@highflame/policy 2.1.39 → 2.1.41

package/_schemas/ai_gateway/context.json

@@ -169,6 +169,12 @@
           "required": false,
           "description": "Built-in tool flag"
         },
+        {
+          "key": "tool_operation_classes",
+          "type": "array",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "All operation classes observed in the tool call. Subset of: 'readonly', 'write_enabling', 'execute_enabling', 'network_access', 'unknown'. 'unknown' appears when any unrecognized or variable-expanded command was seen."
+        },
         {
           "key": "mcp_server_verified",
           "type": "boolean",

package/_schemas/ai_gateway/schema.cedarschema

@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ action call_tool appliesTo {
     tool_is_sensitive?: Bool,
     tool_is_builtin?: Bool,
 
+    // --- Tool Operation Classifier ---
+    tool_operation_classes?: Set<String>,  // subset of {"readonly", "write_enabling", "execute_enabling", "network_access", "unknown"}
+
     // --- MCP Trust ---
     mcp_server_verified?: Bool,       // Whether server is from verified registry
 

package/_schemas/guardrails/context.json

@@ -805,6 +805,12 @@
           "required": false,
           "description": "Risk score for MCP configuration issues (0-100). Typical threshold: >=70 for blocks"
         },
+        {
+          "key": "tool_operation_classes",
+          "type": "array",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "All operation classes observed in the tool call. Subset of: 'readonly', 'write_enabling', 'execute_enabling', 'network_access', 'unknown'. 'unknown' appears when any unrecognized or variable-expanded command was seen."
+        },
         {
           "key": "cross_origin_detected",
           "type": "boolean",

package/_schemas/guardrails/schema.cedarschema

@@ -338,6 +338,9 @@ namespace Guardrails {
         "mcp_risk_type"?: String,                // "inline_execution" | "suspicious_url" | "cross_origin"
         "mcp_risk_score"?: Long,                 // 0-100
 
+        // Tool Operation Classifier (optional) — populated by AST-based classifiers (bash, python, etc.)
+        "tool_operation_classes"?: Set<String>,  // subset of {"readonly", "write_enabling", "execute_enabling", "network_access", "unknown"}
+
         // Agentic - Multi-Turn Context (optional)
         "conversation_turn"?: Long,
         "multi_turn_detection"?: Bool,

package/_schemas/overwatch/context.json

@@ -619,6 +619,12 @@
           "required": false,
           "description": "Whether the MCP server is from a verified registry"
         },
+        {
+          "key": "tool_operation_classes",
+          "type": "array",
+          "required": false,
+          "description": "All operation classes observed in the tool call. Subset of: 'readonly', 'write_enabling', 'execute_enabling', 'network_access', 'unknown'. 'unknown' appears when any unrecognized or variable-expanded command was seen."
+        },
         {
           "key": "session_pii_detected",
           "type": "boolean",

package/_schemas/overwatch/schema.cedarschema

@@ -237,6 +237,9 @@ action call_tool appliesTo {
     // --- MCP Trust ---
     mcp_server_verified?: Bool,       // Whether server is from verified registry
 
+    // --- Tool Operation Classifier ---
+    tool_operation_classes?: Set<String>,  // subset of {"readonly", "write_enabling", "execute_enabling", "network_access", "unknown"}
+
     // --- Session Detection History (cross-turn sticky flags) ---
     session_pii_detected?: Bool,
     session_pii_types?: Set<String>,

package/dist/ai_gateway-context.gen.d.ts

@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ export declare const AiGatewayContextKey: {
     readonly ToolIsBuiltin: "tool_is_builtin";
     readonly ToolIsSensitive: "tool_is_sensitive";
     readonly ToolName: "tool_name";
+    readonly ToolOperationClasses: "tool_operation_classes";
     readonly ToolPoisoningDetected: "tool_poisoning_detected";
     readonly ToolPoisoningScore: "tool_poisoning_score";
     readonly ToolRiskScore: "tool_risk_score";

package/dist/ai_gateway-context.gen.js

@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ export const AiGatewayContextKey = {
     ToolIsBuiltin: 'tool_is_builtin',
     ToolIsSensitive: 'tool_is_sensitive',
     ToolName: 'tool_name',
+    ToolOperationClasses: 'tool_operation_classes',
     ToolPoisoningDetected: 'tool_poisoning_detected',
     ToolPoisoningScore: 'tool_poisoning_score',
     ToolRiskScore: 'tool_risk_score',

package/dist/decision-effects.gen.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+export declare const DecisionEffect: {
+    readonly StepUp: "step_up";
+    readonly Defer: "defer";
+    readonly Modify: "modify";
+};
+export type DecisionEffect = (typeof DecisionEffect)[keyof typeof DecisionEffect];
+/** Every legal decision effect, in canonical order. */
+export declare const AllDecisionEffects: DecisionEffect[];

package/dist/decision-effects.gen.js

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+// Code generated by highflame-policy-codegen. DO NOT EDIT.
+// Source: ALLOWED_DECISION_EFFECTS in codegen/src/lib.rs
+//
+// Canonical decision-effect vocabulary. Studio's policy editor and any
+// other TypeScript consumer should import these symbols rather than
+// hard-coding the string literals.
+export const DecisionEffect = {
+    StepUp: "step_up",
+    Defer: "defer",
+    Modify: "modify",
+};
+/** Every legal decision effect, in canonical order. */
+export const AllDecisionEffects = [
+    DecisionEffect.StepUp,
+    DecisionEffect.Defer,
+    DecisionEffect.Modify,
+];

package/dist/guardrails-context.gen.d.ts

@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ export declare const GuardrailsContextKey: {
     readonly ToolIsBuiltin: "tool_is_builtin";
     readonly ToolIsSensitive: "tool_is_sensitive";
     readonly ToolName: "tool_name";
+    readonly ToolOperationClasses: "tool_operation_classes";
     readonly ToolPoisoningDetected: "tool_poisoning_detected";
     readonly ToolPoisoningScore: "tool_poisoning_score";
     readonly ToolPoisoningType: "tool_poisoning_type";

package/dist/guardrails-context.gen.js

@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ export const GuardrailsContextKey = {
     ToolIsBuiltin: 'tool_is_builtin',
     ToolIsSensitive: 'tool_is_sensitive',
     ToolName: 'tool_name',
+    ToolOperationClasses: 'tool_operation_classes',
     ToolPoisoningDetected: 'tool_poisoning_detected',
     ToolPoisoningScore: 'tool_poisoning_score',
     ToolPoisoningType: 'tool_poisoning_type',

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ export * from './entities.gen.js';
 export * from './actions.gen.js';
 export * from './context.gen.js';
 export * from './schema.gen.js';
+export * from './decision-effects.gen.js';
 export * from './aarm-annotations.gen.js';
 export * from './engine.js';
 export * from './builder.js';

package/dist/index.js

@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ export * from './entities.gen.js';
 export * from './actions.gen.js';
 export * from './context.gen.js';
 export * from './schema.gen.js';
+// Canonical decision-effect vocabulary (AARM R4 Wave A). Always emitted —
+// source is ALLOWED_DECISION_EFFECTS in codegen/src/lib.rs, not annotations.json.
+export * from './decision-effects.gen.js';
 // AARM-aware annotation registry (typed Cedar annotation vocabulary
 // Shield interprets at decision time; Studio/Admin use for lint).
 export * from './aarm-annotations.gen.js';

package/dist/overwatch-context.gen.d.ts

@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ export declare const OverwatchContextKey: {
     readonly ToolIsBuiltin: "tool_is_builtin";
     readonly ToolIsSensitive: "tool_is_sensitive";
     readonly ToolName: "tool_name";
+    readonly ToolOperationClasses: "tool_operation_classes";
     readonly ToolPoisoningDetected: "tool_poisoning_detected";
     readonly ToolPoisoningScore: "tool_poisoning_score";
     readonly ToolRiskScore: "tool_risk_score";

package/dist/overwatch-context.gen.js

@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ export const OverwatchContextKey = {
     ToolIsBuiltin: 'tool_is_builtin',
     ToolIsSensitive: 'tool_is_sensitive',
     ToolName: 'tool_name',
+    ToolOperationClasses: 'tool_operation_classes',
     ToolPoisoningDetected: 'tool_poisoning_detected',
     ToolPoisoningScore: 'tool_poisoning_score',
     ToolRiskScore: 'tool_risk_score',

