@highflame/policy 2.1.36 → 2.1.38

package/dist/ai_gateway-defaults.gen.js

@@ -7,47 +7,65 @@
 // =============================================================================
 // EMBEDDED CEDAR POLICY TEXT
 // =============================================================================
-const AI_GATEWAY_BASELINE_DEFAULT_CEDAR = `// =============================================================================
-// Baseline Permit Policy (Default)
+const AI_GATEWAY_ORGANIZATION_PERMIT_BASELINE_CEDAR = `// =============================================================================
+// Baseline Permit (Default)
 // =============================================================================
-// Permits all actions by default. Threat-specific forbid policies override
-// this to block when detection engines identify issues.
+// Permits all AI Gateway actions by default. Threat-specific forbid policies
+// override this when detectors fire. Cedar is default-deny: without at least
+// one permit rule, every request is denied regardless of forbid rules.
 //
-// Cedar is default-deny: without at least one permit rule, every request
-// is denied regardless of forbid rules.
-//
-// Category: organization
+// Category:  organization
 // Namespace: AIGateway
 // =============================================================================
 
-@id("baseline-permit-all")
-@name("Permit all actions by default")
-@description("Baseline permit for all actions -- threat-specific forbid policies override this when threats are detected")
+@id("organization.permit-baseline")
+@name("Permit baseline")
+@description("Permits all AI Gateway actions.")
 @severity("low")
-@tags("baseline,permit-default,organization")
+@tags("category:organization,posture:permit-default")
 permit (
     principal,
     action,
     resource
 );
 `;
-const AI_GATEWAY_SEMANTIC_DEFAULT_CEDAR = `// =============================================================================
-// Semantic Threat Detection Policy (Default)
+const AI_GATEWAY_SEMANTIC_DEFAULTS_CEDAR = `// =============================================================================
+// Semantic Threat Detection (Default)
 // =============================================================================
-// Detects and blocks prompt injection, jailbreak attempts, and high-severity
-// threats in MCP tool calls and server connections.
+// Blocks prompt injection, jailbreak attempts, and high-severity threats in
+// MCP tool calls and LLM prompts. Uses both detection-engine rule triggers and
+// ML classifier confidence scores.
+//
+// Detection layers:
+//   - Rule triggers (detected_threats), always available
+//   - ML classifier scores (injection_score, jailbreak_score), require API token
+//   - Severity aggregation (highest_severity, threat_count), catch-all rules
+//
+// Context keys consumed:
+//   - detected_threats:  Set<String>
+//   - injection_score:   Long (0-100)
+//   - jailbreak_score:   Long (0-100)
+//   - highest_severity:  String
+//   - threat_count:      Long
 //
-// Category: semantic
+// Compliance:
+//   - OWASP LLM01, OWASP LLM02
+//   - MITRE ATLAS AML.T0051, AML.T0054
+//
+// Category:  semantic
 // Namespace: AIGateway
 // =============================================================================
 
-// Block content with prompt injection patterns detected by rules
-@id("semantic-block-injection")
-@name("Block prompt injection")
-@description("Block tool calls when detection engine rules identify prompt injection patterns in tool arguments or content")
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Section 1: Prompt injection
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+@id("semantic.block-injection-rule")
+@name("Block injection (rule)")
+@description("Blocks call_tool when detected_threats contains \\"prompt_injection\\".")
 @severity("critical")
-@tags("injection,security,owasp-llm01,baseline")
-@reject_message("Tool call was blocked because prompt injection patterns were detected in the content (OWASP LLM01).")
+@tags("category:semantic,threat:injection,detection:rule,surface:call-tool,owasp:llm01,mitre:atlas-t0051,posture:baseline")
+@reject_message("Tool execution blocked: prompt injection patterns detected (OWASP LLM01).")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"call_tool",
@@ -57,29 +75,31 @@ when {
     context has detected_threats && context.detected_threats.contains("prompt_injection")
 };
 
-// Block content with high ML injection confidence
-@id("semantic-block-injection-score")
-@name("Block high-confidence injection")
-@description("Block tool calls when the ML injection classifier confidence exceeds 75/100")
+@id("semantic.block-injection-ml")
+@name("Block injection (ML)")
+@description("Blocks call_tool when injection_score >= 75.")
 @severity("critical")
-@tags("injection,ml-classifier,security,owasp-llm01")
-@reject_message("Tool call was blocked because the ML classifier detected prompt injection with high confidence.")
+@tags("category:semantic,threat:injection,detection:ml,surface:call-tool,owasp:llm01,mitre:atlas-t0051")
+@reject_message("Tool execution blocked: the ML classifier detected prompt injection with high confidence.")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"call_tool",
     resource
 )
 when {
-    context has injection_confidence && context.injection_confidence >= 75
+    context has injection_score && context.injection_score >= 75
 };
 
-// Block content with jailbreak patterns
-@id("semantic-block-jailbreak")
-@name("Block jailbreak attempts")
-@description("Block tool calls when jailbreak patterns are detected in content")
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Section 2: Jailbreak
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+@id("semantic.block-jailbreak-rule")
+@name("Block jailbreak (rule)")
+@description("Blocks call_tool when detected_threats contains \\"jailbreak\\".")
 @severity("critical")
-@tags("jailbreak,security,owasp-llm02,baseline")
-@reject_message("Tool call was blocked because jailbreak patterns were detected.")
+@tags("category:semantic,threat:jailbreak,detection:rule,surface:call-tool,owasp:llm02,mitre:atlas-t0054,posture:baseline")
+@reject_message("Tool execution blocked: jailbreak patterns detected (OWASP LLM02).")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"call_tool",
@@ -89,29 +109,31 @@ when {
     context has detected_threats && context.detected_threats.contains("jailbreak")
 };
 
-// Block content with high ML jailbreak confidence
-@id("semantic-block-jailbreak-score")
-@name("Block high-confidence jailbreak")
-@description("Block tool calls when the ML jailbreak classifier confidence exceeds 75/100")
+@id("semantic.block-jailbreak-ml")
+@name("Block jailbreak (ML)")
+@description("Blocks call_tool when jailbreak_score >= 75.")
 @severity("critical")
-@tags("jailbreak,ml-classifier,security,owasp-llm02")
-@reject_message("Tool call was blocked because the ML classifier detected a jailbreak attempt with high confidence.")
+@tags("category:semantic,threat:jailbreak,detection:ml,surface:call-tool,owasp:llm02,mitre:atlas-t0054")
+@reject_message("Tool execution blocked: the ML classifier detected a jailbreak attempt with high confidence.")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"call_tool",
     resource
 )
 when {
-    context has jailbreak_confidence && context.jailbreak_confidence >= 75
+    context has jailbreak_score && context.jailbreak_score >= 75
 };
 
