@highflame/policy 2.2.7 → 2.2.9

package/_schemas/ai_gateway/context.json

@@ -348,6 +348,30 @@
           "type": "number",
           "required": false,
           "description": "Max secret score across session turns"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining RPM (requests per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the RPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce rate limits via Cedar policy"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining TPM (tokens per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the TPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce token rate limits via Cedar policy"
         }
       ]
     },
@@ -570,6 +594,30 @@
           "type": "number",
           "required": false,
           "description": "Max secret score across session turns"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining RPM (requests per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the RPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce rate limits via Cedar policy"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining TPM (tokens per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the TPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce token rate limits via Cedar policy"
         }
       ]
     },
@@ -822,6 +870,30 @@
           "type": "number",
           "required": false,
           "description": "Max secret score across session turns"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining RPM (requests per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the RPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce rate limits via Cedar policy"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining TPM (tokens per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the TPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce token rate limits via Cedar policy"
         }
       ]
     },
@@ -1002,6 +1074,30 @@
           "type": "number",
           "required": false,
           "description": "Max secret score across session turns"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining RPM (requests per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the RPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce rate limits via Cedar policy"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining TPM (tokens per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the TPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce token rate limits via Cedar policy"
         }
       ]
     },
@@ -1182,6 +1278,30 @@
           "type": "number",
           "required": false,
           "description": "Max secret score across session turns"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining RPM (requests per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the RPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce rate limits via Cedar policy"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining TPM (tokens per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the TPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce token rate limits via Cedar policy"
         }
       ]
     }

package/_schemas/ai_gateway/schema.cedarschema

@@ -173,6 +173,12 @@ action call_tool appliesTo {
     budget_exceeded_session?: Bool,
     budget_exceeded_daily?: Bool,
     budget_exceeded_monthly?: Bool,
+
+    // Rate Limiting — gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)
+    rpm_remaining_pct?: Long,
+    rpm_exceeded?: Bool,
+    tpm_remaining_pct?: Long,
+    tpm_exceeded?: Bool,
   },
 };
 
@@ -245,6 +251,12 @@ action connect_server appliesTo {
     budget_exceeded_session?: Bool,
     budget_exceeded_daily?: Bool,
     budget_exceeded_monthly?: Bool,
+
+    // Rate Limiting — gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)
+    rpm_remaining_pct?: Long,
+    rpm_exceeded?: Bool,
+    tpm_remaining_pct?: Long,
+    tpm_exceeded?: Bool,
   },
 };
 
@@ -326,6 +338,12 @@ action process_prompt appliesTo {
     budget_exceeded_session?: Bool,
     budget_exceeded_daily?: Bool,
     budget_exceeded_monthly?: Bool,
+
+    // Rate Limiting — gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)
+    rpm_remaining_pct?: Long,
+    rpm_exceeded?: Bool,
+    tpm_remaining_pct?: Long,
+    tpm_exceeded?: Bool,
   },
 };
 
@@ -387,6 +405,12 @@ action read_file appliesTo {
     budget_exceeded_session?: Bool,
     budget_exceeded_daily?: Bool,
     budget_exceeded_monthly?: Bool,
+
+    // Rate Limiting — gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)
+    rpm_remaining_pct?: Long,
+    rpm_exceeded?: Bool,
+    tpm_remaining_pct?: Long,
+    tpm_exceeded?: Bool,
   },
 };
 
@@ -448,6 +472,12 @@ action write_file appliesTo {
     budget_exceeded_session?: Bool,
     budget_exceeded_daily?: Bool,
     budget_exceeded_monthly?: Bool,
+
+    // Rate Limiting — gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)
+    rpm_remaining_pct?: Long,
+    rpm_exceeded?: Bool,
+    tpm_remaining_pct?: Long,
+    tpm_exceeded?: Bool,
   },
 };
 

