@hogsend/engine 0.63.0 → 0.65.0

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Files changed (92) hide show
  1. package/package.json +13 -12
  2. package/src/account-links/__fixtures__/fake-fetch.test.ts +57 -0
  3. package/src/account-links/__fixtures__/fake-fetch.ts +114 -0
  4. package/src/account-links/__fixtures__/steam.json +21 -0
  5. package/src/account-links/__fixtures__/twitch.json +22 -0
  6. package/src/account-links/index.ts +8 -0
  7. package/src/account-links/steam.test.ts +243 -0
  8. package/src/account-links/steam.ts +48 -0
  9. package/src/account-links/twitch.test.ts +157 -0
  10. package/src/account-links/twitch.ts +99 -0
  11. package/src/container.account-links.env.test.ts +65 -0
  12. package/src/container.account-links.halfenv.test.ts +48 -0
  13. package/src/container.account-links.test.ts +185 -0
  14. package/src/container.ts +120 -0
  15. package/src/env.ts +60 -0
  16. package/src/index.ts +104 -1
  17. package/src/journeys/journey-boundary.ts +8 -0
  18. package/src/lib/account-link-emit.ts +126 -0
  19. package/src/lib/account-link-events.ts +180 -0
  20. package/src/lib/account-link-hooks.test.ts +158 -0
  21. package/src/lib/account-link-hooks.ts +73 -0
  22. package/src/lib/account-link-ingest.ts +364 -0
  23. package/src/lib/account-link-nonce.test.ts +52 -0
  24. package/src/lib/account-link-nonce.ts +57 -0
  25. package/src/lib/account-link-origins.test.ts +72 -0
  26. package/src/lib/account-link-origins.ts +87 -0
  27. package/src/lib/account-link-pkce.test.ts +91 -0
  28. package/src/lib/account-link-pkce.ts +106 -0
  29. package/src/lib/account-link-provider-registry.test.ts +52 -0
  30. package/src/lib/account-link-provider-registry.ts +61 -0
  31. package/src/lib/account-link-throttle.test.ts +178 -0
  32. package/src/lib/account-link-throttle.ts +130 -0
  33. package/src/lib/account-link-url.ts +85 -0
  34. package/src/lib/account-links-emit.test.ts +525 -0
  35. package/src/lib/account-links-env.test.ts +40 -0
  36. package/src/lib/account-links-from-env.test.ts +187 -0
  37. package/src/lib/account-links-from-env.ts +126 -0
  38. package/src/lib/account-links.ts +1300 -0
  39. package/src/lib/app-secret.ts +34 -0
  40. package/src/lib/attachments.ts +81 -0
  41. package/src/lib/connector-actions.test.ts +13 -4
  42. package/src/lib/connector-state.account-link.test.ts +114 -0
  43. package/src/lib/connector-state.ts +48 -3
  44. package/src/lib/contacts.ts +320 -6
  45. package/src/lib/domain-status.return-path.test.ts +68 -0
  46. package/src/lib/domain-status.ts +19 -0
  47. package/src/lib/email-provider-boot.hogsend.test.ts +48 -0
  48. package/src/lib/email-provider-boot.test.ts +33 -0
  49. package/src/lib/email-providers-from-env.hogsend.test.ts +110 -0
  50. package/src/lib/email-providers-from-env.test.ts +52 -0
  51. package/src/lib/email-providers-from-env.ts +67 -0
  52. package/src/lib/email-service-types.ts +11 -0
  53. package/src/lib/email.ts +17 -0
  54. package/src/lib/mailer-bounce-idempotency.test.ts +469 -0
  55. package/src/lib/mailer-rejected.test.ts +229 -0
  56. package/src/lib/mailer-replied.test.ts +379 -0
  57. package/src/lib/mailer.ts +359 -24
  58. package/src/lib/outbound-account-payloads.test.ts +137 -0
  59. package/src/lib/outbound.ts +126 -0
  60. package/src/lib/provider-credentials.ts +19 -5
  61. package/src/lib/sending-domain-guidance.test.ts +99 -0
  62. package/src/lib/sending-domain-guidance.ts +84 -0
  63. package/src/lib/tracked-attachments.test.ts +376 -0
  64. package/src/lib/tracked-idempotency-header.test.ts +437 -0
  65. package/src/lib/tracked.ts +116 -4
  66. package/src/lib/tracking-event-names.ts +9 -0
