@highflame/policy 2.2.26 → 2.2.28

package/dist/guardrails-defaults.gen.js

@@ -1184,6 +1184,48 @@ when {
     context has mcp_server_verified && context.mcp_server_verified == false
 };
 `;
+const GUARDRAILS_TOOLS_MCP_SERVER_ALLOWLIST_CEDAR = `// =============================================================================
+// MCP Server Allowlist
+// =============================================================================
+// Restricts MCP server connections to a pre-approved list. Customize the
+// \`context.mcp_server\` values in the permit rule to match the allowed
+// servers for your environment.
+//
+// Context keys consumed:
+//   - mcp_server: String
+//
+// Category:  tools
+// Namespace: Guardrails
+// =============================================================================
+
+@id("tools.allow-mcp-allowlist")
+@name("Allow allowlisted MCP servers")
+@description("Permits connect_server when mcp_server is in the allowlist.")
+@severity("medium")
+@tags("category:tools,surface:connect-server,scope:org-wide,posture:deny-default")
+permit (
+    principal,
+    action == Guardrails::Action::"connect_server",
+    resource
+)
+when {
+    context has mcp_server &&
+    (context.mcp_server == "filesystem" ||
+     context.mcp_server == "playwright")
+};
+
+@id("tools.deny-non-allowlisted-mcp")
+@name("Block non-allowlisted MCP servers")
+@description("Blocks connect_server unconditionally so only the allowlist permit applies.")
+@severity("medium")
+@tags("category:tools,surface:connect-server,scope:org-wide,posture:deny-default")
+@reject_message("MCP server connection blocked: server is not on the allowlist.")
+forbid (
+    principal,
+    action == Guardrails::Action::"connect_server",
+    resource
+);
+`;
 const GUARDRAILS_SECURITY_CHAT_ASSISTANT_CEDAR = `// =============================================================================
 // Chat Assistant — Security
 // =============================================================================
@@ -3568,6 +3610,15 @@ export const GUARDRAILS_TEMPLATES = [
         severity: 'critical',
         tags: ['category:tools', 'threat:supply-chain', 'posture:deny-default'],
     },
+    {
+        id: 'tools.mcp-server-allowlist',
+        name: 'MCP Server Allowlist',
+        description: 'Restrict MCP server connections to a pre-approved list. Customize the allowlist values to match the servers permitted in your environment.',
+        category: 'tools',
+        cedarText: GUARDRAILS_TOOLS_MCP_SERVER_ALLOWLIST_CEDAR,
+        severity: 'medium',
+        tags: ['category:tools', 'surface:connect-server', 'scope:org-wide', 'posture:deny-default'],
+    },
     {
         id: 'security.chat-assistant',
         name: 'Chat Assistant — Security',
@@ -3995,6 +4046,15 @@ export const GUARDRAILS_TEMPLATES_JSON = `{
       "severity": "critical",
       "tags": ["category:tools", "threat:supply-chain", "posture:deny-default"]
     },
+    {
+      "id": "tools.mcp-server-allowlist",
+      "name": "MCP Server Allowlist",
+      "description": "Restrict MCP server connections to a pre-approved list. Customize the allowlist values to match the servers permitted in your environment.",
+      "category": "tools",
+      "file": "mcp_server_allowlist.cedar",
+      "severity": "medium",
+      "tags": ["category:tools", "surface:connect-server", "scope:org-wide", "posture:deny-default"]
+    },
     {
       "id": "security.chat-assistant",
       "name": "Chat Assistant — Security",

package/dist/schema.gen.d.ts

@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@
  * Embedded Cedar schema for policy validation.
  * This is the Highflame Cedar schema used across all services.
  */
-export declare const CEDAR_SCHEMA = "// Highflame Cedar Schema - Entity and Action Definitions\n// =======================================================\n// This file defines all entity types and actions used across Highflame services.\n// Used for code generation (EntityType and ActionType constants).\n//\n// For policy validation, use service-specific schemas:\n// - schemas/overwatch/schema.cedarschema (Guardian IDE security)\n// - schemas/palisade/schema.cedarschema (ML supply chain security)\n\nnamespace Highflame {\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ENTITIES\n// =============================================================================\n\n// Multi-tenant hierarchy (used by services for ReBAC policy scoping)\nentity Account {};\nentity Project {};\nentity App {};\nentity Session {};\n\nentity User {\n    user_type: String,\n};\n\nentity Agent {\n    agent_type: String,\n};\n\nentity Scanner {\n    scanner_type: String,\n};\n\nentity Service {\n    service_type: String,\n};\n\nentity Resource {};\n\nentity LlmPrompt {\n    prompt_type: String,\n};\n\nentity ResponseData {};\n\nentity Tool {\n    tool_name: String,\n};\n\nentity FilePath {\n    path: String,\n};\n\nentity HttpEndpoint {\n    hostname: String,\n};\n\nentity Server {\n    server_name: String,\n};\n\nentity Artifact {\n    artifact_format: String,\n};\n\nentity Repository {\n    repo_url: String,\n};\n\nentity Package {\n    package_name: String,\n};\n\nentity GitBranch {\n    branch_name: String,\n};\n\nentity Model {\n    model_name: String,\n};\n\nentity ExternalAPI {\n    api_name: String,\n};\n\nentity Memory {\n    memory_type: String,\n};\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ACTIONS\n// =============================================================================\n\naction process_prompt;\naction process_response;\naction invoke_model;\naction filter_content;\naction call_tool;\naction connect_server;\naction access_server_resource;\naction skip_guardrails;\naction read_file;\naction write_file;\naction delete_file;\naction http_request;\naction call_external_api;\naction execute_code;\naction run_tests;\naction run_build;\naction git_operation;\naction git_clone;\naction git_commit;\naction git_push;\naction git_pull;\naction git_merge;\naction git_checkout;\naction git_reset;\naction git_rebase;\naction delegate_task;\naction spawn_subprocess;\naction access_memory;\naction scan_target;\naction scan_package;\naction scan_artifact;\naction validate_integrity;\naction validate_provenance;\naction quarantine_artifact;\naction load_model;\naction deploy_model;\naction transfer_data;\naction export_data;\n}\n";
+export declare const CEDAR_SCHEMA = "// Highflame Cedar Schema - Entity and Action Definitions\n// =======================================================\n// This file defines all entity types and actions used across Highflame services.\n// Used for code generation (EntityType and ActionType constants).\n//\n// For policy validation, use service-specific schemas:\n// - schemas/overwatch/schema.cedarschema (Guardian IDE security)\n// - schemas/palisade/schema.cedarschema (ML supply chain security)\n\nnamespace Highflame {\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ENTITIES\n// =============================================================================\n\n// Multi-tenant hierarchy (used by services for ReBAC policy scoping)\nentity Account {};\nentity Project {};\nentity App {};\nentity Session {};\n\nentity User {\n    user_type: String,\n};\n\nentity Agent {\n    agent_type: String,\n};\n\nentity Scanner {\n    scanner_type: String,\n};\n\nentity Service {\n    service_type: String,\n};\n\nentity Resource {};\n\nentity LlmPrompt {\n    prompt_type: String,\n};\n\nentity ResponseData {};\n\nentity Tool {\n    tool_name: String,\n};\n\nentity FilePath {\n    path: String,\n};\n\nentity HttpEndpoint {\n    hostname: String,\n};\n\nentity Server {\n    server_name: String,\n};\n\nentity Artifact {\n    artifact_format: String,\n};\n\nentity Repository {\n    repo_url: String,\n};\n\nentity Package {\n    package_name: String,\n};\n\nentity GitBranch {\n    branch_name: String,\n};\n\nentity Model {\n    model_name: String,\n};\n\nentity ExternalAPI {\n    api_name: String,\n};\n\nentity Memory {\n    memory_type: String,\n};\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ACTIONS\n// =============================================================================\n\naction process_prompt;\naction process_response;\naction invoke_model;\naction filter_content;\naction call_tool;\naction connect_server;\naction access_server_resource;\naction skip_guardrails;\naction read_file;\naction write_file;\naction delete_file;\naction http_request;\naction call_external_api;\naction execute_code;\naction run_tests;\naction run_build;\naction git_operation;\naction git_clone;\naction git_commit;\naction git_push;\naction git_pull;\naction git_merge;\naction git_checkout;\naction git_reset;\naction git_rebase;\naction delegate_task;\naction spawn_subprocess;\naction access_memory;\naction provision_sandbox;\naction scan_target;\naction scan_package;\naction scan_artifact;\naction validate_integrity;\naction validate_provenance;\naction quarantine_artifact;\naction load_model;\naction deploy_model;\naction transfer_data;\naction export_data;\n}\n";

package/dist/schema.gen.js

@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ action git_rebase;
 action delegate_task;
 action spawn_subprocess;
 action access_memory;
+action provision_sandbox;
 action scan_target;
 action scan_package;
 action scan_artifact;

package/dist/service-schemas.gen.d.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  *
  * Full Cedar schema for agent_ops, embedded at codegen time.