-// Block any content with critical severity threats
-@id("semantic-block-critical")
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Section 3: Severity aggregation
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+@id("semantic.block-critical")
 @name("Block critical threats")
-@description("Block all MCP operations when any detection engine reports critical severity")
+@description("Blocks all MCP operations when highest_severity equals \\"critical\\".")
 @severity("critical")
-@tags("critical,baseline,security,catch-all")
-@reject_message("MCP operation was blocked because security scanners detected a critical-severity threat.")
+@tags("category:semantic,detection:aggregate,posture:catch-all")
+@reject_message("MCP operation blocked: a critical-severity threat was detected.")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action,
@@ -121,13 +143,12 @@ when {
     context has highest_severity && context.highest_severity == "critical"
 };
 
-// Block tool calls with multiple concurrent threats
-@id("semantic-block-multi-threat-tools")
+@id("semantic.block-multi-threat")
 @name("Block multi-threat tool calls")
-@description("Block tool execution when 3+ distinct threats are detected simultaneously")
+@description("Blocks call_tool when threat_count >= 3.")
 @severity("high")
-@tags("multi-threat,tools,security,defense-in-depth")
-@reject_message("Tool execution was blocked because multiple security threats were detected simultaneously.")
+@tags("category:semantic,detection:aggregate,surface:call-tool,posture:catch-all")
+@reject_message("Tool execution blocked: multiple concurrent security threats were detected.")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"call_tool",
@@ -137,23 +158,40 @@ when {
     context has threat_count && context.threat_count >= 3
 };
 `;
-const AI_GATEWAY_TOOLS_DEFAULT_CEDAR = `// =============================================================================
-// Tool Permissioning Policy (Default)
+const AI_GATEWAY_TOOLS_DEFAULTS_CEDAR = `// =============================================================================
+// Tool Permissioning (Default)
 // =============================================================================
-// Controls access to MCP tools based on risk scoring, threat detection,
-// and tool classification.
+// Blocks MCP tool calls based on risk scoring, threat detection, and tool
+// classification.
+//
+// Detection layers:
+//   - Computed risk score (tool_risk_score)
+//   - Detector category labels (tool_category, tool_is_sensitive)
+//   - Threat aggregation (threat_count, max_threat_severity)
+//   - Detection rule triggers (detected_threats)
+//
+// Context keys consumed:
+//   - tool_risk_score:      Long (0-100)
+//   - tool_category:        String
+//   - tool_is_sensitive:    Bool
+//   - threat_count:         Long
+//   - max_threat_severity:  Long (0-4)
+//   - detected_threats:     Set<String>
+//
+// Compliance:
+//   - OWASP LLM06, OWASP ASI02
+//   - MITRE T1059
 //
-// Category: tools
+// Category:  tools
 // Namespace: AIGateway
 // =============================================================================
 
-// Block tools with very high computed risk
-@id("tools-block-high-risk-score")
-@name("Block high-risk tool operations")
-@description("Block tool operations when the computed risk score exceeds 90/100")
+@id("tools.block-high-risk-score")
+@name("Block high-risk tools")
+@description("Blocks call_tool when tool_risk_score >= 90.")
 @severity("critical")
-@tags("tool-risk,security,owasp-llm06,owasp-asi02")
-@reject_message("Tool execution blocked: this operation scored 90+ on the risk assessment.")
+@tags("category:tools,detection:aggregate,surface:call-tool,owasp:llm06,owasp:asi02")
+@reject_message("Tool execution blocked: tool risk score is at or above 90/100.")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"call_tool",
@@ -163,13 +201,12 @@ when {
     context has tool_risk_score && context.tool_risk_score >= 90
 };
 
-// Block tools classified as dangerous
-@id("tools-block-dangerous-category")
+@id("tools.block-dangerous-category")
 @name("Block dangerous tool category")
-@description("Block all tools classified as dangerous by the detection engine")
+@description("Blocks call_tool when tool_category equals \\"dangerous\\".")
 @severity("critical")
-@tags("tool-category,dangerous,security,owasp-llm06")
-@reject_message("Tool execution blocked: this tool is classified as dangerous.")
+@tags("category:tools,detection:rule,surface:call-tool,owasp:llm06")
+@reject_message("Tool execution blocked: tool is classified as dangerous.")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"call_tool",
@@ -179,30 +216,28 @@ when {
     context has tool_category && context.tool_category == "dangerous"
 };
 
-// Block sensitive tools when threats are detected
-@id("tools-block-sensitive-with-threats")
+@id("tools.block-sensitive-with-threats")
 @name("Block sensitive tools with threats")
-@description("Block sensitive tools when any threats are detected concurrently")
+@description("Blocks call_tool when tool_is_sensitive is true and threat_count >= 1.")
 @severity("high")
-@tags("tool-category,sensitive,security,defense-in-depth")
-@reject_message("Sensitive tool execution blocked: threats were detected alongside a sensitive tool operation.")
+@tags("category:tools,detection:aggregate,surface:call-tool,owasp:llm06")
+@reject_message("Tool execution blocked: a sensitive tool was called while threats were detected.")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"call_tool",
     resource
 )
 when {
-    context has tool_is_sensitive && context.tool_is_sensitive &&
-    context has threat_count && context.threat_count > 0
+    context has tool_is_sensitive && context.tool_is_sensitive == true &&
+    context has threat_count && context.threat_count >= 1
 };
 
-// Block tool calls with high severity threats
-@id("tools-block-high-severity-threats")
-@name("Block tool calls with high severity threats")
-@description("Prevent tool execution when high or critical severity threats are detected")
+@id("tools.block-high-severity")
+@name("Block high-severity tool calls")
+@description("Blocks call_tool when threat_count >= 1 and max_threat_severity >= 3.")
 @severity("high")
-@tags("tools,threats,severity,security")
-@reject_message("Tool execution was blocked because high or critical severity threats were detected.")
+@tags("category:tools,detection:aggregate,surface:call-tool")
+@reject_message("Tool execution blocked: high or critical severity threats were detected.")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"call_tool",
@@ -210,15 +245,14 @@ forbid (
 )
 when {
     context has threat_count && context has max_threat_severity &&
-    context.threat_count > 0 && context.max_threat_severity >= 3
+    context.threat_count >= 1 && context.max_threat_severity >= 3
 };
 
