@haven_ai/signer 0.5.0-alpha.1 → 0.7.0-alpha.0

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -251,6 +251,13 @@ interface SignerCompatibility {
      * never a second literal.
      */
     direct_sign_context_versions: number[];
+    /**
+     * #3329: `task_sign_context_version`s this signer will fetch and verify
+     * from `GET /task-budgets/:id/sign-context` — derived from
+     * `SUPPORTED_TASK_SIGN_CONTEXT_VERSIONS`, never a second literal, same
+     * discipline as `direct_sign_context_versions`.
+     */
+    task_sign_context_versions: number[];
 }
 /** The supported sets this signer enforces, as a plain serialisable object. */
 declare function signerCompatibility(): SignerCompatibility;
@@ -481,6 +488,26 @@ declare const SIGNER_HOSTED_HANDOFF_SHAPES: {
     };
 };
 
+/**
+ * The signer's wire identity. Declared HERE, in the tools/handlers module —
+ * `server.ts` (the MCP wiring) imports them from this module, keeping the
+ * import graph one-directional (tools.ts ← server.ts, never the reverse);
+ * `server.ts` re-exports them, so the package's public API is unchanged.
+ */
+declare const SIGNER_NAME = "@haven_ai/signer";
+declare const SIGNER_VERSION = "0.7.0-alpha.0";
+/**
+ * #3419: the marker the tool layer prefixes the undeclared-argument refusal
+ * with. The strict re-parse lives in THIS module (`parseStrictFor`, below) —
+ * the same module as the `normalizeError` branch that shapes the refusal — so
+ * the marker, the message and the structured fields are one unit and cannot
+ * drift. The registration in `server.ts` is passthrough (the issue's "schema
+ * that keeps unknown keys"): the SDK layer lets an undeclared key through and
+ * the tool layer refuses it here, where the full structured refusal
+ * (`UNSUPPORTED_ARGUMENT` with `unknown_arguments`, `signer_version`,
+ * `fallback`) is still expressible as JSON on the result.
+ */
+declare const UNSUPPORTED_ARGUMENT_MARKER = "HavenSignerUnsupportedArgument:";
 /**
  * Local signer tool set. These run on the agent's machine, next to the key,
  * and pair with the hosted server's construct/relay tools (#183). They sign;
@@ -604,6 +631,8 @@ declare const toolSchemas: {
         }>>;
         readonly typed_data: z$1.ZodOptional<z$1.ZodRecord<z$1.ZodString, z$1.ZodUnknown>>;
         readonly typed_data_b64: z$1.ZodOptional<z$1.ZodString>;
+        readonly task_budget_id: z$1.ZodOptional<z$1.ZodString>;
+        readonly sub_budget_id: z$1.ZodOptional<z$1.ZodString>;
     };
     readonly haven_x402_sign_header: {
         readonly payment_required: z$1.ZodRecord<z$1.ZodString, z$1.ZodUnknown>;
@@ -719,6 +748,14 @@ interface ToolFailure {
      * field for every sign-context refusal (`'typed_data_b64'`).
      */
     fallback?: string;
+    /**
+     * #3419: present on `UNSUPPORTED_ARGUMENT` — the undeclared top-level
+     * argument names the caller sent (the strict schema's `unrecognized_keys`),
+     * so an agent can see exactly what this signer does not accept.
+     */
+    unknown_arguments?: string[];
+    /** #3419: present on `UNSUPPORTED_ARGUMENT` — this signer's own package version. */
+    signer_version?: string;
     /**
      * #3001: present on `SIGN_CONTEXT_REFUSED` — the HTTP status the backend
      * answered the sign-context fetch with (404, 410, …) — the x402 fetch, or
@@ -727,7 +764,7 @@ interface ToolFailure {
     http_status?: number;
     /** #3001: the backend's own `error_code` on `SIGN_CONTEXT_REFUSED` (`expired`, `already_executed`, `not_signable`, `sign_context_unavailable`, and since #3303 `client_outdated`). */
     backend_error_code?: string;
-    /** #3303: on `client_outdated`, the backend's update hint — `upgrade_command` is what updates this signer. */
+    /** #3303: on `client_outdated`, the backend's update hint — `upgrade_command` starts the update (the doctor, then its repair line — #3412). */
     client_update?: HavenClientUpdate;
 }
 type ToolPayload<T = unknown> = ToolSuccess<T> | ToolFailure;
@@ -775,8 +812,6 @@ declare function computeSignerConsentHash(input: SignerConsentInput): string;
 declare function renderSignerConsentBlock(input: SignerConsentInput, hash: string): string;
 declare function ensureSignerConsent(input: SignerConsentInput, options?: SignerConsentOptions): Promise<SignerConsentDecision>;
 