package/dist/service-schemas.gen.d.ts

@@ -3,19 +3,19 @@
  *
  * Full Cedar schema for ai_gateway, embedded at codegen time.
  */
-export declare const AI_GATEWAY_SCHEMA = "// AIGateway Cedar Schema\n// ===================================\n// AI Gateway Security & Policy Enforcement\n//\n// AIGateway protects both MCP proxy operations (tool calls, server connections)\n// and LLM chat completions (prompt processing) by evaluating threats detected\n// by the Shield detection engine pipeline against Cedar policies.\n//\n// Architecture:\n//   MCP/LLM Client -> Firehog Proxy -> Shield (detection + Cedar) -> Allow/Deny\n//\n// Threat Coverage:\n//   - OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025 (LLM01, LLM06)\n//   - OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (ASI01, ASI02, ASI04)\n//   - OWASP MCP Top 10 (MCP01-MCP05)\n\nnamespace AIGateway {\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ENTITIES - Tenant Hierarchy (ReBAC)\n// =============================================================================\n// AIGateway does not use App/Session hierarchy.\n//\n// Entity hierarchy:\n//   Account (org root)\n//     -> Project in [Account]\n//          -> Tool/Server in [Project]\n//\n// Policy scoping examples:\n//   resource == AIGateway::Tool::\"get_me\"            -> specific tool\n//   resource in AIGateway::Project::\"<uuid>\"          -> project-wide\n//   resource in AIGateway::Account::\"<uuid>\"          -> org-wide\n\n/// Account represents an organization (top-level tenant)\nentity Account;\n\n/// Project represents a project within an account\nentity Project in [Account];\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ENTITIES - Principals\n// =============================================================================\n\n/// Human user authenticated via JWT or API key\nentity User;\n\n/// MCP client (default principal for unauthenticated requests)\nentity MCP_Client;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ENTITIES - Resources (scoped under Project)\n// =============================================================================\n\n/// MCP tool -- resource for call_tool action\nentity Tool in [Project];\n\n/// MCP server -- resource for connect_server action\nentity Server in [Project];\n\n/// MCP prompt -- resource for process_prompt action\nentity LlmPrompt in [Project];\n\n/// File/resource path -- resource for read_file/write_file actions\nentity FilePath in [Project];\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ACTIONS\n// =============================================================================\n\n// Call an MCP tool\n// Threat focus: command injection, tool poisoning, rug pull, secrets, PII\naction call_tool appliesTo {\n  principal: [User, MCP_Client],\n  resource: [Tool],\n  context: {\n    // --- Content ---\n    content: String,                  // Raw content being scanned\n\n    // --- Tool & MCP ---\n    tool_name?: String,               // Tool name\n    mcp_server?: String,              // MCP server name\n    mcp_tool?: String,                // MCP tool name\n\n    // --- Threat Detection (from Shield detection pipeline) ---\n    threat_count?: Long,              // Total threats detected\n    highest_severity?: String,        // \"critical\", \"high\", \"medium\", \"low\", \"none\"\n    threat_categories?: Set<String>,  // Threat category names\n    detected_threats?: Set<String>,   // Detection rule names that matched\n    max_threat_severity?: Long,       // Numeric severity (0=none, 1=low, 2=medium, 3=high, 4=critical)\n    secrets_detected?: Bool,          // Whether secrets/credentials detected\n\n    // --- Secrets (granular) ---\n    secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    secret_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- PII Detection ---\n    pii_detected?: Bool,\n    pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    pii_count?: Long,\n    pii_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- ML Detector Confidence Scores (0-100) ---\n    injection_score?: Long,      // Prompt injection classifier confidence\n    jailbreak_score?: Long,      // Jailbreak detection classifier confidence\n\n    // --- Agent Security (0-100) ---\n    tool_poisoning_score?: Long,      // Hidden instructions in tool description/args\n    tool_poisoning_detected?: Bool,\n    rug_pull_score?: Long,            // Tool behavior drift after trust establishment\n    rug_pull_detected?: Bool,\n    indirect_injection_score?: Long,  // Indirect injection via tool output\n\n    // --- Tool Risk Assessment ---\n    tool_risk_score?: Long,           // Computed tool risk (0-100)\n    tool_category?: String,           // \"safe\", \"sensitive\", \"dangerous\"\n    tool_is_sensitive?: Bool,\n    tool_is_builtin?: Bool,\n\n    // --- MCP Trust ---\n    mcp_server_verified?: Bool,       // Whether server is from verified registry\n\n    // --- Content Safety Scores (0-100) ---\n    violence_score?: Long,\n    weapons_score?: Long,\n    hate_speech_score?: Long,\n    crime_score?: Long,\n    sexual_score?: Long,\n    profanity_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Encoding & Unicode Attacks ---\n    invisible_chars_detected?: Bool,\n    invisible_chars_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Behavioral Analysis ---\n    loop_detected?: Bool,\n    loop_count?: Long,\n    loop_tool?: String,\n    suspicious_pattern?: Bool,\n    pattern_type?: String,\n    sequence_risk?: Long,\n\n    // --- Session-Aware Threat Aggregation ---\n    session_threat_turns?: Long,                  // Count of turns with detected threats\n    session_cumulative_risk_score?: Long,         // Accumulated risk across turns\n    session_injection_detected?: Bool,            // Injection seen in any prior turn\n    session_command_injection?: Bool,             // Command injection seen in any prior turn\n    session_pii_detected?: Bool,                  // PII seen in any prior turn\n    session_pii_types?: Set<String>,              // PII types accumulated across session\n    session_secrets_detected?: Bool,              // Secrets seen in any prior turn\n    session_secret_types?: Set<String>,           // Secret types accumulated across session\n    session_max_injection_score?: Long,           // Max injection score across session turns\n    session_max_jailbreak_score?: Long,           // Max jailbreak score across session turns\n    session_max_command_injection_score?: Long,   // Max command-injection score across session turns\n    session_max_pii_score?: Long,                 // Max pii score across session turns\n    session_max_secret_score?: Long,              // Max secret score across session turns\n\n    // --- Usage Budget (multi-window, multi-dimension) ---\n    budget_remaining_pct?: Long,\n    budget_exceeded?: Bool,\n    budget_cost_micros_this_turn?: Long,\n    budget_model?: String,\n    budget_tokens_pct_session?: Long,\n    budget_tokens_pct_daily?: Long,\n    budget_tokens_pct_monthly?: Long,\n    budget_cost_pct_daily?: Long,\n    budget_cost_pct_monthly?: Long,\n    budget_exceeded_session?: Bool,\n    budget_exceeded_daily?: Bool,\n    budget_exceeded_monthly?: Bool,\n  },\n};\n\n// Connect to an MCP server\n// Threat focus: supply chain, tool poisoning, rug pull, config risk\naction connect_server appliesTo {\n  principal: [User, MCP_Client],\n  resource: [Server],\n  context: {\n    content?: String,                 // Server config content (if available)\n    mcp_server?: String,\n\n    // --- Threat Detection ---\n    threat_count?: Long,\n    highest_severity?: String,\n    threat_categories?: Set<String>,\n    max_threat_severity?: Long,\n\n    // --- Agent Security (0-100) ---\n    tool_poisoning_score?: Long,\n    tool_poisoning_detected?: Bool,\n    rug_pull_score?: Long,\n    rug_pull_detected?: Bool,\n    indirect_injection_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Secrets ---\n    secrets_detected?: Bool,\n    secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    secret_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- PII Detection ---\n    pii_detected?: Bool,\n    pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    pii_count?: Long,\n    pii_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- MCP Trust & Config Risk ---\n    mcp_server_verified?: Bool,\n    mcp_config_risk?: Bool,\n    mcp_risk_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Session-Aware Threat Aggregation ---\n    session_threat_turns?: Long,                  // Count of turns with detected threats\n    session_cumulative_risk_score?: Long,         // Accumulated risk across turns\n    session_injection_detected?: Bool,            // Injection seen in any prior turn\n    session_command_injection?: Bool,             // Command injection seen in any prior turn\n    session_pii_detected?: Bool,                  // PII seen in any prior turn\n    session_pii_types?: Set<String>,              // PII types accumulated across session\n    session_secrets_detected?: Bool,              // Secrets seen in any prior turn\n    session_secret_types?: Set<String>,           // Secret types accumulated across session\n    session_max_injection_score?: Long,           // Max injection score across session turns\n    session_max_jailbreak_score?: Long,           // Max jailbreak score across session turns\n    session_max_command_injection_score?: Long,   // Max command-injection score across session turns\n    session_max_pii_score?: Long,                 // Max pii score across session turns\n    session_max_secret_score?: Long,              // Max secret score across session turns\n\n    // --- Usage Budget (multi-window, multi-dimension) ---\n    budget_remaining_pct?: Long,\n    budget_exceeded?: Bool,\n    budget_cost_micros_this_turn?: Long,\n    budget_model?: String,\n    budget_tokens_pct_session?: Long,\n    budget_tokens_pct_daily?: Long,\n    budget_tokens_pct_monthly?: Long,\n    budget_cost_pct_daily?: Long,\n    budget_cost_pct_monthly?: Long,\n    budget_exceeded_session?: Bool,\n    budget_exceeded_daily?: Bool,\n    budget_exceeded_monthly?: Bool,\n  },\n};\n\n// Process a prompt (MCP prompts/get or LLM chat completions)\n// Threat focus: injection, jailbreak, secrets, PII, content safety\naction process_prompt appliesTo {\n  principal: [User, MCP_Client],\n  resource: [LlmPrompt],\n  context: {\n    content: String,\n    mcp_server?: String,\n\n    // --- Threat Detection ---\n    threat_count?: Long,\n    highest_severity?: String,\n    threat_categories?: Set<String>,\n    detected_threats?: Set<String>,\n    max_threat_severity?: Long,\n    secrets_detected?: Bool,\n\n    // --- Secrets ---\n    secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    secret_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- PII Detection ---\n    pii_detected?: Bool,\n    pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    pii_count?: Long,\n    pii_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- ML Detector Confidence Scores (0-100) ---\n    injection_score?: Long,\n    jailbreak_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Content Safety Scores (0-100) ---\n    violence_score?: Long,\n    weapons_score?: Long,\n    hate_speech_score?: Long,\n    crime_score?: Long,\n    sexual_score?: Long,\n    profanity_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Encoding ---\n    invisible_chars_detected?: Bool,\n    invisible_chars_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- LLM-specific ---\n    model_name?: String,              // Target model name (e.g., \"gpt-4\", \"claude-3-opus\")\n    model_provider?: String,          // Provider name (e.g., \"openai\", \"anthropic\", \"bedrock\")\n\n    // --- Session-Aware Threat Aggregation ---\n    session_threat_turns?: Long,                  // Count of turns with detected threats\n    session_cumulative_risk_score?: Long,         // Accumulated risk across turns\n    session_injection_detected?: Bool,            // Injection seen in any prior turn\n    session_command_injection?: Bool,             // Command injection seen in any prior turn\n    session_pii_detected?: Bool,                  // PII seen in any prior turn\n    session_pii_types?: Set<String>,              // PII types accumulated across session\n    session_secrets_detected?: Bool,              // Secrets seen in any prior turn\n    session_secret_types?: Set<String>,           // Secret types accumulated across session\n    session_max_injection_score?: Long,           // Max injection score across session turns\n    session_max_jailbreak_score?: Long,           // Max jailbreak score across session turns\n    session_max_command_injection_score?: Long,   // Max command-injection score across session turns\n    session_max_pii_score?: Long,                 // Max pii score across session turns\n    session_max_secret_score?: Long,              // Max secret score across session turns\n\n    // --- Usage Budget (multi-window, multi-dimension) ---\n    budget_remaining_pct?: Long,\n    budget_exceeded?: Bool,\n    budget_cost_micros_this_turn?: Long,\n    budget_model?: String,\n    budget_tokens_pct_session?: Long,\n    budget_tokens_pct_daily?: Long,\n    budget_tokens_pct_monthly?: Long,\n    budget_cost_pct_daily?: Long,\n    budget_cost_pct_monthly?: Long,\n    budget_exceeded_session?: Bool,\n    budget_exceeded_daily?: Bool,\n    budget_exceeded_monthly?: Bool,\n  },\n};\n\n// Read an MCP resource (resources/read, resources/list)\n// Threat focus: secrets exposure, PII exposure, sensitive paths\naction read_file appliesTo {\n  principal: [User, MCP_Client],\n  resource: [FilePath],\n  context: {\n    content: String,\n    mcp_server?: String,\n\n    // --- Threat Detection ---\n    threat_count?: Long,\n    highest_severity?: String,\n    threat_categories?: Set<String>,\n    detected_threats?: Set<String>,\n    max_threat_severity?: Long,\n    secrets_detected?: Bool,\n\n    // --- Secrets ---\n    secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    secret_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- PII Detection ---\n    pii_detected?: Bool,\n    pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    pii_count?: Long,\n    pii_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Session-Aware Threat Aggregation ---\n    session_threat_turns?: Long,                  // Count of turns with detected threats\n    session_cumulative_risk_score?: Long,         // Accumulated risk across turns\n    session_injection_detected?: Bool,            // Injection seen in any prior turn\n    session_command_injection?: Bool,             // Command injection seen in any prior turn\n    session_pii_detected?: Bool,                  // PII seen in any prior turn\n    session_pii_types?: Set<String>,              // PII types accumulated across session\n    session_secrets_detected?: Bool,              // Secrets seen in any prior turn\n    session_secret_types?: Set<String>,           // Secret types accumulated across session\n    session_max_injection_score?: Long,           // Max injection score across session turns\n    session_max_jailbreak_score?: Long,           // Max jailbreak score across session turns\n    session_max_command_injection_score?: Long,   // Max command-injection score across session turns\n    session_max_pii_score?: Long,                 // Max pii score across session turns\n    session_max_secret_score?: Long,              // Max secret score across session turns\n\n    // --- Usage Budget (multi-window, multi-dimension) ---\n    budget_remaining_pct?: Long,\n    budget_exceeded?: Bool,\n    budget_cost_micros_this_turn?: Long,\n    budget_model?: String,\n    budget_tokens_pct_session?: Long,\n    budget_tokens_pct_daily?: Long,\n    budget_tokens_pct_monthly?: Long,\n    budget_cost_pct_daily?: Long,\n    budget_cost_pct_monthly?: Long,\n    budget_exceeded_session?: Bool,\n    budget_exceeded_daily?: Bool,\n    budget_exceeded_monthly?: Bool,\n  },\n};\n\n// Write an MCP resource (resources/write)\n// Threat focus: secrets in output, PII in output\naction write_file appliesTo {\n  principal: [User, MCP_Client],\n  resource: [FilePath],\n  context: {\n    content: String,\n    mcp_server?: String,\n\n    // --- Threat Detection ---\n    threat_count?: Long,\n    highest_severity?: String,\n    threat_categories?: Set<String>,\n    detected_threats?: Set<String>,\n    max_threat_severity?: Long,\n    secrets_detected?: Bool,\n\n    // --- Secrets ---\n    secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    secret_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- PII Detection ---\n    pii_detected?: Bool,\n    pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    pii_count?: Long,\n    pii_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Session-Aware Threat Aggregation ---\n    session_threat_turns?: Long,                  // Count of turns with detected threats\n    session_cumulative_risk_score?: Long,         // Accumulated risk across turns\n    session_injection_detected?: Bool,            // Injection seen in any prior turn\n    session_command_injection?: Bool,             // Command injection seen in any prior turn\n    session_pii_detected?: Bool,                  // PII seen in any prior turn\n    session_pii_types?: Set<String>,              // PII types accumulated across session\n    session_secrets_detected?: Bool,              // Secrets seen in any prior turn\n    session_secret_types?: Set<String>,           // Secret types accumulated across session\n    session_max_injection_score?: Long,           // Max injection score across session turns\n    session_max_jailbreak_score?: Long,           // Max jailbreak score across session turns\n    session_max_command_injection_score?: Long,   // Max command-injection score across session turns\n    session_max_pii_score?: Long,                 // Max pii score across session turns\n    session_max_secret_score?: Long,              // Max secret score across session turns\n\n    // --- Usage Budget (multi-window, multi-dimension) ---\n    budget_remaining_pct?: Long,\n    budget_exceeded?: Bool,\n    budget_cost_micros_this_turn?: Long,\n    budget_model?: String,\n    budget_tokens_pct_session?: Long,\n    budget_tokens_pct_daily?: Long,\n    budget_tokens_pct_monthly?: Long,\n    budget_cost_pct_daily?: Long,\n    budget_cost_pct_monthly?: Long,\n    budget_exceeded_session?: Bool,\n    budget_exceeded_daily?: Bool,\n    budget_exceeded_monthly?: Bool,\n  },\n};\n\n}\n";