-// Block detected command injection patterns
-@id("tools-block-command-injection")
-@name("Block command injection in tool calls")
-@description("Block tool calls when command injection patterns are detected in arguments")
+@id("tools.block-command-injection")
+@name("Block command injection")
+@description("Blocks call_tool when detected_threats contains \\"command_injection\\".")
 @severity("critical")
-@tags("command-injection,security,mitre-t1059,owasp-asi02")
+@tags("category:tools,threat:command-injection,detection:rule,surface:call-tool,mitre:t1059,owasp:asi02")
 @reject_message("Tool execution blocked: command injection pattern detected in tool arguments.")
 forbid (
     principal,
@@ -226,27 +260,44 @@ forbid (
     resource
 )
 when {
-    context has detected_threats &&
-    context.detected_threats.contains("command_injection")
+    context has detected_threats && context.detected_threats.contains("command_injection")
 };
 `;
-const AI_GATEWAY_AGENT_SECURITY_DEFAULT_CEDAR = `// =============================================================================
-// Agent Security Policy (Default)
+const AI_GATEWAY_AGENT_SECURITY_DEFAULTS_CEDAR = `// =============================================================================
+// Agent Security (Default)
 // =============================================================================
-// Detects and blocks tool poisoning, rug pull attacks, indirect prompt injection,
-// and MCP supply chain threats.
+// Blocks tool poisoning, rug pull behavioral drift, indirect prompt injection
+// from tool outputs, and MCP supply-chain risks (unverified servers, risky
+// configurations).
 //
-// Category: agent_security
+// Context keys consumed:
+//   - tool_poisoning_score:      Long (0-100)
+//   - rug_pull_score:            Long (0-100)
+//   - indirect_injection_score:  Long (0-100)
+//   - tool_is_sensitive:         Bool
+//   - mcp_server_verified:       Bool
+//   - mcp_config_risk:           Bool
+//   - mcp_risk_score:            Long (0-100)
+//   - threat_count:              Long
+//
+// Compliance:
+//   - OWASP LLM01, OWASP ASI01, OWASP ASI02, OWASP ASI04
+//   - OWASP MCP02, MCP03, MCP05
+//
+// Category:  agent-security
 // Namespace: AIGateway
 // =============================================================================
 
-// Block tool calls with tool poisoning risk
-@id("as-block-tool-poisoning")
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Section 1: Tool poisoning
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+@id("agent-security.block-tool-poisoning")
 @name("Block tool poisoning")
-@description("Block tool execution when hidden instructions are detected in tool descriptions or arguments (score >= 70)")
+@description("Blocks call_tool when tool_poisoning_score >= 70.")
 @severity("critical")
-@tags("tool-poisoning,agent-security,owasp-asi01")
-@reject_message("Tool execution blocked: hidden manipulation instructions detected in tool description or arguments (OWASP ASI01).")
+@tags("category:agent-security,threat:tool-poisoning,detection:ml,surface:call-tool,owasp:asi01")
+@reject_message("Tool execution blocked: hidden manipulation instructions detected (OWASP ASI01).")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"call_tool",
@@ -256,12 +307,11 @@ when {
     context has tool_poisoning_score && context.tool_poisoning_score >= 70
 };
 
-// Block MCP server connections with poisoning risk
-@id("as-block-server-poisoning")
+@id("agent-security.block-server-poisoning")
 @name("Block poisoned MCP servers")
-@description("Block connections to MCP servers when tool poisoning patterns are detected (score >= 60)")
+@description("Blocks connect_server when tool_poisoning_score >= 60.")
 @severity("critical")
-@tags("tool-poisoning,mcp-security,owasp-asi04,owasp-mcp02")
+@tags("category:agent-security,threat:tool-poisoning,detection:ml,surface:connect-server,owasp:asi04,owasp:mcp02")
 @reject_message("MCP server connection blocked: tool poisoning patterns detected in server tool descriptions.")
 forbid (
     principal,
@@ -272,13 +322,16 @@ when {
     context has tool_poisoning_score && context.tool_poisoning_score >= 60
 };
 
-// Block tool calls with behavioral drift (rug pull)
-@id("as-block-rug-pull")
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Section 2: Rug pull (behavioral drift)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+@id("agent-security.block-rug-pull")
 @name("Block rug pull attacks")
-@description("Block tool execution when behavioral drift is detected (score >= 70)")
+@description("Blocks call_tool and connect_server when rug_pull_score >= 70.")
 @severity("critical")
-@tags("rug-pull,agent-security,owasp-asi04")
-@reject_message("Tool execution blocked: tool behavior has changed significantly from its established pattern.")
+@tags("category:agent-security,threat:rug-pull,detection:ml,owasp:asi04")
+@reject_message("Tool execution blocked: tool behavior has drifted significantly from its established pattern.")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action in [AIGateway::Action::"call_tool", AIGateway::Action::"connect_server"],
@@ -288,12 +341,15 @@ when {
     context has rug_pull_score && context.rug_pull_score >= 70
 };
 
-// Block with indirect injection from tool outputs
-@id("as-block-indirect-injection")
-@name("Block indirect prompt injection")
-@description("Block when indirect prompt injection is detected in tool outputs (score >= 70)")
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Section 3: Indirect prompt injection
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+@id("agent-security.block-indirect-injection")
+@name("Block indirect injection")
+@description("Blocks call_tool and connect_server when indirect_injection_score >= 70.")
 @severity("critical")
-@tags("indirect-injection,owasp-llm01,owasp-asi01")
+@tags("category:agent-security,threat:indirect-injection,detection:ml,owasp:llm01,owasp:asi01")
 @reject_message("Content blocked: indirect prompt injection detected in tool output or retrieved content.")
 forbid (
     principal,
@@ -304,13 +360,12 @@ when {
     context has indirect_injection_score && context.indirect_injection_score >= 70
 };
 
-// Strict indirect injection for sensitive tool calls
-@id("as-block-indirect-injection-sensitive-tools")
+@id("agent-security.block-indirect-injection-sensitive")
 @name("Block indirect injection on sensitive tools")
-@description("Lower threshold (>= 50) for indirect injection when the tool is classified as sensitive")
+@description("Blocks call_tool when tool_is_sensitive is true and indirect_injection_score >= 50.")
 @severity("critical")
-@tags("indirect-injection,sensitive-tools,owasp-asi02")
-@reject_message("Sensitive tool execution blocked: moderate indirect injection risk detected.")
+@tags("category:agent-security,threat:indirect-injection,detection:ml,surface:call-tool,owasp:asi02")
+@reject_message("Tool execution blocked: a sensitive tool was called with moderate indirect-injection risk.")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"call_tool",
@@ -318,15 +373,18 @@ forbid (
 )
 when {
     context has indirect_injection_score && context.indirect_injection_score >= 50 &&
-    context has tool_is_sensitive && context.tool_is_sensitive
+    context has tool_is_sensitive && context.tool_is_sensitive == true
 };
 
