@hogsend/engine 0.64.0 → 0.65.0

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Files changed (68) hide show
  1. package/package.json +12 -12
  2. package/src/account-links/__fixtures__/fake-fetch.test.ts +57 -0
  3. package/src/account-links/__fixtures__/fake-fetch.ts +114 -0
  4. package/src/account-links/__fixtures__/steam.json +21 -0
  5. package/src/account-links/__fixtures__/twitch.json +22 -0
  6. package/src/account-links/index.ts +8 -0
  7. package/src/account-links/steam.test.ts +243 -0
  8. package/src/account-links/steam.ts +48 -0
  9. package/src/account-links/twitch.test.ts +157 -0
  10. package/src/account-links/twitch.ts +99 -0
  11. package/src/container.account-links.env.test.ts +65 -0
  12. package/src/container.account-links.halfenv.test.ts +48 -0
  13. package/src/container.account-links.test.ts +185 -0
  14. package/src/container.ts +120 -0
  15. package/src/env.ts +37 -0
  16. package/src/index.ts +87 -1
  17. package/src/lib/account-link-emit.ts +126 -0
  18. package/src/lib/account-link-events.ts +180 -0
  19. package/src/lib/account-link-hooks.test.ts +158 -0
  20. package/src/lib/account-link-hooks.ts +73 -0
  21. package/src/lib/account-link-ingest.ts +364 -0
  22. package/src/lib/account-link-nonce.test.ts +52 -0
  23. package/src/lib/account-link-nonce.ts +57 -0
  24. package/src/lib/account-link-origins.test.ts +72 -0
  25. package/src/lib/account-link-origins.ts +87 -0
  26. package/src/lib/account-link-pkce.test.ts +91 -0
  27. package/src/lib/account-link-pkce.ts +106 -0
  28. package/src/lib/account-link-provider-registry.test.ts +52 -0
  29. package/src/lib/account-link-provider-registry.ts +61 -0
  30. package/src/lib/account-link-throttle.test.ts +178 -0
  31. package/src/lib/account-link-throttle.ts +130 -0
  32. package/src/lib/account-link-url.ts +85 -0
  33. package/src/lib/account-links-emit.test.ts +525 -0
  34. package/src/lib/account-links-env.test.ts +40 -0
  35. package/src/lib/account-links-from-env.test.ts +187 -0
  36. package/src/lib/account-links-from-env.ts +126 -0
  37. package/src/lib/account-links.ts +1300 -0
  38. package/src/lib/app-secret.ts +34 -0
  39. package/src/lib/connector-actions.test.ts +13 -4
  40. package/src/lib/connector-state.account-link.test.ts +114 -0
  41. package/src/lib/connector-state.ts +48 -3
  42. package/src/lib/contacts.ts +320 -6
  43. package/src/lib/outbound-account-payloads.test.ts +137 -0
  44. package/src/lib/outbound.ts +91 -0
  45. package/src/lib/provider-credentials.ts +19 -5
  46. package/src/lib/webhook-catalog-sync.test.ts +24 -0
  47. package/src/lib/webhook-signing.ts +18 -1
  48. package/src/routes/accounts/callback.ts +597 -0
  49. package/src/routes/accounts/emit.ts +231 -0
  50. package/src/routes/accounts/import-links.ts +210 -0
  51. package/src/routes/accounts/index.ts +75 -0
  52. package/src/routes/accounts/lookup.ts +177 -0
  53. package/src/routes/accounts/me.ts +215 -0
  54. package/src/routes/accounts/mint.ts +279 -0
  55. package/src/routes/accounts/pages.ts +62 -0
  56. package/src/routes/accounts/resolve.ts +61 -0
  57. package/src/routes/accounts/serialize.ts +96 -0
  58. package/src/routes/accounts/shared.ts +107 -0
  59. package/src/routes/accounts/start.ts +229 -0
  60. package/src/routes/accounts/unlink.ts +98 -0
  61. package/src/routes/admin/agent.ts +2 -0
  62. package/src/routes/admin/api-keys.ts +7 -0
  63. package/src/routes/admin/contacts.ts +38 -2
  64. package/src/routes/connectors/index.ts +17 -0
  65. package/src/routes/contacts/index.ts +8 -0
  66. package/src/routes/index.ts +75 -0
  67. package/src/testing-barrel.test.ts +74 -0
  68. package/src/testing.ts +17 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
1
+ import { getRedisIfConnected } from "./redis.js";
2
+
3
+ /**
4
+ * The single-use nonce burn for the hosted account-link callback.