package/_schemas/guardrails/context.json

@@ -433,6 +433,30 @@
           "required": false,
           "description": "Whether multi-turn injection patterns were detected (attack spread across multiple conversation turns)"
         },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining RPM (requests per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the RPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce rate limits via Cedar policy"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining TPM (tokens per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the TPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce token rate limits via Cedar policy"
+        },
         {
           "key": "session_pii_detected",
           "type": "boolean",
@@ -703,6 +727,30 @@
           "required": false,
           "description": "Whether the token budget has been exceeded. Use this to enforce cost controls on agentic sessions"
         },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining RPM (requests per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the RPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce rate limits via Cedar policy"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining TPM (tokens per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the TPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce token rate limits via Cedar policy"
+        },
         {
           "key": "content_topics",
           "type": "array",
@@ -973,6 +1021,30 @@
           "required": false,
           "description": "Whether multi-turn injection patterns were detected across tool calls in the session"
         },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining RPM (requests per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the RPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce rate limits via Cedar policy"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining TPM (tokens per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the TPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce token rate limits via Cedar policy"
+        },
         {
           "key": "session_pii_detected",
           "type": "boolean",
@@ -1189,6 +1261,30 @@
           "required": false,
           "description": "Type of path traversal detected in the file read path"
         },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining RPM (requests per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the RPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce rate limits via Cedar policy"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining TPM (tokens per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the TPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce token rate limits via Cedar policy"
+        },
         {
           "key": "session_pii_detected",
           "type": "boolean",
@@ -1417,6 +1513,30 @@
           "required": false,
           "description": "Type of path traversal detected in the file write path"
         },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining RPM (requests per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the RPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce rate limits via Cedar policy"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining TPM (tokens per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the TPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce token rate limits via Cedar policy"
+        },
         {
           "key": "session_pii_detected",
           "type": "boolean",
@@ -1645,6 +1765,30 @@
           "required": false,
           "description": "Risk score for cross-origin escalation in server connection (0-100)"
         },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining RPM (requests per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "rpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the RPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce rate limits via Cedar policy"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_remaining_pct",
+          "type": "number",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Remaining TPM (tokens per minute) as percentage (0-100). Gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)"
+        },
+        {
+          "key": "tpm_exceeded",
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "Whether the TPM limit has been exceeded. Use this to enforce token rate limits via Cedar policy"
+        },
         {
           "key": "session_pii_detected",
           "type": "boolean",

package/_schemas/guardrails/schema.cedarschema

@@ -229,6 +229,12 @@ namespace Guardrails {
         "budget_exceeded_daily"?: Bool,         // Any daily-scoped budget exceeded
         "budget_exceeded_monthly"?: Bool,       // Any monthly-scoped budget exceeded
 
+        // Rate Limiting — gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)
+        "rpm_remaining_pct"?: Long,
+        "rpm_exceeded"?: Bool,
+        "tpm_remaining_pct"?: Long,
+        "tpm_exceeded"?: Bool,
+
         // Agent Identity — authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)
         // Present when the request is made by an AI agent (API key or JWT with agent claims).
         // Empty strings for human user requests. Use these to write agent-specific policies.
@@ -315,6 +321,12 @@ namespace Guardrails {
         "budget_exceeded_daily"?: Bool,
         "budget_exceeded_monthly"?: Bool,
 
+        // Rate Limiting — gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)
+        "rpm_remaining_pct"?: Long,
+        "rpm_exceeded"?: Bool,
+        "tpm_remaining_pct"?: Long,
+        "tpm_exceeded"?: Bool,
+
         // Semantic - Topic Classification (optional)
         "content_topics"?: Set<String>,      // ["controlled_substances", "weapons_manufacturing", ...]
         "topic_confidence"?: Long,           // 0-100
@@ -468,6 +480,12 @@ namespace Guardrails {
         "budget_exceeded_daily"?: Bool,
         "budget_exceeded_monthly"?: Bool,
 
+        // Rate Limiting — gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)
+        "rpm_remaining_pct"?: Long,
+        "rpm_exceeded"?: Bool,
+        "tpm_remaining_pct"?: Long,
+        "tpm_exceeded"?: Bool,
+
         // Agent Identity — authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)
         "agent_id"?: String,
         "agent_type"?: String,
@@ -539,6 +557,12 @@ namespace Guardrails {
         "budget_exceeded_daily"?: Bool,
         "budget_exceeded_monthly"?: Bool,
 
+        // Rate Limiting — gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)
+        "rpm_remaining_pct"?: Long,
+        "rpm_exceeded"?: Bool,
+        "tpm_remaining_pct"?: Long,
+        "tpm_exceeded"?: Bool,
+
         // Agent Identity — authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)
         "agent_id"?: String,
         "agent_type"?: String,
@@ -610,6 +634,12 @@ namespace Guardrails {
         "budget_exceeded_daily"?: Bool,
         "budget_exceeded_monthly"?: Bool,
 
