@haven_ai/signer 0.1.36-alpha.0 → 0.2.0-alpha.0

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -79,7 +79,9 @@ interface X402ExpectedPayment {
     /**
      * Resource URL of the x402 payment Haven prepared. On the hosted surface
      * that is `haven_pay_x402_quote` — `buildX402SigningContext` in
-     * `mcp-server/src/tools.ts` relays `intent.resourceUrl` here, and
+     * `mcp-server/src/tools/support/mcp-context.ts` (called from the
+     * `haven_pay_x402_quote` handler, which is still in `tools.ts`) relays
+     * `intent.resourceUrl` here, and
      * `haven_resume_x402_payment` re-emits the same context. Checked against
      * the merchant header's resource in `assertX402MatchesExpected`.
      */
@@ -280,6 +282,17 @@ declare function signerInstructions(): string;
 interface SignerCredentials {
     delegateKey: string;
     agentId?: string;
+    /**
+     * The Haven account (smart account) the agent spends from — #2908, the
+     * account-vocabulary name. Same value as `safeAddress`.
+     */
+    accountAddress?: string;
+    /**
+     * @deprecated #2908 — same value as {@link SignerCredentials.accountAddress}.
+     * Removed from this shape in the release after the one carrying #2908
+     * (#2914). The credential-FILE keys it was read from are a different
+     * matter — see `readAccountAddressField`.
+     */
     safeAddress?: string;
     chainId?: number;
     network?: string;
@@ -287,6 +300,23 @@ interface SignerCredentials {
     /** Absolute path the key was loaded from, if a file was used. */
     sourcePath?: string;
 }
+interface RawCredentialFile {
+    delegate_key?: unknown;
+    delegateKey?: unknown;
+    agent_id?: unknown;
+    agentId?: unknown;
+    /** #2908: what `@haven_ai/connect` writes from this release on. */
+    account_address?: unknown;
+    /** Pre-#2908 spelling — read PERMANENTLY, see `readAccountAddressField`. */
+    safe_address?: unknown;
+    /** Pre-#2908 spelling — read PERMANENTLY, see `readAccountAddressField`. */
+    safeAddress?: unknown;
+    chain_id?: unknown;
+    chainId?: unknown;
+    network?: unknown;
+    x402_binding_signer?: unknown;
+    x402BindingSigner?: unknown;
+}
 /**
  * Resolve the delegate key for the edge signer.
  *
@@ -299,6 +329,30 @@ interface SignerCredentials {
  * `delegate_key` and ignore the rest.
  */
 declare function loadSignerCredentials(path?: string | undefined): Promise<SignerCredentials>;
+/**
+ * The account address off a credential FILE: `account_address` (what
+ * `@haven_ai/connect` writes from #2908 on) first, then the two pre-#2908
+ * spellings.
+ *
+ * The two old fallbacks are PERMANENT, not part of the one-release naming
+ * window (#2906, decision 2a): a credential file on disk was written once and
+ * never rewrites itself, so a signer that stopped reading `safe_address`
+ * would silently lose the address for every agent connected before this
+ * release — the consent hash would change and the spend-context prompt would
+ * say "not provided". Two lines, kept for as long as the file format exists.
+ *
+ * Exported for the mutation tests: dropping `account_address` fails the
+ * new-shape test, dropping either old key fails the old-shape test.
+ */
+declare function readAccountAddressField(raw: Pick<RawCredentialFile, 'account_address' | 'safe_address' | 'safeAddress'>): string | undefined;
+/**
+ * The account address off the process environment, new name first:
+ * `HAVEN_ACCOUNT_ADDRESS` (the survivor, decided on #2906) then the two
+ * names the dashboard handoff emitted before #2908 — `HAVEN_WALLET_ADDRESS`
+ * and `HAVEN_SAFE_ADDRESS`. Unlike the file fallbacks these two ARE
+ * window-scoped: they are dropped at #2914, one release after this one.
+ */
+declare function readAccountAddressEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): string | undefined;
 /**
  * Warn (best-effort, POSIX only) when the credential file is readable beyond
  * its owner. Mirrors `@haven_ai/mcp`'s check — the delegate key is the most
@@ -414,7 +468,7 @@ declare function renderSignerConsentBlock(input: SignerConsentInput, hash: strin
 declare function ensureSignerConsent(input: SignerConsentInput, options?: SignerConsentOptions): Promise<SignerConsentDecision>;
 
