@hilbras/omnihilbras 2.9.5 → 2.9.7

package/app/node_modules/node-forge/lib/aesCipherSuites.js

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+/**
+ * A Javascript implementation of AES Cipher Suites for TLS.
+ *
+ * @author Dave Longley
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2009-2015 Digital Bazaar, Inc.
+ *
+ */
+var forge = require('./forge');
+require('./aes');
+require('./tls');
+
+var tls = module.exports = forge.tls;
+
+/**
+ * Supported cipher suites.
+ */
+tls.CipherSuites['TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA'] = {
+  id: [0x00, 0x2f],
+  name: 'TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA',
+  initSecurityParameters: function(sp) {
+    sp.bulk_cipher_algorithm = tls.BulkCipherAlgorithm.aes;
+    sp.cipher_type = tls.CipherType.block;
+    sp.enc_key_length = 16;
+    sp.block_length = 16;
+    sp.fixed_iv_length = 16;
+    sp.record_iv_length = 16;
+    sp.mac_algorithm = tls.MACAlgorithm.hmac_sha1;
+    sp.mac_length = 20;
+    sp.mac_key_length = 20;
+  },
+  initConnectionState: initConnectionState
+};
+tls.CipherSuites['TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA'] = {
+  id: [0x00, 0x35],
+  name: 'TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA',
+  initSecurityParameters: function(sp) {
+    sp.bulk_cipher_algorithm = tls.BulkCipherAlgorithm.aes;
+    sp.cipher_type = tls.CipherType.block;
+    sp.enc_key_length = 32;
+    sp.block_length = 16;
+    sp.fixed_iv_length = 16;
+    sp.record_iv_length = 16;
+    sp.mac_algorithm = tls.MACAlgorithm.hmac_sha1;
+    sp.mac_length = 20;
+    sp.mac_key_length = 20;
+  },
+  initConnectionState: initConnectionState
+};
+
+function initConnectionState(state, c, sp) {
+  var client = (c.entity === forge.tls.ConnectionEnd.client);
+
+  // cipher setup
+  state.read.cipherState = {
+    init: false,
+    cipher: forge.cipher.createDecipher('AES-CBC', client ?
+      sp.keys.server_write_key : sp.keys.client_write_key),
+    iv: client ? sp.keys.server_write_IV : sp.keys.client_write_IV
+  };
+  state.write.cipherState = {
+    init: false,
+    cipher: forge.cipher.createCipher('AES-CBC', client ?
+      sp.keys.client_write_key : sp.keys.server_write_key),
+    iv: client ? sp.keys.client_write_IV : sp.keys.server_write_IV
+  };
+  state.read.cipherFunction = decrypt_aes_cbc_sha1;
+  state.write.cipherFunction = encrypt_aes_cbc_sha1;
+
+  // MAC setup
+  state.read.macLength = state.write.macLength = sp.mac_length;
+  state.read.macFunction = state.write.macFunction = tls.hmac_sha1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Encrypts the TLSCompressed record into a TLSCipherText record using AES
+ * in CBC mode.
+ *
+ * @param record the TLSCompressed record to encrypt.
+ * @param s the ConnectionState to use.
+ *
+ * @return true on success, false on failure.
+ */
+function encrypt_aes_cbc_sha1(record, s) {
+  var rval = false;
+
+  // append MAC to fragment, update sequence number
+  var mac = s.macFunction(s.macKey, s.sequenceNumber, record);
+  record.fragment.putBytes(mac);
+  s.updateSequenceNumber();
+
+  // TLS 1.1+ use an explicit IV every time to protect against CBC attacks
+  var iv;
+  if(record.version.minor === tls.Versions.TLS_1_0.minor) {
+    // use the pre-generated IV when initializing for TLS 1.0, otherwise use
+    // the residue from the previous encryption
+    iv = s.cipherState.init ? null : s.cipherState.iv;
+  } else {
+    iv = forge.random.getBytesSync(16);
+  }
+
+  s.cipherState.init = true;
+
+  // start cipher
+  var cipher = s.cipherState.cipher;
+  cipher.start({iv: iv});
+
+  // TLS 1.1+ write IV into output
+  if(record.version.minor >= tls.Versions.TLS_1_1.minor) {
+    cipher.output.putBytes(iv);
+  }
+
+  // do encryption (default padding is appropriate)
+  cipher.update(record.fragment);
+  if(cipher.finish(encrypt_aes_cbc_sha1_padding)) {
+    // set record fragment to encrypted output
+    record.fragment = cipher.output;
+    record.length = record.fragment.length();
+    rval = true;
+  }
+
+  return rval;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Handles padding for aes_cbc_sha1 in encrypt mode.