5
+ *
6
+ * Shape-identical to the connector callback's burn
7
+ * (`routes/connectors/index.ts:136-146`), down to the 900s TTL and the
8
+ * `"OK"`-comparison on the `SET NX` result: the signed state is otherwise
9
+ * TTL-replayable, so a captured callback URL works until `exp` unless the first
10
+ * use burns the per-mint nonce.
11
+ *
12
+ * ONE DELIBERATE DIVERGENCE, and it must stay: when Redis is absent the
13
+ * connector callback degrades to TTL-only validity ("we never block a callback
14
+ * on a cache miss"), and this one REFUSES. DECISIONS §6.8 says fail closed, and
15
+ * the threat differs — a replayed connector install re-captures a guild id,
16
+ * whereas a replayed account-link callback can MOVE a platform account between
17
+ * contacts (DECISIONS §6.1). It is a named function rather than four inline
18
+ * lines so the null-Redis arm is directly testable; a guard whose fail-closed
19
+ * branch no test can reach is a guard nobody will notice losing.
20
+ */
21
+
22
+ export interface AccountLinkNonceRedis {
23
+ set(
24
+ key: string,
25
+ value: string,
26
+ ex: "EX",
27
+ ttlSeconds: number,
28
+ nx: "NX",
29
+ ): Promise<string | null>;
30
+ }
31
+
32
+ /** Matches `connector:state:used:<nonce>`'s window so the marker outlives any valid state. */
33
+ export const NONCE_BURN_TTL_SECONDS = 900;
34
+
35
+ /**
36
+ * Claim a nonce. TRUE exactly once per nonce; FALSE on a replay, on a missing
37
+ * Redis, and on any Redis fault.
38
+ */
39
+ export async function burnAccountLinkNonce(
40
+ nonce: string,
41
+ redis?: AccountLinkNonceRedis | null,
42
+ ): Promise<boolean> {
43
+ const client = redis === undefined ? (getRedisIfConnected() ?? null) : redis;
44
+ if (!client) return false;
45
+ try {
46
+ const claimed = await client.set(
47
+ `account_link:state:used:${nonce}`,
48
+ "1",
49
+ "EX",
50
+ NONCE_BURN_TTL_SECONDS,
51
+ "NX",
52
+ );
53
+ return claimed === "OK";
54
+ } catch {
55
+ return false;
56
+ }
57
+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
1
+ import assert from "node:assert/strict";
2
+ import test from "node:test";
3
+ import { parseAllowedOrigins } from "./account-link-origins.js";
4
+
5
+ test("parses a csv of origins", () => {
6
+ assert.deepEqual(
7
+ parseAllowedOrigins(
8
+ "https://play.example.com, https://www.example.com ,http://localhost:3000",
9
+ ),
10
+ [
11
+ "https://play.example.com",
12
+ "https://www.example.com",
13
+ "http://localhost:3000",
14
+ ],
15
+ );
16
+ });
17
+
18
+ test("throws on a path", () => {
19
+ assert.throws(
20
+ () => parseAllowedOrigins("https://x.example.com/cb"),
21
+ /not an absolute origin/,
22
+ );
23
+ assert.throws(
24
+ () => parseAllowedOrigins(["https://x.example.com/cb"]),
25
+ /not an absolute origin/,
26
+ );
27
+ });
28
+
29
+ test("throws on a bare *", () => {
30
+ assert.throws(() => parseAllowedOrigins("*"), /not an absolute origin/);
31
+ });
32
+
33
+ test("throws on a wildcard host", () => {
34
+ assert.throws(
35
+ () => parseAllowedOrigins("https://*.example.com"),
36
+ /not an absolute origin/,
37
+ );
38
+ });
39
+
40
+ test("throws naming the offending entry", () => {
41
+ assert.throws(
42
+ () =>
43
+ parseAllowedOrigins("https://good.example.com,https://bad.example.com/x"),
44
+ /"https:\/\/bad\.example\.com\/x"/,
45
+ );
46
+ // The source label rides along so the operator knows which knob to fix.