-// Block unverified MCP server tool calls with detected threats
-@id("as-block-unverified-threats")
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Section 4: MCP supply chain & trust
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+@id("agent-security.block-unverified-threats")
 @name("Block unverified server threats")
-@description("Block tool calls from unverified MCP servers when any threat is detected")
+@description("Blocks call_tool when mcp_server_verified is false and threat_count >= 1.")
 @severity("high")
-@tags("mcp-trust,owasp-asi04,supply-chain")
+@tags("category:agent-security,threat:supply-chain,detection:aggregate,surface:call-tool,owasp:asi04")
 @reject_message("Tool execution blocked: the MCP server is unverified and security threats were detected.")
 forbid (
     principal,
@@ -335,15 +393,14 @@ forbid (
 )
 when {
     context has mcp_server_verified && context.mcp_server_verified == false &&
-    context has threat_count && context.threat_count > 0
+    context has threat_count && context.threat_count >= 1
 };
 
-// Block connections to MCP servers with risky configurations
-@id("as-block-mcp-config-risk")
+@id("agent-security.block-mcp-config-risk")
 @name("Block risky MCP server configs")
-@description("Block MCP server connections when risky configuration patterns are detected (score >= 70)")
+@description("Blocks connect_server when mcp_config_risk is true and mcp_risk_score >= 70.")
 @severity("high")
-@tags("mcp-config,owasp-mcp03,supply-chain")
+@tags("category:agent-security,threat:mcp-config-risk,detection:ml,surface:connect-server,owasp:mcp03")
 @reject_message("MCP server connection blocked: risky server configuration detected.")
 forbid (
     principal,
@@ -351,16 +408,15 @@ forbid (
     resource
 )
 when {
-    context has mcp_config_risk && context.mcp_config_risk &&
+    context has mcp_config_risk && context.mcp_config_risk == true &&
     context has mcp_risk_score && context.mcp_risk_score >= 70
 };
 
-// Block connections to unverified MCP servers
-@id("as-block-unverified-server-connect")
+@id("agent-security.block-unverified-server")
 @name("Block unverified MCP server connections")
-@description("Block connections to MCP servers that are not from a verified registry")
+@description("Blocks connect_server when mcp_server_verified is false.")
 @severity("high")
-@tags("mcp-trust,owasp-asi04,owasp-mcp05,supply-chain")
+@tags("category:agent-security,threat:supply-chain,detection:rule,surface:connect-server,owasp:asi04,owasp:mcp05")
 @reject_message("MCP server connection blocked: server is not from a verified registry.")
 forbid (
     principal,
@@ -371,18 +427,25 @@ when {
     context has mcp_server_verified && context.mcp_server_verified == false
 };
 `;
-const AI_GATEWAY_TOOLS_MCP_ALLOWLIST_CEDAR = `// MCP Server Allowlist Template
-// Only allow specific MCP servers to be used
-// Category: tools
+const AI_GATEWAY_TOOLS_MCP_SERVER_ALLOWLIST_CEDAR = `// =============================================================================
+// MCP Server Allowlist
+// =============================================================================
+// Restricts MCP server connections to a pre-approved list. Customize the
+// \`context.mcp_server\` values in the permit rule to match the allowed
+// servers for your environment.
 //
-// NOTE: Users should customize the mcp_server values in the permit rule
-// to match their allowed servers before deploying this template.
+// Context keys consumed:
+//   - mcp_server: String
+//
+// Category:  tools
+// Namespace: AIGateway
+// =============================================================================
 
-@id("mcp-allowlist-permit")
-@name("Allow specific MCP servers")
-@description("Only allow connections to pre-approved MCP servers (customize the list)")
+@id("tools.allow-mcp-allowlist")
+@name("Allow allowlisted MCP servers")
+@description("Permits connect_server when mcp_server is in the allowlist.")
 @severity("medium")
-@tags("mcp,allowlist,server,governance")
+@tags("category:tools,surface:connect-server,scope:org-wide,posture:deny-default")
 permit (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"connect_server",
@@ -391,14 +454,15 @@ permit (
 when {
     context has mcp_server &&
     (context.mcp_server == "filesystem" ||
-    context.mcp_server == "playwright")
+     context.mcp_server == "playwright")
 };
 
-@id("mcp-allowlist-deny")
-@name("Deny unallowed MCP servers")
-@description("Block all MCP server connections not in the allowlist")
+@id("tools.deny-non-allowlisted-mcp")
+@name("Block non-allowlisted MCP servers")
+@description("Blocks connect_server unconditionally so only the allowlist permit applies.")
 @severity("medium")
-@tags("mcp,deny-default,server")
+@tags("category:tools,surface:connect-server,scope:org-wide,posture:deny-default")
+@reject_message("MCP server connection blocked: server is not on the allowlist.")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"connect_server",
@@ -406,81 +470,92 @@ forbid (
 );
 `;
 const AI_GATEWAY_TOOLS_MCP_TOOL_PERMISSIONS_CEDAR = `// =============================================================================
-// MCP Tool Permissions Template (AIGateway)
+// MCP Tool Permissions
 // =============================================================================
-// Per-tool access control for MCP servers.
-// Complements the MCP Server Allowlist (connect_server action)
-// with fine-grained per-tool control on call_tool action.
+// Per-tool access control for MCP servers. Complements MCP Server Allowlist
+// (which gates connect_server) with fine-grained control on call_tool.
+//
+// Ships permit-all by default plus two opt-in safety rails (exclude
+// untrusted/deprecated servers, block unverified servers). Add additional
+// forbid rules to gate specific servers or tools.
 //
-// Defaults to permit-all. Customize per-tool gating by adding forbid rules
-// scoped to specific mcp_server / tool_name combinations.
+// Context keys consumed:
+//   - mcp_server:           String
+//   - mcp_server_verified:  Bool
 //
-// Category: tools
+// Category:  tools
 // Namespace: AIGateway
 // =============================================================================
 