  67. package/src/lib/webhook-catalog-sync.test.ts +24 -0
  68. package/src/lib/webhook-signing.ts +25 -1
  69. package/src/routes/accounts/callback.ts +597 -0
  70. package/src/routes/accounts/emit.ts +231 -0
  71. package/src/routes/accounts/import-links.ts +210 -0
  72. package/src/routes/accounts/index.ts +75 -0
  73. package/src/routes/accounts/lookup.ts +177 -0
  74. package/src/routes/accounts/me.ts +215 -0
  75. package/src/routes/accounts/mint.ts +279 -0
  76. package/src/routes/accounts/pages.ts +62 -0
  77. package/src/routes/accounts/resolve.ts +61 -0
  78. package/src/routes/accounts/serialize.ts +96 -0
  79. package/src/routes/accounts/shared.ts +107 -0
  80. package/src/routes/accounts/start.ts +229 -0
  81. package/src/routes/accounts/unlink.ts +98 -0
  82. package/src/routes/admin/agent.ts +2 -0
  83. package/src/routes/admin/api-keys.ts +7 -0
  84. package/src/routes/admin/contacts.ts +38 -2
  85. package/src/routes/admin/domain-conflict.test.ts +188 -0
  86. package/src/routes/admin/domain-return-path.test.ts +274 -0
  87. package/src/routes/admin/domain.ts +214 -1
  88. package/src/routes/connectors/index.ts +17 -0
  89. package/src/routes/contacts/index.ts +8 -0
  90. package/src/routes/index.ts +75 -0
  91. package/src/testing-barrel.test.ts +74 -0
  92. package/src/testing.ts +17 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
1
+ import assert from "node:assert/strict";
2
+ import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
3
+ import test from "node:test";
4
+ import {
5
+ type AccountLinkPkceRedis,
6
+ generatePkcePair,
7
+ storePkceVerifier,
8
+ takePkceVerifier,
9
+ } from "./account-link-pkce.js";
10
+
11
+ /** A fake with real `SET NX EX` / `GETDEL` semantics — the two that matter. */
12
+ function fakeRedis(): AccountLinkPkceRedis & { store: Map<string, string> } {
13
+ const store = new Map<string, string>();
14
+ return {
15
+ store,
16
+ async set(key, value, _ex, _ttl, _nx) {
17
+ if (store.has(key)) return null;
18
+ store.set(key, value);
19
+ return "OK";
20
+ },
21
+ async getdel(key) {
22
+ const value = store.get(key) ?? null;
23
+ store.delete(key);
24
+ return value;
25
+ },
26
+ };
27
+ }
28
+
29
+ test("the challenge is the base64url SHA-256 of the verifier", () => {
30
+ const { verifier, challenge } = generatePkcePair();
31
+ assert.equal(
32
+ challenge,
33
+ createHash("sha256").update(verifier).digest("base64url"),
34
+ );
35
+ // base64url only — a `+`, `/` or `=` breaks the authorize URL.
36
+ assert.match(challenge, /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/);
37
+ });
38
+
39
+ test("the verifier length is within RFC 7636 bounds", () => {
40
+ for (let i = 0; i < 25; i++) {
41
+ const { verifier } = generatePkcePair();
42
+ assert.ok(
43
+ verifier.length >= 43 && verifier.length <= 128,
44
+ `verifier length ${verifier.length} is outside RFC 7636's 43..128`,
45
+ );
46
+ // RFC 7636 unreserved charset.
47
+ assert.match(verifier, /^[A-Za-z0-9._~-]+$/);
48
+ }
49
+ });
50
+
51
+ test("two pairs are never the same", () => {
52
+ const seen = new Set<string>();
53
+ for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) seen.add(generatePkcePair().verifier);
54
+ assert.equal(seen.size, 50);
55
+ });
56
+
57
+ test("takePkceVerifier returns the verifier once and null thereafter", async () => {
58
+ const redis = fakeRedis();
59
+ assert.equal(
60
+ await storePkceVerifier("nonce-1", "verifier-1", 900, redis),
61
+ true,
62
+ );
63
+
64
+ assert.equal(await takePkceVerifier("nonce-1", redis), "verifier-1");
65
+ // GETDEL, not GET: single-use even if the nonce burn were somehow bypassed.