47
+ assert.throws(
48
+ () => parseAllowedOrigins(["*"], "accountLinks.allowedOrigins"),
49
+ /accountLinks\.allowedOrigins/,
50
+ );
51
+ });
52
+
53
+ test("returns an empty array for undefined and for an empty string", () => {
54
+ assert.deepEqual(parseAllowedOrigins(undefined), []);
55
+ assert.deepEqual(parseAllowedOrigins(""), []);
56
+ assert.deepEqual(parseAllowedOrigins([]), []);
57
+ // Empty csv slots are dropped, not treated as malformed entries.
58
+ assert.deepEqual(parseAllowedOrigins(",https://a.example.com,,"), [
59
+ "https://a.example.com",
60
+ ]);
61
+ });
62
+
63
+ test("dedupes", () => {
64
+ assert.deepEqual(
65
+ parseAllowedOrigins([
66
+ "https://a.example.com",
67
+ "https://b.example.com",
68
+ "https://a.example.com",
69
+ ]),
70
+ ["https://a.example.com", "https://b.example.com"],
71
+ );
72
+ });
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * Parse the ONE origin allowlist governing `returnTo` (PRD 07) and the
3
+ * `postMessage` targetOrigin (PRD 10). THROWS on a malformed entry rather than
4
+ * dropping it: an allowlist is a security control, and a silently shortened one
5
+ * produces a link button that spins to a timeout while the link has already
6
+ * committed server-side — the single most likely first-run misconfiguration
7
+ * (PRD 13). Precedent: FX_RATES is parsed outside the env schema for exactly
8
+ * this reason (env.ts, lib/fx.ts).
9
+ *
10
+ * Accepts the csv env var (`ACCOUNT_LINK_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`) as a string, or the
11
+ * consumer option (`accountLinks.allowedOrigins`) as an array — the container
12
+ * concatenates env-first and parses both as ONE list, so the same rule applies
13
+ * to each. Entries are trimmed, empties dropped, and each remaining entry must
14
+ * be a parseable ABSOLUTE origin that round-trips (`new URL(e).origin === e`):
15
+ * a path suffix, a bare `*`, or a wildcard host all throw naming the entry.
16
+ * Returns the deduped list, order preserved.
17
+ *
18
+ * `source` names where the offending entry came from in the throw message;
19
+ * the container's single merged call keeps the default naming both.
20
+ */
21
+ export function parseAllowedOrigins(
22
+ entries: string | string[] | undefined,
23
+ source = "ACCOUNT_LINK_ALLOWED_ORIGINS / accountLinks.allowedOrigins",
24
+ ): string[] {
25
+ if (entries === undefined) return [];
26
+ const raw = typeof entries === "string" ? entries.split(",") : entries;
27
+ const origins: string[] = [];
28
+ for (const entry of raw) {
29
+ const trimmed = entry.trim();
30
+ if (trimmed === "") continue;
31
+ let origin: string | undefined;
32
+ // Explicit, BEFORE the URL parse: `*` is not a forbidden host code point
33
+ // in the WHATWG URL Standard, so `new URL("https://*.example.com")`
34
+ // parses and its origin round-trips — the round-trip check alone would
35
+ // wave a wildcard host (or a bare "*", on some runtimes) straight into a
36
+ // postMessage targetOrigin. An allowlist entry is one literal origin.