  */
-export declare const AGENT_OPS_SCHEMA = "// =============================================================================\n// AgentOps Cedar Schema\n// =============================================================================\n// Unified schema for all agent guardrail policies. Covers every request path\n// where an AI agent touches the Highflame platform:\n//   - LLM prompt/response (Guardrails path)\n//   - IDE tool calls and file access (Overwatch path)\n//   - MCP server connections (AI Gateway path)\n//\n// The context types are a superset of Guardrails, Overwatch, and AI Gateway\n// schemas. All extra fields are optional \u2014 Shield projects only what is present\n// in the request, Cedar ignores absent optional attributes.\n//\n// Service: highflame-shield (agent_ops product)\n// Namespace: AgentOps\n// =============================================================================\n\nnamespace AgentOps {\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Entity Types \u2014 ReBAC Hierarchy\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Entity hierarchy enables Cedar's `in` operator for policy scoping:\n    //   Account (org root)\n    //     \u2514\u2500\u2500 Project in [Account]\n    //           \u251C\u2500\u2500 App in [Project]\n    //           \u2502     \u2514\u2500\u2500 Session in [App, Agent]\n    //           \u2514\u2500\u2500 Agent in [Project]\n    //                 \u2514\u2500\u2500 Session in [App, Agent]\n    //\n    // Policy scoping examples:\n    //   resource in AgentOps::Project::\"<uuid>\"          \u2192 project-wide (all agents)\n    //   resource in AgentOps::Agent::\"<external_id>\"     \u2192 named agent + its sessions\n    //   resource == AgentOps::Agent::\"<external_id>\"     \u2192 named agent only (exact match)\n    //   resource in AgentOps::Account::\"<uuid>\"          \u2192 org-wide\n    // =========================================================================\n\n    /// Account represents an organization (top-level tenant)\n    entity Account;\n\n    /// Project represents a project within an account\n    entity Project in [Account];\n\n    /// User represents a principal (human or service) making requests\n    entity User;\n\n    /// Agent represents an AI agent (Claude, Cursor, Copilot, MCP client, etc.)\n    /// Used as both principal (who is acting) and resource (policy scoping target).\n    /// Agent + sessions: resource in AgentOps::Agent::\"<external_id>\" (hierarchy match)\n    /// Agent only:       resource == AgentOps::Agent::\"<external_id>\" (exact match)\n    entity Agent in [Project];\n\n    /// App represents a protected application (guardrails-enabled LLM app)\n    entity App in [Project];\n\n    /// Session represents an agentic conversation session with state tracking.\n    /// Sessions can belong to either an App or an Agent.\n    entity Session in [App, Agent];\n\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Actions\n    // =========================================================================\n\n    /// Process user prompts and AI responses for security threats and content violations\n    action \"process_prompt\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [App, Agent, Session],\n        context: ProcessPromptContext\n    };\n\n    /// Execute tool calls (shell, file operations, MCP tools)\n    action \"call_tool\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Agent, Session],\n        context: CallToolContext\n    };\n\n    /// Read file operations\n    action \"read_file\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Agent, Session],\n        context: FileReadContext\n    };\n\n    /// Write file operations\n    action \"write_file\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Agent, Session],\n        context: FileWriteContext\n    };\n\n    /// Connect to an MCP server\n    action \"connect_server\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Agent, Session],\n        context: ConnectServerContext\n    };\n\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Context Types (Action-Specific)\n    // =========================================================================\n\n    /// Context for process_prompt action (user prompts & AI responses)\n    type ProcessPromptContext = {\n        // Identity (AARM R6 / CAP-IDN-011) \u2014 projected from the principal's token; optional.\n        \"role\"?: String,\n        \"privilege_scope\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"identity_type\"?: String,        // Principal identity class: \"human\" | \"agent\" | \"service\" | \"mcp_server\"\n        \"principal\"?: String,            // Stable principal identifier (e.g. ZeroID / WIMSE URI or user id)\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n        \"direction\": String,        // \"input\" | \"output\"\n        \"content_type\": String,     // \"prompt\" | \"response\" | \"tool_call\" | \"file\"\n        \"detector_count\": Long,\n\n        // IDE / workspace context (optional \u2014 present for Overwatch/code-agent traffic)\n        \"source\"?: String,           // Traffic origin: \"ide\" | \"cli\" | \"api\" | \"browser\"\n        \"event\"?: String,            // Event type: \"prompt\" | \"tool_call\" | \"file_read\" | ...\n        \"user_email\"?: String,       // Human operator email (IDE sessions)\n        \"cwd\"?: String,              // Current working directory\n        \"workspace_root\"?: String,   // IDE workspace root path\n\n        // Model context (optional \u2014 present for AI Gateway traffic)\n        \"model_name\"?: String,       // LLM model name: \"claude-3-5-sonnet\", \"gpt-4o\", ...\n        \"model_provider\"?: String,   // Model provider: \"anthropic\" | \"openai\" | \"google\" | ...\n\n        // Security - Injection & Jailbreak (optional)\n        \"injection_score\"?: Long,  // Combined injection confidence: MAX(pulse, deep_context)\n        \"jailbreak_score\"?: Long,  // Combined jailbreak confidence: MAX(pulse, deep_context)\n        \"injection_pulse_score\"?: Long,  // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n        \"injection_deep_context_score\"?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n        \"jailbreak_pulse_score\"?: Long,  // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n        \"jailbreak_deep_context_score\"?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n        \"injection_type\"?: String,       // \"prompt\" | \"sql\" | \"command\" | \"none\"\n        \"indirect_injection_score\"?: Long, // Indirect injection via tool outputs (0-100)\n\n        // Privacy - Secrets (optional)\n        \"secrets_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,    // [\"aws_access_key\", \"github_token\", ...]\n\n        // Privacy - PII (optional)\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"pii_count\"?: Long,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,       // [\"email\", \"phone\", \"ssn\", \"credit_card\", ...]\n        \"pii_score\"?: Long,         // PII ML classifier confidence (0-100)\n\n        // Aggregated threat summary (optional \u2014 populated by aggregation detectors)\n        \"highest_severity\"?: String,     // \"critical\" | \"high\" | \"medium\" | \"low\" | \"none\"\n        \"threat_count\"?: Long,\n        \"threat_categories\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"detected_threats\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Trust & Safety - Toxicity (optional)\n        \"violence_score\"?: Long,         // 0-100\n        \"hate_speech_score\"?: Long,      // 0-100\n        \"sexual_score\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n        \"weapons_score\"?: Long,          // 0-100\n        \"crime_score\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n        \"profanity_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n\n        // Semantic - Topic Classification (optional)\n        \"content_topics\"?: Set<String>,      // [\"controlled_substances\", \"weapons_manufacturing\", ...]\n        \"topic_confidence\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Invisible Character Detection (optional)\n        \"invisible_chars_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"invisible_chars_score\"?: Long,      // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Pattern Detection (optional)\n        \"command_injection_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"command_injection_type\"?: String,       // \"reverse_shell\" | \"privilege_escalation\" | ...\n        \"command_injection_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,      // \"critical\" | \"high\" | \"medium\" | \"low\" | \"none\"\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n        \"sql_injection_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"sql_injection_type\"?: String,           // \"tautology\" | \"union_based\" | \"destructive\" | ...