-// -- Permit all MCP tool calls (opt-in default) -----------------------------
-
-@id("mcp-tool-allow-all")
-@name("Allow all MCP tool calls")
-@description("Permit every call_tool action. Add forbid rules below for per-tool gating.")
+@id("tools.allow-mcp-tools-baseline")
+@name("Permit MCP tool calls")
+@description("Permits all call_tool actions; combine with forbid rules for gating.")
 @severity("low")
-@tags("mcp,permit-default")
+@tags("category:tools,surface:call-tool,posture:permit-default")
 permit (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"call_tool",
     resource
 );
 
-// -- Organization-wide MCP server exclusions --------------------------------
-
-@id("mcp-tool-exclude-server")
-@name("Exclude specific MCP servers")
-@description("Block all tool calls from excluded MCP servers (org-wide exclusion list)")
+@id("tools.exclude-mcp-servers")
+@name("Block excluded MCP servers")
+@description("Blocks call_tool when mcp_server is in the org-wide exclusion list.")
 @severity("critical")
-@tags("mcp,exclusion,org-wide,block")
+@tags("category:tools,surface:call-tool,scope:org-wide,posture:deny-default")
+@reject_message("Tool execution blocked: MCP server is on the org-wide exclusion list.")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"call_tool",
     resource
-) when {
+)
+when {
     context has mcp_server &&
     (context.mcp_server == "untrusted-server" ||
      context.mcp_server == "deprecated-server")
 };
 
-// -- Block unverified MCP servers -------------------------------------------
-
-@id("mcp-tool-block-unverified")
-@name("Block tools from unverified MCP servers")
-@description("Deny tool calls from MCP servers not in the verified registry")
+@id("tools.block-unverified-mcp-tools")
+@name("Block unverified MCP server tools")
+@description("Blocks call_tool when mcp_server_verified is false.")
 @severity("high")
-@tags("mcp,trust,verification")
+@tags("category:tools,threat:supply-chain,detection:rule,surface:call-tool")
+@reject_message("Tool execution blocked: MCP server is not from a verified registry.")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"call_tool",
     resource
-) when {
+)
+when {
     context has mcp_server_verified && context.mcp_server_verified == false
 };
 `;
-const AI_GATEWAY_DATA_PII_REDACTION_CEDAR = `// =============================================================================
-// PII Redaction Policy
+const AI_GATEWAY_DATA_PROTECTION_PII_REDACTION_CEDAR = `// =============================================================================
+// PII & Secrets Redaction
 // =============================================================================
-// Block or redact requests containing personally identifiable information.
-// Covers all AI Gateway actions (MCP tool calls, LLM prompts, file ops).
+// Blocks AI Gateway operations when personally identifiable information or
+// secrets are detected in the content. Covers both LLM prompt processing
+// and MCP tool calls, plus a bulk-exposure catch-all.
+//
+// Context keys consumed:
+//   - pii_detected:      Bool
+//   - secrets_detected:  Bool
+//   - pii_count:         Long
 //
-// Category: data_protection
+// Compliance:
+//   - OWASP LLM06
+//   - GDPR, HIPAA (depending on data classification)
+//
+// Category:  data-protection
 // Namespace: AIGateway
 // =============================================================================
 
-// Block requests with PII detected
-@id("data-block-pii")
-@name("Block PII in requests")
-@description("Block any AI Gateway operation when PII is detected in the content")
+@id("data-protection.block-pii")
+@name("Block PII in prompts")
+@description("Blocks process_prompt when pii_detected is true.")
 @severity("high")
-@tags("pii,data-protection,owasp-llm06,dlp")
-@reject_message("Request was blocked because personally identifiable information (PII) was detected. Remove sensitive data before retrying.")
+@tags("category:data-protection,threat:pii,detection:rule,surface:process-prompt,owasp:llm06")
+@reject_message("Prompt blocked: personally identifiable information was detected — remove sensitive data and retry.")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"process_prompt",
@@ -490,29 +565,27 @@ when {
     context has pii_detected && context.pii_detected == true
 };
 
-// Block requests with secrets/credentials
-@id("data-block-secrets")
-@name("Block secrets in requests")
-@description("Block any AI Gateway operation when secrets or credentials are detected")
+@id("data-protection.block-secrets")
+@name("Block secrets in prompts")
+@description("Blocks process_prompt when secrets_detected is true.")
 @severity("critical")
-@tags("secrets,data-protection,credentials,dlp")
-@reject_message("Request was blocked because secrets or credentials were detected in the content. Remove sensitive credentials before retrying.")
+@tags("category:data-protection,threat:secrets,detection:rule,surface:process-prompt")
+@reject_message("Prompt blocked: secrets or credentials were detected — remove sensitive data and retry.")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"process_prompt",
     resource
 )
 when {
-    context has contains_secrets && context.contains_secrets == true
+    context has secrets_detected && context.secrets_detected == true
 };
 
-// Block MCP tool calls with PII
-@id("data-block-pii-tools")
+@id("data-protection.block-pii-tools")
 @name("Block PII in tool calls")
-@description("Block MCP tool execution when PII is detected in tool arguments")
+@description("Blocks call_tool when pii_detected is true.")
 @severity("high")
-@tags("pii,tools,data-protection,dlp")
-@reject_message("Tool call was blocked because PII was detected in the arguments.")
+@tags("category:data-protection,threat:pii,detection:rule,surface:call-tool,owasp:llm06")
+@reject_message("Tool execution blocked: personally identifiable information was detected in tool arguments.")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"call_tool",
@@ -522,29 +595,27 @@ when {
     context has pii_detected && context.pii_detected == true
 };
 
-// Block MCP tool calls with secrets
-@id("data-block-secrets-tools")
+@id("data-protection.block-secrets-tools")
 @name("Block secrets in tool calls")
-@description("Block MCP tool execution when secrets or credentials are detected")
+@description("Blocks call_tool when secrets_detected is true.")
 @severity("critical")
-@tags("secrets,tools,data-protection,dlp")
-@reject_message("Tool call was blocked because secrets were detected in the arguments.")
+@tags("category:data-protection,threat:secrets,detection:rule,surface:call-tool")
+@reject_message("Tool execution blocked: secrets or credentials were detected in tool arguments.")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"call_tool",
     resource
 )
 when {
-    context has contains_secrets && context.contains_secrets == true
+    context has secrets_detected && context.secrets_detected == true
 };
 