+        // Rate Limiting — gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)
+        "rpm_remaining_pct"?: Long,
+        "rpm_exceeded"?: Bool,
+        "tpm_remaining_pct"?: Long,
+        "tpm_exceeded"?: Bool,
+
         // Agent Identity — authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)
         "agent_id"?: String,
         "agent_type"?: String,

package/dist/agent_ops-context.gen.d.ts

@@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ export declare const AgentOpsContextKey: {
     readonly ProfanityScore: "profanity_score";
     readonly RequestId: "request_id";
     readonly Role: "role";
+    readonly RpmExceeded: "rpm_exceeded";
+    readonly RpmRemainingPct: "rpm_remaining_pct";
     readonly RugPullDetected: "rug_pull_detected";
     readonly RugPullScore: "rug_pull_score";
     readonly RugPullType: "rug_pull_type";
@@ -133,6 +135,8 @@ export declare const AgentOpsContextKey: {
     readonly ToolPoisoningType: "tool_poisoning_type";
     readonly ToolRiskScore: "tool_risk_score";
     readonly TopicConfidence: "topic_confidence";
+    readonly TpmExceeded: "tpm_exceeded";
+    readonly TpmRemainingPct: "tpm_remaining_pct";
     readonly UserEmail: "user_email";
     readonly ViolenceScore: "violence_score";
     readonly WeaponsScore: "weapons_score";
@@ -143,4 +147,4 @@ export type AgentOpsContextKey = (typeof AgentOpsContextKey)[keyof typeof AgentO
  * The full set of authorable context attribute keys for AgentOps.
  * Iterate this to enumerate the authorable surface (cockpit, conformance).
  */
-export declare const AgentOpsContextKeys: readonly ["agent_framework", "agent_id", "agent_publisher", "agent_trust_level", "agent_type", "budget_exceeded", "budget_remaining_pct", "code_languages", "code_ratio", "command_injection_detected", "command_injection_score", "command_injection_type", "contains_code", "contains_non_ascii", "content_safety_blocked", "content_safety_score", "content_topics", "content_type", "conversation_turn", "crime_score", "cross_origin_detected", "cross_origin_score", "cross_origin_type", "cwd", "detected_language", "detected_script", "detected_threats", "detector_count", "direction", "encoded_content_detected", "encoded_count", "encoded_score", "encoded_types", "event", "factuality_score", "hallucination_score", "hate_speech_score", "highest_severity", "identity_type", "indirect_injection_score", "indirect_injection_type", "injection_deep_context_score", "injection_pulse_score", "injection_score", "injection_type", "invisible_chars_detected", "invisible_chars_score", "is_english", "is_latin_script", "jailbreak_deep_context_score", "jailbreak_pulse_score", "jailbreak_score", "keyword_categories", "keyword_count", "keyword_matched", "language_confidence", "loop_count", "loop_detected", "loop_tool", "mcp_config_risk", "mcp_risk_score", "mcp_risk_type", "mcp_server", "mcp_server_verified", "mcp_tool", "model_name", "model_provider", "multi_turn_detection", "param_type_violation", "param_type_violations", "path", "path_traversal_detected", "path_traversal_severity", "path_traversal_type", "pattern_type", "phishing_detected", "pii_count", "pii_detected", "pii_score", "pii_types", "principal", "privilege_scope", "profanity_score", "request_id", "role", "rug_pull_detected", "rug_pull_score", "rug_pull_type", "script_confidence", "secret_count", "secret_types", "secrets_detected", "sentiment_score", "sequence_risk", "session_command_injection", "session_cumulative_risk_score", "session_injection_detected", "session_max_command_injection_score", "session_max_injection_score", "session_max_jailbreak_score", "session_max_pii_score", "session_max_secret_score", "session_max_sensitivity", "session_original_request", "session_pii_detected", "session_pii_types", "session_secret_types", "session_secrets_detected", "session_threat_turns", "sexual_score", "source", "sql_injection_detected", "sql_injection_score", "sql_injection_type", "suspicious_pattern", "threat_categories", "threat_count", "timestamp", "tool_category", "tool_is_builtin", "tool_is_sensitive", "tool_name", "tool_operation_classes", "tool_poisoning_detected", "tool_poisoning_score", "tool_poisoning_type", "tool_risk_score", "topic_confidence", "user_email", "violence_score", "weapons_score", "workspace_root"];
+export declare const AgentOpsContextKeys: readonly ["agent_framework", "agent_id", "agent_publisher", "agent_trust_level", "agent_type", "budget_exceeded", "budget_remaining_pct", "code_languages", "code_ratio", "command_injection_detected", "command_injection_score", "command_injection_type", "contains_code", "contains_non_ascii", "content_safety_blocked", "content_safety_score", "content_topics", "content_type", "conversation_turn", "crime_score", "cross_origin_detected", "cross_origin_score", "cross_origin_type", "cwd", "detected_language", "detected_script", "detected_threats", "detector_count", "direction", "encoded_content_detected", "encoded_count", "encoded_score", "encoded_types", "event", "factuality_score", "hallucination_score", "hate_speech_score", "highest_severity", "identity_type", "indirect_injection_score", "indirect_injection_type", "injection_deep_context_score", "injection_pulse_score", "injection_score", "injection_type", "invisible_chars_detected", "invisible_chars_score", "is_english", "is_latin_script", "jailbreak_deep_context_score", "jailbreak_pulse_score", "jailbreak_score", "keyword_categories", "keyword_count", "keyword_matched", "language_confidence", "loop_count", "loop_detected", "loop_tool", "mcp_config_risk", "mcp_risk_score", "mcp_risk_type", "mcp_server", "mcp_server_verified", "mcp_tool", "model_name", "model_provider", "multi_turn_detection", "param_type_violation", "param_type_violations", "path", "path_traversal_detected", "path_traversal_severity", "path_traversal_type", "pattern_type", "phishing_detected", "pii_count", "pii_detected", "pii_score", "pii_types", "principal", "privilege_scope", "profanity_score", "request_id", "role", "rpm_exceeded", "rpm_remaining_pct", "rug_pull_detected", "rug_pull_score", "rug_pull_type", "script_confidence", "secret_count", "secret_types", "secrets_detected", "sentiment_score", "sequence_risk", "session_command_injection", "session_cumulative_risk_score", "session_injection_detected", "session_max_command_injection_score", "session_max_injection_score", "session_max_jailbreak_score", "session_max_pii_score", "session_max_secret_score", "session_max_sensitivity", "session_original_request", "session_pii_detected", "session_pii_types", "session_secret_types", "session_secrets_detected", "session_threat_turns", "sexual_score", "source", "sql_injection_detected", "sql_injection_score", "sql_injection_type", "suspicious_pattern", "threat_categories", "threat_count", "timestamp", "tool_category", "tool_is_builtin", "tool_is_sensitive", "tool_name", "tool_operation_classes", "tool_poisoning_detected", "tool_poisoning_score", "tool_poisoning_type", "tool_risk_score", "topic_confidence", "tpm_exceeded", "tpm_remaining_pct", "user_email", "violence_score", "weapons_score", "workspace_root"];

