
+            out.push({
+                sessionId: meta.sessionId ?? "",
+                sessionName: meta.sessionName ?? null,
+                project: meta.cwd ?? "",
+                role: meta.role ?? "user",
+                content: result.snippet,
+                timestamp: meta.timestamp ?? "",
+                score: result.score,
+            });
+            if (out.length >= limit)
+                break;
+        }
+        return out;
+    }
+    /** Persist index + metadata. */
+    async save() {
+        await mkdir(this.metaPath.replace(/[^/]+$/, ""), { recursive: true });
+        await this.index.save(this.indexFilePath);
+        await writeFile(this.metaPath, JSON.stringify(this.meta), "utf-8");
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=session-indexer.js.map