+export declare const AI_GATEWAY_SCHEMA = "// AIGateway Cedar Schema\n// ===================================\n// AI Gateway Security & Policy Enforcement\n//\n// AIGateway protects both MCP proxy operations (tool calls, server connections)\n// and LLM chat completions (prompt processing) by evaluating threats detected\n// by the Shield detection engine pipeline against Cedar policies.\n//\n// Architecture:\n//   MCP/LLM Client -> Firehog Proxy -> Shield (detection + Cedar) -> Allow/Deny\n//\n// Threat Coverage:\n//   - OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025 (LLM01, LLM06)\n//   - OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (ASI01, ASI02, ASI04)\n//   - OWASP MCP Top 10 (MCP01-MCP05)\n\nnamespace AIGateway {\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ENTITIES - Tenant Hierarchy (ReBAC)\n// =============================================================================\n// AIGateway does not use App/Session hierarchy.\n//\n// Entity hierarchy:\n//   Account (org root)\n//     -> Project in [Account]\n//          -> Tool/Server in [Project]\n//\n// Policy scoping examples:\n//   resource == AIGateway::Tool::\"get_me\"            -> specific tool\n//   resource in AIGateway::Project::\"<uuid>\"          -> project-wide\n//   resource in AIGateway::Account::\"<uuid>\"          -> org-wide\n\n/// Account represents an organization (top-level tenant)\nentity Account;\n\n/// Project represents a project within an account\nentity Project in [Account];\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ENTITIES - Principals\n// =============================================================================\n\n/// Human user authenticated via JWT or API key\nentity User;\n\n/// MCP client (default principal for unauthenticated requests)\nentity MCP_Client;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ENTITIES - Resources (scoped under Project)\n// =============================================================================\n\n/// MCP tool -- resource for call_tool action\nentity Tool in [Project];\n\n/// MCP server -- resource for connect_server action\nentity Server in [Project];\n\n/// MCP prompt -- resource for process_prompt action\nentity LlmPrompt in [Project];\n\n/// File/resource path -- resource for read_file/write_file actions\nentity FilePath in [Project];\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ACTIONS\n// =============================================================================\n\n// Call an MCP tool\n// Threat focus: command injection, tool poisoning, rug pull, secrets, PII\naction call_tool appliesTo {\n  principal: [User, MCP_Client],\n  resource: [Tool],\n  context: {\n    // --- Content ---\n    content: String,                  // Raw content being scanned\n\n    // --- Tool & MCP ---\n    tool_name?: String,               // Tool name\n    mcp_server?: String,              // MCP server name\n    mcp_tool?: String,                // MCP tool name\n\n    // --- Threat Detection (from Shield detection pipeline) ---\n    threat_count?: Long,              // Total threats detected\n    highest_severity?: String,        // \"critical\", \"high\", \"medium\", \"low\", \"none\"\n    threat_categories?: Set<String>,  // Threat category names\n    detected_threats?: Set<String>,   // Detection rule names that matched\n    max_threat_severity?: Long,       // Numeric severity (0=none, 1=low, 2=medium, 3=high, 4=critical)\n    secrets_detected?: Bool,          // Whether secrets/credentials detected\n\n    // --- Secrets (granular) ---\n    secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    secret_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- PII Detection ---\n    pii_detected?: Bool,\n    pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    pii_count?: Long,\n    pii_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- ML Detector Confidence Scores (0-100) ---\n    injection_score?: Long,      // Prompt injection classifier confidence\n    jailbreak_score?: Long,      // Jailbreak detection classifier confidence\n\n    // --- Agent Security (0-100) ---\n    tool_poisoning_score?: Long,      // Hidden instructions in tool description/args\n    tool_poisoning_detected?: Bool,\n    rug_pull_score?: Long,            // Tool behavior drift after trust establishment\n    rug_pull_detected?: Bool,\n    indirect_injection_score?: Long,  // Indirect injection via tool output\n\n    // --- Tool Risk Assessment ---\n    tool_risk_score?: Long,           // Computed tool risk (0-100)\n    tool_category?: String,           // \"safe\", \"sensitive\", \"dangerous\"\n    tool_is_sensitive?: Bool,\n    tool_is_builtin?: Bool,\n\n    // --- Tool Operation Classifier ---\n    tool_operation_classes?: Set<String>,  // subset of {\"readonly\", \"write_enabling\", \"execute_enabling\", \"network_access\", \"unknown\"}\n\n    // --- MCP Trust ---\n    mcp_server_verified?: Bool,       // Whether server is from verified registry\n\n    // --- Content Safety Scores (0-100) ---\n    violence_score?: Long,\n    weapons_score?: Long,\n    hate_speech_score?: Long,\n    crime_score?: Long,\n    sexual_score?: Long,\n    profanity_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Encoding & Unicode Attacks ---\n    invisible_chars_detected?: Bool,\n    invisible_chars_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Behavioral Analysis ---\n    loop_detected?: Bool,\n    loop_count?: Long,\n    loop_tool?: String,\n    suspicious_pattern?: Bool,\n    pattern_type?: String,\n    sequence_risk?: Long,\n\n    // --- Session-Aware Threat Aggregation ---\n    session_threat_turns?: Long,                  // Count of turns with detected threats\n    session_cumulative_risk_score?: Long,         // Accumulated risk across turns\n    session_injection_detected?: Bool,            // Injection seen in any prior turn\n    session_command_injection?: Bool,             // Command injection seen in any prior turn\n    session_pii_detected?: Bool,                  // PII seen in any prior turn\n    session_pii_types?: Set<String>,              // PII types accumulated across session\n    session_secrets_detected?: Bool,              // Secrets seen in any prior turn\n    session_secret_types?: Set<String>,           // Secret types accumulated across session\n    session_max_injection_score?: Long,           // Max injection score across session turns\n    session_max_jailbreak_score?: Long,           // Max jailbreak score across session turns\n    session_max_command_injection_score?: Long,   // Max command-injection score across session turns\n    session_max_pii_score?: Long,                 // Max pii score across session turns\n    session_max_secret_score?: Long,              // Max secret score across session turns\n\n    // --- Usage Budget (multi-window, multi-dimension) ---\n    budget_remaining_pct?: Long,\n    budget_exceeded?: Bool,\n    budget_cost_micros_this_turn?: Long,\n    budget_model?: String,\n    budget_tokens_pct_session?: Long,\n    budget_tokens_pct_daily?: Long,\n    budget_tokens_pct_monthly?: Long,\n    budget_cost_pct_daily?: Long,\n    budget_cost_pct_monthly?: Long,\n    budget_exceeded_session?: Bool,\n    budget_exceeded_daily?: Bool,\n    budget_exceeded_monthly?: Bool,\n  },\n};\n\n// Connect to an MCP server\n// Threat focus: supply chain, tool poisoning, rug pull, config risk\naction connect_server appliesTo {\n  principal: [User, MCP_Client],\n  resource: [Server],\n  context: {\n    content?: String,                 // Server config content (if available)\n    mcp_server?: String,\n\n    // --- Threat Detection ---\n    threat_count?: Long,\n    highest_severity?: String,\n    threat_categories?: Set<String>,\n    max_threat_severity?: Long,\n\n    // --- Agent Security (0-100) ---\n    tool_poisoning_score?: Long,\n    tool_poisoning_detected?: Bool,\n    rug_pull_score?: Long,\n    rug_pull_detected?: Bool,\n    indirect_injection_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Secrets ---\n    secrets_detected?: Bool,\n    secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    secret_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- PII Detection ---\n    pii_detected?: Bool,\n    pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    pii_count?: Long,\n    pii_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- MCP Trust & Config Risk ---\n    mcp_server_verified?: Bool,\n    mcp_config_risk?: Bool,\n    mcp_risk_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Session-Aware Threat Aggregation ---\n    session_threat_turns?: Long,                  // Count of turns with detected threats\n    session_cumulative_risk_score?: Long,         // Accumulated risk across turns\n    session_injection_detected?: Bool,            // Injection seen in any prior turn\n    session_command_injection?: Bool,             // Command injection seen in any prior turn\n    session_pii_detected?: Bool,                  // PII seen in any prior turn\n    session_pii_types?: Set<String>,              // PII types accumulated across session\n    session_secrets_detected?: Bool,              // Secrets seen in any prior turn\n    session_secret_types?: Set<String>,           // Secret types accumulated across session\n    session_max_injection_score?: Long,           // Max injection score across session turns\n    session_max_jailbreak_score?: Long,           // Max jailbreak score across session turns\n    session_max_command_injection_score?: Long,   // Max command-injection score across session turns\n    session_max_pii_score?: Long,                 // Max pii score across session turns\n    session_max_secret_score?: Long,              // Max secret score across session turns\n\n    // --- Usage Budget (multi-window, multi-dimension) ---\n    budget_remaining_pct?: Long,\n    budget_exceeded?: Bool,\n    budget_cost_micros_this_turn?: Long,\n    budget_model?: String,\n    budget_tokens_pct_session?: Long,\n    budget_tokens_pct_daily?: Long,\n    budget_tokens_pct_monthly?: Long,\n    budget_cost_pct_daily?: Long,\n    budget_cost_pct_monthly?: Long,\n    budget_exceeded_session?: Bool,\n    budget_exceeded_daily?: Bool,\n    budget_exceeded_monthly?: Bool,\n  },\n};\n\n// Process a prompt (MCP prompts/get or LLM chat completions)\n// Threat focus: injection, jailbreak, secrets, PII, content safety\naction process_prompt appliesTo {\n  principal: [User, MCP_Client],\n  resource: [LlmPrompt],\n  context: {\n    content: String,\n    mcp_server?: String,\n\n    // --- Threat Detection ---\n    threat_count?: Long,\n    highest_severity?: String,\n    threat_categories?: Set<String>,\n    detected_threats?: Set<String>,\n    max_threat_severity?: Long,\n    secrets_detected?: Bool,\n\n    // --- Secrets ---\n    secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    secret_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- PII Detection ---\n    pii_detected?: Bool,\n    pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    pii_count?: Long,\n    pii_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- ML Detector Confidence Scores (0-100) ---\n    injection_score?: Long,\n    jailbreak_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Content Safety Scores (0-100) ---\n    violence_score?: Long,\n    weapons_score?: Long,\n    hate_speech_score?: Long,\n    crime_score?: Long,\n    sexual_score?: Long,\n    profanity_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Encoding ---\n    invisible_chars_detected?: Bool,\n    invisible_chars_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- LLM-specific ---\n    model_name?: String,              // Target model name (e.g., \"gpt-4\", \"claude-3-opus\")\n    model_provider?: String,          // Provider name (e.g., \"openai\", \"anthropic\", \"bedrock\")\n\n    // --- Session-Aware Threat Aggregation ---\n    session_threat_turns?: Long,                  // Count of turns with detected threats\n    session_cumulative_risk_score?: Long,         // Accumulated risk across turns\n    session_injection_detected?: Bool,            // Injection seen in any prior turn\n    session_command_injection?: Bool,             // Command injection seen in any prior turn\n    session_pii_detected?: Bool,                  // PII seen in any prior turn\n    session_pii_types?: Set<String>,              // PII types accumulated across session\n    session_secrets_detected?: Bool,              // Secrets seen in any prior turn\n    session_secret_types?: Set<String>,           // Secret types accumulated across session\n    session_max_injection_score?: Long,           // Max injection score across session turns\n    session_max_jailbreak_score?: Long,           // Max jailbreak score across session turns\n    session_max_command_injection_score?: Long,   // Max command-injection score across session turns\n    session_max_pii_score?: Long,                 // Max pii score across session turns\n    session_max_secret_score?: Long,              // Max secret score across session turns\n\n    // --- Usage Budget (multi-window, multi-dimension) ---\n    budget_remaining_pct?: Long,\n    budget_exceeded?: Bool,\n    budget_cost_micros_this_turn?: Long,\n    budget_model?: String,\n    budget_tokens_pct_session?: Long,\n    budget_tokens_pct_daily?: Long,\n    budget_tokens_pct_monthly?: Long,\n    budget_cost_pct_daily?: Long,\n    budget_cost_pct_monthly?: Long,\n    budget_exceeded_session?: Bool,\n    budget_exceeded_daily?: Bool,\n    budget_exceeded_monthly?: Bool,\n  },\n};\n\n// Read an MCP resource (resources/read, resources/list)\n// Threat focus: secrets exposure, PII exposure, sensitive paths\naction read_file appliesTo {\n  principal: [User, MCP_Client],\n  resource: [FilePath],\n  context: {\n    content: String,\n    mcp_server?: String,\n\n    // --- Threat Detection ---\n    threat_count?: Long,\n    highest_severity?: String,\n    threat_categories?: Set<String>,\n    detected_threats?: Set<String>,\n    max_threat_severity?: Long,\n    secrets_detected?: Bool,\n\n    // --- Secrets ---\n    secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    secret_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- PII Detection ---\n    pii_detected?: Bool,\n    pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    pii_count?: Long,\n    pii_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Session-Aware Threat Aggregation ---\n    session_threat_turns?: Long,                  // Count of turns with detected threats\n    session_cumulative_risk_score?: Long,         // Accumulated risk across turns\n    session_injection_detected?: Bool,            // Injection seen in any prior turn\n    session_command_injection?: Bool,             // Command injection seen in any prior turn\n    session_pii_detected?: Bool,                  // PII seen in any prior turn\n    session_pii_types?: Set<String>,              // PII types accumulated across session\n    session_secrets_detected?: Bool,              // Secrets seen in any prior turn\n    session_secret_types?: Set<String>,           // Secret types accumulated across session\n    session_max_injection_score?: Long,           // Max injection score across session turns\n    session_max_jailbreak_score?: Long,           // Max jailbreak score across session turns\n    session_max_command_injection_score?: Long,   // Max command-injection score across session turns\n    session_max_pii_score?: Long,                 // Max pii score across session turns\n    session_max_secret_score?: Long,              // Max secret score across session turns\n\n    // --- Usage Budget (multi-window, multi-dimension) ---\n    budget_remaining_pct?: Long,\n    budget_exceeded?: Bool,\n    budget_cost_micros_this_turn?: Long,\n    budget_model?: String,\n    budget_tokens_pct_session?: Long,\n    budget_tokens_pct_daily?: Long,\n    budget_tokens_pct_monthly?: Long,\n    budget_cost_pct_daily?: Long,\n    budget_cost_pct_monthly?: Long,\n    budget_exceeded_session?: Bool,\n    budget_exceeded_daily?: Bool,\n    budget_exceeded_monthly?: Bool,\n  },\n};\n\n// Write an MCP resource (resources/write)\n// Threat focus: secrets in output, PII in output\naction write_file appliesTo {\n  principal: [User, MCP_Client],\n  resource: [FilePath],\n  context: {\n    content: String,\n    mcp_server?: String,\n\n    // --- Threat Detection ---\n    threat_count?: Long,\n    highest_severity?: String,\n    threat_categories?: Set<String>,\n    detected_threats?: Set<String>,\n    max_threat_severity?: Long,\n    secrets_detected?: Bool,\n\n    // --- Secrets ---\n    secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    secret_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- PII Detection ---\n    pii_detected?: Bool,\n    pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    pii_count?: Long,\n    pii_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Session-Aware Threat Aggregation ---\n    session_threat_turns?: Long,                  // Count of turns with detected threats\n    session_cumulative_risk_score?: Long,         // Accumulated risk across turns\n    session_injection_detected?: Bool,            // Injection seen in any prior turn\n    session_command_injection?: Bool,             // Command injection seen in any prior turn\n    session_pii_detected?: Bool,                  // PII seen in any prior turn\n    session_pii_types?: Set<String>,              // PII types accumulated across session\n    session_secrets_detected?: Bool,              // Secrets seen in any prior turn\n    session_secret_types?: Set<String>,           // Secret types accumulated across session\n    session_max_injection_score?: Long,           // Max injection score across session turns\n    session_max_jailbreak_score?: Long,           // Max jailbreak score across session turns\n    session_max_command_injection_score?: Long,   // Max command-injection score across session turns\n    session_max_pii_score?: Long,                 // Max pii score across session turns\n    session_max_secret_score?: Long,              // Max secret score across session turns\n\n    // --- Usage Budget (multi-window, multi-dimension) ---\n    budget_remaining_pct?: Long,\n    budget_exceeded?: Bool,\n    budget_cost_micros_this_turn?: Long,\n    budget_model?: String,\n    budget_tokens_pct_session?: Long,\n    budget_tokens_pct_daily?: Long,\n    budget_tokens_pct_monthly?: Long,\n    budget_cost_pct_daily?: Long,\n    budget_cost_pct_monthly?: Long,\n    budget_exceeded_session?: Bool,\n    budget_exceeded_daily?: Bool,\n    budget_exceeded_monthly?: Bool,\n  },\n};\n\n}\n";
 /**
  * Guardrails Cedar schema
  *
  * Full Cedar schema for guardrails, embedded at codegen time.
  */