-// Block bulk PII exposure (3+ PII matches)
-@id("data-block-bulk-pii")
+@id("data-protection.block-pii-bulk")
 @name("Block bulk PII exposure")
-@description("Block operations with 3 or more PII matches -- indicates data dump or exfiltration attempt")
+@description("Blocks any action when pii_count >= 3.")
 @severity("critical")
-@tags("pii,bulk,data-protection,exfiltration")
-@reject_message("Request was blocked because multiple PII matches were detected, indicating potential data exfiltration.")
+@tags("category:data-protection,threat:exfiltration,detection:aggregate,posture:catch-all")
+@reject_message("Request blocked: multiple PII matches were detected — possible data exfiltration.")
 forbid (
     principal,
     action,
@@ -554,23 +625,22 @@ when {
     context has pii_count && context.pii_count >= 3
 };
 `;
-const AI_GATEWAY_LLM_DEFAULT_ALLOW_CEDAR = `// =============================================================================
-// Default Allow LLM Proxy Calls
+const AI_GATEWAY_ORGANIZATION_PERMIT_LLM_DEFAULT_CEDAR = `// =============================================================================
+// LLM Default Allow
 // =============================================================================
-// Permits all LLM prompt processing by default. Deploy this alongside
-// threat-specific forbid policies to create a "default allow, block on threat"
-// posture for LLM chat completions.
+// Permits all LLM prompt processing by default. Deploy alongside threat-specific
+// forbid policies to create a "default allow, block on threat" posture for LLM
+// chat completions.
 //
-// Category: organization
+// Category:  organization
 // Namespace: AIGateway
 // =============================================================================
 