37
+ if (trimmed.includes("*")) {
38
+ throw new Error(
39
+ `allowed origin "${trimmed}" (from ${source}) is not an absolute ` +
40
+ "origin — wildcards are never allowed. Each entry must be one " +
41
+ 'literal origin, e.g. "https://play.example.com"',
42
+ );
43
+ }
44
+ try {
45
+ origin = new URL(trimmed).origin;
46
+ } catch {
47
+ // fall through to the throw below with origin undefined
48
+ }
49
+ if (origin !== trimmed) {
50
+ throw new Error(
51
+ `allowed origin "${trimmed}" (from ${source}) is not an absolute ` +
52
+ "origin. Each entry must be scheme + host [+ port] exactly — e.g. " +
53
+ '"https://play.example.com" — with no path, no trailing slash, and ' +
54
+ 'never a wildcard or "*". A malformed allowlist entry is a security ' +
55
+ "control failure, so it stops boot rather than being dropped",
56
+ );
57
+ }
58
+ if (!origins.includes(origin)) origins.push(origin);
59
+ }
60
+ return origins;
61
+ }
62
+
63
+ /**
64
+ * Is this `returnTo` allowed to be a redirect target?
65
+ *
66
+ * The ONE rule, applied at BOTH ends of the flow: `/start` checks it before it
67
+ * mints a state, and `/callback` re-checks it before it redirects, because the
68
+ * allowlist can be edited while a signed state is in flight and the signature
69
+ * proves only that WE minted the value, never that it is still permitted.
70
+ *
71
+ * Fail-closed by construction: an empty allowlist allows nothing (the container
72
+ * warns once at boot when providers are registered with no origins), an
73
+ * unparseable `returnTo` is refused, and the comparison is on the parsed
74
+ * `origin` — never a `startsWith`, which `https://play.example.com.evil.test`
75
+ * walks straight through.
76
+ */
77
+ export function isAllowedReturnTo(
78
+ returnTo: string,
79
+ allowedOrigins: readonly string[],
80
+ ): boolean {
81
+ if (allowedOrigins.length === 0) return false;
82
+ try {
83
+ return allowedOrigins.includes(new URL(returnTo).origin);
84
+ } catch {
85
+ return false;
86
+ }
87
+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
1
+ import assert from "node:assert/strict";
2
+ import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
3
+ import test from "node:test";
4
+ import {
5
+ type AccountLinkPkceRedis,
6
+ generatePkcePair,
7
+ storePkceVerifier,
8
+ takePkceVerifier,
9
+ } from "./account-link-pkce.js";
10
+
11
+ /** A fake with real `SET NX EX` / `GETDEL` semantics — the two that matter. */
12
+ function fakeRedis(): AccountLinkPkceRedis & { store: Map<string, string> } {
13
+ const store = new Map<string, string>();
14
+ return {
15
+ store,
16
+ async set(key, value, _ex, _ttl, _nx) {
17
+ if (store.has(key)) return null;
18
+ store.set(key, value);
19
+ return "OK";
20
+ },
21
+ async getdel(key) {
22
+ const value = store.get(key) ?? null;
23
+ store.delete(key);
24
+ return value;
25
+ },
26
+ };
27
+ }
28
+
29
+ test("the challenge is the base64url SHA-256 of the verifier", () => {
30
+ const { verifier, challenge } = generatePkcePair();
31
+ assert.equal(
32
+ challenge,
33
+ createHash("sha256").update(verifier).digest("base64url"),
34
+ );
35
+ // base64url only — a `+`, `/` or `=` breaks the authorize URL.
36
+ assert.match(challenge, /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/);
37
+ });
38
+
39
+ test("the verifier length is within RFC 7636 bounds", () => {
40
+ for (let i = 0; i < 25; i++) {
41
+ const { verifier } = generatePkcePair();
42
+ assert.ok(
43
+ verifier.length >= 43 && verifier.length <= 128,
44
+ `verifier length ${verifier.length} is outside RFC 7636's 43..128`,
45
+ );
46
+ // RFC 7636 unreserved charset.