package/dist/agent_ops-context.gen.js

@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ export const AgentOpsContextKey = {
     ProfanityScore: 'profanity_score',
     RequestId: 'request_id',
     Role: 'role',
+    RpmExceeded: 'rpm_exceeded',
+    RpmRemainingPct: 'rpm_remaining_pct',
     RugPullDetected: 'rug_pull_detected',
     RugPullScore: 'rug_pull_score',
     RugPullType: 'rug_pull_type',
@@ -135,6 +137,8 @@ export const AgentOpsContextKey = {
     ToolPoisoningType: 'tool_poisoning_type',
     ToolRiskScore: 'tool_risk_score',
     TopicConfidence: 'topic_confidence',
+    TpmExceeded: 'tpm_exceeded',
+    TpmRemainingPct: 'tpm_remaining_pct',
     UserEmail: 'user_email',
     ViolenceScore: 'violence_score',
     WeaponsScore: 'weapons_score',
@@ -230,6 +234,8 @@ export const AgentOpsContextKeys = [
     AgentOpsContextKey.ProfanityScore,
     AgentOpsContextKey.RequestId,
     AgentOpsContextKey.Role,
+    AgentOpsContextKey.RpmExceeded,
+    AgentOpsContextKey.RpmRemainingPct,
     AgentOpsContextKey.RugPullDetected,
     AgentOpsContextKey.RugPullScore,
     AgentOpsContextKey.RugPullType,
@@ -273,6 +279,8 @@ export const AgentOpsContextKeys = [
     AgentOpsContextKey.ToolPoisoningType,
     AgentOpsContextKey.ToolRiskScore,
     AgentOpsContextKey.TopicConfidence,
+    AgentOpsContextKey.TpmExceeded,
+    AgentOpsContextKey.TpmRemainingPct,
     AgentOpsContextKey.UserEmail,
     AgentOpsContextKey.ViolenceScore,
     AgentOpsContextKey.WeaponsScore,

