@highflame/policy 2.1.5 → 2.1.7

package/dist/service-schemas.gen.d.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  *
  * Full Cedar schema for guardrails, embedded at codegen time.
  */
-export declare const GUARDRAILS_SCHEMA = "// =============================================================================\n// Guardrails Cedar Schema\n// =============================================================================\n// Defines entity types, actions, and context attributes for the highflame-shield\n// guardrails service. This schema enables type-safe policy authoring and\n// validation in both Studio UI and backend.\n//\n// Service: highflame-shield (guardrails)\n// Namespace: Guardrails\n// =============================================================================\n\nnamespace Guardrails {\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Entity Types \u2014 ReBAC Hierarchy\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Entity hierarchy enables Cedar's `in` operator for policy scoping:\n    //   Account (org root)\n    //     \u2514\u2500\u2500 Project in [Account]\n    //           \u2514\u2500\u2500 App in [Project]\n    //                 \u2514\u2500\u2500 Session in [App]\n    //\n    // Policy scoping examples:\n    //   resource == Guardrails::App::\"<uuid>\"              \u2192 app-scoped\n    //   resource in Guardrails::Project::\"<uuid>\"          \u2192 project-wide\n    //   resource in Guardrails::Account::\"<uuid>\"          \u2192 org-wide\n    // =========================================================================\n\n    /// Account represents an organization (top-level tenant)\n    entity Account;\n\n    /// Project represents a project within an account\n    entity Project in [Account];\n\n    /// User represents a principal (human or service) making requests\n    entity User;\n\n    /// Agent represents an AI agent (Claude, Cursor, Copilot, etc.) making requests\n    entity Agent;\n\n    /// App represents a protected application (guardrails-enabled LLM app)\n    entity App in [Project];\n\n    /// Session represents an agentic conversation session with state tracking\n    entity Session in [App];\n\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Actions\n    // =========================================================================\n\n    /// Process user prompts and AI responses for security threats and content violations\n    action \"process_prompt\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [App, Session],\n        context: ProcessPromptContext\n    };\n\n    /// Execute tool calls (shell, file operations, MCP tools)\n    action \"call_tool\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Session],\n        context: CallToolContext\n    };\n\n    /// Read file operations\n    action \"read_file\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Session],\n        context: FileReadContext\n    };\n\n    /// Write file operations\n    action \"write_file\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Session],\n        context: FileWriteContext\n    };\n\n    /// Connect to an MCP server\n    action \"connect_server\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Session],\n        context: ConnectServerContext\n    };\n\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Context Types (Action-Specific)\n    // =========================================================================\n\n    /// Context for process_prompt action (user prompts & AI responses)\n    type ProcessPromptContext = {\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n        \"direction\": String,        // \"input\" | \"output\"\n        \"content_type\": String,     // \"prompt\" | \"response\" | \"tool_call\" | \"file\"\n        \"detector_count\": Long,\n\n        // Security - Injection & Jailbreak (optional)\n        \"injection_confidence\"?: Long,  // Combined injection confidence: MAX(pulse, deep_context)\n        \"jailbreak_confidence\"?: Long,  // Combined jailbreak confidence: MAX(pulse, deep_context)\n        \"injection_pulse_score\"?: Long,  // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n        \"injection_deep_context_score\"?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n        \"jailbreak_pulse_score\"?: Long,  // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n        \"jailbreak_deep_context_score\"?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n        \"injection_type\"?: String,       // \"prompt\" | \"sql\" | \"command\" | \"none\"\n\n        // Privacy - Secrets (optional)\n        \"contains_secrets\"?: Bool,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,    // [\"aws_access_key\", \"github_token\", ...]\n\n        // Privacy - PII (optional)\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"pii_count\"?: Long,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,       // [\"email\", \"phone\", \"ssn\", \"credit_card\", ...]\n\n        // Trust & Safety - Toxicity (optional)\n        \"violence_score\"?: Long,         // 0-100\n        \"hate_speech_score\"?: Long,      // 0-100\n        \"sexual_score\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n        \"weapons_score\"?: Long,          // 0-100\n        \"crime_score\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n        \"profanity_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n\n        // Semantic - Topic Classification (optional)\n        \"content_topics\"?: Set<String>,      // [\"controlled_substances\", \"weapons_manufacturing\", ...]\n        \"topic_confidence\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Invisible Character Detection (optional)\n        \"contains_invisible_chars\"?: Bool,\n        \"invisible_chars_score\"?: Long,      // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Pattern Detection (optional)\n        \"command_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"command_injection_type\"?: String,       // \"reverse_shell\" | \"privilege_escalation\" | \"code_execution\" | \"destructive_command\" | \"data_exfiltration\"\n        \"command_injection_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,      // \"critical\" | \"high\" | \"medium\" | \"low\" | \"none\"\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n        \"sql_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"sql_injection_type\"?: String,           // \"tautology\" | \"union_based\" | \"destructive\" | \"blind\" | \"error_based\"\n        \"sql_injection_score\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Cross-Origin Escalation (optional)\n        \"cross_origin_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"cross_origin_type\"?: String,            // \"cross_origin_tool\" | \"cross_origin_server\" | \"none\"\n        \"cross_origin_score\"?: Long,             // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Encoded Injection (optional)\n        \"encoded_content_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"encoded_types\"?: Set<String>,           // [\"base64\", \"hex\", \"unicode\", \"url\", ...]\n        \"encoded_count\"?: Long,\n        \"encoded_score\"?: Long,                  // 0-100\n\n        // Language & Script Detection (optional)\n        \"detected_language\"?: String,            // ISO language code\n        \"is_english\"?: Bool,\n        \"language_confidence\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n        \"detected_script\"?: String,              // \"latin\" | \"cyrillic\" | \"arabic\" | \"unknown\" | ...