-export declare const GUARDRAILS_SCHEMA = "// =============================================================================\n// Guardrails Cedar Schema\n// =============================================================================\n// Defines entity types, actions, and context attributes for the highflame-shield\n// guardrails service. This schema enables type-safe policy authoring and\n// validation in both Studio UI and backend.\n//\n// Service: highflame-shield (guardrails)\n// Namespace: Guardrails\n// =============================================================================\n\nnamespace Guardrails {\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Entity Types \u2014 ReBAC Hierarchy\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Entity hierarchy enables Cedar's `in` operator for policy scoping:\n    //   Account (org root)\n    //     \u2514\u2500\u2500 Project in [Account]\n    //           \u251C\u2500\u2500 App in [Project]\n    //           \u2502     \u2514\u2500\u2500 Session in [App, Agent]\n    //           \u2514\u2500\u2500 Agent in [Project]\n    //                 \u2514\u2500\u2500 Session in [App, Agent]\n    //\n    // Policy scoping examples:\n    //   resource == Guardrails::App::\"<uuid>\"              \u2192 app-scoped (app only)\n    //   resource == Guardrails::Agent::\"<agent_id>\"        \u2192 agent-only (exact match)\n    //   resource in Guardrails::Agent::\"<agent_id>\"        \u2192 agent + its sessions\n    //   resource in Guardrails::Project::\"<uuid>\"          \u2192 project-wide (apps + agents)\n    //   resource in Guardrails::Account::\"<uuid>\"          \u2192 org-wide\n    // =========================================================================\n\n    /// Account represents an organization (top-level tenant)\n    entity Account;\n\n    /// Project represents a project within an account\n    entity Project in [Account];\n\n    /// User represents a principal (human or service) making requests\n    entity User;\n\n    /// Agent represents an AI agent (Claude, Cursor, Copilot, etc.) making requests.\n    /// Used as both principal (who is acting) and resource (policy scoping target).\n    /// Agent + sessions: resource in Guardrails::Agent::\"<agent_id>\" (hierarchy match)\n    /// Agent only:       resource == Guardrails::Agent::\"<agent_id>\" (exact match)\n    entity Agent in [Project];\n\n    /// App represents a protected application (guardrails-enabled LLM app)\n    entity App in [Project];\n\n    /// Session represents an agentic conversation session with state tracking.\n    /// Sessions can belong to either an App or an Agent.\n    entity Session in [App, Agent];\n\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Actions\n    // =========================================================================\n\n    /// Process user prompts and AI responses for security threats and content violations\n    action \"process_prompt\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [App, Agent, Session],\n        context: ProcessPromptContext\n    };\n\n    /// Execute tool calls (shell, file operations, MCP tools)\n    action \"call_tool\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Agent, Session],\n        context: CallToolContext\n    };\n\n    /// Read file operations\n    action \"read_file\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Agent, Session],\n        context: FileReadContext\n    };\n\n    /// Write file operations\n    action \"write_file\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Agent, Session],\n        context: FileWriteContext\n    };\n\n    /// Connect to an MCP server\n    action \"connect_server\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Agent, Session],\n        context: ConnectServerContext\n    };\n\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Context Types (Action-Specific)\n    // =========================================================================\n\n    /// Context for process_prompt action (user prompts & AI responses)\n    type ProcessPromptContext = {\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n        \"direction\": String,        // \"input\" | \"output\"\n        \"content_type\": String,     // \"prompt\" | \"response\" | \"tool_call\" | \"file\"\n        \"detector_count\": Long,\n\n        // Security - Injection & Jailbreak (optional)\n        \"injection_score\"?: Long,  // Combined injection confidence: MAX(pulse, deep_context)\n        \"jailbreak_score\"?: Long,  // Combined jailbreak confidence: MAX(pulse, deep_context)\n        \"injection_pulse_score\"?: Long,  // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n        \"injection_deep_context_score\"?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n        \"jailbreak_pulse_score\"?: Long,  // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n        \"jailbreak_deep_context_score\"?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n        \"injection_type\"?: String,       // \"prompt\" | \"sql\" | \"command\" | \"none\"\n\n        // Privacy - Secrets (optional)\n        \"secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,    // [\"aws_access_key\", \"github_token\", ...]\n\n        // Privacy - PII (optional)\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"pii_count\"?: Long,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,       // [\"email\", \"phone\", \"ssn\", \"credit_card\", ...]\n        \"pii_score\"?: Long,         // PII ML classifier confidence (0-100) \u2014 catches novel PII patterns that escape regex detection\n\n        // Threat Severity Aggregation (optional)\n        \"highest_severity\"?: String,     // Highest severity across all detectors: \"critical\" | \"high\" | \"medium\" | \"low\" | \"none\"\n\n        // Trust & Safety - Toxicity (optional)\n        \"violence_score\"?: Long,         // 0-100\n        \"hate_speech_score\"?: Long,      // 0-100\n        \"sexual_score\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n        \"weapons_score\"?: Long,          // 0-100\n        \"crime_score\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n        \"profanity_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n\n        // Semantic - Topic Classification (optional)\n        \"content_topics\"?: Set<String>,      // [\"controlled_substances\", \"weapons_manufacturing\", ...]\n        \"topic_confidence\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Invisible Character Detection (optional)\n        \"invisible_chars_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"invisible_chars_score\"?: Long,      // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Pattern Detection (optional)\n        \"command_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"command_injection_type\"?: String,       // \"reverse_shell\" | \"privilege_escalation\" | \"code_execution\" | \"destructive_command\" | \"data_exfiltration\"\n        \"command_injection_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,      // \"critical\" | \"high\" | \"medium\" | \"low\" | \"none\"\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n        \"sql_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"sql_injection_type\"?: String,           // \"tautology\" | \"union_based\" | \"destructive\" | \"blind\" | \"error_based\"\n        \"sql_injection_score\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Cross-Origin Escalation (optional)\n        \"cross_origin_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"cross_origin_type\"?: String,            // \"cross_origin_tool\" | \"cross_origin_server\" | \"none\"\n        \"cross_origin_score\"?: Long,             // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Encoded Injection (optional)\n        \"encoded_content_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"encoded_types\"?: Set<String>,           // [\"base64\", \"hex\", \"unicode\", \"url\", ...]\n        \"encoded_count\"?: Long,\n        \"encoded_score\"?: Long,                  // 0-100\n\n        // Language & Script Detection (optional)\n        \"detected_language\"?: String,            // ISO language code\n        \"is_english\"?: Bool,\n        \"language_confidence\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n        \"detected_script\"?: String,              // \"latin\" | \"cyrillic\" | \"arabic\" | \"unknown\" | ...\n        \"is_latin_script\"?: Bool,\n        \"script_confidence\"?: Long,              // 0-100\n\n        // Content Analysis (optional)\n        \"hallucination_score\"?: Long,\n        \"factuality_score\"?: Long,               // 0-100\n        \"sentiment_score\"?: Long,\n        \"contains_code\"?: Bool,\n        \"code_languages\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"code_ratio\"?: Long,                     // 0-100, percentage of content that is code\n        \"keyword_matched\"?: Bool,\n        \"keyword_categories\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"keyword_count\"?: Long,\n        \"contains_non_ascii\"?: Bool,\n        \"phishing_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"content_safety_score\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n        \"content_safety_blocked\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Agentic - Multi-Turn Context (optional)\n        \"conversation_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"multi_turn_detection\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Usage Budget \u2014 multi-window token & cost enforcement (optional)\n        // Emitted by usage_budget detector. Enforced across session/daily/monthly windows\n        // and user/app/project/account dimensions. Percentages are 0-100.\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,          // Min remaining % across all windows\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Bool,               // Any window limit exceeded\n        \"budget_cost_micros_this_turn\"?: Long,  // Cost of this request in microdollars (USD * 1e6)\n        \"budget_model\"?: String,                // Model name used for cost calculation\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_session\"?: Long,     // Session token usage % (0-100)\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_daily\"?: Long,       // Daily token usage % (0-100)\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_monthly\"?: Long,     // Monthly token usage % (0-100)\n        \"budget_cost_pct_daily\"?: Long,         // Daily cost usage % (0-100)\n        \"budget_cost_pct_monthly\"?: Long,       // Monthly cost usage % (0-100)\n        \"budget_exceeded_session\"?: Bool,       // Session-scoped budget exceeded\n        \"budget_exceeded_daily\"?: Bool,         // Any daily-scoped budget exceeded\n        \"budget_exceeded_monthly\"?: Bool,       // Any monthly-scoped budget exceeded\n\n        // Agent Identity \u2014 authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)\n        // Present when the request is made by an AI agent (API key or JWT with agent claims).\n        // Empty strings for human user requests. Use these to write agent-specific policies.\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,             // Unique agent identifier (e.g., \"agent_research_v3\")\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,           // \"orchestrator\" | \"autonomous\" | \"tool_agent\" | \"human_proxy\"\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,    // \"first_party\" | \"verified_third_party\" | \"unverified\"\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,      // Agent framework (e.g., \"claude-code\", \"langchain\", \"crewai\")\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,      // Organization that published the agent\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for call_tool action (agentic tool execution)\n    type CallToolContext = {\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // Tool Risk (optional)\n        \"tool_name\"?: String,            // \"shell\", \"write_file\", \"http_post\", etc.\n        \"tool_risk_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n        \"tool_is_sensitive\"?: Bool,\n        \"tool_category\"?: String,        // \"safe\" | \"sensitive\" | \"dangerous\"\n        \"tool_is_builtin\"?: Bool,\n\n        // MCP context (optional \u2014 only present for MCP tool calls)\n        \"mcp_server\"?: String,           // MCP server name (e.g., \"github\", \"filesystem\")\n        \"mcp_tool\"?: String,             // MCP tool name within the server\n        \"mcp_server_verified\"?: Bool,    // Whether server is from verified registry\n\n        // Agentic - Behavioral Patterns (optional)\n        \"suspicious_pattern\"?: Bool,\n        \"pattern_type\"?: String,         // \"data_exfiltration\" | \"secret_exfiltration\" | \"db_exfiltration\" | \"credential_theft\" | \"destructive_sequence\" | \"none\"\n        \"sequence_risk\"?: Long,          // 0-100\n\n        // Agentic - Loop Detection (optional)\n        \"loop_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"loop_count\"?: Long,\n        \"loop_tool\"?: String,\n\n        // Usage Budget \u2014 multi-window token & cost enforcement (optional)\n        // See ProcessPromptContext for full documentation.\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,          // Min remaining % across all windows\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Bool,               // Any window limit exceeded\n        \"budget_cost_micros_this_turn\"?: Long,  // Cost of this request in microdollars\n        \"budget_model\"?: String,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_session\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded_session\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_exceeded_daily\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_exceeded_monthly\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Semantic - Topic Classification (optional)\n        \"content_topics\"?: Set<String>,      // [\"controlled_substances\", \"weapons_manufacturing\", ...]\n        \"topic_confidence\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n\n        // Security checks on tool arguments (optional)\n        \"secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_count\"?: Long,              // Number of PII pattern matches in tool content\n        \"pii_score\"?: Long,         // PII ML classifier confidence (0-100)\n        \"injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"injection_pulse_score\"?: Long,  // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n        \"injection_deep_context_score\"?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n\n        // Security - Pattern Detection (optional)\n        \"command_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"command_injection_type\"?: String,\n        \"command_injection_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n        \"sql_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"sql_injection_type\"?: String,\n        \"sql_injection_score\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Cross-Origin Escalation (optional)\n        \"cross_origin_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"cross_origin_type\"?: String,\n        \"cross_origin_score\"?: Long,             // 0-100\n\n        // File & Path (optional \u2014 for path-based access control policies)\n        \"path\"?: String,                         // File path when tool operates on files\n\n        // Security - Invisible Character Detection in tool args (optional)\n        \"invisible_chars_detected\"?: Bool,       // Whether invisible Unicode chars detected in tool args\n        \"invisible_chars_score\"?: Long,          // Invisible character attack severity (0-100)\n\n        // Security - Encoded Injection (optional)\n        \"encoded_content_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"encoded_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"encoded_count\"?: Long,\n        \"encoded_score\"?: Long,                  // 0-100\n\n        // Agentic - Agent Security (optional)\n        \"tool_poisoning_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"tool_poisoning_score\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n        \"tool_poisoning_type\"?: String,          // \"hidden_instructions\" | \"system_prompt_injection\" | \"authority_hijack\"\n        \"rug_pull_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"rug_pull_score\"?: Long,                 // 0-100\n        \"rug_pull_type\"?: String,                // \"risk_spike\" | \"pattern_change\" | \"combined\" | \"none\"\n\n        // Agentic - Indirect Prompt Injection (optional \u2014 injection via tool outputs/retrieved content)\n        \"indirect_injection_score\"?: Long,       // Indirect injection risk score (0-100)\n        \"indirect_injection_type\"?: String,      // Type of indirect injection detected\n\n        // Agentic - MCP Risk (optional)\n        \"mcp_config_risk\"?: Bool,\n        \"mcp_risk_type\"?: String,                // \"inline_execution\" | \"suspicious_url\" | \"cross_origin\"\n        \"mcp_risk_score\"?: Long,                 // 0-100\n\n        // Agentic - Multi-Turn Context (optional)\n        \"conversation_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"multi_turn_detection\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Agent Identity \u2014 authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for read_file action\n    type FileReadContext = {\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // File path (optional \u2014 for path-based access control policies)\n        \"path\"?: String,                 // File path being read\n\n        // Security checks on file content (optional)\n        \"secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Security - Path Traversal (optional)\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Usage Budget \u2014 multi-window token & cost enforcement (optional)\n        // See ProcessPromptContext for full documentation.\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_cost_micros_this_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_model\"?: String,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_session\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded_session\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_exceeded_daily\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_exceeded_monthly\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Agent Identity \u2014 authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for write_file action\n    type FileWriteContext = {\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // File path (optional \u2014 for path-based access control policies)\n        \"path\"?: String,                         // File path being written\n\n        // Security - Invisible Character Detection in write content (optional)\n        \"invisible_chars_detected\"?: Bool,       // Whether invisible Unicode chars detected in write content\n        \"invisible_chars_score\"?: Long,          // Invisible character attack severity (0-100)\n\n        // Security checks on content being written (optional)\n        \"secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Security - Path Traversal (optional)\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Usage Budget \u2014 multi-window token & cost enforcement (optional)\n        // See ProcessPromptContext for full documentation.\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_cost_micros_this_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_model\"?: String,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_session\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded_session\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_exceeded_daily\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_exceeded_monthly\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Agent Identity \u2014 authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for connect_server action (MCP server connections)\n    type ConnectServerContext = {\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // MCP context (optional)\n        \"mcp_server\"?: String,           // MCP server name (e.g., \"github\", \"filesystem\")\n        \"mcp_server_verified\"?: Bool,    // Whether server is from verified registry\n\n        // Agentic - Agent Security (optional)\n        \"tool_poisoning_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"tool_poisoning_score\"?: Long,\n        \"tool_poisoning_type\"?: String,\n\n        // Agentic - MCP Risk (optional)\n        \"mcp_config_risk\"?: Bool,\n        \"mcp_risk_type\"?: String,\n        \"mcp_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Security - Cross-Origin Escalation (optional)\n        \"cross_origin_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"cross_origin_type\"?: String,\n        \"cross_origin_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Usage Budget \u2014 multi-window token & cost enforcement (optional)\n        // See ProcessPromptContext for full documentation.\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_cost_micros_this_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_model\"?: String,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_session\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded_session\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_exceeded_daily\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_exceeded_monthly\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Agent Identity \u2014 authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n    };\n}\n";