\n        \"sql_injection_score\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Cross-Origin Escalation (optional)\n        \"cross_origin_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"cross_origin_type\"?: String,            // \"cross_origin_tool\" | \"cross_origin_server\" | \"none\"\n        \"cross_origin_score\"?: Long,             // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Encoded Injection (optional)\n        \"encoded_content_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"encoded_types\"?: Set<String>,           // [\"base64\", \"hex\", \"unicode\", \"url\", ...]\n        \"encoded_count\"?: Long,\n        \"encoded_score\"?: Long,                  // 0-100\n\n        // Language & Script Detection (optional)\n        \"detected_language\"?: String,            // ISO language code\n        \"is_english\"?: Boolean,\n        \"language_confidence\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n        \"detected_script\"?: String,              // \"latin\" | \"cyrillic\" | \"arabic\" | \"unknown\" | ...\n        \"is_latin_script\"?: Boolean,\n        \"script_confidence\"?: Long,              // 0-100\n\n        // Content Analysis (optional)\n        \"hallucination_score\"?: Long,\n        \"factuality_score\"?: Long,               // 0-100\n        \"sentiment_score\"?: Long,\n        \"contains_code\"?: Boolean,\n        \"code_languages\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"code_ratio\"?: Long,                     // 0-100\n        \"keyword_matched\"?: Boolean,\n        \"keyword_categories\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"keyword_count\"?: Long,\n        \"contains_non_ascii\"?: Boolean,\n        \"phishing_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"content_safety_score\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n        \"content_safety_blocked\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Agentic - Multi-Turn Context (optional)\n        \"conversation_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"multi_turn_detection\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_original_request\"?: String,\n        \"session_max_sensitivity\"?: String,\n\n        // Usage Budget \u2014 multi-window token & cost enforcement (optional)\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_cost_micros_this_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_model\"?: String,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_session\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded_session\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_exceeded_daily\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_exceeded_monthly\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Rate Limiting \u2014 gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)\n        \"rpm_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"rpm_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n        \"tpm_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"tpm_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Agent Identity \u2014 authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,           // \"orchestrator\" | \"autonomous\" | \"tool_agent\" | \"human_proxy\"\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,    // \"first_party\" | \"verified_third_party\" | \"unverified\"\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for call_tool action (agentic tool execution)\n    type CallToolContext = {\n        // Identity (AARM R6 / CAP-IDN-011) \u2014 projected from the principal's token; optional.\n        \"role\"?: String,\n        \"privilege_scope\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"identity_type\"?: String,\n        \"principal\"?: String,\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // IDE / workspace context (optional)\n        \"source\"?: String,\n        \"event\"?: String,\n        \"user_email\"?: String,\n        \"cwd\"?: String,\n        \"workspace_root\"?: String,\n\n        // Tool Risk (optional)\n        \"tool_name\"?: String,\n        \"tool_risk_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n        \"tool_is_sensitive\"?: Boolean,\n        \"tool_category\"?: String,        // \"safe\" | \"sensitive\" | \"dangerous\"\n        \"tool_is_builtin\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // AARM R3 (CAP-ENF-007) \u2014 Action Parameter Validation\n        \"action_params\"?: {\n            \"amount\"?: Long,\n            \"count\"?: Long,\n            \"command\"?: String,\n            \"path\"?: String,\n            \"url\"?: String,\n            \"recipient\"?: String,\n            \"target\"?: String,\n            \"query\"?: String,\n        },\n        \"param_type_violation\"?: Boolean,\n        \"param_type_violations\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // MCP context (optional)\n        \"mcp_server\"?: String,\n        \"mcp_tool\"?: String,\n        \"mcp_server_verified\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Agentic - Behavioral Patterns (optional)\n        \"suspicious_pattern\"?: Boolean,\n        \"pattern_type\"?: String,         // \"data_exfiltration\" | \"secret_exfiltration\" | ...\n        \"sequence_risk\"?: Long,          // 0-100\n\n        // Agentic - Loop Detection (optional)\n        \"loop_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"loop_count\"?: Long,\n        \"loop_tool\"?: String,\n\n        // Security checks on tool arguments (optional)\n        \"secrets_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_count\"?: Long,\n        \"pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"injection_pulse_score\"?: Long,\n        \"injection_deep_context_score\"?: Long,\n        \"indirect_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"indirect_injection_type\"?: String,      // Type of indirect injection detected\n\n        // Semantic - Topic Classification (optional)\n        \"content_topics\"?: Set<String>,      // [\"controlled_substances\", \"weapons_manufacturing\", ...]\n        \"topic_confidence\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Pattern Detection (optional)\n        \"command_injection_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"command_injection_type\"?: String,\n        \"command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n        \"sql_injection_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"sql_injection_type\"?: String,\n        \"sql_injection_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Security - Cross-Origin Escalation (optional)\n        \"cross_origin_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"cross_origin_type\"?: String,\n        \"cross_origin_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Security - Invisible Character Detection (optional)\n        \"invisible_chars_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"invisible_chars_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Security - Encoded Injection (optional)\n        \"encoded_content_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"encoded_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"encoded_count\"?: Long,\n        \"encoded_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Agentic - Agent Security (optional)\n        \"tool_poisoning_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"tool_poisoning_score\"?: Long,\n        \"tool_poisoning_type\"?: String,\n        \"rug_pull_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"rug_pull_score\"?: Long,\n        \"rug_pull_type\"?: String,\n\n        // Agentic - MCP Risk (optional)\n        \"mcp_config_risk\"?: Boolean,\n        \"mcp_risk_type\"?: String,\n        \"mcp_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Tool Operation Classifier (optional)\n        \"tool_operation_classes\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Agentic - Multi-Turn Context (optional)\n        \"conversation_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"multi_turn_detection\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_original_request\"?: String,\n        \"session_max_sensitivity\"?: String,\n\n        // Usage Budget (optional)\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_cost_micros_this_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_model\"?: String,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_session\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded_session\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_exceeded_daily\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_exceeded_monthly\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Rate Limiting \u2014 gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)\n        \"rpm_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"rpm_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n        \"tpm_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"tpm_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Aggregated threat summary (optional)\n        \"highest_severity\"?: String,\n        \"threat_count\"?: Long,\n        \"detected_threats\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Agent Identity (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n        // File & Path (optional)\n        \"path\"?: String,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for read_file action\n    type FileReadContext = {\n        // Identity (optional)\n        \"role\"?: String,\n        \"privilege_scope\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"identity_type\"?: String,\n        \"principal\"?: String,\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // IDE / workspace context (optional)\n        \"source\"?: String,\n        \"event\"?: String,\n        \"user_email\"?: String,\n        \"cwd\"?: String,\n        \"workspace_root\"?: String,\n\n        // File path (optional)\n        \"path\"?: String,\n\n        // Security checks on file content (optional)\n        \"secrets_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Security - Path Traversal (optional)\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n\n        // Aggregated threat summary (optional)\n        \"highest_severity\"?: String,\n        \"threat_count\"?: Long,\n        \"detected_threats\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Session Detection History (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_original_request\"?: String,\n        \"session_max_sensitivity\"?: String,\n\n        // Usage Budget (optional)\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_cost_micros_this_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_model\"?: String,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_session\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded_session\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_exceeded_daily\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_exceeded_monthly\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Rate Limiting \u2014 gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)\n        \"rpm_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"rpm_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n        \"tpm_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"tpm_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Agent Identity (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for write_file action\n    type FileWriteContext = {\n        // Identity (optional)\n        \"role\"?: String,\n        \"privilege_scope\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"identity_type\"?: String,\n        \"principal\"?: String,\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // IDE / workspace context (optional)\n        \"source\"?: String,\n        \"event\"?: String,\n        \"user_email\"?: String,\n        \"cwd\"?: String,\n        \"workspace_root\"?: String,\n\n        // File path (optional)\n        \"path\"?: String,\n\n        // Security - Invisible Character Detection in write content (optional)\n        \"invisible_chars_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"invisible_chars_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Security checks on content being written (optional)\n        \"secrets_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Security - Path Traversal (optional)\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n\n        // Aggregated threat summary (optional)\n        \"highest_severity\"?: String,\n        \"threat_count\"?: Long,\n        \"detected_threats\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Session Detection History (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_original_request\"?: String,\n        \"session_max_sensitivity\"?: String,\n\n        // Usage Budget (optional)\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_cost_micros_this_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_model\"?: String,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_session\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded_session\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_exceeded_daily\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_exceeded_monthly\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Rate Limiting \u2014 gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)\n        \"rpm_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"rpm_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n        \"tpm_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"tpm_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Agent Identity (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for connect_server action (MCP server connections)\n    type ConnectServerContext = {\n        // Identity (optional)\n        \"role\"?: String,\n        \"privilege_scope\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"identity_type\"?: String,\n        \"principal\"?: String,\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // IDE / workspace context (optional)\n        \"source\"?: String,\n        \"event\"?: String,\n        \"user_email\"?: String,\n        \"cwd\"?: String,\n        \"workspace_root\"?: String,\n\n        // MCP context (optional)\n        \"mcp_server\"?: String,\n        \"mcp_server_verified\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Agentic - Agent Security (optional)\n        \"tool_poisoning_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"tool_poisoning_score\"?: Long,\n        \"tool_poisoning_type\"?: String,\n\n        // Agentic - MCP Risk (optional)\n        \"mcp_config_risk\"?: Boolean,\n        \"mcp_risk_type\"?: String,\n        \"mcp_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Security - Cross-Origin Escalation (optional)\n        \"cross_origin_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"cross_origin_type\"?: String,\n        \"cross_origin_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Aggregated threat summary (optional)\n        \"highest_severity\"?: String,\n        \"threat_count\"?: Long,\n        \"detected_threats\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Session Detection History (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_original_request\"?: String,\n        \"session_max_sensitivity\"?: String,\n\n        // Usage Budget (optional)\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_cost_micros_this_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_model\"?: String,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_session\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded_session\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_exceeded_daily\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_exceeded_monthly\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Rate Limiting \u2014 gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)\n        \"rpm_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"rpm_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n        \"tpm_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"tpm_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Agent Identity (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n    };\n}\n";
+export declare const AGENT_OPS_SCHEMA = "// =============================================================================\n// AgentOps Cedar Schema\n// =============================================================================\n// Unified schema for all agent guardrail policies. Covers every request path\n// where an AI agent touches the Highflame platform:\n//   - LLM prompt/response (Guardrails path)\n//   - IDE tool calls and file access (Overwatch path)\n//   - MCP server connections (AI Gateway path)\n//\n// The context types are a superset of Guardrails, Overwatch, and AI Gateway\n// schemas. All extra fields are optional \u2014 Shield projects only what is present\n// in the request, Cedar ignores absent optional attributes.