66
+ assert.equal(await takePkceVerifier("nonce-1", redis), null);
67
+ assert.equal(redis.store.size, 0);
68
+ });
69
+
70
+ test("takePkceVerifier returns null for an unknown nonce", async () => {
71
+ assert.equal(await takePkceVerifier("never-stored", fakeRedis()), null);
72
+ });
73
+
74
+ test("storePkceVerifier refuses to overwrite an existing nonce", async () => {
75
+ const redis = fakeRedis();
76
+ assert.equal(await storePkceVerifier("nonce-2", "first", 900, redis), true);
77
+ assert.equal(await storePkceVerifier("nonce-2", "second", 900, redis), false);
78
+ // The original custody is intact — a collision never silently rebinds it.
79
+ assert.equal(await takePkceVerifier("nonce-2", redis), "first");
80
+ });
81
+
82
+ test("a null redis stores nothing and takes nothing (fail closed)", async () => {
83
+ assert.equal(await storePkceVerifier("nonce-3", "v", 900, null), false);
84
+ assert.equal(await takePkceVerifier("nonce-3", null), null);
85
+ });
86
+
87
+ test("the key is namespaced per nonce", async () => {
88
+ const redis = fakeRedis();
89
+ await storePkceVerifier("abc", "v", 900, redis);
90
+ assert.deepEqual([...redis.store.keys()], ["account_link:pkce:abc"]);
91
+ });
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
1
+ import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
2
+ import { getRedisIfConnected } from "./redis.js";
3
+
4
+ /**
5
+ * PKCE custody for the hosted account-link flow (RFC 7636, S256 only).
6
+ *
7
+ * The verifier NEVER travels: not in the signed state, not in the redirect
8
+ * URL, not in a log line. It lives in Redis for the life of one attempt, keyed
9
+ * by that attempt's nonce, and is consumed with `GETDEL` so it is single-use
10
+ * even if the nonce burn were somehow bypassed. Only the S256 CHALLENGE goes
11
+ * out on the authorize URL, which is the entire point of PKCE: an intercepted
12
+ * authorization code is worthless without the verifier the interceptor never
13
+ * saw.
14
+ */
15
+
16
+ /** The slice of ioredis this module uses; narrowed so a test can inject a fake. */
17
+ export interface AccountLinkPkceRedis {
18
+ set(
19
+ key: string,
20
+ value: string,
21
+ ex: "EX",
22
+ ttlSeconds: number,
23
+ nx: "NX",
24
+ ): Promise<string | null>;
25
+ getdel(key: string): Promise<string | null>;
26
+ }
27
+
28
+ const KEY_PREFIX = "account_link:pkce:";
29
+
30
+ function pkceKey(nonce: string): string {
31
+ return `${KEY_PREFIX}${nonce}`;
32
+ }
33
+
34
+ function resolveRedis(
35
+ redis: AccountLinkPkceRedis | null | undefined,
36
+ ): AccountLinkPkceRedis | null {
37
+ // `undefined` = "not injected" → the process client. Explicit `null` is the
38
+ // fail-closed arm and must never fall through to a lazy connect.
39
+ return redis === undefined ? (getRedisIfConnected() ?? null) : redis;
40
+ }
41
+
42
+ /**
43
+ * A fresh verifier + its S256 challenge.
44
+ *
45
+ * 32 random bytes → 43 base64url chars, the RFC 7636 MINIMUM length, which is
46
+ * also the maximum entropy the spec's 43..128 range can carry from a 256-bit
47
+ * source. base64url's alphabet is a subset of the spec's `unreserved`
48
+ * production, so the value needs no further encoding anywhere it appears.