\n        \"is_latin_script\"?: Bool,\n        \"script_confidence\"?: Long,              // 0-100\n\n        // Content Analysis (optional)\n        \"hallucination_score\"?: Long,\n        \"factuality_score\"?: Long,               // 0-100\n        \"sentiment_score\"?: Long,\n        \"contains_code\"?: Bool,\n        \"code_languages\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"code_ratio\"?: Long,                     // 0-100, percentage of content that is code\n        \"keyword_matched\"?: Bool,\n        \"keyword_categories\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"keyword_count\"?: Long,\n        \"contains_non_ascii\"?: Bool,\n        \"phishing_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"content_safety_score\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n        \"content_safety_blocked\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Agentic - Multi-Turn Context (optional)\n        \"conversation_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"multi_turn_detection\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for call_tool action (agentic tool execution)\n    type CallToolContext = {\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // Tool Risk (optional)\n        \"tool_name\"?: String,            // \"shell\", \"write_file\", \"http_post\", etc.\n        \"tool_risk_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n        \"tool_is_sensitive\"?: Bool,\n        \"tool_category\"?: String,        // \"safe\" | \"sensitive\" | \"dangerous\"\n        \"tool_is_builtin\"?: Bool,\n\n        // MCP context (optional \u2014 only present for MCP tool calls)\n        \"mcp_server\"?: String,           // MCP server name (e.g., \"github\", \"filesystem\")\n        \"mcp_tool\"?: String,             // MCP tool name within the server\n        \"mcp_server_verified\"?: Bool,    // Whether server is from verified registry\n\n        // Agentic - Behavioral Patterns (optional)\n        \"suspicious_pattern\"?: Bool,\n        \"pattern_type\"?: String,         // \"data_exfiltration\" | \"secret_exfiltration\" | \"db_exfiltration\" | \"none\"\n        \"sequence_risk\"?: Long,          // 0-100\n\n        // Agentic - Loop Detection (optional)\n        \"loop_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"loop_count\"?: Long,\n        \"loop_tool\"?: String,\n\n        // Agentic - Budget Control (optional)\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,   // 0-100\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Semantic - Topic Classification (optional)\n        \"content_topics\"?: Set<String>,      // [\"controlled_substances\", \"weapons_manufacturing\", ...]\n        \"topic_confidence\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n\n        // Security checks on tool arguments (optional)\n        \"contains_secrets\"?: Bool,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"injection_confidence\"?: Long,\n        \"injection_pulse_score\"?: Long,  // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n        \"injection_deep_context_score\"?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n\n        // Security - Pattern Detection (optional)\n        \"command_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"command_injection_type\"?: String,\n        \"command_injection_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n        \"sql_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"sql_injection_type\"?: String,\n        \"sql_injection_score\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Cross-Origin Escalation (optional)\n        \"cross_origin_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"cross_origin_type\"?: String,\n        \"cross_origin_score\"?: Long,             // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Encoded Injection (optional)\n        \"encoded_content_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"encoded_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"encoded_count\"?: Long,\n        \"encoded_score\"?: Long,                  // 0-100\n\n        // Agentic - Agent Security (optional)\n        \"tool_poisoning_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"tool_poisoning_score\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n        \"tool_poisoning_type\"?: String,          // \"hidden_instructions\" | \"system_prompt_injection\" | \"authority_hijack\"\n        \"rug_pull_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"rug_pull_score\"?: Long,                 // 0-100\n        \"rug_pull_type\"?: String,                // \"risk_spike\" | \"pattern_change\" | \"combined\" | \"none\"\n\n        // Agentic - MCP Risk (optional)\n        \"mcp_config_risk\"?: Bool,\n        \"mcp_risk_type\"?: String,                // \"inline_execution\" | \"suspicious_url\" | \"cross_origin\"\n        \"mcp_risk_score\"?: Long,                 // 0-100\n\n        // Agentic - Multi-Turn Context (optional)\n        \"conversation_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"multi_turn_detection\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for read_file action\n    type FileReadContext = {\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // Security checks on file content (optional)\n        \"contains_secrets\"?: Bool,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Security - Path Traversal (optional)\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for write_file action\n    type FileWriteContext = {\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // Security checks on content being written (optional)\n        \"contains_secrets\"?: Bool,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Security - Path Traversal (optional)\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for connect_server action (MCP server connections)\n    type ConnectServerContext = {\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // MCP context (optional)\n        \"mcp_server\"?: String,           // MCP server name (e.g., \"github\", \"filesystem\")\n        \"mcp_server_verified\"?: Bool,    // Whether server is from verified registry\n\n        // Agentic - Agent Security (optional)\n        \"tool_poisoning_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"tool_poisoning_score\"?: Long,\n        \"tool_poisoning_type\"?: String,\n\n        // Agentic - MCP Risk (optional)\n        \"mcp_config_risk\"?: Bool,\n        \"mcp_risk_type\"?: String,\n        \"mcp_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Security - Cross-Origin Escalation (optional)\n        \"cross_origin_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"cross_origin_type\"?: String,\n        \"cross_origin_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n    };\n}\n";