 declare const SIGNER_NAME = "@haven_ai/signer";
-declare const SIGNER_VERSION = "0.1.36-alpha.0";
+declare const SIGNER_VERSION = "0.2.0-alpha.0";
 interface SignerOptions {
     /** Path to a Haven credential JSON file (delegate_key is read from it). */
     credentialsPath?: string;
@@ -479,4 +533,4 @@ declare function assertSupportedNodeVersion(nodeVersion?: string): void;
 declare function runSignerStdioServer(options?: SignerOptions): Promise<void>;
 declare function runSignerConsentGate(signer: EdgeSigner, credentials: SignerCredentials | undefined, options: SignerOptions): Promise<SignerConsentDecision>;
 
-export { type EdgeSigner, type ResolvedSignerRuntime, SIGNER_ACK_ENV, SIGNER_CAPABILITY_KEY, SIGNER_NAME, SIGNER_VERSION, SUPPORTED_SWEEP_BINDING_VERSIONS, SUPPORTED_X402_EXPECTED_VERSIONS, type SignerCompatibility, type SignerConsentDecision, type SignerConsentInput, type SignerConsentOptions, type SignerCredentials, type SignerOptions, type SignerToolName, type SigningAuditContext, type SigningAuditEntry, type ToolFailure, type ToolPayload, type ToolSuccess, type X402ExpectedPayment, type X402FundingSignatureResult, type X402HeaderResult, appendSigningAuditEntry, assertSupportedBindingVersion, assertSupportedNodeVersion, assertX402MatchesExpected, buildSignerMcpServer, computeSignerConsentHash, createEdgeSigner, createSigningAuditEntry, createToolHandlers, defaultSigningAuditPath, ensureSignerConsent, hashPayloadForAudit, loadSignerCredentials, renderSignerConsentBlock, resolveEdgeSigner, resolveSignerRuntime, runSignerConsentGate, runSignerStdioServer, signerCapabilityAdvertisement, signerCompatibility, signerInstructions, toolDescriptions, toolSchemas, warnIfCredentialFilePermissive };
+export { type EdgeSigner, type ResolvedSignerRuntime, SIGNER_ACK_ENV, SIGNER_CAPABILITY_KEY, SIGNER_NAME, SIGNER_VERSION, SUPPORTED_SWEEP_BINDING_VERSIONS, SUPPORTED_X402_EXPECTED_VERSIONS, type SignerCompatibility, type SignerConsentDecision, type SignerConsentInput, type SignerConsentOptions, type SignerCredentials, type SignerOptions, type SignerToolName, type SigningAuditContext, type SigningAuditEntry, type ToolFailure, type ToolPayload, type ToolSuccess, type X402ExpectedPayment, type X402FundingSignatureResult, type X402HeaderResult, appendSigningAuditEntry, assertSupportedBindingVersion, assertSupportedNodeVersion, assertX402MatchesExpected, buildSignerMcpServer, computeSignerConsentHash, createEdgeSigner, createSigningAuditEntry, createToolHandlers, defaultSigningAuditPath, ensureSignerConsent, hashPayloadForAudit, loadSignerCredentials, readAccountAddressEnv, readAccountAddressField, renderSignerConsentBlock, resolveEdgeSigner, resolveSignerRuntime, runSignerConsentGate, runSignerStdioServer, signerCapabilityAdvertisement, signerCompatibility, signerInstructions, toolDescriptions, toolSchemas, warnIfCredentialFilePermissive };