49
+ */
50
+ export function generatePkcePair(): { verifier: string; challenge: string } {
51
+ const verifier = randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
52
+ const challenge = createHash("sha256").update(verifier).digest("base64url");
53
+ return { verifier, challenge };
54
+ }
55
+
56
+ /**
57
+ * Take custody of a verifier for one attempt. `SET NX` — returns FALSE when the
58
+ * nonce is already claimed rather than rebinding it, so a nonce collision (or a
59
+ * replayed `/start`) can never silently swap the verifier out from under a live
60
+ * attempt. `/start` treats `false` as a 500.
61
+ *
62
+ * Returns false on a Redis fault too: fail closed, never a PKCE-less flow.
63
+ */
64
+ export async function storePkceVerifier(
65
+ nonce: string,
66
+ verifier: string,
67
+ ttlSeconds: number,
68
+ redis?: AccountLinkPkceRedis | null,
69
+ ): Promise<boolean> {
70
+ const client = resolveRedis(redis);
71
+ if (!client) return false;
72
+ try {
73
+ const claimed = await client.set(
74
+ pkceKey(nonce),
75
+ verifier,
76
+ "EX",
77
+ ttlSeconds,
78
+ "NX",
79
+ );
80
+ return claimed === "OK";
81
+ } catch {
82
+ return false;
83
+ }
84
+ }
85
+
86
+ /**
87
+ * Consume the verifier for one attempt. `GETDEL` (Redis >= 6.2) so the read and
88
+ * the delete are one atomic step — a `GET` then `DEL` leaves a window in which
89
+ * two concurrent callbacks both read the same verifier.
90
+ *
91
+ * `null` means "no verifier for this nonce", which the callback treats as a
92
+ * rejection: a PKCE provider whose verifier is gone cannot complete an exchange
93
+ * that proves anything.
94
+ */
95
+ export async function takePkceVerifier(
96
+ nonce: string,
97
+ redis?: AccountLinkPkceRedis | null,
98
+ ): Promise<string | null> {
99
+ const client = resolveRedis(redis);
100
+ if (!client) return null;
101
+ try {
102
+ return await client.getdel(pkceKey(nonce));
103
+ } catch {
104
+ return null;
105
+ }
106
+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
1
+ import assert from "node:assert/strict";
2
+ import test from "node:test";
3
+ import type { AccountLinkProvider } from "@hogsend/core";
4
+ import { AccountLinkProviderRegistry } from "./account-link-provider-registry.js";
5
+
6
+ // Hand-built stubs on purpose (the PRD 05 "Seams" note): the registry cares
7
+ // only about `meta.id`, so a minimal object exercises it end to end without
8
+ // touching defineAccountLink's authoring guards (tested in @hogsend/core).
9
+ function stubProvider(id: string, name = id): AccountLinkProvider {
10
+ return {
11
+ meta: { id, name },
12
+ authorizeUrl: () => `https://example.com/authorize?provider=${id}`,
13
+ handleCallback: async () => ({ providerUserId: `${id}-user` }),
14
+ };
15
+ }
16
+
17
+ test("register replaces a provider of the same id (last-writer-wins)", () => {
18
+ const first = stubProvider("steam", "first");
19
+ const second = stubProvider("steam", "second");
20
+ const registry = new AccountLinkProviderRegistry([first, second]);
21
+ assert.equal(registry.count(), 1);
22
+ assert.equal(registry.get("steam"), second);
23
+ });
24
+
25
+ test("get returns undefined for an unknown id", () => {
26
+ const registry = new AccountLinkProviderRegistry([stubProvider("steam")]);
27
+ assert.equal(registry.get("twitch"), undefined);
28
+ });
29
+
30
+ test("register throws on a provider with no meta.id", () => {
31
+ const registry = new AccountLinkProviderRegistry();
32
+ const noMeta = { ...stubProvider("x"), meta: undefined };
33
+ const emptyId = stubProvider("");
34
+ assert.throws(
35
+ () => registry.register(noMeta as unknown as AccountLinkProvider),
36
+ TypeError,
37
+ );
38
+ assert.throws(() => registry.register(emptyId), TypeError);
39
+ assert.equal(registry.count(), 0);
40
+ });
41
+
42
+ test("getAll preserves insertion order of distinct ids", () => {
43
+ const steam = stubProvider("steam");
44
+ const twitch = stubProvider("twitch");
45
+ const custom = stubProvider("battlenet");
46
+ const registry = new AccountLinkProviderRegistry([steam, twitch, custom]);
47
+ assert.deepEqual(
48
+ registry.getAll().map((p) => p.meta.id),
49
+ ["steam", "twitch", "battlenet"],
50
+ );
51
+ assert.deepEqual(registry.ids(), ["steam", "twitch", "battlenet"]);
52
+ });
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
1
+ import type { AccountLinkProvider } from "@hogsend/core";
2
+
3
+ /**
4
+ * Container-held registry of account-link providers, keyed by
5
+ * `provider.meta.id` — a direct structural mirror of the
6
+ * {@link EmailProviderRegistry} (`lib/email-provider-registry.ts`). The hosted
7
+ * flow routes (`/v1/accounts/:provider/start` + `/callback`, PRD 07), the data
8
+ * plane (PRD 09) and the property-sync cron (PRD 14) all resolve providers out
9
+ * of this via the container.