+export declare const GUARDRAILS_SCHEMA = "// =============================================================================\n// Guardrails Cedar Schema\n// =============================================================================\n// Defines entity types, actions, and context attributes for the highflame-shield\n// guardrails service. This schema enables type-safe policy authoring and\n// validation in both Studio UI and backend.\n//\n// Service: highflame-shield (guardrails)\n// Namespace: Guardrails\n// =============================================================================\n\nnamespace Guardrails {\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Entity Types \u2014 ReBAC Hierarchy\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Entity hierarchy enables Cedar's `in` operator for policy scoping:\n    //   Account (org root)\n    //     \u2514\u2500\u2500 Project in [Account]\n    //           \u2514\u2500\u2500 App in [Project]\n    //                 \u2514\u2500\u2500 Session in [App]\n    //\n    // Policy scoping examples:\n    //   resource == Guardrails::App::\"<uuid>\"              \u2192 app-scoped\n    //   resource in Guardrails::Project::\"<uuid>\"          \u2192 project-wide\n    //   resource in Guardrails::Account::\"<uuid>\"          \u2192 org-wide\n    // =========================================================================\n\n    /// Account represents an organization (top-level tenant)\n    entity Account;\n\n    /// Project represents a project within an account\n    entity Project in [Account];\n\n    /// User represents a principal (human or service) making requests\n    entity User;\n\n    /// Agent represents an AI agent (Claude, Cursor, Copilot, etc.) making requests\n    entity Agent;\n\n    /// App represents a protected application (guardrails-enabled LLM app)\n    entity App in [Project];\n\n    /// Session represents an agentic conversation session with state tracking\n    entity Session in [App];\n\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Actions\n    // =========================================================================\n\n    /// Process user prompts and AI responses for security threats and content violations\n    action \"process_prompt\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [App, Session],\n        context: ProcessPromptContext\n    };\n\n    /// Execute tool calls (shell, file operations, MCP tools)\n    action \"call_tool\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Session],\n        context: CallToolContext\n    };\n\n    /// Read file operations\n    action \"read_file\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Session],\n        context: FileReadContext\n    };\n\n    /// Write file operations\n    action \"write_file\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Session],\n        context: FileWriteContext\n    };\n\n    /// Connect to an MCP server\n    action \"connect_server\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Session],\n        context: ConnectServerContext\n    };\n\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Context Types (Action-Specific)\n    // =========================================================================\n\n    /// Context for process_prompt action (user prompts & AI responses)\n    type ProcessPromptContext = {\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n        \"direction\": String,        // \"input\" | \"output\"\n        \"content_type\": String,     // \"prompt\" | \"response\" | \"tool_call\" | \"file\"\n        \"detector_count\": Long,\n\n        // Security - Injection & Jailbreak (optional)\n        \"injection_confidence\"?: Long,  // Combined injection confidence: MAX(pulse, deep_context)\n        \"jailbreak_confidence\"?: Long,  // Combined jailbreak confidence: MAX(pulse, deep_context)\n        \"injection_pulse_score\"?: Long,  // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n        \"injection_deep_context_score\"?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n        \"jailbreak_pulse_score\"?: Long,  // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n        \"jailbreak_deep_context_score\"?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n        \"injection_type\"?: String,       // \"prompt\" | \"sql\" | \"command\" | \"none\"\n\n        // Privacy - Secrets (optional)\n        \"contains_secrets\"?: Bool,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,    // [\"aws_access_key\", \"github_token\", ...]\n\n        // Privacy - PII (optional)\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"pii_count\"?: Long,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,       // [\"email\", \"phone\", \"ssn\", \"credit_card\", ...]\n\n        // Trust & Safety - Toxicity (optional)\n        \"violence_score\"?: Long,         // 0-100\n        \"hate_speech_score\"?: Long,      // 0-100\n        \"sexual_score\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n        \"weapons_score\"?: Long,          // 0-100\n        \"crime_score\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n        \"profanity_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n\n        // Semantic - Topic Classification (optional)\n        \"content_topics\"?: Set<String>,      // [\"controlled_substances\", \"weapons_manufacturing\", ...]\n        \"topic_confidence\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Invisible Character Detection (optional)\n        \"contains_invisible_chars\"?: Bool,\n        \"invisible_chars_score\"?: Long,      // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Pattern Detection (optional)\n        \"command_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"command_injection_type\"?: String,       // \"reverse_shell\" | \"privilege_escalation\" | \"code_execution\" | \"destructive_command\" | \"data_exfiltration\"\n        \"command_injection_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,      // \"critical\" | \"high\" | \"medium\" | \"low\" | \"none\"\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n        \"sql_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"sql_injection_type\"?: String,           // \"tautology\" | \"union_based\" | \"destructive\" | \"blind\" | \"error_based\"\n        \"sql_injection_score\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Cross-Origin Escalation (optional)\n        \"cross_origin_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"cross_origin_type\"?: String,            // \"cross_origin_tool\" | \"cross_origin_server\" | \"none\"\n        \"cross_origin_score\"?: Long,             // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Encoded Injection (optional)\n        \"encoded_content_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"encoded_types\"?: Set<String>,           // [\"base64\", \"hex\", \"unicode\", \"url\", ...]\n        \"encoded_count\"?: Long,\n        \"encoded_score\"?: Long,                  // 0-100\n\n        // Language & Script Detection (optional)\n        \"detected_language\"?: String,            // ISO language code\n        \"is_english\"?: Bool,\n        \"language_confidence\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n        \"detected_script\"?: String,              // \"latin\" | \"cyrillic\" | \"arabic\" | \"unknown\" | ...\n        \"is_latin_script\"?: Bool,\n        \"script_confidence\"?: Long,              // 0-100\n\n        // Content Analysis (optional)\n        \"hallucination_score\"?: Long,\n        \"factuality_score\"?: Long,               // 0-100\n        \"sentiment_score\"?: Long,\n        \"contains_code\"?: Bool,\n        \"code_languages\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"code_ratio\"?: Long,                     // 0-100, percentage of content that is code\n        \"keyword_matched\"?: Bool,\n        \"keyword_categories\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"keyword_count\"?: Long,\n        \"contains_non_ascii\"?: Bool,\n        \"phishing_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"content_safety_score\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n        \"content_safety_blocked\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Agentic - Multi-Turn Context (optional)\n        \"conversation_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"multi_turn_detection\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Agent Identity \u2014 authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)\n        // Present when the request is made by an AI agent (API key or JWT with agent claims).