@highflame/policy 2.1.4 → 2.1.5

package/_schemas/guardrails/templates/profiles/code_agent.cedar

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-// =============================================================================
-// Code Agent Profile
-// =============================================================================
-// Optimized for coding assistants and agentic development tools.
-// Focuses on tool risk, shell execution controls, agentic safety patterns,
-// and data exfiltration prevention. Relaxed toxicity (code discussions may
-// reference security topics legitimately).
-//
-// Deploy: One-click deploy scopes all rules to a specific application via
-// resource == Guardrails::App::"<app-uuid>" (injected at deploy time).
-//
-// Category: agentic_security
-// Namespace: Guardrails
-// =============================================================================
-
-@id("code-block-dangerous-tools")
-@name("Block dangerous tool execution")
-@description("Forbids tools classified as dangerous or with very high risk scores")
-@severity("critical")
-@tags("profile,code-agent,tools,agentic")
-forbid (
-    principal,
-    action == Guardrails::Action::"call_tool",
-    resource
-) when {
-    context.tool_risk_score > 85 ||
-    context.tool_category == "dangerous"
-};
-
-@id("code-block-shell-execution")
-@name("Block direct shell commands")
-@description("Forbids direct shell and command execution tools")
-@severity("high")
-@tags("profile,code-agent,tools,shell")
-forbid (
-    principal,
-    action == Guardrails::Action::"call_tool",
-    resource
-) when {
-    context.tool_name == "shell" ||
-    context.tool_name == "execute_command" ||
-    context.tool_name == "bash"
-};
-
-@id("code-block-sensitive-tools")
-@name("Block sensitive tools with elevated risk")
-@description("Forbids sensitive tool calls with risk above 70")
-@severity("high")
-@tags("profile,code-agent,tools,security")
-forbid (
-    principal,
-    action == Guardrails::Action::"call_tool",
-    resource
-) when {
-    context.tool_is_sensitive == true &&
-    context.tool_risk_score > 70
-};
-
-@id("code-block-loops")
-@name("Block tool call loops")
-@description("Stops infinite tool call loops in agentic workflows")
-@severity("high")
-@tags("profile,code-agent,agentic,loops")
-forbid (
-    principal,
-    action == Guardrails::Action::"call_tool",
-    resource
-) when {
-    context.loop_detected == true &&
-    context.loop_count > 5
-};
-
-@id("code-block-exfiltration")
-@name("Block data exfiltration patterns")
-@description("Detects and blocks read → send patterns indicating data theft")
-@severity("critical")
-@tags("profile,code-agent,agentic,exfiltration")
-forbid (
-    principal,
-    action,
-    resource
-) when {
-    context.suspicious_pattern == true &&
-    (context.pattern_type == "data_exfiltration" ||
-     context.pattern_type == "secret_exfiltration")
-};
-
-@id("code-block-high-sequence-risk")
-@name("Block high-risk action sequences")
-@description("Forbids suspicious multi-step tool sequences with risk above 75")
-@severity("high")
-@tags("profile,code-agent,agentic,patterns")
-forbid (
-    principal,
-    action,
-    resource
-) when {
-    context.sequence_risk > 75
-};
-
-@id("code-block-budget-exceeded")
-@name("Block on budget exceeded")
-@description("Stops agent execution when token budget is exhausted")
-@severity("medium")
-@tags("profile,code-agent,budget,cost-control")
-forbid (
-    principal,
-    action,
-    resource
-) when {
-    context.budget_exceeded == true
-};
-
-@id("code-block-write-secrets")
-@name("Block writing secrets to files")
-@description("Prevents code agents from writing detected secrets to output files")
-@severity("critical")
-@tags("profile,code-agent,secrets,security")
-forbid (
-    principal,
-    action == Guardrails::Action::"write_file",
-    resource
-) when {
-    context.contains_secrets == true
-};

package/_schemas/guardrails/templates/profiles/data_pipeline.cedar

@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-// =============================================================================
-// Data Pipeline Profile
-// =============================================================================
-// Optimized for RAG pipelines, data processing agents, and retrieval systems.
-// Strong PII and secrets protection, exfiltration detection, and output
-// filtering. Focused on data integrity and privacy compliance.
-//
-// Deploy: One-click deploy scopes all rules to a specific application via
-// resource == Guardrails::App::"<app-uuid>" (injected at deploy time).
-//
-// Category: privacy
-// Namespace: Guardrails
-// =============================================================================
-
-@id("data-pii-block-all")
-@name("Block all PII in data pipeline")
-@description("Forbids any PII in both inputs and outputs — data pipelines must not process or leak PII")
-@severity("critical")
-@tags("profile,data-pipeline,pii,privacy")
-forbid (
-    principal,
-    action == Guardrails::Action::"process_prompt",
-    resource
-) when {
-    context.pii_detected == true
-};
-
-@id("data-pii-block-sensitive-types")
-@name("Block sensitive PII types strictly")
-@description("Zero-tolerance for SSN, credit cards, passport numbers, and medical IDs in data pipelines")
-@severity("critical")
-@tags("profile,data-pipeline,pii,compliance")
-forbid (
-    principal,
-    action == Guardrails::Action::"process_prompt",
-    resource
-) when {
-    context.pii_types.contains("ssn") ||
-    context.pii_types.contains("credit_card") ||
-    context.pii_types.contains("passport") ||
-    context.pii_types.contains("medical_id") ||
-    context.pii_types.contains("tax_id")
-};
-
-@id("data-secrets-strict")
-@name("Strict secrets detection for data pipeline")
-@description("Blocks any content containing secrets — even a single match")
-@severity("critical")
-@tags("profile,data-pipeline,secrets,security")
-forbid (
-    principal,
-    action,
-    resource
-) when {
-    context.contains_secrets == true
-};
-
-@id("data-block-exfiltration")
-@name("Block data exfiltration from pipeline")
-@description("Prevents retrieval data from being sent to external endpoints")
-@severity("critical")
-@tags("profile,data-pipeline,exfiltration,security")
-forbid (
-    principal,
-    action,
-    resource
-) when {
-    context.suspicious_pattern == true &&
-    (context.pattern_type == "data_exfiltration" ||
-     context.pattern_type == "db_exfiltration")
-};
-
-@id("data-block-high-risk-tools")
-@name("Block high-risk tools in pipeline")
-@description("Forbids tools with elevated risk in data processing context")
-@severity("high")
-@tags("profile,data-pipeline,tools,security")
-forbid (
-    principal,
-    action == Guardrails::Action::"call_tool",
-    resource
-) when {
-    context.tool_risk_score > 60
-};
-
-@id("data-block-output-secrets")
-@name("Block secrets in pipeline outputs")
-@description("Prevents data pipeline from writing secrets to any output")
-@severity("critical")
-@tags("profile,data-pipeline,secrets,output")
-forbid (
-    principal,
-    action == Guardrails::Action::"write_file",
-    resource
-) when {
-    context.contains_secrets == true ||
-    context.secret_count > 0
-};
-
-@id("data-injection-defense")
-@name("Pipeline injection defense")
-@description("Lower injection threshold for data pipelines — RAG inputs are high-risk for injection")
-@severity("high")
-@tags("profile,data-pipeline,injection,security")
-forbid (
-    principal,
-    action == Guardrails::Action::"process_prompt",
-    resource
-) when {
-    context.injection_score > 65
-};