+export declare const GUARDRAILS_SCHEMA = "// =============================================================================\n// Guardrails Cedar Schema\n// =============================================================================\n// Defines entity types, actions, and context attributes for the highflame-shield\n// guardrails service. This schema enables type-safe policy authoring and\n// validation in both Studio UI and backend.\n//\n// Service: highflame-shield (guardrails)\n// Namespace: Guardrails\n// =============================================================================\n\nnamespace Guardrails {\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Entity Types \u2014 ReBAC Hierarchy\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Entity hierarchy enables Cedar's `in` operator for policy scoping:\n    //   Account (org root)\n    //     \u2514\u2500\u2500 Project in [Account]\n    //           \u251C\u2500\u2500 App in [Project]\n    //           \u2502     \u2514\u2500\u2500 Session in [App, Agent]\n    //           \u2514\u2500\u2500 Agent in [Project]\n    //                 \u2514\u2500\u2500 Session in [App, Agent]\n    //\n    // Policy scoping examples:\n    //   resource == Guardrails::App::\"<uuid>\"              \u2192 app-scoped (app only)\n    //   resource == Guardrails::Agent::\"<agent_id>\"        \u2192 agent-only (exact match)\n    //   resource in Guardrails::Agent::\"<agent_id>\"        \u2192 agent + its sessions\n    //   resource in Guardrails::Project::\"<uuid>\"          \u2192 project-wide (apps + agents)\n    //   resource in Guardrails::Account::\"<uuid>\"          \u2192 org-wide\n    // =========================================================================\n\n    /// Account represents an organization (top-level tenant)\n    entity Account;\n\n    /// Project represents a project within an account\n    entity Project in [Account];\n\n    /// User represents a principal (human or service) making requests\n    entity User;\n\n    /// Agent represents an AI agent (Claude, Cursor, Copilot, etc.) making requests.\n    /// Used as both principal (who is acting) and resource (policy scoping target).\n    /// Agent + sessions: resource in Guardrails::Agent::\"<agent_id>\" (hierarchy match)\n    /// Agent only:       resource == Guardrails::Agent::\"<agent_id>\" (exact match)\n    entity Agent in [Project];\n\n    /// App represents a protected application (guardrails-enabled LLM app)\n    entity App in [Project];\n\n    /// Session represents an agentic conversation session with state tracking.\n    /// Sessions can belong to either an App or an Agent.\n    entity Session in [App, Agent];\n\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Actions\n    // =========================================================================\n\n    /// Process user prompts and AI responses for security threats and content violations\n    action \"process_prompt\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [App, Agent, Session],\n        context: ProcessPromptContext\n    };\n\n    /// Execute tool calls (shell, file operations, MCP tools)\n    action \"call_tool\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Agent, Session],\n        context: CallToolContext\n    };\n\n    /// Read file operations\n    action \"read_file\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Agent, Session],\n        context: FileReadContext\n    };\n\n    /// Write file operations\n    action \"write_file\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Agent, Session],\n        context: FileWriteContext\n    };\n\n    /// Connect to an MCP server\n    action \"connect_server\" appliesTo {\n        principal: [User, Agent],\n        resource: [Agent, Session],\n        context: ConnectServerContext\n    };\n\n    // =========================================================================\n    // Context Types (Action-Specific)\n    // =========================================================================\n\n    /// Context for process_prompt action (user prompts & AI responses)\n    type ProcessPromptContext = {\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n        \"direction\": String,        // \"input\" | \"output\"\n        \"content_type\": String,     // \"prompt\" | \"response\" | \"tool_call\" | \"file\"\n        \"detector_count\": Long,\n\n        // Security - Injection & Jailbreak (optional)\n        \"injection_score\"?: Long,  // Combined injection confidence: MAX(pulse, deep_context)\n        \"jailbreak_score\"?: Long,  // Combined jailbreak confidence: MAX(pulse, deep_context)\n        \"injection_pulse_score\"?: Long,  // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n        \"injection_deep_context_score\"?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n        \"jailbreak_pulse_score\"?: Long,  // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n        \"jailbreak_deep_context_score\"?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n        \"injection_type\"?: String,       // \"prompt\" | \"sql\" | \"command\" | \"none\"\n\n        // Privacy - Secrets (optional)\n        \"secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,    // [\"aws_access_key\", \"github_token\", ...]\n\n        // Privacy - PII (optional)\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"pii_count\"?: Long,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,       // [\"email\", \"phone\", \"ssn\", \"credit_card\", ...]\n        \"pii_score\"?: Long,         // PII ML classifier confidence (0-100) \u2014 catches novel PII patterns that escape regex detection\n\n        // Threat Severity Aggregation (optional)\n        \"highest_severity\"?: String,     // Highest severity across all detectors: \"critical\" | \"high\" | \"medium\" | \"low\" | \"none\"\n\n        // Trust & Safety - Toxicity (optional)\n        \"violence_score\"?: Long,         // 0-100\n        \"hate_speech_score\"?: Long,      // 0-100\n        \"sexual_score\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n        \"weapons_score\"?: Long,          // 0-100\n        \"crime_score\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n        \"profanity_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n\n        // Semantic - Topic Classification (optional)\n        \"content_topics\"?: Set<String>,      // [\"controlled_substances\", \"weapons_manufacturing\", ...]\n        \"topic_confidence\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Invisible Character Detection (optional)\n        \"invisible_chars_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"invisible_chars_score\"?: Long,      // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Pattern Detection (optional)\n        \"command_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"command_injection_type\"?: String,       // \"reverse_shell\" | \"privilege_escalation\" | \"code_execution\" | \"destructive_command\" | \"data_exfiltration\"\n        \"command_injection_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,      // \"critical\" | \"high\" | \"medium\" | \"low\" | \"none\"\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n        \"sql_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"sql_injection_type\"?: String,           // \"tautology\" | \"union_based\" | \"destructive\" | \"blind\" | \"error_based\"\n        \"sql_injection_score\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Cross-Origin Escalation (optional)\n        \"cross_origin_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"cross_origin_type\"?: String,            // \"cross_origin_tool\" | \"cross_origin_server\" | \"none\"\n        \"cross_origin_score\"?: Long,             // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Encoded Injection (optional)\n        \"encoded_content_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"encoded_types\"?: Set<String>,           // [\"base64\", \"hex\", \"unicode\", \"url\", ...]\n        \"encoded_count\"?: Long,\n        \"encoded_score\"?: Long,                  // 0-100\n\n        // Language & Script Detection (optional)\n        \"detected_language\"?: String,            // ISO language code\n        \"is_english\"?: Bool,\n        \"language_confidence\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n        \"detected_script\"?: String,              // \"latin\" | \"cyrillic\" | \"arabic\" | \"unknown\" | ...\n        \"is_latin_script\"?: Bool,\n        \"script_confidence\"?: Long,              // 0-100\n\n        // Content Analysis (optional)\n        \"hallucination_score\"?: Long,\n        \"factuality_score\"?: Long,               // 0-100\n        \"sentiment_score\"?: Long,\n        \"contains_code\"?: Bool,\n        \"code_languages\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"code_ratio\"?: Long,                     // 0-100, percentage of content that is code\n        \"keyword_matched\"?: Bool,\n        \"keyword_categories\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"keyword_count\"?: Long,\n        \"contains_non_ascii\"?: Bool,\n        \"phishing_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"content_safety_score\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n        \"content_safety_blocked\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Agentic - Multi-Turn Context (optional)\n        \"conversation_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"multi_turn_detection\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Usage Budget \u2014 multi-window token & cost enforcement (optional)\n        // Emitted by usage_budget detector. Enforced across session/daily/monthly windows\n        // and user/app/project/account dimensions. Percentages are 0-100.\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,          // Min remaining % across all windows\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Bool,               // Any window limit exceeded\n        \"budget_cost_micros_this_turn\"?: Long,  // Cost of this request in microdollars (USD * 1e6)\n        \"budget_model\"?: String,                // Model name used for cost calculation\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_session\"?: Long,     // Session token usage % (0-100)\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_daily\"?: Long,       // Daily token usage % (0-100)\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_monthly\"?: Long,     // Monthly token usage % (0-100)\n        \"budget_cost_pct_daily\"?: Long,         // Daily cost usage % (0-100)\n        \"budget_cost_pct_monthly\"?: Long,       // Monthly cost usage % (0-100)\n        \"budget_exceeded_session\"?: Bool,       // Session-scoped budget exceeded\n        \"budget_exceeded_daily\"?: Bool,         // Any daily-scoped budget exceeded\n        \"budget_exceeded_monthly\"?: Bool,       // Any monthly-scoped budget exceeded\n\n        // Agent Identity \u2014 authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)\n        // Present when the request is made by an AI agent (API key or JWT with agent claims).\n        // Empty strings for human user requests. Use these to write agent-specific policies.\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,             // Unique agent identifier (e.g., \"agent_research_v3\")\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,           // \"orchestrator\" | \"autonomous\" | \"tool_agent\" | \"human_proxy\"\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,    // \"first_party\" | \"verified_third_party\" | \"unverified\"\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,      // Agent framework (e.g., \"claude-code\", \"langchain\", \"crewai\")\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,      // Organization that published the agent\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for call_tool action (agentic tool execution)\n    type CallToolContext = {\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // Tool Risk (optional)\n        \"tool_name\"?: String,            // \"shell\", \"write_file\", \"http_post\", etc.\n        \"tool_risk_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n        \"tool_is_sensitive\"?: Bool,\n        \"tool_category\"?: String,        // \"safe\" | \"sensitive\" | \"dangerous\"\n        \"tool_is_builtin\"?: Bool,\n\n        // MCP context (optional \u2014 only present for MCP tool calls)\n        \"mcp_server\"?: String,           // MCP server name (e.g., \"github\", \"filesystem\")\n        \"mcp_tool\"?: String,             // MCP tool name within the server\n        \"mcp_server_verified\"?: Bool,    // Whether server is from verified registry\n\n        // Agentic - Behavioral Patterns (optional)\n        \"suspicious_pattern\"?: Bool,\n        \"pattern_type\"?: String,         // \"data_exfiltration\" | \"secret_exfiltration\" | \"db_exfiltration\" | \"credential_theft\" | \"destructive_sequence\" | \"none\"\n        \"sequence_risk\"?: Long,          // 0-100\n\n        // Agentic - Loop Detection (optional)\n        \"loop_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"loop_count\"?: Long,\n        \"loop_tool\"?: String,\n\n        // Usage Budget \u2014 multi-window token & cost enforcement (optional)\n        // See ProcessPromptContext for full documentation.\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,          // Min remaining % across all windows\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Bool,               // Any window limit exceeded\n        \"budget_cost_micros_this_turn\"?: Long,  // Cost of this request in microdollars\n        \"budget_model\"?: String,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_session\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded_session\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_exceeded_daily\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_exceeded_monthly\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Semantic - Topic Classification (optional)\n        \"content_topics\"?: Set<String>,      // [\"controlled_substances\", \"weapons_manufacturing\", ...]\n        \"topic_confidence\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n\n        // Security checks on tool arguments (optional)\n        \"secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_count\"?: Long,              // Number of PII pattern matches in tool content\n        \"pii_score\"?: Long,         // PII ML classifier confidence (0-100)\n        \"injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"injection_pulse_score\"?: Long,  // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n        \"injection_deep_context_score\"?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n\n        // Security - Pattern Detection (optional)\n        \"command_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"command_injection_type\"?: String,\n        \"command_injection_score\"?: Long,        // 0-100\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n        \"sql_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"sql_injection_type\"?: String,\n        \"sql_injection_score\"?: Long,            // 0-100\n\n        // Security - Cross-Origin Escalation (optional)\n        \"cross_origin_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"cross_origin_type\"?: String,\n        \"cross_origin_score\"?: Long,             // 0-100\n\n        // File & Path (optional \u2014 for path-based access control policies)\n        \"path\"?: String,                         // File path when tool operates on files\n\n        // Security - Invisible Character Detection in tool args (optional)\n        \"invisible_chars_detected\"?: Bool,       // Whether invisible Unicode chars detected in tool args\n        \"invisible_chars_score\"?: Long,          // Invisible character attack severity (0-100)\n\n        // Security - Encoded Injection (optional)\n        \"encoded_content_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"encoded_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"encoded_count\"?: Long,\n        \"encoded_score\"?: Long,                  // 0-100\n\n        // Agentic - Agent Security (optional)\n        \"tool_poisoning_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"tool_poisoning_score\"?: Long,           // 0-100\n        \"tool_poisoning_type\"?: String,          // \"hidden_instructions\" | \"system_prompt_injection\" | \"authority_hijack\"\n        \"rug_pull_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"rug_pull_score\"?: Long,                 // 0-100\n        \"rug_pull_type\"?: String,                // \"risk_spike\" | \"pattern_change\" | \"combined\" | \"none\"\n\n        // Agentic - Indirect Prompt Injection (optional \u2014 injection via tool outputs/retrieved content)\n        \"indirect_injection_score\"?: Long,       // Indirect injection risk score (0-100)\n        \"indirect_injection_type\"?: String,      // Type of indirect injection detected\n\n        // Agentic - MCP Risk (optional)\n        \"mcp_config_risk\"?: Bool,\n        \"mcp_risk_type\"?: String,                // \"inline_execution\" | \"suspicious_url\" | \"cross_origin\"\n        \"mcp_risk_score\"?: Long,                 // 0-100\n\n        // Tool Operation Classifier (optional) \u2014 populated by AST-based classifiers (bash, python, etc.)\n        \"tool_operation_classes\"?: Set<String>,  // subset of {\"readonly\", \"write_enabling\", \"execute_enabling\", \"network_access\", \"unknown\"}\n\n        // Agentic - Multi-Turn Context (optional)\n        \"conversation_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"multi_turn_detection\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Agent Identity \u2014 authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for read_file action\n    type FileReadContext = {\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // File path (optional \u2014 for path-based access control policies)\n        \"path\"?: String,                 // File path being read\n\n        // Security checks on file content (optional)\n        \"secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Security - Path Traversal (optional)\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Usage Budget \u2014 multi-window token & cost enforcement (optional)\n        // See ProcessPromptContext for full documentation.