\n        // Empty strings for human user requests. Use these to write agent-specific policies.\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,             // Unique agent identifier (e.g., \"agent_research_v3\")\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,           // \"orchestrator\" | \"autonomous\" | \"tool_agent\" | \"human_proxy\"\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,    // \"first_party\" | \"verified_third_party\" | \"unverified\"\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,      // Agent framework (e.g., \"claude-code\", \"langchain\", \"crewai\")\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,      // Organization that published the agent\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for call_tool action (agentic tool execution)\n    type CallToolContext = {\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // Tool Risk (optional)\n        \"tool_name\"?: String,            // \"shell\", \"write_file\", \"http_post\", etc.\n        \"tool_risk_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n        \"tool_is_sensitive\"?: Bool,\n        \"tool_category\"?: String,        // \"safe\" | \"sensitive\" | \"dangerous\"\n        \"tool_is_builtin\"?: Bool,\n\n        // MCP context (optional \u2014 only present for MCP tool calls)\n        \"mcp_server\"?: String,           // MCP server name (e.g., \"github\", \"filesystem\")\n        \"mcp_tool\"?: String,             // MCP tool name within the server\n        \"mcp_server_verified\"?: Bool,    // Whether server is from verified registry\n\n        // Agentic - Behavioral Patterns (optional)\n        \"suspicious_pattern\"?: Bool,\n        \"pattern_type\"?: String,         // \"data_exfiltration\" | \"secret_exfiltration\" | \"db_exfiltration\" | \"none\"\n        \"sequence_risk\"?: Long,          // 0-100\n\n        // Agentic - Loop Detection (optional)\n        \"loop_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"loop_count\"?: Long,\n        \"loop_tool\"?: String,\n\n        // Agentic - Budget Control (optional)\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,   // 0-100\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Semantic - Topic Classification (optional)\n        \"content_topics\"?: Set<String>,      // [\"controlled_substances\", \"weapons_manufacturing\", ...]\n        \"topic_confidence\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n\n        // Security checks on tool arguments (optional)\n        \"contains_secrets\"?: Bool,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"injection_confidence\"?: Long,\n        \"injection_pulse_score\"?: Long,  // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n        \"injection_deep_context_score\"?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n\n        // Security - Pattern Detection (optional)\n        \"command_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"command_injection_type\"?: String,\n        \"command_injection_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n        \"sql_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"sql_injection_type\"?: String,\n        \"sql_injection_score\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Cross-Origin Escalation (optional)\n        \"cross_origin_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"cross_origin_type\"?: String,\n        \"cross_origin_score\"?: Long,             // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Encoded Injection (optional)\n        \"encoded_content_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"encoded_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"encoded_count\"?: Long,\n        \"encoded_score\"?: Long,                  // 0-100\n\n        // Agentic - Agent Security (optional)\n        \"tool_poisoning_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"tool_poisoning_score\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n        \"tool_poisoning_type\"?: String,          // \"hidden_instructions\" | \"system_prompt_injection\" | \"authority_hijack\"\n        \"rug_pull_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"rug_pull_score\"?: Long,                 // 0-100\n        \"rug_pull_type\"?: String,                // \"risk_spike\" | \"pattern_change\" | \"combined\" | \"none\"\n\n        // Agentic - MCP Risk (optional)\n        \"mcp_config_risk\"?: Bool,\n        \"mcp_risk_type\"?: String,                // \"inline_execution\" | \"suspicious_url\" | \"cross_origin\"\n        \"mcp_risk_score\"?: Long,                 // 0-100\n\n        // Agentic - Multi-Turn Context (optional)\n        \"conversation_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"multi_turn_detection\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Agent Identity \u2014 authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for read_file action\n    type FileReadContext = {\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // Security checks on file content (optional)\n        \"contains_secrets\"?: Bool,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Security - Path Traversal (optional)\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Agent Identity \u2014 authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for write_file action\n    type FileWriteContext = {\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // Security checks on content being written (optional)\n        \"contains_secrets\"?: Bool,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Security - Path Traversal (optional)\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Agent Identity \u2014 authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for connect_server action (MCP server connections)\n    type ConnectServerContext = {\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // MCP context (optional)\n        \"mcp_server\"?: String,           // MCP server name (e.g., \"github\", \"filesystem\")\n        \"mcp_server_verified\"?: Bool,    // Whether server is from verified registry\n\n        // Agentic - Agent Security (optional)\n        \"tool_poisoning_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"tool_poisoning_score\"?: Long,\n        \"tool_poisoning_type\"?: String,\n\n        // Agentic - MCP Risk (optional)\n        \"mcp_config_risk\"?: Bool,\n        \"mcp_risk_type\"?: String,\n        \"mcp_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Security - Cross-Origin Escalation (optional)\n        \"cross_origin_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"cross_origin_type\"?: String,\n        \"cross_origin_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Agent Identity \u2014 authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n    };\n}\n";
 /**
  * Overwatch Cedar schema
  *