\n//\n// Service: highflame-shield (agent_ops product)\n// Namespace: AgentOps\n// =============================================================================\n\nnamespace AgentOps {\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Entity Types \u2014 ReBAC Hierarchy\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Entity hierarchy enables Cedar's `in` operator for policy scoping:\n    //   Account (org root)\n    //     \u2514\u2500\u2500 Project in [Account]\n    //           \u251C\u2500\u2500 App in [Project]\n    //           \u2502     \u2514\u2500\u2500 Session in [App, Agent]\n    //           \u2514\u2500\u2500 Agent in [Project]\n    //                 \u2514\u2500\u2500 Session in [App, Agent]\n    //\n    // Policy scoping examples:\n    //   resource in AgentOps::Project::\"<uuid>\"          \u2192 project-wide (all agents)\n    //   resource in AgentOps::Agent::\"<external_id>\"     \u2192 named agent + its sessions\n    //   resource == AgentOps::Agent::\"<external_id>\"     \u2192 named agent only (exact match)\n    //   resource in AgentOps::Account::\"<uuid>\"          \u2192 org-wide\n    // =========================================================================\n\n    /// Account represents an organization (top-level tenant)\n    entity Account;\n\n    /// Project represents a project within an account\n    entity Project in [Account];\n\n    /// User represents a principal (human or service) making requests\n    entity User;\n\n    /// Agent represents an AI agent (Claude, Cursor, Copilot, MCP client, etc.)\n    /// Used as both principal (who is acting) and resource (policy scoping target).\n    /// Agent + sessions: resource in AgentOps::Agent::\"<external_id>\" (hierarchy match)\n    /// Agent only:       resource == AgentOps::Agent::\"<external_id>\" (exact match)\n    entity Agent in [Project];\n\n    /// App represents a protected application (guardrails-enabled LLM app)\n    entity App in [Project];\n\n    /// Session represents an agentic conversation session with state tracking.\n    /// Sessions can belong to either an App or an Agent.\n    entity Session in [App, Agent];\n\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Actions\n    // =========================================================================\n\n    /// Process user prompts and AI responses for security threats and content violations\n    action \"process_prompt\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [App, Agent, Session],\n        context: ProcessPromptContext\n    };\n\n    /// Execute tool calls (shell, file operations, MCP tools)\n    action \"call_tool\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Agent, Session],\n        context: CallToolContext\n    };\n\n    /// Read file operations\n    action \"read_file\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Agent, Session],\n        context: FileReadContext\n    };\n\n    /// Write file operations\n    action \"write_file\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Agent, Session],\n        context: FileWriteContext\n    };\n\n    /// Connect to an MCP server\n    action \"connect_server\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Agent, Session],\n        context: ConnectServerContext\n    };\n\n    /// Provision a sandbox for the acting identity (Forge OS-layer envelope).\n    /// The MANDATORY authorization gate for sandbox creation (ADR 0019 D1):\n    /// Forge evaluates this action's AgentOps bundle at create-time; no decision\n    /// means no sandbox. Context carries the requested capability envelope\n    /// (writable paths, egress, exec allowlist, curated mechanism toggles,\n    /// isolation tier). Raw syscalls are NEVER expressed here \u2014 the enforcement\n    /// generators own the mechanism\u2192syscall translation (ADR 0017 D1).\n    action \"provision_sandbox\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Agent, Session],\n        context: ProvisionSandboxContext\n    };\n\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Context Types (Action-Specific)\n    // =========================================================================\n\n    /// Context for process_prompt action (user prompts & AI responses)\n    type ProcessPromptContext = {\n        // Identity (AARM R6 / CAP-IDN-011) \u2014 projected from the principal's token; optional.\n        \"role\"?: String,\n        \"privilege_scope\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"identity_type\"?: String,        // Principal identity class: \"human\" | \"agent\" | \"service\" | \"mcp_server\"\n        \"principal\"?: String,            // Stable principal identifier (e.g. ZeroID / WIMSE URI or user id)\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n        \"direction\": String,        // \"input\" | \"output\"\n        \"content_type\": String,     // \"prompt\" | \"response\" | \"tool_call\" | \"file\"\n        \"detector_count\": Long,\n\n        // IDE / workspace context (optional \u2014 present for Overwatch/code-agent traffic)\n        \"source\"?: String,           // Traffic origin: \"ide\" | \"cli\" | \"api\" | \"browser\"\n        \"event\"?: String,            // Event type: \"prompt\" | \"tool_call\" | \"file_read\" | ...\n        \"user_email\"?: String,       // Human operator email (IDE sessions)\n        \"cwd\"?: String,              // Current working directory\n        \"workspace_root\"?: String,   // IDE workspace root path\n\n        // Model context (optional \u2014 present for AI Gateway traffic)\n        \"model_name\"?: String,       // LLM model name: \"claude-3-5-sonnet\", \"gpt-4o\", ...\n        \"model_provider\"?: String,   // Model provider: \"anthropic\" | \"openai\" | \"google\" | ...\n\n        // Security - Injection & Jailbreak (optional)\n        \"injection_score\"?: Long,  // Combined injection confidence: MAX(pulse, deep_context)\n        \"jailbreak_score\"?: Long,  // Combined jailbreak confidence: MAX(pulse, deep_context)\n        \"injection_pulse_score\"?: Long,  // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n        \"injection_deep_context_score\"?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n        \"jailbreak_pulse_score\"?: Long,  // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n        \"jailbreak_deep_context_score\"?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n        \"injection_type\"?: String,       // \"prompt\" | \"sql\" | \"command\" | \"none\"\n        \"indirect_injection_score\"?: Long, // Indirect injection via tool outputs (0-100)\n\n        // Privacy - Secrets (optional)\n        \"secrets_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,    // [\"aws_access_key\", \"github_token\", ...]\n\n        // Privacy - PII (optional)\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"pii_count\"?: Long,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,       // [\"email\", \"phone\", \"ssn\", \"credit_card\", ...]\n        \"pii_score\"?: Long,         // PII ML classifier confidence (0-100)\n\n        // Aggregated threat summary (optional \u2014 populated by aggregation detectors)\n        \"highest_severity\"?: String,     // \"critical\" | \"high\" | \"medium\" | \"low\" | \"none\"\n        \"threat_count\"?: Long,\n        \"threat_categories\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"detected_threats\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Trust & Safety - Toxicity (optional)\n        \"violence_score\"?: Long,         // 0-100\n        \"hate_speech_score\"?: Long,      // 0-100\n        \"sexual_score\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n        \"weapons_score\"?: Long,          // 0-100\n        \"crime_score\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n        \"profanity_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n\n        // Semantic - Topic Classification (optional)\n        \"content_topics\"?: Set<String>,      // [\"controlled_substances\", \"weapons_manufacturing\", ...]\n        \"topic_confidence\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Invisible Character Detection (optional)\n        \"invisible_chars_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"invisible_chars_score\"?: Long,      // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Pattern Detection (optional)\n        \"command_injection_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"command_injection_type\"?: String,       // \"reverse_shell\" | \"privilege_escalation\" | ...\n        \"command_injection_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,      // \"critical\" | \"high\" | \"medium\" | \"low\" | \"none\"\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n        \"sql_injection_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"sql_injection_type\"?: String,           // \"tautology\" | \"union_based\" | \"destructive\" | ...\n        \"sql_injection_score\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Cross-Origin Escalation (optional)\n        \"cross_origin_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"cross_origin_type\"?: String,            // \"cross_origin_tool\" | \"cross_origin_server\" | \"none\"\n        \"cross_origin_score\"?: Long,             // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Encoded Injection (optional)\n        \"encoded_content_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"encoded_types\"?: Set<String>,           // [\"base64\", \"hex\", \"unicode\", \"url\", ...]