-// Allow all LLM prompt processing by default
-@id("llm-permit-all-prompts")
-@name("Allow all LLM proxy calls")
-@description("Permits all LLM chat completion requests by default -- threat-specific forbid policies override this when threats are detected")
+@id("organization.permit-llm-default")
+@name("Permit LLM proxy calls")
+@description("Permits all process_prompt actions for the LLM proxy.")
 @severity("low")
-@tags("llm,permit-default,organization,proxy")
+@tags("category:organization,surface:process-prompt,posture:permit-default")
 permit (
     principal,
     action == AIGateway::Action::"process_prompt",
@@ -581,25 +651,24 @@ permit (
 // CATEGORIES
 // =============================================================================
 export const AI_GATEWAY_CATEGORIES = [
-    { id: 'semantic', name: 'Semantic Threat Detection', description: 'Detect and block prompt injection, jailbreak attempts, and high-severity AI security threats' },
-    { id: 'tools', name: 'Tool Permissioning', description: 'Control access to MCP tools, enforce risk scoring, and manage per-tool permissions' },
-    { id: 'agent_security', name: 'Agent Security', description: 'Detect and block tool poisoning, rug pull attacks, indirect prompt injection, and MCP supply chain threats' },
-    { id: 'data_protection', name: 'Data Protection', description: 'Prevent secrets and PII leakage in LLM chat completions and MCP operations' },
-    { id: 'content_safety', name: 'Content Safety', description: 'Enforce content moderation score thresholds on LLM prompts and MCP content' },
-    { id: 'organization', name: 'Organization Rules', description: 'Apply organization-wide policy baselines for AI gateway operations' },
+    { id: 'semantic', name: 'Semantic Threat Detection', description: 'Detect and block prompt injection, jailbreak attempts, and high-severity AI security threats.' },
+    { id: 'tools', name: 'Tool Permissioning', description: 'Control access to MCP tools, enforce risk scoring, and manage per-tool permissions.' },
+    { id: 'agent-security', name: 'Agent Security', description: 'Detect tool poisoning, rug pull attacks, indirect prompt injection, and MCP supply chain threats.' },
+    { id: 'data-protection', name: 'Data Protection', description: 'Prevent secrets and PII leakage in LLM chat completions and MCP operations.' },
+    { id: 'organization', name: 'Organization', description: 'Organization-wide baselines and default permit policies.' },
 ];
 // =============================================================================
 // DEFAULT POLICIES
 // =============================================================================
 export const AI_GATEWAY_DEFAULTS = [
     {
-        id: 'baseline-default',
+        id: 'organization.permit-baseline',
         name: 'Baseline Permit',
-        description: 'Permits all actions by default -- threat-specific forbid policies override this when threats are detected',
+        description: 'Permits all actions by default; threat-specific forbid policies override this when detectors fire.',
         category: 'organization',
-        cedarText: AI_GATEWAY_BASELINE_DEFAULT_CEDAR,
+        cedarText: AI_GATEWAY_ORGANIZATION_PERMIT_BASELINE_CEDAR,
         severity: 'low',
-        tags: ['baseline', 'permit-default', 'organization'],
+        tags: ['category:organization', 'posture:permit-default'],
         isActive: true,
     },
 ];
@@ -608,77 +677,77 @@ export const AI_GATEWAY_DEFAULTS = [
 // =============================================================================
 export const AI_GATEWAY_TEMPLATES = [
     {
-        id: 'baseline-default',
+        id: 'organization.permit-baseline',
         name: 'Baseline Permit',
-        description: 'Permits all actions by default -- threat-specific forbid policies override this when threats are detected',
+        description: 'Permits all actions by default; threat-specific forbid policies override this when detectors fire.',
         category: 'organization',
-        cedarText: AI_GATEWAY_BASELINE_DEFAULT_CEDAR,
+        cedarText: AI_GATEWAY_ORGANIZATION_PERMIT_BASELINE_CEDAR,
         severity: 'low',
-        tags: ['baseline', 'permit-default', 'organization'],
+        tags: ['category:organization', 'posture:permit-default'],
         autoDeploy: true,
     },
     {
-        id: 'semantic-default',
+        id: 'semantic.defaults',
         name: 'Semantic Threat Detection',
-        description: 'Detect and block prompt injection, jailbreak attempts, and high-severity threats in MCP tool calls and LLM prompts',
+        description: 'Block prompt injection, jailbreak attempts, and high-severity threats in MCP tool calls and LLM prompts.',
         category: 'semantic',
-        cedarText: AI_GATEWAY_SEMANTIC_DEFAULT_CEDAR,
+        cedarText: AI_GATEWAY_SEMANTIC_DEFAULTS_CEDAR,
         severity: 'critical',
-        tags: ['prompt-injection', 'jailbreak', 'owasp-llm01', 'owasp-llm02', 'security'],
+        tags: ['category:semantic', 'threat:injection', 'threat:jailbreak', 'owasp:llm01', 'owasp:llm02'],
     },
     {
-        id: 'tools-default',
+        id: 'tools.defaults',
         name: 'Tool Permissioning',
-        description: 'Enforce tool risk scoring, block dangerous tools, and detect command injection in MCP tool arguments',
+        description: 'Enforce tool risk scoring, block dangerous tools, and detect command injection in MCP tool arguments.',
         category: 'tools',
-        cedarText: AI_GATEWAY_TOOLS_DEFAULT_CEDAR,
+        cedarText: AI_GATEWAY_TOOLS_DEFAULTS_CEDAR,
         severity: 'critical',
-        tags: ['tool-risk', 'command-injection', 'owasp-llm06', 'owasp-asi02'],
+        tags: ['category:tools', 'threat:command-injection', 'owasp:llm06', 'owasp:asi02'],
     },
     {
-        id: 'agent-security-default',
+        id: 'agent-security.defaults',
         name: 'Agent Security',
-        description: 'Detect and block tool poisoning, rug pull attacks, indirect prompt injection, and MCP supply chain threats',
-        category: 'agent_security',
-        cedarText: AI_GATEWAY_AGENT_SECURITY_DEFAULT_CEDAR,
+        description: 'Block tool poisoning, rug pull attacks, indirect prompt injection, and MCP supply chain threats.',
+        category: 'agent-security',
+        cedarText: AI_GATEWAY_AGENT_SECURITY_DEFAULTS_CEDAR,
         severity: 'critical',
-        tags: ['tool-poisoning', 'rug-pull', 'indirect-injection', 'mcp-security', 'owasp-asi01', 'owasp-asi04'],
+        tags: ['category:agent-security', 'threat:tool-poisoning', 'threat:rug-pull', 'threat:indirect-injection', 'threat:supply-chain', 'owasp:asi01', 'owasp:asi04'],
     },
     {
-        id: 'tools-mcp-allowlist',
+        id: 'tools.mcp-server-allowlist',
         name: 'MCP Server Allowlist',
-        description: 'Only allow specific MCP servers to be used',
+        description: 'Only allow specific MCP servers to be used; customize the allowlist in the permit rule.',
         category: 'tools',
-        cedarText: AI_GATEWAY_TOOLS_MCP_ALLOWLIST_CEDAR,
+        cedarText: AI_GATEWAY_TOOLS_MCP_SERVER_ALLOWLIST_CEDAR,
         severity: 'medium',
-        tags: ['mcp', 'allowlist', 'whitelist'],
+        tags: ['category:tools', 'scope:org-wide', 'posture:deny-default'],
     },
     {
-        id: 'tools-mcp-tool-permissions',
+        id: 'tools.mcp-tool-permissions',
         name: 'MCP Tool Permissions',
-        description: 'Permit every MCP call_tool by default. Ships two opt-in safety rails (block untrusted/deprecated servers, block unverified servers). Add forbid rules for per-tool or per-server gating.',
+        description: 'Permit MCP call_tool by default plus two safety rails (server exclusion list, block unverified servers); add forbid rules for per-tool gating.',
         category: 'tools',
         cedarText: AI_GATEWAY_TOOLS_MCP_TOOL_PERMISSIONS_CEDAR,
-        severity: 'low',
-        tags: ['mcp', 'tools', 'permit-default', 'exclusion'],
+        severity: 'critical',
+        tags: ['category:tools', 'threat:supply-chain', 'posture:permit-default'],
     },
     {
-        id: 'data-pii-redaction',
+        id: 'data-protection.pii-redaction',
         name: 'PII & Secrets Redaction',
-        description: 'Block requests containing PII or secrets across LLM prompts and MCP tool calls -- prevents data leakage and credential exposure',
-        category: 'data_protection',
-        cedarText: AI_GATEWAY_DATA_PII_REDACTION_CEDAR,
-        severity: 'high',
-        tags: ['pii', 'secrets', 'data-protection', 'dlp', 'owasp-llm06'],
+        description: 'Block requests containing PII or secrets across LLM prompts and MCP tool calls.',
+        category: 'data-protection',
+        cedarText: AI_GATEWAY_DATA_PROTECTION_PII_REDACTION_CEDAR,
+        severity: 'critical',
+        tags: ['category:data-protection', 'threat:pii', 'threat:secrets', 'threat:exfiltration', 'owasp:llm06'],
     },
     {
-        id: 'llm-default-allow',
-        name: 'Default Allow LLM Proxy',
-        description: 'Permit all LLM chat completion requests by default -- deploy alongside threat-specific forbid policies for a default-allow posture',