10
+ *
11
+ * Deliberately NOT a process singleton, for the same reason spelled out on the
12
+ * email registry: every reader holds a container reference, so a singleton +
13
+ * lazy-preset fallback would be dead weight.
14
+ *
15
+ * Divergence from the email registry: `meta.id` is REQUIRED here. The email
16
+ * registry falls back to `"resend"` for providers built before `meta` existed;
17
+ * this contract is new and has no pre-`meta` era, so an empty/absent id is a
18
+ * `TypeError` rather than a silent default. It does NOT re-validate
19
+ * `ACCOUNT_LINK_ID_RE` / `RESERVED_ACCOUNT_LINK_IDS` — `defineAccountLink()`
20
+ * already throws on both at definition time, and a second copy of that rule is
21
+ * a second place to update.
22
+ *
23
+ * Last-writer-wins on `meta.id`, so a consumer-supplied provider of the same id
24
+ * overrides an env preset of that id (env presets are constructed first).
25
+ */
26
+ export class AccountLinkProviderRegistry {
27
+ private byId = new Map<string, AccountLinkProvider>();
28
+
29
+ constructor(providers: AccountLinkProvider[] = []) {
30
+ for (const provider of providers) this.register(provider);
31
+ }
32
+
33
+ /** Register (or replace) a provider. Last-writer-wins on `meta.id`. */
34
+ register(provider: AccountLinkProvider): void {
35
+ const id = provider.meta?.id;
36
+ if (!id) {
37
+ throw new TypeError(
38
+ "account link provider has no meta.id — the id keys the registry " +
39
+ "and is the `:provider` route segment, so it is required " +
40
+ "(author providers with defineAccountLink, which enforces it)",
41
+ );
42
+ }
43
+ this.byId.set(id, provider);
44
+ }
45
+
46
+ get(id: string): AccountLinkProvider | undefined {
47
+ return this.byId.get(id);
48
+ }
49
+
50
+ getAll(): AccountLinkProvider[] {
51
+ return [...this.byId.values()];
52
+ }
53
+
54
+ ids(): string[] {
55
+ return [...this.byId.keys()];
56
+ }
57
+
58
+ count(): number {
59
+ return this.byId.size;
60
+ }
61
+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
1
+ import assert from "node:assert/strict";
2
+ import test from "node:test";
3
+ import {
4
+ type AccountLinkThrottleRedis,
5
+ checkAccountLinkThrottle,
6
+ } from "./account-link-throttle.js";
7
+
8
+ /**
9
+ * PRD 07 T3. The fake redis is the whole point: this throttle is FAIL-CLOSED
10
+ * (DECISIONS §6.8), which is the opposite of the connector callback's
11
+ * degrade-to-TTL posture, so the "no redis" arm must be exercised directly.