47
+ assert.match(verifier, /^[A-Za-z0-9._~-]+$/);
48
+ }
49
+ });
50
+
51
+ test("two pairs are never the same", () => {
52
+ const seen = new Set<string>();
53
+ for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) seen.add(generatePkcePair().verifier);
54
+ assert.equal(seen.size, 50);
55
+ });
56
+
57
+ test("takePkceVerifier returns the verifier once and null thereafter", async () => {
58
+ const redis = fakeRedis();
59
+ assert.equal(
60
+ await storePkceVerifier("nonce-1", "verifier-1", 900, redis),
61
+ true,
62
+ );
63
+
64
+ assert.equal(await takePkceVerifier("nonce-1", redis), "verifier-1");
65
+ // GETDEL, not GET: single-use even if the nonce burn were somehow bypassed.
66
+ assert.equal(await takePkceVerifier("nonce-1", redis), null);
67
+ assert.equal(redis.store.size, 0);
68
+ });
69
+
70
+ test("takePkceVerifier returns null for an unknown nonce", async () => {
71
+ assert.equal(await takePkceVerifier("never-stored", fakeRedis()), null);
72
+ });
73
+
74
+ test("storePkceVerifier refuses to overwrite an existing nonce", async () => {
75
+ const redis = fakeRedis();
76
+ assert.equal(await storePkceVerifier("nonce-2", "first", 900, redis), true);
77
+ assert.equal(await storePkceVerifier("nonce-2", "second", 900, redis), false);
78
+ // The original custody is intact — a collision never silently rebinds it.
79
+ assert.equal(await takePkceVerifier("nonce-2", redis), "first");
80
+ });
81
+
82
+ test("a null redis stores nothing and takes nothing (fail closed)", async () => {
83
+ assert.equal(await storePkceVerifier("nonce-3", "v", 900, null), false);
84
+ assert.equal(await takePkceVerifier("nonce-3", null), null);
85
+ });
86
+
87
+ test("the key is namespaced per nonce", async () => {
88
+ const redis = fakeRedis();
89
+ await storePkceVerifier("abc", "v", 900, redis);
90
+ assert.deepEqual([...redis.store.keys()], ["account_link:pkce:abc"]);
91
+ });
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
1
+ import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
2
+ import { getRedisIfConnected } from "./redis.js";
3
+
4
+ /**
5
+ * PKCE custody for the hosted account-link flow (RFC 7636, S256 only).
6
+ *
7
+ * The verifier NEVER travels: not in the signed state, not in the redirect
8
+ * URL, not in a log line. It lives in Redis for the life of one attempt, keyed
9
+ * by that attempt's nonce, and is consumed with `GETDEL` so it is single-use
10
+ * even if the nonce burn were somehow bypassed. Only the S256 CHALLENGE goes
11
+ * out on the authorize URL, which is the entire point of PKCE: an intercepted
12
+ * authorization code is worthless without the verifier the interceptor never
13
+ * saw.
14
+ */
15
+
16
+ /** The slice of ioredis this module uses; narrowed so a test can inject a fake. */
17
+ export interface AccountLinkPkceRedis {
18
+ set(
19
+ key: string,
20
+ value: string,
21
+ ex: "EX",
22
+ ttlSeconds: number,
23
+ nx: "NX",
24
+ ): Promise<string | null>;
25
+ getdel(key: string): Promise<string | null>;
26
+ }
27
+
28
+ const KEY_PREFIX = "account_link:pkce:";
29
+
30
+ function pkceKey(nonce: string): string {
31
+ return `${KEY_PREFIX}${nonce}`;
32
+ }
33
+
34
+ function resolveRedis(
35
+ redis: AccountLinkPkceRedis | null | undefined,
36
+ ): AccountLinkPkceRedis | null {
37
+ // `undefined` = "not injected" → the process client. Explicit `null` is the
38
+ // fail-closed arm and must never fall through to a lazy connect.
39
+ return redis === undefined ? (getRedisIfConnected() ?? null) : redis;
40
+ }
41
+
42
+ /**
43
+ * A fresh verifier + its S256 challenge.