package/dist/service-schemas.gen.js

@@ -210,6 +210,15 @@ namespace Guardrails {
         "session_max_secret_score"?: Long,
         "session_cumulative_risk_score"?: Long,
 
+        // Agent Identity — authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)
+        // Present when the request is made by an AI agent (API key or JWT with agent claims).
+        // Empty strings for human user requests. Use these to write agent-specific policies.
+        "agent_id"?: String,             // Unique agent identifier (e.g., "agent_research_v3")
+        "agent_type"?: String,           // "orchestrator" | "autonomous" | "tool_agent" | "human_proxy"
+        "agent_trust_level"?: String,    // "first_party" | "verified_third_party" | "unverified"
+        "agent_framework"?: String,      // Agent framework (e.g., "claude-code", "langchain", "crewai")
+        "agent_publisher"?: String,      // Organization that published the agent
+
     };
 
     /// Context for call_tool action (agentic tool execution)
@@ -250,6 +259,7 @@ namespace Guardrails {
 
         // Security checks on tool arguments (optional)
         "contains_secrets"?: Bool,
+        "secret_count"?: Long,
         "secret_types"?: Set<String>,
         "pii_detected"?: Bool,
         "pii_types"?: Set<String>,
@@ -311,6 +321,13 @@ namespace Guardrails {
         "session_max_secret_score"?: Long,
         "session_cumulative_risk_score"?: Long,
 