package/dist/ai_gateway-context.gen.d.ts

@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ export declare const AiGatewayContextKey: {
     readonly PrivilegeScope: "privilege_scope";
     readonly ProfanityScore: "profanity_score";
     readonly Role: "role";
+    readonly RpmExceeded: "rpm_exceeded";
+    readonly RpmRemainingPct: "rpm_remaining_pct";
     readonly RugPullDetected: "rug_pull_detected";
     readonly RugPullScore: "rug_pull_score";
     readonly SecretCount: "secret_count";
@@ -64,6 +66,8 @@ export declare const AiGatewayContextKey: {
     readonly ToolPoisoningDetected: "tool_poisoning_detected";
     readonly ToolPoisoningScore: "tool_poisoning_score";
     readonly ToolRiskScore: "tool_risk_score";
+    readonly TpmExceeded: "tpm_exceeded";
+    readonly TpmRemainingPct: "tpm_remaining_pct";
     readonly ViolenceScore: "violence_score";
     readonly WeaponsScore: "weapons_score";
 };
@@ -72,4 +76,4 @@ export type AiGatewayContextKey = (typeof AiGatewayContextKey)[keyof typeof AiGa
  * The full set of authorable context attribute keys for AiGateway.
  * Iterate this to enumerate the authorable surface (cockpit, conformance).
  */
-export declare const AiGatewayContextKeys: readonly ["content", "crime_score", "detected_threats", "hate_speech_score", "highest_severity", "indirect_injection_score", "injection_score", "invisible_chars_detected", "invisible_chars_score", "jailbreak_score", "loop_count", "loop_detected", "max_threat_severity", "mcp_config_risk", "mcp_risk_score", "mcp_server", "mcp_server_verified", "mcp_tool", "model_name", "model_provider", "pattern_type", "pii_count", "pii_detected", "pii_score", "pii_types", "privilege_scope", "profanity_score", "role", "rug_pull_detected", "rug_pull_score", "secret_count", "secret_types", "secrets_detected", "sequence_risk", "session_command_injection", "session_cumulative_risk_score", "session_injection_detected", "session_max_command_injection_score", "session_max_injection_score", "session_max_jailbreak_score", "session_max_pii_score", "session_max_secret_score", "session_pii_detected", "session_pii_types", "session_secret_types", "session_secrets_detected", "session_threat_turns", "sexual_score", "suspicious_pattern", "threat_categories", "threat_count", "tool_category", "tool_is_builtin", "tool_is_sensitive", "tool_name", "tool_operation_classes", "tool_poisoning_detected", "tool_poisoning_score", "tool_risk_score", "violence_score", "weapons_score"];
+export declare const AiGatewayContextKeys: readonly ["content", "crime_score", "detected_threats", "hate_speech_score", "highest_severity", "indirect_injection_score", "injection_score", "invisible_chars_detected", "invisible_chars_score", "jailbreak_score", "loop_count", "loop_detected", "max_threat_severity", "mcp_config_risk", "mcp_risk_score", "mcp_server", "mcp_server_verified", "mcp_tool", "model_name", "model_provider", "pattern_type", "pii_count", "pii_detected", "pii_score", "pii_types", "privilege_scope", "profanity_score", "role", "rpm_exceeded", "rpm_remaining_pct", "rug_pull_detected", "rug_pull_score", "secret_count", "secret_types", "secrets_detected", "sequence_risk", "session_command_injection", "session_cumulative_risk_score", "session_injection_detected", "session_max_command_injection_score", "session_max_injection_score", "session_max_jailbreak_score", "session_max_pii_score", "session_max_secret_score", "session_pii_detected", "session_pii_types", "session_secret_types", "session_secrets_detected", "session_threat_turns", "sexual_score", "suspicious_pattern", "threat_categories", "threat_count", "tool_category", "tool_is_builtin", "tool_is_sensitive", "tool_name", "tool_operation_classes", "tool_poisoning_detected", "tool_poisoning_score", "tool_risk_score", "tpm_exceeded", "tpm_remaining_pct", "violence_score", "weapons_score"];