-declare const SIGNER_NAME = "@haven_ai/signer";
-declare const SIGNER_VERSION = "0.5.0-alpha.1";
 interface SignerOptions {
     /** Path to a Haven credential JSON file (delegate_key is read from it). */
     credentialsPath?: string;
@@ -841,4 +876,4 @@ declare function assertSupportedNodeVersion(nodeVersion?: string): void;
 declare function runSignerStdioServer(options?: SignerOptions): Promise<void>;
 declare function runSignerConsentGate(signer: EdgeSigner, credentials: SignerCredentials | undefined, options: SignerOptions): Promise<SignerConsentDecision>;
 
-export { AUDIT_ROTATE_BYTES, type AppendAuditOptions, type EdgeSigner, OWNER_ONLY_MODE, type PermissionLog, type PermissiveFile, type ResolvedSignerRuntime, SIGNER_ACK_ENV, SIGNER_CAPABILITY_KEY, SIGNER_HOSTED_HANDOFF_SHAPES, SIGNER_NAME, SIGNER_VERSION, SUPPORTED_SWEEP_BINDING_VERSIONS, SUPPORTED_X402_EXPECTED_VERSIONS, type SignerCompatibility, type SignerConsentDecision, type SignerConsentInput, type SignerConsentOptions, type SignerCredentials, type SignerOptions, type SignerToolName, type SigningAuditContext, type SigningAuditEntry, type TightenOutcome, type ToolFailure, type ToolPayload, type ToolSuccess, type X402ExpectedPayment, type X402FundingSignatureResult, type X402HeaderResult, appendSigningAuditEntry, assertSupportedBindingVersion, assertSupportedNodeVersion, assertX402MatchesExpected, buildSignerMcpServer, computeSignerConsentHash, createEdgeSigner, createSigningAuditEntry, createToolHandlers, defaultSigningAuditPath, ensureSignerConsent, hashPayloadForAudit, loadSignerCredentials, permissiveMode, readAccountAddressEnv, readAccountAddressField, renderSignerConsentBlock, resolveEdgeSigner, resolveSignerRuntime, runSignerConsentGate, runSignerStdioServer, signerCapabilityAdvertisement, signerCompatibility, signerInstructions, tightenIfFilePermissive, toolDescriptions, toolSchemas, warnIfCredentialFilePermissive, warnIfFilePermissive };
+export { AUDIT_ROTATE_BYTES, type AppendAuditOptions, type EdgeSigner, OWNER_ONLY_MODE, type PermissionLog, type PermissiveFile, type ResolvedSignerRuntime, SIGNER_ACK_ENV, SIGNER_CAPABILITY_KEY, SIGNER_HOSTED_HANDOFF_SHAPES, SIGNER_NAME, SIGNER_VERSION, SUPPORTED_SWEEP_BINDING_VERSIONS, SUPPORTED_X402_EXPECTED_VERSIONS, type SignerCompatibility, type SignerConsentDecision, type SignerConsentInput, type SignerConsentOptions, type SignerCredentials, type SignerOptions, type SignerToolName, type SigningAuditContext, type SigningAuditEntry, type TightenOutcome, type ToolFailure, type ToolPayload, type ToolSuccess, UNSUPPORTED_ARGUMENT_MARKER, type X402ExpectedPayment, type X402FundingSignatureResult, type X402HeaderResult, appendSigningAuditEntry, assertSupportedBindingVersion, assertSupportedNodeVersion, assertX402MatchesExpected, buildSignerMcpServer, computeSignerConsentHash, createEdgeSigner, createSigningAuditEntry, createToolHandlers, defaultSigningAuditPath, ensureSignerConsent, hashPayloadForAudit, loadSignerCredentials, permissiveMode, readAccountAddressEnv, readAccountAddressField, renderSignerConsentBlock, resolveEdgeSigner, resolveSignerRuntime, runSignerConsentGate, runSignerStdioServer, signerCapabilityAdvertisement, signerCompatibility, signerInstructions, tightenIfFilePermissive, toolDescriptions, toolSchemas, warnIfCredentialFilePermissive, warnIfFilePermissive };