\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_cost_micros_this_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_model\"?: String,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_session\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded_session\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_exceeded_daily\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_exceeded_monthly\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Agent Identity \u2014 authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for write_file action\n    type FileWriteContext = {\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // File path (optional \u2014 for path-based access control policies)\n        \"path\"?: String,                         // File path being written\n\n        // Security - Invisible Character Detection in write content (optional)\n        \"invisible_chars_detected\"?: Bool,       // Whether invisible Unicode chars detected in write content\n        \"invisible_chars_score\"?: Long,          // Invisible character attack severity (0-100)\n\n        // Security checks on content being written (optional)\n        \"secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"secret_count\"?: Long,\n        \"secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n\n        // Security - Path Traversal (optional)\n        \"path_traversal_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"path_traversal_severity\"?: String,\n        \"path_traversal_type\"?: String,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Usage Budget \u2014 multi-window token & cost enforcement (optional)\n        // See ProcessPromptContext for full documentation.\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_cost_micros_this_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_model\"?: String,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_session\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded_session\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_exceeded_daily\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_exceeded_monthly\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Agent Identity \u2014 authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n    };\n\n    /// Context for connect_server action (MCP server connections)\n    type ConnectServerContext = {\n        // Core metadata (required)\n        \"request_id\": String,\n        \"timestamp\": Long,\n\n        // MCP context (optional)\n        \"mcp_server\"?: String,           // MCP server name (e.g., \"github\", \"filesystem\")\n        \"mcp_server_verified\"?: Bool,    // Whether server is from verified registry\n\n        // Agentic - Agent Security (optional)\n        \"tool_poisoning_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"tool_poisoning_score\"?: Long,\n        \"tool_poisoning_type\"?: String,\n\n        // Agentic - MCP Risk (optional)\n        \"mcp_config_risk\"?: Bool,\n        \"mcp_risk_type\"?: String,\n        \"mcp_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Security - Cross-Origin Escalation (optional)\n        \"cross_origin_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"cross_origin_type\"?: String,\n        \"cross_origin_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Session Detection History \u2014 cross-turn sticky flags (optional)\n        \"session_pii_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_pii_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_secrets_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_secret_types\"?: Set<String>,\n        \"session_injection_detected\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_command_injection\"?: Bool,\n        \"session_threat_turns\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_jailbreak_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_command_injection_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_pii_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_max_secret_score\"?: Long,\n        \"session_cumulative_risk_score\"?: Long,\n\n        // Usage Budget \u2014 multi-window token & cost enforcement (optional)\n        // See ProcessPromptContext for full documentation.\n        \"budget_remaining_pct\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_cost_micros_this_turn\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_model\"?: String,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_session\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_tokens_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_daily\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_cost_pct_monthly\"?: Long,\n        \"budget_exceeded_session\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_exceeded_daily\"?: Bool,\n        \"budget_exceeded_monthly\"?: Bool,\n\n        // Agent Identity \u2014 authenticated agent principal metadata (optional)\n        \"agent_id\"?: String,\n        \"agent_type\"?: String,\n        \"agent_trust_level\"?: String,\n        \"agent_framework\"?: String,\n        \"agent_publisher\"?: String,\n\n    };\n}\n";
 /**
  * Overwatch Cedar schema
  *
  * Full Cedar schema for overwatch, embedded at codegen time.
  */
-export declare const OVERWATCH_SCHEMA = "// Overwatch Cedar Schema\n// ===================================\n// IDE Agent Security & Policy Enforcement\n//\n// Overwatch protects IDE agent operations (prompts, tool calls, file access, MCP connections)\n// by evaluating threats detected by the detection engine pipeline against Cedar policies.\n//\n// Architecture:\n//   User/Agent \u2192 IDE Hook \u2192 Detection Engine \u2192 Cedar Policy \u2192 Allow/Deny\n//\n// Supported IDEs:\n//   - Cursor (beforeSubmitPrompt, beforeShellExecution, beforeMCPExecution, etc.)\n//   - Claude Code (UserPromptSubmit, PreToolUse)\n//   - GitHub Copilot (userPromptSubmitted, preToolUse)\n//\n// Threat Coverage:\n//   - OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025 (LLM01-LLM10)\n//   - OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (ASI01-ASI10)\n//   - OWASP MCP Top 10 (MCP01-MCP05)\n//   - MITRE ATLAS Agent Techniques (AML.T0051, AML.T0080-T0082)\n\nnamespace Overwatch {\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ENTITIES - Tenant Hierarchy (ReBAC)\n// =============================================================================\n// Aligned with Guardrails entity hierarchy (Account \u2192 Project).\n// Overwatch does not have app-specific policies, so App is omitted.\n//\n// Entity hierarchy enables Cedar's `in` operator for policy scoping:\n//   Account (org root)\n//     \u2514\u2500\u2500 Project in [Account]\n//           \u2514\u2500\u2500 Tool/Server/FilePath/LlmPrompt in [Project]\n//\n// Policy scoping examples:\n//   resource == Overwatch::Tool::\"shell\"               \u2192 specific tool\n//   resource in Overwatch::Project::\"<uuid>\"            \u2192 project-wide\n//   resource in Overwatch::Account::\"<uuid>\"            \u2192 org-wide\n\n/// Account represents an organization (top-level tenant)\nentity Account;\n\n/// Project represents a project within an account\nentity Project in [Account];\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ENTITIES - Principals\n// =============================================================================\n\n/// Human user or service account making requests to the IDE\nentity User;\n\n/// AI agent (Claude, GitHub Copilot, etc.)\nentity Agent;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ENTITIES - Resources (scoped under Project)\n// =============================================================================\n\n/// LLM prompt or session \u2014 resource for process_prompt action\nentity LlmPrompt in [Project];\n\n/// MCP tool or native IDE tool \u2014 resource for call_tool action\nentity Tool in [Project];\n\n/// MCP server \u2014 resource for connect_server action\nentity Server in [Project];\n\n/// File system path \u2014 resource for read_file/write_file/call_tool actions\nentity FilePath in [Project];\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ACTIONS\n// =============================================================================\n\n// User submits a prompt or receives AI response\n// Threat focus: injection, jailbreak, secrets, PII, content safety, invisible chars\naction process_prompt appliesTo {\n  principal: [User, Agent],\n  resource: [LlmPrompt],\n  context: {\n    // --- Event & Source ---\n    content: String,                  // Raw content being scanned\n    source: String,                   // IDE source: \"cursor\", \"claudecode\", \"github_copilot\"\n    event: String,                    // Hook event name\n    user_email: String,               // User identifier\n\n    // --- Workspace ---\n    cwd?: String,                     // Current working directory\n    workspace_root?: String,          // Workspace/repository root\n\n    // --- Threat Detection (from detection engine pipeline) ---\n    threat_count: Long,               // Total threats detected\n    highest_severity: String,         // \"critical\", \"high\", \"medium\", \"low\", \"none\"\n    threat_categories: Set<String>,   // Threat category names\n    detected_threats: Set<String>,    // Detection rule names that matched\n    max_threat_severity: Long,        // Numeric severity (0=none, 1=low, 2=medium, 3=high, 4=critical)\n    secrets_detected: Bool,           // Whether secrets/credentials detected\n\n    // --- Secrets (granular) ---\n    secret_types?: Set<String>,       // Types: \"aws_access_key\", \"github_token\", \"ssh_private_key\", etc.\n    secret_count?: Long,              // Number of distinct secrets found\n\n    // --- PII Detection ---\n    pii_detected?: Bool,              // Whether any PII patterns matched\n    pii_types?: Set<String>,          // Types: \"ssn\", \"credit_card\", \"email\", \"phone\", etc.\n    pii_count?: Long,                 // Number of PII matches\n\n    // --- Encoding & Unicode Attacks ---\n    invisible_chars_detected?: Bool,  // Zero-width chars, bidi overrides, tag chars detected\n    invisible_chars_score?: Long,     // Unicode attack severity (0-100)\n\n    // --- Content Safety Scores (0-100, from ML classifiers) ---\n    violence_score: Long,\n    weapons_score: Long,\n    hate_speech_score: Long,\n    crime_score: Long,\n    sexual_score: Long,\n    profanity_score: Long,\n\n    // --- ML Detector Confidence Scores (0-100) ---\n    pii_score: Long,             // PII detection classifier confidence\n    injection_score: Long,       // Combined injection confidence: MAX(pulse, deep_context)\n    jailbreak_score: Long,       // Combined jailbreak confidence: MAX(pulse, deep_context)\n    injection_pulse_score?: Long,     // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n    injection_deep_context_score?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n    jailbreak_pulse_score?: Long,     // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n    jailbreak_deep_context_score?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n\n    // --- Agent Security (0-100) ---\n    indirect_injection_score: Long,   // Indirect prompt injection risk (OWASP LLM01, ASI01)\n\n    // --- Session Detection History (cross-turn sticky flags) ---\n    session_pii_detected?: Bool,\n    session_pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    session_secrets_detected?: Bool,\n    session_secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    session_injection_detected?: Bool,\n    session_command_injection?: Bool,\n    session_threat_turns?: Long,\n    session_max_injection_score?: Long,\n    session_max_jailbreak_score?: Long,\n    session_max_command_injection_score?: Long,\n    session_max_pii_score?: Long,\n    session_max_secret_score?: Long,\n    session_cumulative_risk_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Legacy ---\n    prompt_text?: String,             // Same as content (backward compatibility)\n    response_content?: String,        // Response content (if available)\n  },\n};\n\n// User calls a tool (native IDE tool or MCP tool)\n// Threat focus: command injection, tool poisoning, rug pull, data exfiltration, loops\naction call_tool appliesTo {\n  principal: [User, Agent],\n  resource: [Tool, FilePath],\n  context: {\n    // --- Event & Source ---\n    content: String,                  // Raw content being scanned (e.g., shell command, tool args)\n    source: String,                   // IDE source\n    event: String,                    // Hook event name\n    user_email: String,               // User identifier\n\n    // --- Tool & MCP ---\n    tool_name?: String,               // Normalized tool name (\"shell\", \"read_file\", etc.)\n    mcp_server?: String,              // MCP server name\n    mcp_tool?: String,                // MCP tool name\n\n    // --- File & Path ---\n    path?: String,                    // File path (if file operation)\n\n    // --- Workspace ---\n    cwd?: String,\n    workspace_root?: String,\n\n    // --- Threat Detection ---\n    threat_count?: Long,\n    highest_severity?: String,\n    threat_categories?: Set<String>,\n    detected_threats?: Set<String>,\n    max_threat_severity?: Long,\n    secrets_detected?: Bool,\n\n    // --- Secrets (granular) ---\n    secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    secret_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- PII Detection ---\n    pii_detected?: Bool,\n    pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    pii_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- Encoding & Unicode Attacks ---\n    invisible_chars_detected?: Bool,\n    invisible_chars_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Content Safety Scores (0-100) ---\n    violence_score?: Long,\n    weapons_score?: Long,\n    hate_speech_score?: Long,\n    crime_score?: Long,\n    sexual_score?: Long,\n    profanity_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- ML Detector Confidence Scores (0-100) ---\n    pii_score?: Long,\n    injection_score?: Long,      // Combined injection confidence: MAX(pulse, deep_context)\n    jailbreak_score?: Long,      // Combined jailbreak confidence: MAX(pulse, deep_context)\n    injection_pulse_score?: Long,     // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n    injection_deep_context_score?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n    jailbreak_pulse_score?: Long,     // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n    jailbreak_deep_context_score?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n\n    // --- Agent Security (0-100) --- (OWASP ASI01, ASI02, ASI04; MITRE AML.T0051)\n    tool_poisoning_score?: Long,      // Hidden instructions in tool description/args\n    tool_poisoning_detected?: Bool,   // Boolean flag for tool poisoning\n    rug_pull_score?: Long,            // Tool behavior drift after trust establishment\n    rug_pull_detected?: Bool,         // Boolean flag for rug pull\n    indirect_injection_score?: Long,  // Indirect injection via tool output\n\n    // --- Tool Risk Assessment ---\n    tool_risk_score?: Long,           // Computed tool risk (0-100)\n    tool_category?: String,           // \"safe\", \"sensitive\", \"dangerous\"\n    tool_is_sensitive?: Bool,         // Sensitivity classification\n    tool_is_builtin?: Bool,           // Built-in IDE tool vs MCP tool\n\n    // --- Behavioral Analysis --- (OWASP LLM10, ASI02, ASI08)\n    loop_detected?: Bool,             // Consecutive same-tool call loop\n    loop_count?: Long,                // Number of consecutive repeat calls\n    loop_tool?: String,               // Tool name in loop\n    suspicious_pattern?: Bool,        // Data exfiltration or attack sequence detected\n    pattern_type?: String,            // \"data_exfiltration\", \"secret_exfiltration\", \"credential_theft\", \"destructive_sequence\"\n    sequence_risk?: Long,             // Sequence risk score (0-100)\n\n    // --- MCP Trust ---\n    mcp_server_verified?: Bool,       // Whether server is from verified registry\n\n    // --- Session Detection History (cross-turn sticky flags) ---\n    session_pii_detected?: Bool,\n    session_pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    session_secrets_detected?: Bool,\n    session_secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    session_injection_detected?: Bool,\n    session_command_injection?: Bool,\n    session_threat_turns?: Long,\n    session_max_injection_score?: Long,\n    session_max_jailbreak_score?: Long,\n    session_max_command_injection_score?: Long,\n    session_max_pii_score?: Long,\n    session_max_secret_score?: Long,\n    session_cumulative_risk_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Legacy ---\n    response_content?: String,\n  },\n};\n\n// Connect to an MCP server\n// Threat focus: supply chain, tool poisoning, rug pull, config risk\naction connect_server appliesTo {\n  principal: [User, Agent],\n  resource: [Server],\n  context: {\n    content?: String,                 // Server config content (if available)\n    source: String,\n    event: String,\n    user_email: String,\n    mcp_server?: String,\n\n    // --- Threat Detection ---\n    threat_count?: Long,\n    highest_severity?: String,\n    threat_categories?: Set<String>,\n    max_threat_severity?: Long,\n\n    // --- Agent Security (0-100) --- (OWASP ASI04, MCP01-MCP05)\n    tool_poisoning_score?: Long,      // Poisoned tool descriptions in server\n    tool_poisoning_detected?: Bool,\n    rug_pull_score?: Long,            // Server behavior change after approval\n    rug_pull_detected?: Bool,\n    indirect_injection_score?: Long,  // Injection payloads in server responses\n\n    // --- MCP Trust & Config Risk ---\n    mcp_server_verified?: Bool,       // Verified registry status\n    mcp_config_risk?: Bool,           // Risky server config detected (inline code exec, etc.)\n    mcp_risk_score?: Long,            // Config risk severity (0-100)\n\n    // --- Session Detection History (cross-turn sticky flags) ---\n    session_pii_detected?: Bool,\n    session_pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    session_secrets_detected?: Bool,\n    session_secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    session_injection_detected?: Bool,\n    session_command_injection?: Bool,\n    session_threat_turns?: Long,\n    session_max_injection_score?: Long,\n    session_max_jailbreak_score?: Long,\n    session_max_command_injection_score?: Long,\n    session_max_pii_score?: Long,\n    session_max_secret_score?: Long,\n    session_cumulative_risk_score?: Long,\n  },\n};\n\n// Read a file from disk\n// Threat focus: secrets exposure, PII exposure, path traversal, sensitive paths\naction read_file appliesTo {\n  principal: [User, Agent],\n  resource: [FilePath],\n  context: {\n    content: String,\n    source: String,\n    event: String,\n    user_email: String,\n    path?: String,\n    cwd?: String,\n    workspace_root?: String,\n\n    // --- Threat Detection ---\n    threat_count?: Long,\n    highest_severity?: String,\n    threat_categories?: Set<String>,\n    detected_threats?: Set<String>,\n    max_threat_severity?: Long,\n    secrets_detected?: Bool,\n\n    // --- Secrets (granular) ---\n    secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    secret_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- PII Detection ---\n    pii_detected?: Bool,\n    pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    pii_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- Session Detection History (cross-turn sticky flags) ---\n    session_pii_detected?: Bool,\n    session_pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    session_secrets_detected?: Bool,\n    session_secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    session_injection_detected?: Bool,\n    session_command_injection?: Bool,\n    session_threat_turns?: Long,\n    session_max_injection_score?: Long,\n    session_max_jailbreak_score?: Long,\n    session_max_command_injection_score?: Long,\n    session_max_pii_score?: Long,\n    session_max_secret_score?: Long,\n    session_cumulative_risk_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Agent Security ---\n    indirect_injection_score?: Long,  // Indirect injection via file content\n  },\n};\n\n// Write a file to disk\n// Threat focus: secrets in output, PII in output, sensitive paths, malicious code\naction write_file appliesTo {\n  principal: [User, Agent],\n  resource: [FilePath],\n  context: {\n    content: String,\n    source: String,\n    event: String,\n    user_email: String,\n    path?: String,\n    cwd?: String,\n    workspace_root?: String,\n\n    // --- Threat Detection ---\n    threat_count?: Long,\n    highest_severity?: String,\n    threat_categories?: Set<String>,\n    detected_threats?: Set<String>,\n    max_threat_severity?: Long,\n    secrets_detected?: Bool,\n\n    // --- Secrets (granular) ---\n    secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    secret_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- PII Detection ---\n    pii_detected?: Bool,\n    pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    pii_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- Session Detection History (cross-turn sticky flags) ---\n    session_pii_detected?: Bool,\n    session_pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    session_secrets_detected?: Bool,\n    session_secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    session_injection_detected?: Bool,\n    session_command_injection?: Bool,\n    session_threat_turns?: Long,\n    session_max_injection_score?: Long,\n    session_max_jailbreak_score?: Long,\n    session_max_command_injection_score?: Long,\n    session_max_pii_score?: Long,\n    session_max_secret_score?: Long,\n    session_cumulative_risk_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Agent Security ---\n    indirect_injection_score?: Long,  // Indirect injection via file content\n  },\n};\n\n}\n";
