@haven_ai/signer 0.2.0-alpha.0 → 0.3.0-alpha.0

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -282,18 +282,8 @@ declare function signerInstructions(): string;
 interface SignerCredentials {
     delegateKey: string;
     agentId?: string;
-    /**
-     * The Haven account (smart account) the agent spends from — #2908, the
-     * account-vocabulary name. Same value as `safeAddress`.
-     */
+    /** The Haven account (smart account) the agent spends from. */
     accountAddress?: string;
-    /**
-     * @deprecated #2908 — same value as {@link SignerCredentials.accountAddress}.
-     * Removed from this shape in the release after the one carrying #2908
-     * (#2914). The credential-FILE keys it was read from are a different
-     * matter — see `readAccountAddressField`.
-     */
-    safeAddress?: string;
     chainId?: number;
     network?: string;
     x402BindingSigner?: string;
@@ -305,11 +295,11 @@ interface RawCredentialFile {
     delegateKey?: unknown;
     agent_id?: unknown;
     agentId?: unknown;
-    /** #2908: what `@haven_ai/connect` writes from this release on. */
+    /** What `@haven_ai/connect` writes. */
     account_address?: unknown;
-    /** Pre-#2908 spelling — read PERMANENTLY, see `readAccountAddressField`. */
+    /** Pre-#2908 spelling — read PERMANENTLY (a credential file never rewrites itself), see `readAccountAddressField`. */
     safe_address?: unknown;
-    /** Pre-#2908 spelling — read PERMANENTLY, see `readAccountAddressField`. */
+    /** Pre-#2908 spelling — read PERMANENTLY (a credential file never rewrites itself), see `readAccountAddressField`. */
     safeAddress?: unknown;
     chain_id?: unknown;
     chainId?: unknown;
@@ -346,11 +336,11 @@ declare function loadSignerCredentials(path?: string | undefined): Promise<Signe
  */
 declare function readAccountAddressField(raw: Pick<RawCredentialFile, 'account_address' | 'safe_address' | 'safeAddress'>): string | undefined;
 /**
- * The account address off the process environment, new name first:
- * `HAVEN_ACCOUNT_ADDRESS` (the survivor, decided on #2906) then the two
- * names the dashboard handoff emitted before #2908 — `HAVEN_WALLET_ADDRESS`
- * and `HAVEN_SAFE_ADDRESS`. Unlike the file fallbacks these two ARE
- * window-scoped: they are dropped at #2914, one release after this one.
+ * The account address off the process environment: `HAVEN_ACCOUNT_ADDRESS`
+ * (the survivor, decided on #2906). The two names the dashboard handoff
+ * emitted before #2908 — `HAVEN_WALLET_ADDRESS` and `HAVEN_SAFE_ADDRESS` —
+ * were window-scoped (unlike the credential-FILE fallbacks) and are retired
+ * as of #2914.
  */
 declare function readAccountAddressEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): string | undefined;
 /**
@@ -368,12 +358,20 @@ interface SigningAuditEntry {
     tool: SignerToolName;
     payload_hash: string;
     delegate_address: string;
+    /**
+     * Serialized key kept as `safe_address` deliberately (#2914 review): this
+     * is a persisted JSONL field, and an audit log written by an earlier
+     * release never rewrites itself — renaming the key here would fork the
+     * format mid-file. `SigningAuditContext.accountAddress` (the in-memory
+     * field this is built from) carries the account-vocabulary name; only the
+     * on-disk spelling stays put.
+     */
     safe_address?: string;
     chain_id?: number;
 }
 interface SigningAuditContext {
     delegateAddress: string;
-    safeAddress?: string;
+    accountAddress?: string;
     chainId?: number;
     auditPath?: string;
 }
@@ -420,9 +418,17 @@ interface ToolFailure {
     /**
      * #1309: precise recovery guidance as DATA, not just prose inside `message`
      * — the same text the hosted quote's advisory `signer_compatibility.fallback`
-     * carries when the refusal is an out-of-date signer.