\n        \"encoded_count\"?: Long,\n        \"encoded_score\"?: Long,                  // 0-100\n\n        // Language & Script Detection (optional)\n        \"detected_language\"?: String,            // ISO language code\n        \"is_english\"?: Boolean,\n        \"language_confidence\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n        \"detected_script\"?: String,              // \"latin\" | \"cyrillic\" | \"arabic\" | \"unknown\" | ...\n        \"is_latin_script\"?: Boolean,\n        \"script_confidence\"?: Long,              // 0-100\n\n        // Content Analysis (optional)\n        \"hallucination_score\"?: Long,\n        \"factuality_score\"?: Long,               // 0-100\n        \"sentiment_score\"?: Long,\n        \"contains_code\"?: Boolean,\n        \"code_languages\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"code_ratio\"?: Long,                     // 0-100\n        \"keyword_matched\"?: Boolean,\n        \"keyword_categories\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"keyword_count\"?: Long,\n        \"contains_non_ascii\"?: Boolean,\n        \"phishing_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"content_safety_score\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n        \"content_safety_blocked\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Agentic - Multi-Turn Context (optional)\n        \"conversation_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"multi_turn_detection\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_original_request\"?: String,\n        \"session_max_sensitivity\"?: String,\n\n        // Data-Flow Labels \u2014 per-value information-flow facts (ADR 0020, optional).\n        // All optional: guard every access with `has` \u2014 an absent-attribute read is\n        // a Cedar evaluation error and an errored forbid is silently skipped (fail-open).\n        \"flow_confidentiality\"?: String,         // \"public\" | \"internal\" | \"confidential\" | \"restricted\" | \"unknown\"\n        \"flow_integrity\"?: String,               // \"trusted\" | \"untrusted\" | \"mixed\" | \"unknown\"\n        \"flow_data_types\"?: Set<String>,         // \"pii\" | \"secrets\" | \"source_code\" | \"financial\" | \"health\" | ...\n        \"flow_compartments\"?: Set<String>,       // \"tenant:*\" | \"customer:*\" | \"project:*\"\n        \"flow_resolution_status\"?: String,       // \"known\" | \"inferred\" | \"unknown\" | \"conflicted\"\n        \"flow_origins\"?: Set<String>,            // \"mcp_tool_result\" | \"model\" | \"file\" | \"database\" | \"user\"\n        \"flow_sink\"?: String,                    // \"external_model\" | \"local_model\" | \"external_mcp\" | \"trusted_mcp\" | \"user_secure_output\" | \"public_network\" | \"file\"\n        \"flow_sink_is_external\"?: Boolean,\n        \"flow_sink_effects\"?: Set<String>,       // \"network.send\" | \"financial.transfer\" | \"filesystem.write\" | ...\n        \"principal_clearances\"?: Set<String>,    // ADR 0020 D8 \u2014 clearances AuthN mints for the principal\n        \"principal_compartments\"?: Set<String>,  // ADR 0020 D8 \u2014 compartments the principal is admitted to\n\n        // Usage Budget \u2014 multi-window token & cost enforcement (optional)\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_cost_micros_this_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_model\"?: String,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_session\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded_session\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_exceeded_daily\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_exceeded_monthly\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Rate Limiting \u2014 gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)\n        \"rpm_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"rpm_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n        \"tpm_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"tpm_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Agent Identity \u2014 authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,           // \"orchestrator\" | \"autonomous\" | \"tool_agent\" | \"human_proxy\"\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,    // \"first_party\" | \"verified_third_party\" | \"unverified\"\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for call_tool action (agentic tool execution)\n    type CallToolContext = {\n        // Identity (AARM R6 / CAP-IDN-011) \u2014 projected from the principal's token; optional.\n        \"role\"?: String,\n        \"privilege_scope\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"identity_type\"?: String,\n        \"principal\"?: String,\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // IDE / workspace context (optional)\n        \"source\"?: String,\n        \"event\"?: String,\n        \"user_email\"?: String,\n        \"cwd\"?: String,\n        \"workspace_root\"?: String,\n\n        // Tool Risk (optional)\n        \"tool_name\"?: String,\n        \"tool_risk_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n        \"tool_is_sensitive\"?: Boolean,\n        \"tool_category\"?: String,        // \"safe\" | \"sensitive\" | \"dangerous\"\n        \"tool_is_builtin\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // AARM R3 (CAP-ENF-007) \u2014 Action Parameter Validation\n        \"action_params\"?: {\n            \"amount\"?: Long,\n            \"count\"?: Long,\n            \"command\"?: String,\n            \"path\"?: String,\n            \"url\"?: String,\n            \"recipient\"?: String,\n            \"target\"?: String,\n            \"query\"?: String,\n        },\n        \"param_type_violation\"?: Boolean,\n        \"param_type_violations\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // MCP context (optional)\n        \"mcp_server\"?: String,\n        \"mcp_tool\"?: String,\n        \"mcp_server_verified\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Agentic - Behavioral Patterns (optional)\n        \"suspicious_pattern\"?: Boolean,\n        \"pattern_type\"?: String,         // \"data_exfiltration\" | \"secret_exfiltration\" | ...\n        \"sequence_risk\"?: Long,          // 0-100\n\n        // Agentic - Loop Detection (optional)\n        \"loop_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"loop_count\"?: Long,\n        \"loop_tool\"?: String,\n\n        // Security checks on tool arguments (optional)\n        \"secrets_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_count\"?: Long,\n        \"pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"injection_pulse_score\"?: Long,\n        \"injection_deep_context_score\"?: Long,\n        \"indirect_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"indirect_injection_type\"?: String,      // Type of indirect injection detected\n\n        // Semantic - Topic Classification (optional)\n        \"content_topics\"?: Set<String>,      // [\"controlled_substances\", \"weapons_manufacturing\", ...]\n        \"topic_confidence\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Pattern Detection (optional)\n        \"command_injection_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"command_injection_type\"?: String,\n        \"command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n        \"sql_injection_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"sql_injection_type\"?: String,\n        \"sql_injection_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Security - Cross-Origin Escalation (optional)\n        \"cross_origin_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"cross_origin_type\"?: String,\n        \"cross_origin_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Security - Invisible Character Detection (optional)\n        \"invisible_chars_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"invisible_chars_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Security - Encoded Injection (optional)\n        \"encoded_content_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"encoded_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"encoded_count\"?: Long,\n        \"encoded_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Agentic - Agent Security (optional)\n        \"tool_poisoning_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"tool_poisoning_score\"?: Long,\n        \"tool_poisoning_type\"?: String,\n        \"rug_pull_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"rug_pull_score\"?: Long,\n        \"rug_pull_type\"?: String,\n\n        // Agentic - MCP Risk (optional)\n        \"mcp_config_risk\"?: Boolean,\n        \"mcp_risk_type\"?: String,\n        \"mcp_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Tool Operation Classifier (optional)\n        \"tool_operation_classes\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Agentic - Multi-Turn Context (optional)\n        \"conversation_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"multi_turn_detection\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_original_request\"?: String,\n        \"session_max_sensitivity\"?: String,\n\n        // Data-Flow Labels \u2014 per-value information-flow facts (ADR 0020, optional).