+export declare const OVERWATCH_SCHEMA = "// Overwatch Cedar Schema\n// ===================================\n// IDE Agent Security & Policy Enforcement\n//\n// Overwatch protects IDE agent operations (prompts, tool calls, file access, MCP connections)\n// by evaluating threats detected by the detection engine pipeline against Cedar policies.\n//\n// Architecture:\n//   User/Agent \u2192 IDE Hook \u2192 Detection Engine \u2192 Cedar Policy \u2192 Allow/Deny\n//\n// Supported IDEs:\n//   - Cursor (beforeSubmitPrompt, beforeShellExecution, beforeMCPExecution, etc.)\n//   - Claude Code (UserPromptSubmit, PreToolUse)\n//   - GitHub Copilot (userPromptSubmitted, preToolUse)\n//\n// Threat Coverage:\n//   - OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025 (LLM01-LLM10)\n//   - OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (ASI01-ASI10)\n//   - OWASP MCP Top 10 (MCP01-MCP05)\n//   - MITRE ATLAS Agent Techniques (AML.T0051, AML.T0080-T0082)\n\nnamespace Overwatch {\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ENTITIES - Tenant Hierarchy (ReBAC)\n// =============================================================================\n// Aligned with Guardrails entity hierarchy (Account \u2192 Project).\n// Overwatch does not have app-specific policies, so App is omitted.\n//\n// Entity hierarchy enables Cedar's `in` operator for policy scoping:\n//   Account (org root)\n//     \u2514\u2500\u2500 Project in [Account]\n//           \u2514\u2500\u2500 Tool/Server/FilePath/LlmPrompt in [Project]\n//\n// Policy scoping examples:\n//   resource == Overwatch::Tool::\"shell\"               \u2192 specific tool\n//   resource in Overwatch::Project::\"<uuid>\"            \u2192 project-wide\n//   resource in Overwatch::Account::\"<uuid>\"            \u2192 org-wide\n\n/// Account represents an organization (top-level tenant)\nentity Account;\n\n/// Project represents a project within an account\nentity Project in [Account];\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ENTITIES - Principals\n// =============================================================================\n\n/// Human user or service account making requests to the IDE\nentity User;\n\n/// AI agent (Claude, GitHub Copilot, etc.)\nentity Agent;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ENTITIES - Resources (scoped under Project)\n// =============================================================================\n\n/// LLM prompt or session \u2014 resource for process_prompt action\nentity LlmPrompt in [Project];\n\n/// MCP tool or native IDE tool \u2014 resource for call_tool action\nentity Tool in [Project];\n\n/// MCP server \u2014 resource for connect_server action\nentity Server in [Project];\n\n/// File system path \u2014 resource for read_file/write_file/call_tool actions\nentity FilePath in [Project];\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ACTIONS\n// =============================================================================\n\n// User submits a prompt or receives AI response\n// Threat focus: injection, jailbreak, secrets, PII, content safety, invisible chars\naction process_prompt appliesTo {\n  principal: [User, Agent],\n  resource: [LlmPrompt],\n  context: {\n    // --- Event & Source ---\n    content: String,                  // Raw content being scanned\n    source: String,                   // IDE source: \"cursor\", \"claudecode\", \"github_copilot\"\n    event: String,                    // Hook event name\n    user_email: String,               // User identifier\n\n    // --- Workspace ---\n    cwd?: String,                     // Current working directory\n    workspace_root?: String,          // Workspace/repository root\n\n    // --- Threat Detection (from detection engine pipeline) ---\n    threat_count: Long,               // Total threats detected\n    highest_severity: String,         // \"critical\", \"high\", \"medium\", \"low\", \"none\"\n    threat_categories: Set<String>,   // Threat category names\n    detected_threats: Set<String>,    // Detection rule names that matched\n    max_threat_severity: Long,        // Numeric severity (0=none, 1=low, 2=medium, 3=high, 4=critical)\n    secrets_detected: Bool,           // Whether secrets/credentials detected\n\n    // --- Secrets (granular) ---\n    secret_types?: Set<String>,       // Types: \"aws_access_key\", \"github_token\", \"ssh_private_key\", etc.\n    secret_count?: Long,              // Number of distinct secrets found\n\n    // --- PII Detection ---\n    pii_detected?: Bool,              // Whether any PII patterns matched\n    pii_types?: Set<String>,          // Types: \"ssn\", \"credit_card\", \"email\", \"phone\", etc.\n    pii_count?: Long,                 // Number of PII matches\n\n    // --- Encoding & Unicode Attacks ---\n    invisible_chars_detected?: Bool,  // Zero-width chars, bidi overrides, tag chars detected\n    invisible_chars_score?: Long,     // Unicode attack severity (0-100)\n\n    // --- Content Safety Scores (0-100, from ML classifiers) ---\n    violence_score: Long,\n    weapons_score: Long,\n    hate_speech_score: Long,\n    crime_score: Long,\n    sexual_score: Long,\n    profanity_score: Long,\n\n    // --- ML Detector Confidence Scores (0-100) ---\n    pii_score: Long,             // PII detection classifier confidence\n    injection_score: Long,       // Combined injection confidence: MAX(pulse, deep_context)\n    jailbreak_score: Long,       // Combined jailbreak confidence: MAX(pulse, deep_context)\n    injection_pulse_score?: Long,     // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n    injection_deep_context_score?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n    jailbreak_pulse_score?: Long,     // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n    jailbreak_deep_context_score?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n\n    // --- Agent Security (0-100) ---\n    indirect_injection_score: Long,   // Indirect prompt injection risk (OWASP LLM01, ASI01)\n\n    // --- Session Detection History (cross-turn sticky flags) ---\n    session_pii_detected?: Bool,\n    session_pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    session_secrets_detected?: Bool,\n    session_secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    session_injection_detected?: Bool,\n    session_command_injection?: Bool,\n    session_threat_turns?: Long,\n    session_max_injection_score?: Long,\n    session_max_jailbreak_score?: Long,\n    session_max_command_injection_score?: Long,\n    session_max_pii_score?: Long,\n    session_max_secret_score?: Long,\n    session_cumulative_risk_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Legacy ---\n    prompt_text?: String,             // Same as content (backward compatibility)\n    response_content?: String,        // Response content (if available)\n  },\n};\n\n// User calls a tool (native IDE tool or MCP tool)\n// Threat focus: command injection, tool poisoning, rug pull, data exfiltration, loops\naction call_tool appliesTo {\n  principal: [User, Agent],\n  resource: [Tool, FilePath],\n  context: {\n    // --- Event & Source ---\n    content: String,                  // Raw content being scanned (e.g., shell command, tool args)\n    source: String,                   // IDE source\n    event: String,                    // Hook event name\n    user_email: String,               // User identifier\n\n    // --- Tool & MCP ---\n    tool_name?: String,               // Normalized tool name (\"shell\", \"read_file\", etc.)\n    mcp_server?: String,              // MCP server name\n    mcp_tool?: String,                // MCP tool name\n\n    // --- File & Path ---\n    path?: String,                    // File path (if file operation)\n\n    // --- Workspace ---\n    cwd?: String,\n    workspace_root?: String,\n\n    // --- Threat Detection ---\n    threat_count?: Long,\n    highest_severity?: String,\n    threat_categories?: Set<String>,\n    detected_threats?: Set<String>,\n    max_threat_severity?: Long,\n    secrets_detected?: Bool,\n\n    // --- Secrets (granular) ---\n    secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    secret_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- PII Detection ---\n    pii_detected?: Bool,\n    pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    pii_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- Encoding & Unicode Attacks ---\n    invisible_chars_detected?: Bool,\n    invisible_chars_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Content Safety Scores (0-100) ---\n    violence_score?: Long,\n    weapons_score?: Long,\n    hate_speech_score?: Long,\n    crime_score?: Long,\n    sexual_score?: Long,\n    profanity_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- ML Detector Confidence Scores (0-100) ---\n    pii_score?: Long,\n    injection_score?: Long,      // Combined injection confidence: MAX(pulse, deep_context)\n    jailbreak_score?: Long,      // Combined jailbreak confidence: MAX(pulse, deep_context)\n    injection_pulse_score?: Long,     // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n    injection_deep_context_score?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n    jailbreak_pulse_score?: Long,     // 0-100 Pulse single-turn classifier\n    jailbreak_deep_context_score?: Long, // 0-100 DeepContext multi-turn\n\n    // --- Agent Security (0-100) --- (OWASP ASI01, ASI02, ASI04; MITRE AML.T0051)\n    tool_poisoning_score?: Long,      // Hidden instructions in tool description/args\n    tool_poisoning_detected?: Bool,   // Boolean flag for tool poisoning\n    rug_pull_score?: Long,            // Tool behavior drift after trust establishment\n    rug_pull_detected?: Bool,         // Boolean flag for rug pull\n    indirect_injection_score?: Long,  // Indirect injection via tool output\n\n    // --- Tool Risk Assessment ---\n    tool_risk_score?: Long,           // Computed tool risk (0-100)\n    tool_category?: String,           // \"safe\", \"sensitive\", \"dangerous\"\n    tool_is_sensitive?: Bool,         // Sensitivity classification\n    tool_is_builtin?: Bool,           // Built-in IDE tool vs MCP tool\n\n    // --- Behavioral Analysis --- (OWASP LLM10, ASI02, ASI08)\n    loop_detected?: Bool,             // Consecutive same-tool call loop\n    loop_count?: Long,                // Number of consecutive repeat calls\n    loop_tool?: String,               // Tool name in loop\n    suspicious_pattern?: Bool,        // Data exfiltration or attack sequence detected\n    pattern_type?: String,            // \"data_exfiltration\", \"secret_exfiltration\", \"credential_theft\", \"destructive_sequence\"\n    sequence_risk?: Long,             // Sequence risk score (0-100)\n\n    // --- MCP Trust ---\n    mcp_server_verified?: Bool,       // Whether server is from verified registry\n\n    // --- Tool Operation Classifier ---\n    tool_operation_classes?: Set<String>,  // subset of {\"readonly\", \"write_enabling\", \"execute_enabling\", \"network_access\", \"unknown\"}\n\n    // --- Session Detection History (cross-turn sticky flags) ---\n    session_pii_detected?: Bool,\n    session_pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    session_secrets_detected?: Bool,\n    session_secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    session_injection_detected?: Bool,\n    session_command_injection?: Bool,\n    session_threat_turns?: Long,\n    session_max_injection_score?: Long,\n    session_max_jailbreak_score?: Long,\n    session_max_command_injection_score?: Long,\n    session_max_pii_score?: Long,\n    session_max_secret_score?: Long,\n    session_cumulative_risk_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Legacy ---\n    response_content?: String,\n  },\n};\n\n// Connect to an MCP server\n// Threat focus: supply chain, tool poisoning, rug pull, config risk\naction connect_server appliesTo {\n  principal: [User, Agent],\n  resource: [Server],\n  context: {\n    content?: String,                 // Server config content (if available)\n    source: String,\n    event: String,\n    user_email: String,\n    mcp_server?: String,\n\n    // --- Threat Detection ---\n    threat_count?: Long,\n    highest_severity?: String,\n    threat_categories?: Set<String>,\n    max_threat_severity?: Long,\n\n    // --- Agent Security (0-100) --- (OWASP ASI04, MCP01-MCP05)\n    tool_poisoning_score?: Long,      // Poisoned tool descriptions in server\n    tool_poisoning_detected?: Bool,\n    rug_pull_score?: Long,            // Server behavior change after approval\n    rug_pull_detected?: Bool,\n    indirect_injection_score?: Long,  // Injection payloads in server responses\n\n    // --- MCP Trust & Config Risk ---\n    mcp_server_verified?: Bool,       // Verified registry status\n    mcp_config_risk?: Bool,           // Risky server config detected (inline code exec, etc.)\n    mcp_risk_score?: Long,            // Config risk severity (0-100)\n\n    // --- Session Detection History (cross-turn sticky flags) ---\n    session_pii_detected?: Bool,\n    session_pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    session_secrets_detected?: Bool,\n    session_secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    session_injection_detected?: Bool,\n    session_command_injection?: Bool,\n    session_threat_turns?: Long,\n    session_max_injection_score?: Long,\n    session_max_jailbreak_score?: Long,\n    session_max_command_injection_score?: Long,\n    session_max_pii_score?: Long,\n    session_max_secret_score?: Long,\n    session_cumulative_risk_score?: Long,\n  },\n};\n\n// Read a file from disk\n// Threat focus: secrets exposure, PII exposure, path traversal, sensitive paths\naction read_file appliesTo {\n  principal: [User, Agent],\n  resource: [FilePath],\n  context: {\n    content: String,\n    source: String,\n    event: String,\n    user_email: String,\n    path?: String,\n    cwd?: String,\n    workspace_root?: String,\n\n    // --- Threat Detection ---\n    threat_count?: Long,\n    highest_severity?: String,\n    threat_categories?: Set<String>,\n    detected_threats?: Set<String>,\n    max_threat_severity?: Long,\n    secrets_detected?: Bool,\n\n    // --- Secrets (granular) ---\n    secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    secret_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- PII Detection ---\n    pii_detected?: Bool,\n    pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    pii_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- Session Detection History (cross-turn sticky flags) ---\n    session_pii_detected?: Bool,\n    session_pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    session_secrets_detected?: Bool,\n    session_secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    session_injection_detected?: Bool,\n    session_command_injection?: Bool,\n    session_threat_turns?: Long,\n    session_max_injection_score?: Long,\n    session_max_jailbreak_score?: Long,\n    session_max_command_injection_score?: Long,\n    session_max_pii_score?: Long,\n    session_max_secret_score?: Long,\n    session_cumulative_risk_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Agent Security ---\n    indirect_injection_score?: Long,  // Indirect injection via file content\n  },\n};\n\n// Write a file to disk\n// Threat focus: secrets in output, PII in output, sensitive paths, malicious code\naction write_file appliesTo {\n  principal: [User, Agent],\n  resource: [FilePath],\n  context: {\n    content: String,\n    source: String,\n    event: String,\n    user_email: String,\n    path?: String,\n    cwd?: String,\n    workspace_root?: String,\n\n    // --- Threat Detection ---\n    threat_count?: Long,\n    highest_severity?: String,\n    threat_categories?: Set<String>,\n    detected_threats?: Set<String>,\n    max_threat_severity?: Long,\n    secrets_detected?: Bool,\n\n    // --- Secrets (granular) ---\n    secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    secret_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- PII Detection ---\n    pii_detected?: Bool,\n    pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    pii_count?: Long,\n\n    // --- Session Detection History (cross-turn sticky flags) ---\n    session_pii_detected?: Bool,\n    session_pii_types?: Set<String>,\n    session_secrets_detected?: Bool,\n    session_secret_types?: Set<String>,\n    session_injection_detected?: Bool,\n    session_command_injection?: Bool,\n    session_threat_turns?: Long,\n    session_max_injection_score?: Long,\n    session_max_jailbreak_score?: Long,\n    session_max_command_injection_score?: Long,\n    session_max_pii_score?: Long,\n    session_max_secret_score?: Long,\n    session_cumulative_risk_score?: Long,\n\n    // --- Agent Security ---\n    indirect_injection_score?: Long,  // Indirect injection via file content\n  },\n};\n\n}\n";
 /**
  * Palisade Cedar schema
  *