+     * carries when the refusal is an out-of-date signer. #3001 reuses this same
+     * field for every sign-context refusal (`'typed_data_b64'`).
      */
     fallback?: string;
+    /**
+     * #3001: present on `SIGN_CONTEXT_REFUSED` — the HTTP status the backend
+     * answered the `/x402/:id/sign-context` fetch with (404, 410, …).
+     */
+    http_status?: number;
+    /** #3001: the backend's own `error_code` on `SIGN_CONTEXT_REFUSED` (`expired`, `already_executed`, `not_signable`, `sign_context_unavailable`). */
+    backend_error_code?: string;
 }
 type ToolPayload<T = unknown> = ToolSuccess<T> | ToolFailure;
 interface ToolHandlerOptions {
@@ -443,7 +449,7 @@ declare function createToolHandlers(signer: EdgeSigner, options?: ToolHandlerOpt
 
 interface SignerConsentInput {
     delegateAddress: string;
-    safeAddress?: string;
+    accountAddress?: string;
     agentId?: string;
     chainId?: number;
     network?: string;
@@ -468,7 +474,7 @@ declare function renderSignerConsentBlock(input: SignerConsentInput, hash: strin
 declare function ensureSignerConsent(input: SignerConsentInput, options?: SignerConsentOptions): Promise<SignerConsentDecision>;
 
 declare const SIGNER_NAME = "@haven_ai/signer";
-declare const SIGNER_VERSION = "0.2.0-alpha.0";
+declare const SIGNER_VERSION = "0.3.0-alpha.0";
 interface SignerOptions {
     /** Path to a Haven credential JSON file (delegate_key is read from it). */
     credentialsPath?: string;

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -282,18 +282,8 @@ declare function signerInstructions(): string;
 interface SignerCredentials {
     delegateKey: string;
     agentId?: string;
-    /**
-     * The Haven account (smart account) the agent spends from — #2908, the
-     * account-vocabulary name. Same value as `safeAddress`.
-     */
+    /** The Haven account (smart account) the agent spends from. */
     accountAddress?: string;
-    /**
-     * @deprecated #2908 — same value as {@link SignerCredentials.accountAddress}.
-     * Removed from this shape in the release after the one carrying #2908
-     * (#2914). The credential-FILE keys it was read from are a different
-     * matter — see `readAccountAddressField`.
-     */
-    safeAddress?: string;
     chainId?: number;
     network?: string;
     x402BindingSigner?: string;
@@ -305,11 +295,11 @@ interface RawCredentialFile {
     delegateKey?: unknown;
     agent_id?: unknown;
     agentId?: unknown;
-    /** #2908: what `@haven_ai/connect` writes from this release on. */
+    /** What `@haven_ai/connect` writes. */
     account_address?: unknown;
-    /** Pre-#2908 spelling — read PERMANENTLY, see `readAccountAddressField`. */
+    /** Pre-#2908 spelling — read PERMANENTLY (a credential file never rewrites itself), see `readAccountAddressField`. */
     safe_address?: unknown;
-    /** Pre-#2908 spelling — read PERMANENTLY, see `readAccountAddressField`. */
+    /** Pre-#2908 spelling — read PERMANENTLY (a credential file never rewrites itself), see `readAccountAddressField`. */
     safeAddress?: unknown;
     chain_id?: unknown;
     chainId?: unknown;
@@ -346,11 +336,11 @@ declare function loadSignerCredentials(path?: string | undefined): Promise<Signe
  */
 declare function readAccountAddressField(raw: Pick<RawCredentialFile, 'account_address' | 'safe_address' | 'safeAddress'>): string | undefined;
 /**
- * The account address off the process environment, new name first:
- * `HAVEN_ACCOUNT_ADDRESS` (the survivor, decided on #2906) then the two
- * names the dashboard handoff emitted before #2908 — `HAVEN_WALLET_ADDRESS`
- * and `HAVEN_SAFE_ADDRESS`. Unlike the file fallbacks these two ARE
- * window-scoped: they are dropped at #2914, one release after this one.