+        id: 'organization.permit-llm-default',
+        name: 'Permit LLM proxy calls',
+        description: 'Permit all LLM chat completion requests by default; deploy alongside threat-specific forbids for a permit-default posture.',
         category: 'organization',
-        cedarText: AI_GATEWAY_LLM_DEFAULT_ALLOW_CEDAR,
+        cedarText: AI_GATEWAY_ORGANIZATION_PERMIT_LLM_DEFAULT_CEDAR,
         severity: 'low',
-        tags: ['llm', 'permit-default', 'proxy', 'organization'],
+        tags: ['category:organization', 'surface:process-prompt', 'posture:permit-default'],
     },
 ];
 // =============================================================================
@@ -687,125 +756,120 @@ export const AI_GATEWAY_TEMPLATES = [
 /** Raw templates.json metadata for the AiGateway service. */
 export const AI_GATEWAY_TEMPLATES_JSON = `{
   "service": "ai_gateway",
-  "version": "2.0.0",
-  "description": "AIGateway policy templates for MCP + LLM gateway security",
+  "version": "2.1.0",
+  "description": "AI Gateway policy templates for MCP + LLM gateway security",
   "categories": [
     {
       "id": "semantic",
       "name": "Semantic Threat Detection",
-      "description": "Detect and block prompt injection, jailbreak attempts, and high-severity AI security threats"
+      "description": "Detect and block prompt injection, jailbreak attempts, and high-severity AI security threats."
     },
     {
       "id": "tools",
       "name": "Tool Permissioning",
-      "description": "Control access to MCP tools, enforce risk scoring, and manage per-tool permissions"
+      "description": "Control access to MCP tools, enforce risk scoring, and manage per-tool permissions."
     },
     {
-      "id": "agent_security",
+      "id": "agent-security",
       "name": "Agent Security",
-      "description": "Detect and block tool poisoning, rug pull attacks, indirect prompt injection, and MCP supply chain threats"
+      "description": "Detect tool poisoning, rug pull attacks, indirect prompt injection, and MCP supply chain threats."
     },
     {
-      "id": "data_protection",
+      "id": "data-protection",
       "name": "Data Protection",
-      "description": "Prevent secrets and PII leakage in LLM chat completions and MCP operations"
-    },
-    {
-      "id": "content_safety",
-      "name": "Content Safety",
-      "description": "Enforce content moderation score thresholds on LLM prompts and MCP content"
+      "description": "Prevent secrets and PII leakage in LLM chat completions and MCP operations."
     },
     {
       "id": "organization",
-      "name": "Organization Rules",
-      "description": "Apply organization-wide policy baselines for AI gateway operations"
+      "name": "Organization",
+      "description": "Organization-wide baselines and default permit policies."
     }
   ],
   "defaults": [
     {
-      "id": "baseline-default",
+      "id": "organization.permit-baseline",
       "name": "Baseline Permit",
-      "description": "Permits all actions by default -- threat-specific forbid policies override this when threats are detected",
+      "description": "Permits all actions by default; threat-specific forbid policies override this when detectors fire.",
       "category": "organization",
       "file": "defaults/baseline.cedar",
       "severity": "low",
-      "tags": ["baseline", "permit-default", "organization"],
+      "tags": ["category:organization", "posture:permit-default"],
       "is_active": true
     }
   ],
   "templates": [
     {
-      "id": "baseline-default",
+      "id": "organization.permit-baseline",
       "name": "Baseline Permit",
-      "description": "Permits all actions by default -- threat-specific forbid policies override this when threats are detected",
+      "description": "Permits all actions by default; threat-specific forbid policies override this when detectors fire.",
       "category": "organization",
       "file": "defaults/baseline.cedar",
       "severity": "low",
-      "tags": ["baseline", "permit-default", "organization"],
+      "tags": ["category:organization", "posture:permit-default"],
       "auto_deploy": true
     },
     {
-      "id": "semantic-default",
+      "id": "semantic.defaults",
       "name": "Semantic Threat Detection",
-      "description": "Detect and block prompt injection, jailbreak attempts, and high-severity threats in MCP tool calls and LLM prompts",
+      "description": "Block prompt injection, jailbreak attempts, and high-severity threats in MCP tool calls and LLM prompts.",
       "category": "semantic",
       "file": "defaults/semantic.cedar",
       "severity": "critical",
-      "tags": ["prompt-injection", "jailbreak", "owasp-llm01", "owasp-llm02", "security"]
+      "tags": ["category:semantic", "threat:injection", "threat:jailbreak", "owasp:llm01", "owasp:llm02"]
     },
     {
-      "id": "tools-default",
+      "id": "tools.defaults",
       "name": "Tool Permissioning",
-      "description": "Enforce tool risk scoring, block dangerous tools, and detect command injection in MCP tool arguments",
+      "description": "Enforce tool risk scoring, block dangerous tools, and detect command injection in MCP tool arguments.",
       "category": "tools",
       "file": "defaults/tools.cedar",
       "severity": "critical",
-      "tags": ["tool-risk", "command-injection", "owasp-llm06", "owasp-asi02"]
+      "tags": ["category:tools", "threat:command-injection", "owasp:llm06", "owasp:asi02"]
     },
     {
-      "id": "agent-security-default",
+      "id": "agent-security.defaults",
       "name": "Agent Security",
-      "description": "Detect and block tool poisoning, rug pull attacks, indirect prompt injection, and MCP supply chain threats",
-      "category": "agent_security",
+      "description": "Block tool poisoning, rug pull attacks, indirect prompt injection, and MCP supply chain threats.",
+      "category": "agent-security",
       "file": "defaults/agent_security.cedar",
       "severity": "critical",
-      "tags": ["tool-poisoning", "rug-pull", "indirect-injection", "mcp-security", "owasp-asi01", "owasp-asi04"]
+      "tags": ["category:agent-security", "threat:tool-poisoning", "threat:rug-pull", "threat:indirect-injection", "threat:supply-chain", "owasp:asi01", "owasp:asi04"]
     },
     {
-      "id": "tools-mcp-allowlist",
+      "id": "tools.mcp-server-allowlist",
       "name": "MCP Server Allowlist",
-      "description": "Only allow specific MCP servers to be used",
+      "description": "Only allow specific MCP servers to be used; customize the allowlist in the permit rule.",
       "category": "tools",
       "file": "mcp_server_allowlist.cedar",
       "severity": "medium",
-      "tags": ["mcp", "allowlist", "whitelist"]
+      "tags": ["category:tools", "scope:org-wide", "posture:deny-default"]
     },
     {
-      "id": "tools-mcp-tool-permissions",
+      "id": "tools.mcp-tool-permissions",
       "name": "MCP Tool Permissions",
-      "description": "Permit every MCP call_tool by default. Ships two opt-in safety rails (block untrusted/deprecated servers, block unverified servers). Add forbid rules for per-tool or per-server gating.",
+      "description": "Permit MCP call_tool by default plus two safety rails (server exclusion list, block unverified servers); add forbid rules for per-tool gating.",
       "category": "tools",
       "file": "mcp_tool_permissions.cedar",
-      "severity": "low",
-      "tags": ["mcp", "tools", "permit-default", "exclusion"]
+      "severity": "critical",
+      "tags": ["category:tools", "threat:supply-chain", "posture:permit-default"]
     },
     {
-      "id": "data-pii-redaction",
+      "id": "data-protection.pii-redaction",
       "name": "PII & Secrets Redaction",
-      "description": "Block requests containing PII or secrets across LLM prompts and MCP tool calls -- prevents data leakage and credential exposure",
-      "category": "data_protection",
+      "description": "Block requests containing PII or secrets across LLM prompts and MCP tool calls.",
+      "category": "data-protection",
       "file": "pii_redaction.cedar",
-      "severity": "high",
-      "tags": ["pii", "secrets", "data-protection", "dlp", "owasp-llm06"]
+      "severity": "critical",
+      "tags": ["category:data-protection", "threat:pii", "threat:secrets", "threat:exfiltration", "owasp:llm06"]
     },
     {
-      "id": "llm-default-allow",
-      "name": "Default Allow LLM Proxy",
-      "description": "Permit all LLM chat completion requests by default -- deploy alongside threat-specific forbid policies for a default-allow posture",
+      "id": "organization.permit-llm-default",
+      "name": "Permit LLM proxy calls",
+      "description": "Permit all LLM chat completion requests by default; deploy alongside threat-specific forbids for a permit-default posture.",
       "category": "organization",
       "file": "llm_default_allow.cedar",
       "severity": "low",
-      "tags": ["llm", "permit-default", "proxy", "organization"]
+      "tags": ["category:organization", "surface:process-prompt", "posture:permit-default"]
     }
   ]
 }