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -251,6 +251,13 @@ interface SignerCompatibility {
      * never a second literal.
      */
     direct_sign_context_versions: number[];
+    /**
+     * #3329: `task_sign_context_version`s this signer will fetch and verify
+     * from `GET /task-budgets/:id/sign-context` — derived from
+     * `SUPPORTED_TASK_SIGN_CONTEXT_VERSIONS`, never a second literal, same
+     * discipline as `direct_sign_context_versions`.
+     */
+    task_sign_context_versions: number[];
 }
 /** The supported sets this signer enforces, as a plain serialisable object. */
 declare function signerCompatibility(): SignerCompatibility;
@@ -481,6 +488,26 @@ declare const SIGNER_HOSTED_HANDOFF_SHAPES: {
     };
 };
 
+/**
+ * The signer's wire identity. Declared HERE, in the tools/handlers module —
+ * `server.ts` (the MCP wiring) imports them from this module, keeping the
+ * import graph one-directional (tools.ts ← server.ts, never the reverse);
+ * `server.ts` re-exports them, so the package's public API is unchanged.
+ */
+declare const SIGNER_NAME = "@haven_ai/signer";
+declare const SIGNER_VERSION = "0.7.0-alpha.0";
+/**
+ * #3419: the marker the tool layer prefixes the undeclared-argument refusal
+ * with. The strict re-parse lives in THIS module (`parseStrictFor`, below) —
+ * the same module as the `normalizeError` branch that shapes the refusal — so
+ * the marker, the message and the structured fields are one unit and cannot
+ * drift. The registration in `server.ts` is passthrough (the issue's "schema
+ * that keeps unknown keys"): the SDK layer lets an undeclared key through and
+ * the tool layer refuses it here, where the full structured refusal
+ * (`UNSUPPORTED_ARGUMENT` with `unknown_arguments`, `signer_version`,
+ * `fallback`) is still expressible as JSON on the result.
+ */
+declare const UNSUPPORTED_ARGUMENT_MARKER = "HavenSignerUnsupportedArgument:";
 /**
  * Local signer tool set. These run on the agent's machine, next to the key,
  * and pair with the hosted server's construct/relay tools (#183). They sign;
@@ -604,6 +631,8 @@ declare const toolSchemas: {
         }>>;
         readonly typed_data: z$1.ZodOptional<z$1.ZodRecord<z$1.ZodString, z$1.ZodUnknown>>;
         readonly typed_data_b64: z$1.ZodOptional<z$1.ZodString>;
+        readonly task_budget_id: z$1.ZodOptional<z$1.ZodString>;
+        readonly sub_budget_id: z$1.ZodOptional<z$1.ZodString>;
     };
     readonly haven_x402_sign_header: {
         readonly payment_required: z$1.ZodRecord<z$1.ZodString, z$1.ZodUnknown>;
@@ -719,6 +748,14 @@ interface ToolFailure {
      * field for every sign-context refusal (`'typed_data_b64'`).
      */
     fallback?: string;
+    /**
+     * #3419: present on `UNSUPPORTED_ARGUMENT` — the undeclared top-level
+     * argument names the caller sent (the strict schema's `unrecognized_keys`),
+     * so an agent can see exactly what this signer does not accept.
+     */
+    unknown_arguments?: string[];
+    /** #3419: present on `UNSUPPORTED_ARGUMENT` — this signer's own package version. */
+    signer_version?: string;
     /**
      * #3001: present on `SIGN_CONTEXT_REFUSED` — the HTTP status the backend
      * answered the sign-context fetch with (404, 410, …) — the x402 fetch, or
@@ -727,7 +764,7 @@ interface ToolFailure {
     http_status?: number;
     /** #3001: the backend's own `error_code` on `SIGN_CONTEXT_REFUSED` (`expired`, `already_executed`, `not_signable`, `sign_context_unavailable`, and since #3303 `client_outdated`). */
     backend_error_code?: string;
-    /** #3303: on `client_outdated`, the backend's update hint — `upgrade_command` is what updates this signer. */
+    /** #3303: on `client_outdated`, the backend's update hint — `upgrade_command` starts the update (the doctor, then its repair line — #3412). */
     client_update?: HavenClientUpdate;
 }
 type ToolPayload<T = unknown> = ToolSuccess<T> | ToolFailure;
@@ -775,8 +812,6 @@ declare function computeSignerConsentHash(input: SignerConsentInput): string;
 declare function renderSignerConsentBlock(input: SignerConsentInput, hash: string): string;
 declare function ensureSignerConsent(input: SignerConsentInput, options?: SignerConsentOptions): Promise<SignerConsentDecision>;
 