44
+ *
45
+ * 32 random bytes → 43 base64url chars, the RFC 7636 MINIMUM length, which is
46
+ * also the maximum entropy the spec's 43..128 range can carry from a 256-bit
47
+ * source. base64url's alphabet is a subset of the spec's `unreserved`
48
+ * production, so the value needs no further encoding anywhere it appears.
49
+ */
50
+ export function generatePkcePair(): { verifier: string; challenge: string } {
51
+ const verifier = randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
52
+ const challenge = createHash("sha256").update(verifier).digest("base64url");
53
+ return { verifier, challenge };
54
+ }
55
+
56
+ /**
57
+ * Take custody of a verifier for one attempt. `SET NX` — returns FALSE when the
58
+ * nonce is already claimed rather than rebinding it, so a nonce collision (or a
59
+ * replayed `/start`) can never silently swap the verifier out from under a live
60
+ * attempt. `/start` treats `false` as a 500.
61
+ *
62
+ * Returns false on a Redis fault too: fail closed, never a PKCE-less flow.
63
+ */
64
+ export async function storePkceVerifier(
65
+ nonce: string,
66
+ verifier: string,
67
+ ttlSeconds: number,
68
+ redis?: AccountLinkPkceRedis | null,
69
+ ): Promise<boolean> {
70
+ const client = resolveRedis(redis);
71
+ if (!client) return false;
72
+ try {
73
+ const claimed = await client.set(
74
+ pkceKey(nonce),
75
+ verifier,
76
+ "EX",
77
+ ttlSeconds,
78
+ "NX",
79
+ );
80
+ return claimed === "OK";
81
+ } catch {
82
+ return false;
83
+ }
84
+ }
85
+
86
+ /**
87
+ * Consume the verifier for one attempt. `GETDEL` (Redis >= 6.2) so the read and
88
+ * the delete are one atomic step — a `GET` then `DEL` leaves a window in which
89
+ * two concurrent callbacks both read the same verifier.
90
+ *
91
+ * `null` means "no verifier for this nonce", which the callback treats as a
92
+ * rejection: a PKCE provider whose verifier is gone cannot complete an exchange
93
+ * that proves anything.
94
+ */
95
+ export async function takePkceVerifier(
96
+ nonce: string,
97
+ redis?: AccountLinkPkceRedis | null,
98
+ ): Promise<string | null> {
99
+ const client = resolveRedis(redis);
100
+ if (!client) return null;
101
+ try {
102
+ return await client.getdel(pkceKey(nonce));
103
+ } catch {
104
+ return null;
105
+ }
106
+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
1
+ import assert from "node:assert/strict";
2
+ import test from "node:test";
3
+ import type { AccountLinkProvider } from "@hogsend/core";
4
+ import { AccountLinkProviderRegistry } from "./account-link-provider-registry.js";
5
+
6
+ // Hand-built stubs on purpose (the PRD 05 "Seams" note): the registry cares
7
+ // only about `meta.id`, so a minimal object exercises it end to end without
8
+ // touching defineAccountLink's authoring guards (tested in @hogsend/core).