12
+ */
13
+ function fakeRedis(opts: { throwOnIncr?: boolean } = {}): {
14
+ redis: AccountLinkThrottleRedis;
15
+ counts: Map<string, number>;
16
+ expires: Array<{ key: string; seconds: number }>;
17
+ } {
18
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>();
19
+ const expires: Array<{ key: string; seconds: number }> = [];
20
+ return {
21
+ counts,
22
+ expires,
23
+ redis: {
24
+ async incr(key) {
25
+ if (opts.throwOnIncr) throw new Error("connection lost");
26
+ const next = (counts.get(key) ?? 0) + 1;
27
+ counts.set(key, next);
28
+ return next;
29
+ },
30
+ async expire(key, seconds) {
31
+ expires.push({ key, seconds });
32
+ return 1;
33
+ },
34
+ },
35
+ };
36
+ }
37
+
38
+ test("allows under the cap", async () => {
39
+ const { redis } = fakeRedis();
40
+ for (let i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
41
+ const result = await checkAccountLinkThrottle({
42
+ surface: "start",
43
+ ip: "203.0.113.7",
44
+ redis,
45
+ });
46
+ assert.deepEqual(result, { ok: true }, `attempt ${i + 1} should pass`);
47
+ }
48
+ });
49
+
50
+ test("rejects over the cap with rate_limited", async () => {
51
+ const { redis } = fakeRedis();
52
+ for (let i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
53
+ await checkAccountLinkThrottle({
54
+ surface: "callback",
55
+ ip: "203.0.113.8",
56
+ redis,
57
+ });
58
+ }
59
+ const result = await checkAccountLinkThrottle({
60
+ surface: "callback",
61
+ ip: "203.0.113.8",
62
+ redis,
63
+ });
64
+ assert.deepEqual(result, { ok: false, reason: "rate_limited" });
65
+ });
66
+
67
+ test("rejects with redis_unavailable when redis is null", async () => {
68
+ // FAIL-CLOSED. A replayed account link can MOVE a platform account between
69
+ // contacts, so a cache miss must never wave one through.
70
+ const result = await checkAccountLinkThrottle({
71
+ surface: "start",
72
+ ip: "203.0.113.9",
73
+ redis: null,
74
+ });
75
+ assert.deepEqual(result, { ok: false, reason: "redis_unavailable" });
76
+ });
77
+
78
+ test("rejects with redis_unavailable when redis throws", async () => {
79
+ const { redis } = fakeRedis({ throwOnIncr: true });
80
+ const result = await checkAccountLinkThrottle({
81
+ surface: "start",
82
+ ip: "203.0.113.10",
83
+ redis,
84
+ });
85
+ assert.deepEqual(result, { ok: false, reason: "redis_unavailable" });
86
+ });
87
+
88
+ test("sets the TTL exactly once, on the first increment", async () => {
89
+ const { redis, expires } = fakeRedis();
90
+ for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
91
+ await checkAccountLinkThrottle({
92
+ surface: "start",
93
+ ip: "203.0.113.11",
94
+ redis,
95
+ });
96
+ }
97
+ assert.deepEqual(expires, [
98
+ { key: "hogsend:al:throttle:start:203.0.113.11", seconds: 900 },
99
+ ]);
100
+ });
101
+
102
+ test("the warm path adds a per-contact budget on its own key", async () => {
103
+ const { redis, counts } = fakeRedis();
104
+ await checkAccountLinkThrottle({
105
+ surface: "start",
106
+ ip: "203.0.113.12",
107
+ contactId: "c-1",
108
+ redis,
109
+ });
110
+ assert.equal(counts.get("hogsend:al:throttle:start:203.0.113.12"), 1);
111
+ assert.equal(counts.get("hogsend:al:throttle:contact:c-1"), 1);
112
+ });
113
+
114
+ test("a per-contact budget over the cap rejects even from a fresh IP", async () => {
115
+ const { redis } = fakeRedis();
116
+ for (let i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
117
+ await checkAccountLinkThrottle({
118
+ surface: "start",
119
+ ip: `198.51.100.${i}`,
120
+ contactId: "c-hot",
121
+ redis,
122
+ });
123
+ }
124
+ const result = await checkAccountLinkThrottle({
125
+ surface: "start",
126
+ ip: "198.51.100.200",
127
+ contactId: "c-hot",
128
+ redis,
129
+ });
130
+ assert.deepEqual(result, { ok: false, reason: "rate_limited" });
131
+ });
132
+
133
+ test("a contact-only call bumps the contact budget and no IP budget", async () => {
134
+ // `/start` calls this shape for the WARM leg, after the binding is known —
135
+ // re-passing the IP would double-count it against its own budget.