+ * The account address off the process environment: `HAVEN_ACCOUNT_ADDRESS`
+ * (the survivor, decided on #2906). The two names the dashboard handoff
+ * emitted before #2908 — `HAVEN_WALLET_ADDRESS` and `HAVEN_SAFE_ADDRESS` —
+ * were window-scoped (unlike the credential-FILE fallbacks) and are retired
+ * as of #2914.
  */
 declare function readAccountAddressEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): string | undefined;
 /**
@@ -368,12 +358,20 @@ interface SigningAuditEntry {
     tool: SignerToolName;
     payload_hash: string;
     delegate_address: string;
+    /**
+     * Serialized key kept as `safe_address` deliberately (#2914 review): this
+     * is a persisted JSONL field, and an audit log written by an earlier
+     * release never rewrites itself — renaming the key here would fork the
+     * format mid-file. `SigningAuditContext.accountAddress` (the in-memory
+     * field this is built from) carries the account-vocabulary name; only the
+     * on-disk spelling stays put.
+     */
     safe_address?: string;
     chain_id?: number;
 }
 interface SigningAuditContext {
     delegateAddress: string;
-    safeAddress?: string;
+    accountAddress?: string;
     chainId?: number;
     auditPath?: string;
 }
@@ -420,9 +418,17 @@ interface ToolFailure {
     /**
      * #1309: precise recovery guidance as DATA, not just prose inside `message`
      * — the same text the hosted quote's advisory `signer_compatibility.fallback`
-     * carries when the refusal is an out-of-date signer.
+     * carries when the refusal is an out-of-date signer. #3001 reuses this same
+     * field for every sign-context refusal (`'typed_data_b64'`).
      */
     fallback?: string;
+    /**
+     * #3001: present on `SIGN_CONTEXT_REFUSED` — the HTTP status the backend
+     * answered the `/x402/:id/sign-context` fetch with (404, 410, …).
+     */
+    http_status?: number;
+    /** #3001: the backend's own `error_code` on `SIGN_CONTEXT_REFUSED` (`expired`, `already_executed`, `not_signable`, `sign_context_unavailable`). */
+    backend_error_code?: string;
 }
 type ToolPayload<T = unknown> = ToolSuccess<T> | ToolFailure;
 interface ToolHandlerOptions {
@@ -443,7 +449,7 @@ declare function createToolHandlers(signer: EdgeSigner, options?: ToolHandlerOpt
 
 interface SignerConsentInput {
     delegateAddress: string;
-    safeAddress?: string;
+    accountAddress?: string;
     agentId?: string;
     chainId?: number;
     network?: string;
@@ -468,7 +474,7 @@ declare function renderSignerConsentBlock(input: SignerConsentInput, hash: strin
 declare function ensureSignerConsent(input: SignerConsentInput, options?: SignerConsentOptions): Promise<SignerConsentDecision>;
 
 declare const SIGNER_NAME = "@haven_ai/signer";
-declare const SIGNER_VERSION = "0.2.0-alpha.0";
+declare const SIGNER_VERSION = "0.3.0-alpha.0";
 interface SignerOptions {
     /** Path to a Haven credential JSON file (delegate_key is read from it). */
     credentialsPath?: string;

package/dist/index.js

@@ -506,7 +506,6 @@ async function loadSignerCredentials(path = process.env.HAVEN_CREDENTIALS) {
       delegateKey: envKey,
       agentId: stringField(process.env.HAVEN_AGENT_ID),
       accountAddress,
-      safeAddress: accountAddress,
       chainId: chainIdField(process.env.HAVEN_CHAIN_ID, "HAVEN_CHAIN_ID"),