package/dist/ai_gateway-context.gen.js

@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ export const AiGatewayContextKey = {
     PrivilegeScope: 'privilege_scope',
     ProfanityScore: 'profanity_score',
     Role: 'role',
+    RpmExceeded: 'rpm_exceeded',
+    RpmRemainingPct: 'rpm_remaining_pct',
     RugPullDetected: 'rug_pull_detected',
     RugPullScore: 'rug_pull_score',
     SecretCount: 'secret_count',
@@ -66,6 +68,8 @@ export const AiGatewayContextKey = {
     ToolPoisoningDetected: 'tool_poisoning_detected',
     ToolPoisoningScore: 'tool_poisoning_score',
     ToolRiskScore: 'tool_risk_score',
+    TpmExceeded: 'tpm_exceeded',
+    TpmRemainingPct: 'tpm_remaining_pct',
     ViolenceScore: 'violence_score',
     WeaponsScore: 'weapons_score',
 };
@@ -102,6 +106,8 @@ export const AiGatewayContextKeys = [
     AiGatewayContextKey.PrivilegeScope,
     AiGatewayContextKey.ProfanityScore,
     AiGatewayContextKey.Role,
+    AiGatewayContextKey.RpmExceeded,
+    AiGatewayContextKey.RpmRemainingPct,
     AiGatewayContextKey.RugPullDetected,
     AiGatewayContextKey.RugPullScore,
     AiGatewayContextKey.SecretCount,
@@ -133,6 +139,8 @@ export const AiGatewayContextKeys = [
     AiGatewayContextKey.ToolPoisoningDetected,
     AiGatewayContextKey.ToolPoisoningScore,
     AiGatewayContextKey.ToolRiskScore,
+    AiGatewayContextKey.TpmExceeded,
+    AiGatewayContextKey.TpmRemainingPct,
     AiGatewayContextKey.ViolenceScore,
     AiGatewayContextKey.WeaponsScore,
 ];