+ *
+ * @param blockSize the block size.
+ * @param input the input buffer.
+ * @param decrypt true in decrypt mode, false in encrypt mode.
+ *
+ * @return true on success, false on failure.
+ */
+function encrypt_aes_cbc_sha1_padding(blockSize, input, decrypt) {
+  /* The encrypted data length (TLSCiphertext.length) is one more than the sum
+   of SecurityParameters.block_length, TLSCompressed.length,
+   SecurityParameters.mac_length, and padding_length.
+
+   The padding may be any length up to 255 bytes long, as long as it results in
+   the TLSCiphertext.length being an integral multiple of the block length.
+   Lengths longer than necessary might be desirable to frustrate attacks on a
+   protocol based on analysis of the lengths of exchanged messages. Each uint8
+   in the padding data vector must be filled with the padding length value.
+
+   The padding length should be such that the total size of the
+   GenericBlockCipher structure is a multiple of the cipher's block length.
+   Legal values range from zero to 255, inclusive. This length specifies the
+   length of the padding field exclusive of the padding_length field itself.
+
+   This is slightly different from PKCS#7 because the padding value is 1
+   less than the actual number of padding bytes if you include the
+   padding_length uint8 itself as a padding byte. */
+  if(!decrypt) {
+    // get the number of padding bytes required to reach the blockSize and
+    // subtract 1 for the padding value (to make room for the padding_length
+    // uint8)
+    var padding = blockSize - (input.length() % blockSize);
+    input.fillWithByte(padding - 1, padding);
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Handles padding for aes_cbc_sha1 in decrypt mode.
+ *
+ * @param blockSize the block size.
+ * @param output the output buffer.
+ * @param decrypt true in decrypt mode, false in encrypt mode.
+ *
+ * @return true on success, false on failure.
+ */
+function decrypt_aes_cbc_sha1_padding(blockSize, output, decrypt) {
+  var rval = true;
+  if(decrypt) {
+    /* The last byte in the output specifies the number of padding bytes not
+      including itself. Each of the padding bytes has the same value as that
+      last byte (known as the padding_length). Here we check all padding
+      bytes to ensure they have the value of padding_length even if one of
+      them is bad in order to ward-off timing attacks. */
+    var len = output.length();
+    var paddingLength = output.last();
+    for(var i = len - 1 - paddingLength; i < len - 1; ++i) {
+      rval = rval && (output.at(i) == paddingLength);
+    }
+    if(rval) {
+      // trim off padding bytes and last padding length byte
+      output.truncate(paddingLength + 1);
+    }
+  }
+  return rval;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decrypts a TLSCipherText record into a TLSCompressed record using
+ * AES in CBC mode.
+ *
+ * @param record the TLSCipherText record to decrypt.
+ * @param s the ConnectionState to use.
+ *
+ * @return true on success, false on failure.
+ */
+function decrypt_aes_cbc_sha1(record, s) {
+  var rval = false;
+
+  var iv;
+  if(record.version.minor === tls.Versions.TLS_1_0.minor) {
+    // use pre-generated IV when initializing for TLS 1.0, otherwise use the
+    // residue from the previous decryption
+    iv = s.cipherState.init ? null : s.cipherState.iv;
+  } else {
+    // TLS 1.1+ use an explicit IV every time to protect against CBC attacks
+    // that is appended to the record fragment
+    iv = record.fragment.getBytes(16);
+  }
+
+  s.cipherState.init = true;
+
+  // start cipher
+  var cipher = s.cipherState.cipher;
+  cipher.start({iv: iv});
+
+  // do decryption
+  cipher.update(record.fragment);
+  rval = cipher.finish(decrypt_aes_cbc_sha1_padding);
+
+  // even if decryption fails, keep going to minimize timing attacks
+
+  // decrypted data:
+  // first (len - 20) bytes = application data
+  // last 20 bytes          = MAC
+  var macLen = s.macLength;
+
+  // create a random MAC to check against should the mac length check fail
+  // Note: do this regardless of the failure to keep timing consistent
+  var mac = forge.random.getBytesSync(macLen);
+
+  // get fragment and mac
+  var len = cipher.output.length();
+  if(len >= macLen) {
+    record.fragment = cipher.output.getBytes(len - macLen);
+    mac = cipher.output.getBytes(macLen);
+  } else {
+    // bad data, but get bytes anyway to try to keep timing consistent
+    record.fragment = cipher.output.getBytes();
+  }
+  record.fragment = forge.util.createBuffer(record.fragment);
+  record.length = record.fragment.length();
+
+  // see if data integrity checks out, update sequence number
+  var mac2 = s.macFunction(s.macKey, s.sequenceNumber, record);
+  s.updateSequenceNumber();
+  rval = compareMacs(s.macKey, mac, mac2) && rval;
+  return rval;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Safely compare two MACs. This function will compare two MACs in a way
+ * that protects against timing attacks.