\n        // All optional: guard every access with `has` \u2014 an absent-attribute read is\n        // a Cedar evaluation error and an errored forbid is silently skipped (fail-open).\n        \"flow_confidentiality\"?: String,         // \"public\" | \"internal\" | \"confidential\" | \"restricted\" | \"unknown\"\n        \"flow_integrity\"?: String,               // \"trusted\" | \"untrusted\" | \"mixed\" | \"unknown\"\n        \"flow_data_types\"?: Set<String>,         // \"pii\" | \"secrets\" | \"source_code\" | \"financial\" | \"health\" | ...\n        \"flow_compartments\"?: Set<String>,       // \"tenant:*\" | \"customer:*\" | \"project:*\"\n        \"flow_resolution_status\"?: String,       // \"known\" | \"inferred\" | \"unknown\" | \"conflicted\"\n        \"flow_origins\"?: Set<String>,            // \"mcp_tool_result\" | \"model\" | \"file\" | \"database\" | \"user\"\n        \"flow_sink\"?: String,                    // \"external_model\" | \"local_model\" | \"external_mcp\" | \"trusted_mcp\" | \"user_secure_output\" | \"public_network\" | \"file\"\n        \"flow_sink_is_external\"?: Boolean,\n        \"flow_sink_effects\"?: Set<String>,       // \"network.send\" | \"financial.transfer\" | \"filesystem.write\" | ...\n        \"principal_clearances\"?: Set<String>,    // ADR 0020 D8 \u2014 clearances AuthN mints for the principal\n        \"principal_compartments\"?: Set<String>,  // ADR 0020 D8 \u2014 compartments the principal is admitted to\n\n        // Usage Budget (optional)\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_cost_micros_this_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_model\"?: String,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_session\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded_session\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_exceeded_daily\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_exceeded_monthly\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Rate Limiting \u2014 gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)\n        \"rpm_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"rpm_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n        \"tpm_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"tpm_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Aggregated threat summary (optional)\n        \"highest_severity\"?: String,\n        \"threat_count\"?: Long,\n        \"detected_threats\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Agent Identity (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n        // File & Path (optional)\n        \"path\"?: String,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for read_file action\n    type FileReadContext = {\n        // Identity (optional)\n        \"role\"?: String,\n        \"privilege_scope\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"identity_type\"?: String,\n        \"principal\"?: String,\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // IDE / workspace context (optional)\n        \"source\"?: String,\n        \"event\"?: String,\n        \"user_email\"?: String,\n        \"cwd\"?: String,\n        \"workspace_root\"?: String,\n\n        // File path (optional)\n        \"path\"?: String,\n\n        // Security checks on file content (optional)\n        \"secrets_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Security - Path Traversal (optional)\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n\n        // Aggregated threat summary (optional)\n        \"highest_severity\"?: String,\n        \"threat_count\"?: Long,\n        \"detected_threats\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Session Detection History (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_original_request\"?: String,\n        \"session_max_sensitivity\"?: String,\n\n        // Data-Flow Labels \u2014 per-value information-flow facts (ADR 0020, optional).\n        // All optional: guard every access with `has` \u2014 an absent-attribute read is\n        // a Cedar evaluation error and an errored forbid is silently skipped (fail-open).\n        \"flow_confidentiality\"?: String,         // \"public\" | \"internal\" | \"confidential\" | \"restricted\" | \"unknown\"\n        \"flow_integrity\"?: String,               // \"trusted\" | \"untrusted\" | \"mixed\" | \"unknown\"\n        \"flow_data_types\"?: Set<String>,         // \"pii\" | \"secrets\" | \"source_code\" | \"financial\" | \"health\" | ...\n        \"flow_compartments\"?: Set<String>,       // \"tenant:*\" | \"customer:*\" | \"project:*\"\n        \"flow_resolution_status\"?: String,       // \"known\" | \"inferred\" | \"unknown\" | \"conflicted\"\n        \"flow_origins\"?: Set<String>,            // \"mcp_tool_result\" | \"model\" | \"file\" | \"database\" | \"user\"\n        \"flow_sink\"?: String,                    // \"external_model\" | \"local_model\" | \"external_mcp\" | \"trusted_mcp\" | \"user_secure_output\" | \"public_network\" | \"file\"\n        \"flow_sink_is_external\"?: Boolean,\n        \"flow_sink_effects\"?: Set<String>,       // \"network.send\" | \"financial.transfer\" | \"filesystem.write\" | ...\n        \"principal_clearances\"?: Set<String>,    // ADR 0020 D8 \u2014 clearances AuthN mints for the principal\n        \"principal_compartments\"?: Set<String>,  // ADR 0020 D8 \u2014 compartments the principal is admitted to\n\n        // Usage Budget (optional)\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_cost_micros_this_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_model\"?: String,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_session\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded_session\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_exceeded_daily\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_exceeded_monthly\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Rate Limiting \u2014 gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)\n        \"rpm_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"rpm_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n        \"tpm_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"tpm_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Agent Identity (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for write_file action\n    type FileWriteContext = {\n        // Identity (optional)\n        \"role\"?: String,\n        \"privilege_scope\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"identity_type\"?: String,\n        \"principal\"?: String,\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // IDE / workspace context (optional)\n        \"source\"?: String,\n        \"event\"?: String,\n        \"user_email\"?: String,\n        \"cwd\"?: String,\n        \"workspace_root\"?: String,\n\n        // File path (optional)\n        \"path\"?: String,\n\n        // Security - Invisible Character Detection in write content (optional)\n        \"invisible_chars_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"invisible_chars_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Security checks on content being written (optional)\n        \"secrets_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Security - Path Traversal (optional)\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n\n        // Aggregated threat summary (optional)\n        \"highest_severity\"?: String,\n        \"threat_count\"?: Long,\n        \"detected_threats\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Session Detection History (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_original_request\"?: String,\n        \"session_max_sensitivity\"?: String,\n\n        // Data-Flow Labels \u2014 per-value information-flow facts (ADR 0020, optional).\n        // All optional: guard every access with `has` \u2014 an absent-attribute read is\n        // a Cedar evaluation error and an errored forbid is silently skipped (fail-open).\n        \"flow_confidentiality\"?: String,         // \"public\" | \"internal\" | \"confidential\" | \"restricted\" | \"unknown\"\n        \"flow_integrity\"?: String,               // \"trusted\" | \"untrusted\" | \"mixed\" | \"unknown\"\n        \"flow_data_types\"?: Set<String>,         // \"pii\" | \"secrets\" | \"source_code\" | \"financial\" | \"health\" | ...