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -79,7 +79,9 @@ interface X402ExpectedPayment {
     /**
      * Resource URL of the x402 payment Haven prepared. On the hosted surface
      * that is `haven_pay_x402_quote` — `buildX402SigningContext` in
-     * `mcp-server/src/tools.ts` relays `intent.resourceUrl` here, and
+     * `mcp-server/src/tools/support/mcp-context.ts` (called from the
+     * `haven_pay_x402_quote` handler, which is still in `tools.ts`) relays
+     * `intent.resourceUrl` here, and
      * `haven_resume_x402_payment` re-emits the same context. Checked against
      * the merchant header's resource in `assertX402MatchesExpected`.
      */
@@ -280,6 +282,17 @@ declare function signerInstructions(): string;
 interface SignerCredentials {
     delegateKey: string;
     agentId?: string;
+    /**
+     * The Haven account (smart account) the agent spends from — #2908, the
+     * account-vocabulary name. Same value as `safeAddress`.
+     */
+    accountAddress?: string;
+    /**
+     * @deprecated #2908 — same value as {@link SignerCredentials.accountAddress}.
+     * Removed from this shape in the release after the one carrying #2908
+     * (#2914). The credential-FILE keys it was read from are a different
+     * matter — see `readAccountAddressField`.
+     */
     safeAddress?: string;
     chainId?: number;
     network?: string;
@@ -287,6 +300,23 @@ interface SignerCredentials {
     /** Absolute path the key was loaded from, if a file was used. */
     sourcePath?: string;
 }
+interface RawCredentialFile {
+    delegate_key?: unknown;
+    delegateKey?: unknown;
+    agent_id?: unknown;
+    agentId?: unknown;
+    /** #2908: what `@haven_ai/connect` writes from this release on. */
+    account_address?: unknown;
+    /** Pre-#2908 spelling — read PERMANENTLY, see `readAccountAddressField`. */
+    safe_address?: unknown;
+    /** Pre-#2908 spelling — read PERMANENTLY, see `readAccountAddressField`. */
+    safeAddress?: unknown;
+    chain_id?: unknown;
+    chainId?: unknown;
+    network?: unknown;
+    x402_binding_signer?: unknown;
+    x402BindingSigner?: unknown;
+}
 /**
  * Resolve the delegate key for the edge signer.
  *
@@ -299,6 +329,30 @@ interface SignerCredentials {
  * `delegate_key` and ignore the rest.
  */
 declare function loadSignerCredentials(path?: string | undefined): Promise<SignerCredentials>;
+/**
+ * The account address off a credential FILE: `account_address` (what
+ * `@haven_ai/connect` writes from #2908 on) first, then the two pre-#2908
+ * spellings.
+ *
+ * The two old fallbacks are PERMANENT, not part of the one-release naming
+ * window (#2906, decision 2a): a credential file on disk was written once and
+ * never rewrites itself, so a signer that stopped reading `safe_address`
+ * would silently lose the address for every agent connected before this
+ * release — the consent hash would change and the spend-context prompt would
+ * say "not provided". Two lines, kept for as long as the file format exists.
+ *
+ * Exported for the mutation tests: dropping `account_address` fails the
+ * new-shape test, dropping either old key fails the old-shape test.
+ */
+declare function readAccountAddressField(raw: Pick<RawCredentialFile, 'account_address' | 'safe_address' | 'safeAddress'>): string | undefined;
+/**
+ * The account address off the process environment, new name first:
+ * `HAVEN_ACCOUNT_ADDRESS` (the survivor, decided on #2906) then the two
+ * names the dashboard handoff emitted before #2908 — `HAVEN_WALLET_ADDRESS`
+ * and `HAVEN_SAFE_ADDRESS`. Unlike the file fallbacks these two ARE
+ * window-scoped: they are dropped at #2914, one release after this one.
+ */
+declare function readAccountAddressEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): string | undefined;
 /**
  * Warn (best-effort, POSIX only) when the credential file is readable beyond
  * its owner. Mirrors `@haven_ai/mcp`'s check — the delegate key is the most
@@ -414,7 +468,7 @@ declare function renderSignerConsentBlock(input: SignerConsentInput, hash: strin
 declare function ensureSignerConsent(input: SignerConsentInput, options?: SignerConsentOptions): Promise<SignerConsentDecision>;
 
 declare const SIGNER_NAME = "@haven_ai/signer";
-declare const SIGNER_VERSION = "0.1.36-alpha.0";
+declare const SIGNER_VERSION = "0.2.0-alpha.0";
 interface SignerOptions {
     /** Path to a Haven credential JSON file (delegate_key is read from it). */
     credentialsPath?: string;
@@ -479,4 +533,4 @@ declare function assertSupportedNodeVersion(nodeVersion?: string): void;
 declare function runSignerStdioServer(options?: SignerOptions): Promise<void>;
 declare function runSignerConsentGate(signer: EdgeSigner, credentials: SignerCredentials | undefined, options: SignerOptions): Promise<SignerConsentDecision>;
 