136
+ const { redis, counts } = fakeRedis();
137
+ const result = await checkAccountLinkThrottle({
138
+ surface: "start",
139
+ contactId: "c-2",
140
+ redis,
141
+ });
142
+ assert.deepEqual(result, { ok: true });
143
+ assert.deepEqual([...counts.keys()], ["hogsend:al:throttle:contact:c-2"]);
144
+ });
145
+
146
+ test("start and callback hold separate budgets", async () => {
147
+ const { redis, counts } = fakeRedis();
148
+ await checkAccountLinkThrottle({ surface: "start", ip: "1.2.3.4", redis });
149
+ await checkAccountLinkThrottle({ surface: "callback", ip: "1.2.3.4", redis });
150
+ assert.equal(counts.get("hogsend:al:throttle:start:1.2.3.4"), 1);
151
+ assert.equal(counts.get("hogsend:al:throttle:cb:1.2.3.4"), 1);
152
+ });
153
+
154
+ test("config overrides the window and the cap", async () => {
155
+ const { redis, expires } = fakeRedis();
156
+ const config = { windowSeconds: 60, max: 1 };
157
+ assert.deepEqual(
158
+ await checkAccountLinkThrottle({
159
+ surface: "start",
160
+ ip: "5.6.7.8",
161
+ config,
162
+ redis,
163
+ }),
164
+ { ok: true },
165
+ );
166
+ assert.deepEqual(
167
+ await checkAccountLinkThrottle({
168
+ surface: "start",
169
+ ip: "5.6.7.8",
170
+ config,
171
+ redis,
172
+ }),
173
+ { ok: false, reason: "rate_limited" },
174
+ );
175
+ assert.deepEqual(expires, [
176
+ { key: "hogsend:al:throttle:start:5.6.7.8", seconds: 60 },
177
+ ]);
178
+ });
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
1
+ import { getRedisIfConnected } from "./redis.js";
2
+
3
+ /**
4
+ * The public account-link surfaces (`/v1/accounts/:provider/start` and
5
+ * `/callback`) are UNAUTHENTICATED by construction — a browser redirect target
6
+ * carries no `Authorization` header — so they are throttled per IP, and the
7
+ * warm mint is additionally throttled per contact.
8
+ *
9
+ * FAIL-CLOSED (DECISIONS §6.8), which is a DELIBERATE divergence from the
10
+ * connector callback next door: that one degrades to TTL-only validity when
11
+ * Redis is absent on the stated principle that it will "never block a callback
12
+ * on a cache miss" (`routes/connectors/index.ts:134-136`). The threat is not
13
+ * the same. A replayed connector install re-captures a guild id; a replayed
14
+ * account-link callback can MOVE a platform account between contacts
15
+ * (DECISIONS §6.1). PKCE verifier custody also lives in Redis, so for the
16
+ * OAuth2 providers Redis is structurally required regardless. Do not "fix" this
17
+ * into the connector posture.
18
+ *
19
+ * Modelled on `cold-connect/throttle.ts` — the same fixed-window `INCR` + set
20
+ * the TTL on the FIRST increment idiom.
21
+ */
22
+
23
+ /**
24
+ * The slice of ioredis this module uses. Narrowed so a test can inject a fake
25
+ * (and so `null` — the fail-closed arm — is expressible), the same seam
26
+ * `lib/leader-lease.ts` uses for its `redis` argument.