       network: stringField(process.env.HAVEN_NETWORK),
       x402BindingSigner: stringField(process.env.HAVEN_X402_BINDING_SIGNER)
@@ -541,7 +540,6 @@ async function loadFromFile(path) {
     delegateKey,
     agentId: stringField(raw.agent_id ?? raw.agentId),
     accountAddress,
-    safeAddress: accountAddress,
     chainId: chainIdField(raw.chain_id ?? raw.chainId, "chain_id"),
     network: stringField(raw.network),
     x402BindingSigner: stringField(
@@ -554,7 +552,22 @@ function readAccountAddressField(raw) {
   return stringField(raw.account_address ?? raw.safe_address ?? raw.safeAddress);
 }
 function readAccountAddressEnv(env) {
-  return stringField(env.HAVEN_ACCOUNT_ADDRESS ?? env.HAVEN_WALLET_ADDRESS ?? env.HAVEN_SAFE_ADDRESS);
+  const current = stringField(env.HAVEN_ACCOUNT_ADDRESS);
+  for (const name of ["HAVEN_WALLET_ADDRESS", "HAVEN_SAFE_ADDRESS"]) {
+    const retired = stringField(env[name]);
+    if (!retired) continue;
+    if (!current) {
+      throw new Error(
+        `${name} is retired (#2906) \u2014 Haven accounts are addressed as accounts, not Safes. Set HAVEN_ACCOUNT_ADDRESS to the same value. Refusing rather than ignoring it, because an unset account address silently skips the sweep-destination check.`
+      );
+    }
+    if (retired.toLowerCase() !== current.toLowerCase()) {
+      throw new Error(
+        `${name} and HAVEN_ACCOUNT_ADDRESS were both set to different addresses. Remove the retired name, or make them match \u2014 picking one silently would hide the mismatch.`
+      );
+    }
+  }
+  return current;
 }
 function stringField(value) {
   return typeof value === "string" && value.trim() ? value.trim() : void 0;
@@ -611,7 +624,7 @@ function createSigningAuditEntry(tool, payloadHash, context, now = /* @__PURE__
     payload_hash: payloadHash,
     delegate_address: context.delegateAddress
   };
-  if (context.safeAddress) entry.safe_address = context.safeAddress;
+  if (context.accountAddress) entry.safe_address = context.accountAddress;
   if (typeof context.chainId === "number") entry.chain_id = context.chainId;
   return entry;
 }
@@ -627,6 +640,49 @@ function stableStringify(value) {
   const object = value;
   return `{${Object.keys(object).sort().map((key) => `${JSON.stringify(key)}:${stableStringify(object[key])}`).join(",")}}`;
 }
+var HavenSignContextError = class extends HavenSigningError {
+  /**
+   * #3001 / #3010 review: the recovery path, when signing OTHER bytes is
+   * actually a remedy — a transport failure (timeout, unreachable) or a
+   * body this signer could not read. `typed_data_b64` is NOT in the default
+   * quote result since #1272: obtain it by re-running the SAME quote tool
+   * with the SAME idempotency_key plus `include_signing_payload: true`.
+   * Absent on a backend REFUSAL: an expired, executed or unsignable intent
+   * cannot be rescued by re-signing its bytes.
+   */
+  fallback;
+  /**
+   * #3001: `AgentPaymentNextAction` values the signer already emits — the
+   * version-mismatch refusal's `stop_and_tell_user` for the classes where
+   * retrying the same call cannot help, and `payment_window_expired` (with
+   * `retry_with_new_quote`) for the backend's 410 `expired`, exactly as the
+   * plain `HavenError` branch already does for that code.