+ *
+ * TODO: Expose elsewhere as a utility API.
+ *
+ * See: https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blog/2011/february/double-hmac-verification/
+ *
+ * @param key the MAC key to use.
+ * @param mac1 as a binary-encoded string of bytes.
+ * @param mac2 as a binary-encoded string of bytes.
+ *
+ * @return true if the MACs are the same, false if not.
+ */
+function compareMacs(key, mac1, mac2) {
+  var hmac = forge.hmac.create();
+
+  hmac.start('SHA1', key);
+  hmac.update(mac1);
+  mac1 = hmac.digest().getBytes();
+
+  hmac.start(null, null);
+  hmac.update(mac2);
+  mac2 = hmac.digest().getBytes();
+
+  return mac1 === mac2;
+}

package/app/node_modules/node-forge/lib/asn1-validator.js

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/**
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Digital Bazaar, Inc.
+ */
+
+var forge = require('./forge');
+require('./asn1');
+var asn1 = forge.asn1;
+
+exports.privateKeyValidator = {
+  // PrivateKeyInfo
+  name: 'PrivateKeyInfo',
+  tagClass: asn1.Class.UNIVERSAL,
+  type: asn1.Type.SEQUENCE,
+  constructed: true,
+  value: [{
+    // Version (INTEGER)
+    name: 'PrivateKeyInfo.version',
+    tagClass: asn1.Class.UNIVERSAL,
+    type: asn1.Type.INTEGER,
+    constructed: false,
+    capture: 'privateKeyVersion'
+  }, {
+    // privateKeyAlgorithm
+    name: 'PrivateKeyInfo.privateKeyAlgorithm',
+    tagClass: asn1.Class.UNIVERSAL,
+    type: asn1.Type.SEQUENCE,
+    constructed: true,
+    value: [{
+      name: 'AlgorithmIdentifier.algorithm',
+      tagClass: asn1.Class.UNIVERSAL,
+      type: asn1.Type.OID,
+      constructed: false,
+      capture: 'privateKeyOid'
+    }]
+  }, {
+    // PrivateKey
+    name: 'PrivateKeyInfo',
+    tagClass: asn1.Class.UNIVERSAL,
+    type: asn1.Type.OCTETSTRING,
+    constructed: false,
+    capture: 'privateKey'
+  }]
+};
+
+exports.publicKeyValidator = {
+  name: 'SubjectPublicKeyInfo',
+  tagClass: asn1.Class.UNIVERSAL,
+  type: asn1.Type.SEQUENCE,
+  constructed: true,
+  captureAsn1: 'subjectPublicKeyInfo',
+  value: [{
+    name: 'SubjectPublicKeyInfo.AlgorithmIdentifier',
+    tagClass: asn1.Class.UNIVERSAL,
+    type: asn1.Type.SEQUENCE,
+    constructed: true,
+    value: [{
+      name: 'AlgorithmIdentifier.algorithm',
+      tagClass: asn1.Class.UNIVERSAL,
+      type: asn1.Type.OID,
+      constructed: false,
+      capture: 'publicKeyOid'
+    }]
+  },
+  // capture group for ed25519PublicKey
+  {
+    tagClass: asn1.Class.UNIVERSAL,
+    type: asn1.Type.BITSTRING,
+    constructed: false,
+    composed: true,
+    captureBitStringValue: 'ed25519PublicKey'
+  }
+  // FIXME: this is capture group for rsaPublicKey, use it in this API or
+  // discard?
+  /* {
+    // subjectPublicKey
+    name: 'SubjectPublicKeyInfo.subjectPublicKey',
+    tagClass: asn1.Class.UNIVERSAL,
+    type: asn1.Type.BITSTRING,
+    constructed: false,
+    value: [{
+      // RSAPublicKey
+      name: 'SubjectPublicKeyInfo.subjectPublicKey.RSAPublicKey',
+      tagClass: asn1.Class.UNIVERSAL,
+      type: asn1.Type.SEQUENCE,
+      constructed: true,
+      optional: true,
+      captureAsn1: 'rsaPublicKey'
+    }]
+  } */
+  ]
+};