27
+ */
28
+ export interface AccountLinkThrottleRedis {
29
+ incr(key: string): Promise<number>;
30
+ expire(key: string, seconds: number): Promise<unknown>;
31
+ }
32
+
33
+ export type ThrottleResult =
34
+ | { ok: true }
35
+ | { ok: false; reason: "rate_limited" | "redis_unavailable" };
36
+
37
+ const DEFAULT_WINDOW_SECONDS = 900;
38
+ const DEFAULT_MAX = 20;
39
+
40
+ /** The key namespaces, one per budget. `cb` keeps the key short and readable. */
41
+ const SURFACE_KEY = { start: "start", callback: "cb" } as const;
42
+
43
+ interface AccountLinkThrottleBase {
44
+ surface: "start" | "callback";
45
+ config?: { windowSeconds?: number; max?: number };
46
+ /**
47
+ * TEST SEAM (and the fail-closed arm). Defaults to
48
+ * {@link getRedisIfConnected}, NOT `getRedis()`: the account-link routes
49
+ * refuse to serve at all without a connected Redis, so this must never be the
50
+ * thing that lazily opens a connection and papers over that.
51
+ */
52
+ redis?: AccountLinkThrottleRedis | null;
53
+ }
54
+
55
+ /**
56
+ * At least ONE budget must be named, enforced by the union rather than by a
57
+ * runtime check — a call that names no budget would silently allow everything.
58
+ *
59
+ * `/start` calls this TWICE and that is deliberate: once on the IP alone,
60
+ * BEFORE anything is minted (the order of operations puts the throttle ahead of
61
+ * the binding resolution), and once on the sealed `contactId` alone once the
62
+ * WARM binding is known. One call cannot do both, because the contact is not
63
+ * known at the point the IP budget has to bite, and re-passing the IP on the
64
+ * second call would double-count every warm request against its own budget.
65
+ */
66
+ export type AccountLinkThrottleArgs = AccountLinkThrottleBase &
67
+ (
68
+ | {
69
+ /** Best-effort client IP; `"unknown"` shares ONE bounded bucket, never bypasses. */
70
+ ip: string;
71
+ contactId?: string;
72
+ }
73
+ | {
74
+ ip?: undefined;
75
+ /** WARM only — the sealed contact gets its own budget across IPs. */
76
+ contactId: string;
77
+ }
78
+ );
79
+
80
+ /**
81
+ * One fixed-window counter. `INCR`, then set the TTL on the FIRST increment
82
+ * only so the window slides forward rather than being extended by traffic. A
83
+ * missing client throws so the caller fails CLOSED.
84
+ */
85
+ async function bump(
86
+ redis: AccountLinkThrottleRedis | null | undefined,
87
+ key: string,
88
+ windowSeconds: number,
89
+ ): Promise<number> {
90
+ if (!redis) throw new Error("redis_unavailable");
91
+ const count = await redis.incr(key);
92
+ if (count === 1) await redis.expire(key, windowSeconds);
93
+ return count;
94
+ }
95
+
96
+ /**
97
+ * Bump every budget this call owns and reject when ANY is over its cap. Both
98
+ * budgets are bumped even when the first is already over: a fixed-window
99
+ * counter that stops counting under attack is a counter that reopens early.
100
+ */
101
+ export async function checkAccountLinkThrottle(
102
+ args: AccountLinkThrottleArgs,
103
+ ): Promise<ThrottleResult> {
104
+ const windowSeconds = args.config?.windowSeconds ?? DEFAULT_WINDOW_SECONDS;
105
+ const max = args.config?.max ?? DEFAULT_MAX;
106
+ const redis = args.redis === undefined ? getRedisIfConnected() : args.redis;
107
+
108
+ const keys = [
109
+ ...(args.ip
110
+ ? [`hogsend:al:throttle:${SURFACE_KEY[args.surface]}:${args.ip}`]
111
+ : []),
112
+ ...(args.contactId
113
+ ? [`hogsend:al:throttle:contact:${args.contactId}`]
114
+ : []),
115
+ ];
116
+
117
+ try {
118
+ const counts = await Promise.all(
119
+ keys.map((key) => bump(redis, key, windowSeconds)),
120
+ );
121
+ if (counts.some((count) => count > max)) {
122
+ return { ok: false, reason: "rate_limited" };
123
+ }
124
+ return { ok: true };
125
+ } catch {
126
+ // Any Redis fault — absent client, connection loss, command error — is a
127
+ // refusal, never a bypass.
128
+ return { ok: false, reason: "redis_unavailable" };
129
+ }
130
+ }