package/dist/guardrails-context.gen.d.ts

@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ export declare const GuardrailsContextKey: {
     readonly ProfanityScore: "profanity_score";
     readonly RequestId: "request_id";
     readonly Role: "role";
+    readonly RpmExceeded: "rpm_exceeded";
+    readonly RpmRemainingPct: "rpm_remaining_pct";
     readonly RugPullDetected: "rug_pull_detected";
     readonly RugPullScore: "rug_pull_score";
     readonly RugPullType: "rug_pull_type";
@@ -125,6 +127,8 @@ export declare const GuardrailsContextKey: {
     readonly ToolPoisoningType: "tool_poisoning_type";
     readonly ToolRiskScore: "tool_risk_score";
     readonly TopicConfidence: "topic_confidence";
+    readonly TpmExceeded: "tpm_exceeded";
+    readonly TpmRemainingPct: "tpm_remaining_pct";
     readonly ViolenceScore: "violence_score";
     readonly WeaponsScore: "weapons_score";
 };
@@ -133,4 +137,4 @@ export type GuardrailsContextKey = (typeof GuardrailsContextKey)[keyof typeof Gu
  * The full set of authorable context attribute keys for Guardrails.
  * Iterate this to enumerate the authorable surface (cockpit, conformance).
  */
-export declare const GuardrailsContextKeys: readonly ["agent_framework", "agent_id", "agent_publisher", "agent_trust_level", "agent_type", "budget_exceeded", "budget_remaining_pct", "code_languages", "code_ratio", "command_injection_detected", "command_injection_score", "command_injection_type", "contains_code", "contains_non_ascii", "content_safety_blocked", "content_safety_score", "content_topics", "content_type", "conversation_turn", "crime_score", "cross_origin_detected", "cross_origin_score", "cross_origin_type", "detected_language", "detected_script", "detector_count", "direction", "encoded_content_detected", "encoded_count", "encoded_score", "encoded_types", "factuality_score", "hallucination_score", "hate_speech_score", "highest_severity", "identity_type", "indirect_injection_score", "indirect_injection_type", "injection_deep_context_score", "injection_pulse_score", "injection_score", "injection_type", "invisible_chars_detected", "invisible_chars_score", "is_english", "is_latin_script", "jailbreak_deep_context_score", "jailbreak_pulse_score", "jailbreak_score", "keyword_categories", "keyword_count", "keyword_matched", "language_confidence", "loop_count", "loop_detected", "loop_tool", "mcp_config_risk", "mcp_risk_score", "mcp_risk_type", "mcp_server", "mcp_server_verified", "mcp_tool", "multi_turn_detection", "param_type_violation", "param_type_violations", "path", "path_traversal_detected", "path_traversal_severity", "path_traversal_type", "pattern_type", "phishing_detected", "pii_count", "pii_detected", "pii_score", "pii_types", "principal", "privilege_scope", "profanity_score", "request_id", "role", "rug_pull_detected", "rug_pull_score", "rug_pull_type", "script_confidence", "secret_count", "secret_types", "secrets_detected", "sentiment_score", "sequence_risk", "session_command_injection", "session_cumulative_risk_score", "session_injection_detected", "session_max_command_injection_score", "session_max_injection_score", "session_max_jailbreak_score", "session_max_pii_score", "session_max_secret_score", "session_max_sensitivity", "session_original_request", "session_pii_detected", "session_pii_types", "session_secret_types", "session_secrets_detected", "session_threat_turns", "sexual_score", "sql_injection_detected", "sql_injection_score", "sql_injection_type", "suspicious_pattern", "timestamp", "tool_category", "tool_is_builtin", "tool_is_sensitive", "tool_name", "tool_operation_classes", "tool_poisoning_detected", "tool_poisoning_score", "tool_poisoning_type", "tool_risk_score", "topic_confidence", "violence_score", "weapons_score"];
+export declare const GuardrailsContextKeys: readonly ["agent_framework", "agent_id", "agent_publisher", "agent_trust_level", "agent_type", "budget_exceeded", "budget_remaining_pct", "code_languages", "code_ratio", "command_injection_detected", "command_injection_score", "command_injection_type", "contains_code", "contains_non_ascii", "content_safety_blocked", "content_safety_score", "content_topics", "content_type", "conversation_turn", "crime_score", "cross_origin_detected", "cross_origin_score", "cross_origin_type", "detected_language", "detected_script", "detector_count", "direction", "encoded_content_detected", "encoded_count", "encoded_score", "encoded_types", "factuality_score", "hallucination_score", "hate_speech_score", "highest_severity", "identity_type", "indirect_injection_score", "indirect_injection_type", "injection_deep_context_score", "injection_pulse_score", "injection_score", "injection_type", "invisible_chars_detected", "invisible_chars_score", "is_english", "is_latin_script", "jailbreak_deep_context_score", "jailbreak_pulse_score", "jailbreak_score", "keyword_categories", "keyword_count", "keyword_matched", "language_confidence", "loop_count", "loop_detected", "loop_tool", "mcp_config_risk", "mcp_risk_score", "mcp_risk_type", "mcp_server", "mcp_server_verified", "mcp_tool", "multi_turn_detection", "param_type_violation", "param_type_violations", "path", "path_traversal_detected", "path_traversal_severity", "path_traversal_type", "pattern_type", "phishing_detected", "pii_count", "pii_detected", "pii_score", "pii_types", "principal", "privilege_scope", "profanity_score", "request_id", "role", "rpm_exceeded", "rpm_remaining_pct", "rug_pull_detected", "rug_pull_score", "rug_pull_type", "script_confidence", "secret_count", "secret_types", "secrets_detected", "sentiment_score", "sequence_risk", "session_command_injection", "session_cumulative_risk_score", "session_injection_detected", "session_max_command_injection_score", "session_max_injection_score", "session_max_jailbreak_score", "session_max_pii_score", "session_max_secret_score", "session_max_sensitivity", "session_original_request", "session_pii_detected", "session_pii_types", "session_secret_types", "session_secrets_detected", "session_threat_turns", "sexual_score", "sql_injection_detected", "sql_injection_score", "sql_injection_type", "suspicious_pattern", "timestamp", "tool_category", "tool_is_builtin", "tool_is_sensitive", "tool_name", "tool_operation_classes", "tool_poisoning_detected", "tool_poisoning_score", "tool_poisoning_type", "tool_risk_score", "topic_confidence", "tpm_exceeded", "tpm_remaining_pct", "violence_score", "weapons_score"];