package/dist/service-schemas.gen.js

@@ -133,6 +133,9 @@ action call_tool appliesTo {
     tool_is_sensitive?: Bool,
     tool_is_builtin?: Bool,
 
+    // --- Tool Operation Classifier ---
+    tool_operation_classes?: Set<String>,  // subset of {"readonly", "write_enabling", "execute_enabling", "network_access", "unknown"}
+
     // --- MCP Trust ---
     mcp_server_verified?: Bool,       // Whether server is from verified registry
 
@@ -797,6 +800,9 @@ namespace Guardrails {
         "mcp_risk_type"?: String,                // "inline_execution" | "suspicious_url" | "cross_origin"
         "mcp_risk_score"?: Long,                 // 0-100
 
+        // Tool Operation Classifier (optional) — populated by AST-based classifiers (bash, python, etc.)
+        "tool_operation_classes"?: Set<String>,  // subset of {"readonly", "write_enabling", "execute_enabling", "network_access", "unknown"}
+
         // Agentic - Multi-Turn Context (optional)
         "conversation_turn"?: Long,
         "multi_turn_detection"?: Bool,
@@ -1258,6 +1264,9 @@ action call_tool appliesTo {
     // --- MCP Trust ---
     mcp_server_verified?: Bool,       // Whether server is from verified registry
 
+    // --- Tool Operation Classifier ---
+    tool_operation_classes?: Set<String>,  // subset of {"readonly", "write_enabling", "execute_enabling", "network_access", "unknown"}
+
     // --- Session Detection History (cross-turn sticky flags) ---
     session_pii_detected?: Bool,
     session_pii_types?: Set<String>,
@@ -2036,6 +2045,7 @@ export const AI_GATEWAY_CONTEXT = {
                 { "key": "tool_category", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Tool category: safe/sensitive/dangerous" },
                 { "key": "tool_is_sensitive", "type": "boolean", "required": false, "description": "Tool sensitivity flag" },
                 { "key": "tool_is_builtin", "type": "boolean", "required": false, "description": "Built-in tool flag" },
+                { "key": "tool_operation_classes", "type": "array", "required": false, "description": "All operation classes observed in the tool call. Subset of: \'readonly\', \'write_enabling\', \'execute_enabling\', \'network_access\', \'unknown\'. \'unknown\' appears when any unrecognized or variable-expanded command was seen." },
                 { "key": "mcp_server_verified", "type": "boolean", "required": false, "description": "Whether server is from verified registry" },
                 { "key": "violence_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Violence content score (0-100)" },
                 { "key": "weapons_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Weapons content score (0-100)" },
@@ -2368,6 +2378,7 @@ export const GUARDRAILS_CONTEXT = {
                 { "key": "mcp_config_risk", "type": "boolean", "required": false, "description": "Whether MCP configuration risk was detected (inline code execution, suspicious URLs, cross-origin issues)" },
                 { "key": "mcp_risk_type", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Type of MCP risk: \'inline_execution\', \'suspicious_url\', or \'cross_origin\'" },
                 { "key": "mcp_risk_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Risk score for MCP configuration issues (0-100). Typical threshold: >=70 for blocks" },
+                { "key": "tool_operation_classes", "type": "array", "required": false, "description": "All operation classes observed in the tool call. Subset of: \'readonly\', \'write_enabling\', \'execute_enabling\', \'network_access\', \'unknown\'. \'unknown\' appears when any unrecognized or variable-expanded command was seen." },
                 { "key": "cross_origin_detected", "type": "boolean", "required": false, "description": "Whether cross-origin escalation patterns were detected in tool calls crossing trust boundaries" },
                 { "key": "cross_origin_type", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Type of cross-origin escalation detected in tool call" },
                 { "key": "cross_origin_score", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Risk score for cross-origin escalation in tool calls (0-100)" },
@@ -2633,6 +2644,7 @@ export const OVERWATCH_CONTEXT = {
                 { "key": "pattern_type", "type": "string", "required": false, "description": "Type of suspicious pattern: data_exfiltration, secret_exfiltration, credential_theft, destructive_sequence" },
                 { "key": "sequence_risk", "type": "number", "required": false, "description": "Behavioral sequence risk score (0-100)" },
                 { "key": "mcp_server_verified", "type": "boolean", "required": false, "description": "Whether the MCP server is from a verified registry" },
+                { "key": "tool_operation_classes", "type": "array", "required": false, "description": "All operation classes observed in the tool call. Subset of: \'readonly\', \'write_enabling\', \'execute_enabling\', \'network_access\', \'unknown\'. \'unknown\' appears when any unrecognized or variable-expanded command was seen." },
                 { "key": "session_pii_detected", "type": "boolean", "required": false, "description": "Whether PII was detected in any previous turn of the session" },
                 { "key": "session_pii_types", "type": "array", "required": false, "description": "PII types detected across the session (accumulated)" },
                 { "key": "session_secrets_detected", "type": "boolean", "required": false, "description": "Whether secrets were detected in any previous turn of the session" },

package/dist/types.d.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ export * from './entities.gen.js';
 export * from './actions.gen.js';
 export * from './context.gen.js';
 export * from './schema.gen.js';
+export * from './decision-effects.gen.js';
 export * from './aarm-annotations.gen.js';
 export * from './builder.js';
 export * from './errors.js';

package/dist/types.js

@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ export * from './entities.gen.js';
 export * from './actions.gen.js';
 export * from './context.gen.js';
 export * from './schema.gen.js';
+// Canonical decision-effect vocabulary (browser-safe). Studio's Monaco
+// policy editor imports these typed symbols rather than string literals.
+export * from './decision-effects.gen.js';
 // AARM-aware annotation registry (browser-safe — Studio uses this
 // for Monaco autocomplete + lint of @step_up_required / @defer_* keys).
 export * from './aarm-annotations.gen.js';

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@highflame/policy",
-  "version": "2.1.39",
+  "version": "2.1.41",
   "engines": {
     "node": ">=18"
   },