+   */
+  next_action;
+  retry_with_new_quote;
+  /** Present only for `SIGN_CONTEXT_REFUSED` (the backend's HTTP status). */
+  http_status;
+  /** Present only for `SIGN_CONTEXT_REFUSED`: the backend's own `error_code`. */
+  backend_error_code;
+  constructor(message, code, refusal) {
+    super(message);
+    this.code = code;
+    this.name = "HavenSignContextError";
+    if (code === "SIGN_CONTEXT_REFUSED") {
+      this.http_status = refusal?.httpStatus;
+      this.backend_error_code = refusal?.errorCode;
+      if (refusal?.httpStatus === 410 || refusal?.errorCode === "expired") {
+        this.next_action = AgentPaymentNextAction.PaymentWindowExpired;
+        this.retry_with_new_quote = true;
+      } else {
+        this.next_action = AgentPaymentNextAction.StopAndTellUser;
+      }
+    } else {
+      this.fallback = "typed_data_b64";
+      this.next_action = AgentPaymentNextAction.StopAndTellUser;
+    }
+  }
+};
 async function loadHavenIdentity(credentialsPath) {
   if (!credentialsPath) return null;
   try {
@@ -641,30 +697,50 @@ async function loadHavenIdentity(credentialsPath) {
     return null;
   }
 }
-async function fetchX402SignContext(identity, paymentId, fetchImpl = fetch) {
+var SIGN_CONTEXT_TIMEOUT_MS = 15e3;
+async function fetchX402SignContext(identity, paymentId, fetchImpl = fetch, timeoutMs = SIGN_CONTEXT_TIMEOUT_MS) {
   let response;
   try {
     response = await fetchImpl(
       `${identity.apiUrl}/x402/${encodeURIComponent(paymentId)}/sign-context`,
-      { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${identity.apiKey}` } }
+      {
+        headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${identity.apiKey}` },
+        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(timeoutMs)
+      }
     );
   } catch (err) {
-    throw new HavenSigningError(
-      `Could not reach Haven to fetch the signing context for ${paymentId}: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}. Retry, or pass typed_data_b64 from the quote result instead.`
+    const timedOut = err instanceof Error && (err.name === "TimeoutError" || err.name === "AbortError");
+    throw new HavenSignContextError(
+      timedOut ? `Haven did not answer the signing-context fetch for ${paymentId} within ${timeoutMs} ms. Retry, or pass typed_data_b64 from the quote result instead.` : `Could not reach Haven to fetch the signing context for ${paymentId}: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}. Retry, or pass typed_data_b64 from the quote result instead.`,
+      timedOut ? "SIGN_CONTEXT_TIMEOUT" : "SIGN_CONTEXT_UNREACHABLE"
     );
   }
-  const body = await response.json().catch(() => ({}));
+  let body;
+  try {
+    body = await response.json();
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (err instanceof Error && (err.name === "TimeoutError" || err.name === "AbortError")) {
+      throw new HavenSignContextError(
+        `Haven did not finish sending the signing context for ${paymentId} within ${timeoutMs} ms. Retry, or pass typed_data_b64 from the quote result instead.`,
+        "SIGN_CONTEXT_TIMEOUT"
+      );
+    }
+    body = {};
+  }
   if (!response.ok) {
     const detail = typeof body.error === "string" ? body.error : `HTTP ${response.status}`;
-    throw new HavenSigningError(
-      `Haven refused the signing-context fetch for ${paymentId}: ${detail}` + (response.status === 404 ? " \u2014 check the payment_id came from this agent\u2019s own quote." : response.status === 410 ? " Re-run the quote with the same idempotency key, then sign the fresh payment_id." : "")
+    throw new HavenSignContextError(
+      `Haven refused the signing-context fetch for ${paymentId}: ${detail}` + (response.status === 404 ? " \u2014 check the payment_id came from this agent\u2019s own quote." : response.status === 410 ? " Re-run the quote with the same idempotency key, then sign the fresh payment_id." : ""),
+      "SIGN_CONTEXT_REFUSED",
+      { httpStatus: response.status, errorCode: typeof body.error_code === "string" ? body.error_code : void 0 }
     );
   }
   const signData = body.sign_data;
   const x402Expected = body.x402_expected;
   if (!signData || typeof signData.hash !== "string" || !signData.typed_data || typeof signData.typed_data !== "object" || !x402Expected) {
-    throw new HavenSigningError(
-      "The Haven sign-context response is missing sign_data.typed_data or x402_expected \u2014 the backend may predate #1263. Pass typed_data_b64 from the quote result instead."