+        // Agent Identity — authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)
+        "agent_id"?: String,
+        "agent_type"?: String,
+        "agent_trust_level"?: String,
+        "agent_framework"?: String,
+        "agent_publisher"?: String,
+
     };
 
     /// Context for read_file action
@@ -321,6 +338,7 @@ namespace Guardrails {
 
         // Security checks on file content (optional)
         "contains_secrets"?: Bool,
+        "secret_count"?: Long,
         "secret_types"?: Set<String>,
         "pii_detected"?: Bool,
         "pii_types"?: Set<String>,
@@ -345,6 +363,13 @@ namespace Guardrails {
         "session_max_secret_score"?: Long,
         "session_cumulative_risk_score"?: Long,
 
+        // Agent Identity — authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)
+        "agent_id"?: String,
+        "agent_type"?: String,
+        "agent_trust_level"?: String,
+        "agent_framework"?: String,
+        "agent_publisher"?: String,
+
     };
 
     /// Context for write_file action
@@ -355,6 +380,7 @@ namespace Guardrails {
 
         // Security checks on content being written (optional)
         "contains_secrets"?: Bool,
+        "secret_count"?: Long,
         "secret_types"?: Set<String>,
         "pii_detected"?: Bool,
         "pii_types"?: Set<String>,
@@ -379,6 +405,13 @@ namespace Guardrails {
         "session_max_secret_score"?: Long,
         "session_cumulative_risk_score"?: Long,
 
+        // Agent Identity — authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)
+        "agent_id"?: String,
+        "agent_type"?: String,
+        "agent_trust_level"?: String,
+        "agent_framework"?: String,
+        "agent_publisher"?: String,
+
     };
 
     /// Context for connect_server action (MCP server connections)
@@ -421,6 +454,13 @@ namespace Guardrails {
         "session_max_secret_score"?: Long,
         "session_cumulative_risk_score"?: Long,
 