\n        \"flow_compartments\"?: Set<String>,       // \"tenant:*\" | \"customer:*\" | \"project:*\"\n        \"flow_resolution_status\"?: String,       // \"known\" | \"inferred\" | \"unknown\" | \"conflicted\"\n        \"flow_origins\"?: Set<String>,            // \"mcp_tool_result\" | \"model\" | \"file\" | \"database\" | \"user\"\n        \"flow_sink\"?: String,                    // \"external_model\" | \"local_model\" | \"external_mcp\" | \"trusted_mcp\" | \"user_secure_output\" | \"public_network\" | \"file\"\n        \"flow_sink_is_external\"?: Boolean,\n        \"flow_sink_effects\"?: Set<String>,       // \"network.send\" | \"financial.transfer\" | \"filesystem.write\" | ...\n        \"principal_clearances\"?: Set<String>,    // ADR 0020 D8 \u2014 clearances AuthN mints for the principal\n        \"principal_compartments\"?: Set<String>,  // ADR 0020 D8 \u2014 compartments the principal is admitted to\n\n        // Usage Budget (optional)\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_cost_micros_this_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_model\"?: String,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_session\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded_session\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_exceeded_daily\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_exceeded_monthly\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Rate Limiting \u2014 gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)\n        \"rpm_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"rpm_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n        \"tpm_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"tpm_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Agent Identity (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for connect_server action (MCP server connections)\n    type ConnectServerContext = {\n        // Identity (optional)\n        \"role\"?: String,\n        \"privilege_scope\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"identity_type\"?: String,\n        \"principal\"?: String,\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // IDE / workspace context (optional)\n        \"source\"?: String,\n        \"event\"?: String,\n        \"user_email\"?: String,\n        \"cwd\"?: String,\n        \"workspace_root\"?: String,\n\n        // MCP context (optional)\n        \"mcp_server\"?: String,\n        \"mcp_server_verified\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Agentic - Agent Security (optional)\n        \"tool_poisoning_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"tool_poisoning_score\"?: Long,\n        \"tool_poisoning_type\"?: String,\n\n        // Agentic - MCP Risk (optional)\n        \"mcp_config_risk\"?: Boolean,\n        \"mcp_risk_type\"?: String,\n        \"mcp_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Security - Cross-Origin Escalation (optional)\n        \"cross_origin_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"cross_origin_type\"?: String,\n        \"cross_origin_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Aggregated threat summary (optional)\n        \"highest_severity\"?: String,\n        \"threat_count\"?: Long,\n        \"detected_threats\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Session Detection History (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Boolean,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_original_request\"?: String,\n        \"session_max_sensitivity\"?: String,\n\n        // Data-Flow Labels \u2014 per-value information-flow facts (ADR 0020, optional).\n        // All optional: guard every access with `has` \u2014 an absent-attribute read is\n        // a Cedar evaluation error and an errored forbid is silently skipped (fail-open).\n        \"flow_confidentiality\"?: String,         // \"public\" | \"internal\" | \"confidential\" | \"restricted\" | \"unknown\"\n        \"flow_integrity\"?: String,               // \"trusted\" | \"untrusted\" | \"mixed\" | \"unknown\"\n        \"flow_data_types\"?: Set<String>,         // \"pii\" | \"secrets\" | \"source_code\" | \"financial\" | \"health\" | ...\n        \"flow_compartments\"?: Set<String>,       // \"tenant:*\" | \"customer:*\" | \"project:*\"\n        \"flow_resolution_status\"?: String,       // \"known\" | \"inferred\" | \"unknown\" | \"conflicted\"\n        \"flow_origins\"?: Set<String>,            // \"mcp_tool_result\" | \"model\" | \"file\" | \"database\" | \"user\"\n        \"flow_sink\"?: String,                    // \"external_model\" | \"local_model\" | \"external_mcp\" | \"trusted_mcp\" | \"user_secure_output\" | \"public_network\" | \"file\"\n        \"flow_sink_is_external\"?: Boolean,\n        \"flow_sink_effects\"?: Set<String>,       // \"network.send\" | \"financial.transfer\" | \"filesystem.write\" | ...\n        \"principal_clearances\"?: Set<String>,    // ADR 0020 D8 \u2014 clearances AuthN mints for the principal\n        \"principal_compartments\"?: Set<String>,  // ADR 0020 D8 \u2014 compartments the principal is admitted to\n\n        // Usage Budget (optional)\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_cost_micros_this_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_model\"?: String,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_session\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded_session\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_exceeded_daily\"?: Boolean,\n        \"budget_exceeded_monthly\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Rate Limiting \u2014 gateway-metered, Shield-decided (ADR 0014)\n        \"rpm_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"rpm_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n        \"tpm_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"tpm_exceeded\"?: Boolean,\n\n        // Agent Identity (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for provision_sandbox action (Forge sandbox-create envelope).\n    ///\n    /// Every capability field below is OPTIONAL and describes the envelope the\n    /// sandbox is being asked to provision with \u2014 Forge synthesizes it from the\n    /// create request attenuated by the token's scope ceiling (ADR 0019 D1),\n    /// then asks Cedar whether this identity may provision it. Profile templates\n    /// `permit` provision_sandbox only when the requested envelope stays within\n    /// the profile ceiling, and `forbid` any escalation beyond it.\n    ///\n    /// FAIL-OPEN WARNING (ADR 0019 D3): because these attributes are optional,\n    /// accessing an absent one is a Cedar *evaluation error*, and an errored\n    /// `forbid` is silently skipped \u2014 which fails OPEN. Every rule touching a\n    /// field here MUST guard it first with `has` (e.g.\n    /// `context has mechanism_capabilities && context.mechanism_capabilities.contains(\"sys:ptrace\")`).\n    type ProvisionSandboxContext = {\n        // Identity (AARM R6 / CAP-IDN-011) \u2014 projected from the principal's token; optional.\n        \"role\"?: String,\n        \"privilege_scope\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"identity_type\"?: String,        // Principal identity class: \"human\" | \"agent\" | \"service\" | \"mcp_server\"\n        \"principal\"?: String,            // Stable principal identifier (ZeroID / WIMSE URI or user id)\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,    // \"untrusted\" | \"low\" | \"verified\" | \"trusted\"\n\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // Requested isolation tier (required) \u2014 the OS-isolation tier the\n        // sandbox will run at, as the lowercased Forge IsolationTier name (ADR\n        // 0016 D1). Ordinal, weakest\u2192strongest: \"none\" (trusted-local) < \"os\"\n        // (bwrap/seatbelt) < \"kernel\" (gVisor) < \"hardware\" (micro-VM + TEE).\n        // Templates assert a floor via set membership (e.g. a KERNEL floor =\n        // {\"kernel\",\"hardware\"}); Forge owns the ordering.\n        \"isolation_tier\": String,\n\n        // Requested capability envelope (all optional \u2014 has-guard mandatory).\n        \"writable_paths\"?: Set<String>,        // Writable path prefixes, e.g. {\"/scratch\"}\n        // Master egress switch. Forge MUST set this true whenever ANY egress is\n        // requested (i.e. whenever egress_hosts is non-empty), so a \"no network\"\n        // profile can gate on this single boolean. egress_hosts then narrows the\n        // host allowlist for profiles that DO permit egress.\n        \"network_egress\"?: Boolean,\n        \"egress_hosts\"?: Set<String>,          // Host allowlist for egress, e.g. {\"pypi.org\"}\n        \"exec_allowlist\"?: Set<String>,        // Executables the sandbox may run, e.g. {\"python\", \"python3\"}\n        // Curated mechanism toggles (ADR 0017 D1.3) \u2014 authorization facts only;\n        // NEVER raw syscalls. Allowed members: \"sys:ptrace\", \"sys:bpf\",\n        // \"sys:raw_socket\", \"dev:gpu\", \"virt:nested\".\n        \"mechanism_capabilities\"?: Set<String>,\n    };\n}\n";
 /**
  * AiGateway Cedar schema
  *