9
+ function stubProvider(id: string, name = id): AccountLinkProvider {
10
+ return {
11
+ meta: { id, name },
12
+ authorizeUrl: () => `https://example.com/authorize?provider=${id}`,
13
+ handleCallback: async () => ({ providerUserId: `${id}-user` }),
14
+ };
15
+ }
16
+
17
+ test("register replaces a provider of the same id (last-writer-wins)", () => {
18
+ const first = stubProvider("steam", "first");
19
+ const second = stubProvider("steam", "second");
20
+ const registry = new AccountLinkProviderRegistry([first, second]);
21
+ assert.equal(registry.count(), 1);
22
+ assert.equal(registry.get("steam"), second);
23
+ });
24
+
25
+ test("get returns undefined for an unknown id", () => {
26
+ const registry = new AccountLinkProviderRegistry([stubProvider("steam")]);
27
+ assert.equal(registry.get("twitch"), undefined);
28
+ });
29
+
30
+ test("register throws on a provider with no meta.id", () => {
31
+ const registry = new AccountLinkProviderRegistry();
32
+ const noMeta = { ...stubProvider("x"), meta: undefined };
33
+ const emptyId = stubProvider("");
34
+ assert.throws(
35
+ () => registry.register(noMeta as unknown as AccountLinkProvider),
36
+ TypeError,
37
+ );
38
+ assert.throws(() => registry.register(emptyId), TypeError);
39
+ assert.equal(registry.count(), 0);
40
+ });
41
+
42
+ test("getAll preserves insertion order of distinct ids", () => {
43
+ const steam = stubProvider("steam");
44
+ const twitch = stubProvider("twitch");
45
+ const custom = stubProvider("battlenet");
46
+ const registry = new AccountLinkProviderRegistry([steam, twitch, custom]);
47
+ assert.deepEqual(
48
+ registry.getAll().map((p) => p.meta.id),
49
+ ["steam", "twitch", "battlenet"],
50
+ );
51
+ assert.deepEqual(registry.ids(), ["steam", "twitch", "battlenet"]);
52
+ });
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
1
+ import type { AccountLinkProvider } from "@hogsend/core";
2
+
3
+ /**
4
+ * Container-held registry of account-link providers, keyed by
5
+ * `provider.meta.id` — a direct structural mirror of the
6
+ * {@link EmailProviderRegistry} (`lib/email-provider-registry.ts`). The hosted
7
+ * flow routes (`/v1/accounts/:provider/start` + `/callback`, PRD 07), the data
8
+ * plane (PRD 09) and the property-sync cron (PRD 14) all resolve providers out
9
+ * of this via the container.
10
+ *
11
+ * Deliberately NOT a process singleton, for the same reason spelled out on the
12
+ * email registry: every reader holds a container reference, so a singleton +
13
+ * lazy-preset fallback would be dead weight.
14
+ *
15
+ * Divergence from the email registry: `meta.id` is REQUIRED here. The email
16
+ * registry falls back to `"resend"` for providers built before `meta` existed;
17
+ * this contract is new and has no pre-`meta` era, so an empty/absent id is a
18
+ * `TypeError` rather than a silent default. It does NOT re-validate
19
+ * `ACCOUNT_LINK_ID_RE` / `RESERVED_ACCOUNT_LINK_IDS` — `defineAccountLink()`
20
+ * already throws on both at definition time, and a second copy of that rule is
21
+ * a second place to update.
22
+ *
23
+ * Last-writer-wins on `meta.id`, so a consumer-supplied provider of the same id
24
+ * overrides an env preset of that id (env presets are constructed first).
25
+ */
26
+ export class AccountLinkProviderRegistry {
27
+ private byId = new Map<string, AccountLinkProvider>();
28
+
29
+ constructor(providers: AccountLinkProvider[] = []) {
30
+ for (const provider of providers) this.register(provider);
31
+ }
32
+
33
+ /** Register (or replace) a provider. Last-writer-wins on `meta.id`. */
34
+ register(provider: AccountLinkProvider): void {
35
+ const id = provider.meta?.id;
36
+ if (!id) {
37
+ throw new TypeError(
38
+ "account link provider has no meta.id — the id keys the registry " +
39
+ "and is the `:provider` route segment, so it is required " +
40
+ "(author providers with defineAccountLink, which enforces it)",
41
+ );
42
+ }
43
+ this.byId.set(id, provider);
44
+ }
45
+
46
+ get(id: string): AccountLinkProvider | undefined {
47
+ return this.byId.get(id);
48
+ }
49
+
50
+ getAll(): AccountLinkProvider[] {
51
+ return [...this.byId.values()];
52
+ }
53
+
54
+ ids(): string[] {
55
+ return [...this.byId.keys()];
56
+ }
57
+
58
+ count(): number {
59
+ return this.byId.size;
60
+ }
61
+ }