+        // Agent Identity — authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)
+        "agent_id"?: String,
+        "agent_type"?: String,
+        "agent_trust_level"?: String,
+        "agent_framework"?: String,
+        "agent_publisher"?: String,
+
     };
 }
 `;
@@ -1490,7 +1530,12 @@ export const GUARDRAILS_CONTEXT = {
                 { "key": "session_max_command_injection_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Highest command injection score seen in any turn of the session (0-100)" },
                 { "key": "session_max_pii_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Highest PII risk score seen in any turn of the session (0-100)" },
                 { "key": "session_max_secret_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Highest secret detection score seen in any turn of the session (0-100)" },
-                { "key": "session_cumulative_risk_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Sum of per-turn risk scores across the session. Catches death-by-a-thousand-cuts where no single turn is high but cumulative risk is significant" }
+                { "key": "session_cumulative_risk_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Sum of per-turn risk scores across the session. Catches death-by-a-thousand-cuts where no single turn is high but cumulative risk is significant" },
+                { "key": "agent_id", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Unique identifier of the authenticated AI agent making this request (e.g., \'agent_research_v3\'). Empty string for human user requests. Use this to write agent-specific policies" },
+                { "key": "agent_type", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Type of the authenticated agent: \'orchestrator\' (coordinates sub-agents), \'autonomous\' (self-directed), \'tool_agent\' (single-purpose tool), or \'human_proxy\' (acts on behalf of a human). Empty string for human users" },
+                { "key": "agent_trust_level", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Trust level of the authenticated agent: \'first_party\' (your own agents), \'verified_third_party\' (audited external agents), or \'unverified\' (unknown agents). Use this for tiered access control — e.g., only first_party agents can call dangerous tools" },
+                { "key": "agent_framework", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Framework or SDK the agent is built with (e.g., \'claude-code\', \'langchain\', \'crewai\', \'autogen\'). Use this to apply framework-specific policies" },
+                { "key": "agent_publisher", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Organization that published the agent (e.g., \'anthropic\', \'internal\', \'acme-corp\'). Use this for organization-level trust policies" }
             ]
         },
         {
@@ -1518,6 +1563,7 @@ export const GUARDRAILS_CONTEXT = {
                 { "key": "content_topics", "type": "array", "required": false, "description": "Semantic topics detected in tool arguments or content (e.g., [\'controlled_substances\']). Use .contains() to restrict tool calls involving specific topics" },
                 { "key": "topic_confidence", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Confidence score from topic classifier for tool content (0-100)" },
                 { "key": "contains_secrets", "type": "boolean", "required": false, "description": "Whether secrets were detected in tool arguments or content" },
+                { "key": "secret_count", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Total number of secret matches found in tool arguments or content. Multiple matches may indicate data dumps or accidental credential exposure" },
                 { "key": "secret_types", "type": "array", "required": false, "description": "Array of secret types found in tool arguments" },
                 { "key": "pii_detected", "type": "boolean", "required": false, "description": "Whether PII was detected in tool arguments or content" },
                 { "key": "pii_types", "type": "array", "required": false, "description": "Array of PII types found in tool arguments" },
@@ -1563,7 +1609,12 @@ export const GUARDRAILS_CONTEXT = {
                 { "key": "session_max_command_injection_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Highest command injection score seen in any turn of the session (0-100)" },
                 { "key": "session_max_pii_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Highest PII risk score seen in any turn of the session (0-100)" },
                 { "key": "session_max_secret_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Highest secret detection score seen in any turn of the session (0-100)" },
-                { "key": "session_cumulative_risk_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Sum of per-turn risk scores across the session. Catches death-by-a-thousand-cuts where no single turn is high but cumulative risk is significant" }
+                { "key": "session_cumulative_risk_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Sum of per-turn risk scores across the session. Catches death-by-a-thousand-cuts where no single turn is high but cumulative risk is significant" },
+                { "key": "agent_id", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Unique identifier of the authenticated AI agent making this request (e.g., \'agent_research_v3\'). Empty string for human user requests. Use this to write agent-specific policies" },
+                { "key": "agent_type", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Type of the authenticated agent: \'orchestrator\' (coordinates sub-agents), \'autonomous\' (self-directed), \'tool_agent\' (single-purpose tool), or \'human_proxy\' (acts on behalf of a human). Empty string for human users" },
+                { "key": "agent_trust_level", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Trust level of the authenticated agent: \'first_party\' (your own agents), \'verified_third_party\' (audited external agents), or \'unverified\' (unknown agents). Use this for tiered access control — e.g., only first_party agents can call dangerous tools" },
+                { "key": "agent_framework", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Framework or SDK the agent is built with (e.g., \'claude-code\', \'langchain\', \'crewai\', \'autogen\'). Use this to apply framework-specific policies" },
+                { "key": "agent_publisher", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Organization that published the agent (e.g., \'anthropic\', \'internal\', \'acme-corp\'). Use this for organization-level trust policies" }
             ]
         },
         {
@@ -1573,6 +1624,7 @@ export const GUARDRAILS_CONTEXT = {
                 { "key": "request_id", "type": "string", "required": true, "description": "Unique identifier for this request" },
                 { "key": "timestamp", "type": "number", "required": true, "description": "Unix timestamp in milliseconds" },
                 { "key": "contains_secrets", "type": "boolean", "required": false, "description": "Whether secrets were detected in the file content being read" },
+                { "key": "secret_count", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Total number of secret matches found in file content. Multiple matches may indicate data dumps or accidental credential exposure" },
                 { "key": "secret_types", "type": "array", "required": false, "description": "Array of secret types found in file content" },
                 { "key": "pii_detected", "type": "boolean", "required": false, "description": "Whether PII was detected in the file content" },
                 { "key": "pii_types", "type": "array", "required": false, "description": "Array of PII types found in file content" },
@@ -1591,7 +1643,12 @@ export const GUARDRAILS_CONTEXT = {
                 { "key": "session_max_command_injection_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Highest command injection score seen in any turn of the session (0-100)" },
                 { "key": "session_max_pii_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Highest PII risk score seen in any turn of the session (0-100)" },
                 { "key": "session_max_secret_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Highest secret detection score seen in any turn of the session (0-100)" },