+    throw new HavenSignContextError(
+      "The Haven sign-context response is missing sign_data.typed_data or x402_expected \u2014 the backend may predate #1263. Pass typed_data_b64 from the quote result instead.",
+      "SIGN_CONTEXT_MALFORMED"
     );
   }
   const paymentRequired = body.payment_required;
@@ -1015,7 +1091,7 @@ function createToolHandlers(signer, options = {}) {
         authorization: args.authorization,
         expectedAuth: args.expected_auth,
         // Cross-check `to` against the Safe in the local credential when present.
-        expectedSafe: options.audit?.safeAddress
+        expectedSafe: options.audit?.accountAddress
       });
       await auditSigning(
         "haven_sign_sweep_delegate",
@@ -1095,6 +1171,18 @@ function normalizeError(err) {
       next_action: AgentPaymentNextAction.StopAndTellUser
     };
   }
+  if (err instanceof HavenSignContextError) {
+    return {
+      success: false,
+      code: err.code,
+      message: err.message,
+      next_action: err.next_action,
+      ...err.fallback !== void 0 ? { fallback: err.fallback } : {},
+      ...err.retry_with_new_quote ? { retry_with_new_quote: true } : {},
+      ...err.http_status !== void 0 ? { http_status: err.http_status } : {},
+      ...err.backend_error_code !== void 0 ? { backend_error_code: err.backend_error_code } : {}
+    };
+  }
   if (err instanceof HavenSigningError) {
     return { success: false, code: err.code, message: err.message };
   }
@@ -1128,7 +1216,7 @@ var SIGNER_CONSENT_SURFACE_VERSION = 2;
 function computeSignerConsentHash(input) {
   const identity = [
     input.delegateAddress.toLowerCase(),
-    (input.safeAddress ?? "").toLowerCase(),
+    (input.accountAddress ?? "").toLowerCase(),
     input.agentId ?? "",
     input.chainId ?? "",
     input.network ?? ""
@@ -1147,7 +1235,7 @@ function renderSignerConsentBlock(input, hash) {
     "",
     `Delegate address: ${input.delegateAddress}`
   ];
-  lines.push(`Haven wallet:     ${input.safeAddress ?? "not provided to this signer"}`);
+  lines.push(`Haven wallet:     ${input.accountAddress ?? "not provided to this signer"}`);
   if (input.agentId) lines.push(`Agent ID:         ${input.agentId}`);
   if (typeof input.chainId === "number") lines.push(`Chain ID:         ${input.chainId}`);
   if (input.network) lines.push(`Network:          ${input.network}`);
@@ -1241,7 +1329,7 @@ async function writeAckFile(path, hash) {
   );
 }
 var SIGNER_NAME = "@haven_ai/signer";
-var SIGNER_VERSION = "0.2.0-alpha.0";
+var SIGNER_VERSION = "0.3.0-alpha.0";
 async function resolveEdgeSigner(options = {}) {
   const { signer } = await resolveSignerRuntime(options);
   return signer;
@@ -1280,7 +1368,7 @@ function buildSignerMcpServer(signer, options = {}) {
     audit: {
       auditPath: options.auditPath ?? defaultSigningAuditPath(credentialsPath),
       delegateAddress: signer.delegateAddress,
-      safeAddress: options.credentials?.accountAddress ?? options.credentials?.safeAddress,
+      accountAddress: options.credentials?.accountAddress,
       chainId: options.credentials?.chainId
     },
     // #1263: the payment_id signing path — the ONLY network call this server
@@ -1330,7 +1418,7 @@ async function runSignerConsentGate(signer, credentials, options) {
   return ensureSignerConsent(
     {
       delegateAddress: signer.delegateAddress,
-      safeAddress: credentials?.accountAddress ?? credentials?.safeAddress,
+      accountAddress: credentials?.accountAddress,
       agentId: credentials?.agentId,
       chainId: credentials?.chainId,
       network: credentials?.network,