-declare const SIGNER_NAME = "@haven_ai/signer";
-declare const SIGNER_VERSION = "0.5.0-alpha.1";
 interface SignerOptions {
     /** Path to a Haven credential JSON file (delegate_key is read from it). */
     credentialsPath?: string;
@@ -841,4 +876,4 @@ declare function assertSupportedNodeVersion(nodeVersion?: string): void;
 declare function runSignerStdioServer(options?: SignerOptions): Promise<void>;
 declare function runSignerConsentGate(signer: EdgeSigner, credentials: SignerCredentials | undefined, options: SignerOptions): Promise<SignerConsentDecision>;
 
-export { AUDIT_ROTATE_BYTES, type AppendAuditOptions, type EdgeSigner, OWNER_ONLY_MODE, type PermissionLog, type PermissiveFile, type ResolvedSignerRuntime, SIGNER_ACK_ENV, SIGNER_CAPABILITY_KEY, SIGNER_HOSTED_HANDOFF_SHAPES, SIGNER_NAME, SIGNER_VERSION, SUPPORTED_SWEEP_BINDING_VERSIONS, SUPPORTED_X402_EXPECTED_VERSIONS, type SignerCompatibility, type SignerConsentDecision, type SignerConsentInput, type SignerConsentOptions, type SignerCredentials, type SignerOptions, type SignerToolName, type SigningAuditContext, type SigningAuditEntry, type TightenOutcome, type ToolFailure, type ToolPayload, type ToolSuccess, type X402ExpectedPayment, type X402FundingSignatureResult, type X402HeaderResult, appendSigningAuditEntry, assertSupportedBindingVersion, assertSupportedNodeVersion, assertX402MatchesExpected, buildSignerMcpServer, computeSignerConsentHash, createEdgeSigner, createSigningAuditEntry, createToolHandlers, defaultSigningAuditPath, ensureSignerConsent, hashPayloadForAudit, loadSignerCredentials, permissiveMode, readAccountAddressEnv, readAccountAddressField, renderSignerConsentBlock, resolveEdgeSigner, resolveSignerRuntime, runSignerConsentGate, runSignerStdioServer, signerCapabilityAdvertisement, signerCompatibility, signerInstructions, tightenIfFilePermissive, toolDescriptions, toolSchemas, warnIfCredentialFilePermissive, warnIfFilePermissive };
+export { AUDIT_ROTATE_BYTES, type AppendAuditOptions, type EdgeSigner, OWNER_ONLY_MODE, type PermissionLog, type PermissiveFile, type ResolvedSignerRuntime, SIGNER_ACK_ENV, SIGNER_CAPABILITY_KEY, SIGNER_HOSTED_HANDOFF_SHAPES, SIGNER_NAME, SIGNER_VERSION, SUPPORTED_SWEEP_BINDING_VERSIONS, SUPPORTED_X402_EXPECTED_VERSIONS, type SignerCompatibility, type SignerConsentDecision, type SignerConsentInput, type SignerConsentOptions, type SignerCredentials, type SignerOptions, type SignerToolName, type SigningAuditContext, type SigningAuditEntry, type TightenOutcome, type ToolFailure, type ToolPayload, type ToolSuccess, UNSUPPORTED_ARGUMENT_MARKER, type X402ExpectedPayment, type X402FundingSignatureResult, type X402HeaderResult, appendSigningAuditEntry, assertSupportedBindingVersion, assertSupportedNodeVersion, assertX402MatchesExpected, buildSignerMcpServer, computeSignerConsentHash, createEdgeSigner, createSigningAuditEntry, createToolHandlers, defaultSigningAuditPath, ensureSignerConsent, hashPayloadForAudit, loadSignerCredentials, permissiveMode, readAccountAddressEnv, readAccountAddressField, renderSignerConsentBlock, resolveEdgeSigner, resolveSignerRuntime, runSignerConsentGate, runSignerStdioServer, signerCapabilityAdvertisement, signerCompatibility, signerInstructions, tightenIfFilePermissive, toolDescriptions, toolSchemas, warnIfCredentialFilePermissive, warnIfFilePermissive };