-                { "key": "session_cumulative_risk_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Sum of per-turn risk scores across the session. Catches death-by-a-thousand-cuts where no single turn is high but cumulative risk is significant" }
+                { "key": "session_cumulative_risk_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Sum of per-turn risk scores across the session. Catches death-by-a-thousand-cuts where no single turn is high but cumulative risk is significant" },
+                { "key": "agent_id", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Unique identifier of the authenticated AI agent making this request (e.g., \'agent_research_v3\'). Empty string for human user requests. Use this to write agent-specific policies" },
+                { "key": "agent_type", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Type of the authenticated agent: \'orchestrator\' (coordinates sub-agents), \'autonomous\' (self-directed), \'tool_agent\' (single-purpose tool), or \'human_proxy\' (acts on behalf of a human). Empty string for human users" },
+                { "key": "agent_trust_level", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Trust level of the authenticated agent: \'first_party\' (your own agents), \'verified_third_party\' (audited external agents), or \'unverified\' (unknown agents). Use this for tiered access control — e.g., only first_party agents can call dangerous tools" },
+                { "key": "agent_framework", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Framework or SDK the agent is built with (e.g., \'claude-code\', \'langchain\', \'crewai\', \'autogen\'). Use this to apply framework-specific policies" },
+                { "key": "agent_publisher", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Organization that published the agent (e.g., \'anthropic\', \'internal\', \'acme-corp\'). Use this for organization-level trust policies" }
             ]
         },
         {
@@ -1601,6 +1658,7 @@ export const GUARDRAILS_CONTEXT = {
                 { "key": "request_id", "type": "string", "required": true, "description": "Unique identifier for this request" },
                 { "key": "timestamp", "type": "number", "required": true, "description": "Unix timestamp in milliseconds" },
                 { "key": "contains_secrets", "type": "boolean", "required": false, "description": "Whether secrets were detected in the content being written. Block writes containing credentials" },
+                { "key": "secret_count", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Total number of secret matches found in write content. Multiple matches may indicate data dumps or accidental credential exposure" },
                 { "key": "secret_types", "type": "array", "required": false, "description": "Array of secret types found in write content" },
                 { "key": "pii_detected", "type": "boolean", "required": false, "description": "Whether PII was detected in the content being written" },
                 { "key": "pii_types", "type": "array", "required": false, "description": "Array of PII types found in write content" },
@@ -1619,7 +1677,12 @@ export const GUARDRAILS_CONTEXT = {
                 { "key": "session_max_command_injection_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Highest command injection score seen in any turn of the session (0-100)" },
                 { "key": "session_max_pii_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Highest PII risk score seen in any turn of the session (0-100)" },
                 { "key": "session_max_secret_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Highest secret detection score seen in any turn of the session (0-100)" },
-                { "key": "session_cumulative_risk_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Sum of per-turn risk scores across the session. Catches death-by-a-thousand-cuts where no single turn is high but cumulative risk is significant" }
+                { "key": "session_cumulative_risk_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Sum of per-turn risk scores across the session. Catches death-by-a-thousand-cuts where no single turn is high but cumulative risk is significant" },
+                { "key": "agent_id", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Unique identifier of the authenticated AI agent making this request (e.g., \'agent_research_v3\'). Empty string for human user requests. Use this to write agent-specific policies" },
+                { "key": "agent_type", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Type of the authenticated agent: \'orchestrator\' (coordinates sub-agents), \'autonomous\' (self-directed), \'tool_agent\' (single-purpose tool), or \'human_proxy\' (acts on behalf of a human). Empty string for human users" },
+                { "key": "agent_trust_level", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Trust level of the authenticated agent: \'first_party\' (your own agents), \'verified_third_party\' (audited external agents), or \'unverified\' (unknown agents). Use this for tiered access control — e.g., only first_party agents can call dangerous tools" },
+                { "key": "agent_framework", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Framework or SDK the agent is built with (e.g., \'claude-code\', \'langchain\', \'crewai\', \'autogen\'). Use this to apply framework-specific policies" },
+                { "key": "agent_publisher", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Organization that published the agent (e.g., \'anthropic\', \'internal\', \'acme-corp\'). Use this for organization-level trust policies" }
             ]
         },
         {
@@ -1651,7 +1714,12 @@ export const GUARDRAILS_CONTEXT = {
                 { "key": "session_max_command_injection_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Highest command injection score seen in any turn of the session (0-100)" },
                 { "key": "session_max_pii_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Highest PII risk score seen in any turn of the session (0-100)" },
                 { "key": "session_max_secret_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Highest secret detection score seen in any turn of the session (0-100)" },
-                { "key": "session_cumulative_risk_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Sum of per-turn risk scores across the session. Catches death-by-a-thousand-cuts where no single turn is high but cumulative risk is significant" }
+                { "key": "session_cumulative_risk_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Sum of per-turn risk scores across the session. Catches death-by-a-thousand-cuts where no single turn is high but cumulative risk is significant" },
+                { "key": "agent_id", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Unique identifier of the authenticated AI agent making this request (e.g., \'agent_research_v3\'). Empty string for human user requests. Use this to write agent-specific policies" },
+                { "key": "agent_type", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Type of the authenticated agent: \'orchestrator\' (coordinates sub-agents), \'autonomous\' (self-directed), \'tool_agent\' (single-purpose tool), or \'human_proxy\' (acts on behalf of a human). Empty string for human users" },
+                { "key": "agent_trust_level", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Trust level of the authenticated agent: \'first_party\' (your own agents), \'verified_third_party\' (audited external agents), or \'unverified\' (unknown agents). Use this for tiered access control — e.g., only first_party agents can call dangerous tools" },
+                { "key": "agent_framework", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Framework or SDK the agent is built with (e.g., \'claude-code\', \'langchain\', \'crewai\', \'autogen\'). Use this to apply framework-specific policies" },
+                { "key": "agent_publisher", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Organization that published the agent (e.g., \'anthropic\', \'internal\', \'acme-corp\'). Use this for organization-level trust policies" }
             ]
         }
     ]

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@highflame/policy",
-  "version": "2.1.5",
+  "version": "2.1.7",
   "description": "Highflame Cedar policy types and engine wrapper",
   "readme": "README.md",
   "main": "dist/index.js",