-export { type EdgeSigner, type ResolvedSignerRuntime, SIGNER_ACK_ENV, SIGNER_CAPABILITY_KEY, SIGNER_NAME, SIGNER_VERSION, SUPPORTED_SWEEP_BINDING_VERSIONS, SUPPORTED_X402_EXPECTED_VERSIONS, type SignerCompatibility, type SignerConsentDecision, type SignerConsentInput, type SignerConsentOptions, type SignerCredentials, type SignerOptions, type SignerToolName, type SigningAuditContext, type SigningAuditEntry, type ToolFailure, type ToolPayload, type ToolSuccess, type X402ExpectedPayment, type X402FundingSignatureResult, type X402HeaderResult, appendSigningAuditEntry, assertSupportedBindingVersion, assertSupportedNodeVersion, assertX402MatchesExpected, buildSignerMcpServer, computeSignerConsentHash, createEdgeSigner, createSigningAuditEntry, createToolHandlers, defaultSigningAuditPath, ensureSignerConsent, hashPayloadForAudit, loadSignerCredentials, renderSignerConsentBlock, resolveEdgeSigner, resolveSignerRuntime, runSignerConsentGate, runSignerStdioServer, signerCapabilityAdvertisement, signerCompatibility, signerInstructions, toolDescriptions, toolSchemas, warnIfCredentialFilePermissive };
+export { type EdgeSigner, type ResolvedSignerRuntime, SIGNER_ACK_ENV, SIGNER_CAPABILITY_KEY, SIGNER_NAME, SIGNER_VERSION, SUPPORTED_SWEEP_BINDING_VERSIONS, SUPPORTED_X402_EXPECTED_VERSIONS, type SignerCompatibility, type SignerConsentDecision, type SignerConsentInput, type SignerConsentOptions, type SignerCredentials, type SignerOptions, type SignerToolName, type SigningAuditContext, type SigningAuditEntry, type ToolFailure, type ToolPayload, type ToolSuccess, type X402ExpectedPayment, type X402FundingSignatureResult, type X402HeaderResult, appendSigningAuditEntry, assertSupportedBindingVersion, assertSupportedNodeVersion, assertX402MatchesExpected, buildSignerMcpServer, computeSignerConsentHash, createEdgeSigner, createSigningAuditEntry, createToolHandlers, defaultSigningAuditPath, ensureSignerConsent, hashPayloadForAudit, loadSignerCredentials, readAccountAddressEnv, readAccountAddressField, renderSignerConsentBlock, resolveEdgeSigner, resolveSignerRuntime, runSignerConsentGate, runSignerStdioServer, signerCapabilityAdvertisement, signerCompatibility, signerInstructions, toolDescriptions, toolSchemas, warnIfCredentialFilePermissive };

package/dist/index.js

@@ -501,10 +501,12 @@ async function loadSignerCredentials(path = process.env.HAVEN_CREDENTIALS) {
   if (path) return loadFromFile(path);
   const envKey = stringField(process.env.HAVEN_DELEGATE_KEY);
   if (envKey) {
+    const accountAddress = readAccountAddressEnv(process.env);
     return {
       delegateKey: envKey,
       agentId: stringField(process.env.HAVEN_AGENT_ID),
-      safeAddress: stringField(process.env.HAVEN_SAFE_ADDRESS),
+      accountAddress,
+      safeAddress: accountAddress,
       chainId: chainIdField(process.env.HAVEN_CHAIN_ID, "HAVEN_CHAIN_ID"),
       network: stringField(process.env.HAVEN_NETWORK),
       x402BindingSigner: stringField(process.env.HAVEN_X402_BINDING_SIGNER)
@@ -534,10 +536,12 @@ async function loadFromFile(path) {
   if (!delegateKey) {
     throw new Error("Haven credentials are missing delegate_key \u2014 the edge signer needs it to sign.");
   }
+  const accountAddress = readAccountAddressField(raw);
   return {
     delegateKey,
     agentId: stringField(raw.agent_id ?? raw.agentId),
-    safeAddress: stringField(raw.safe_address ?? raw.safeAddress),
+    accountAddress,
+    safeAddress: accountAddress,
     chainId: chainIdField(raw.chain_id ?? raw.chainId, "chain_id"),
     network: stringField(raw.network),
     x402BindingSigner: stringField(
@@ -546,6 +550,12 @@ async function loadFromFile(path) {
     sourcePath: path
   };
 }
+function readAccountAddressField(raw) {
+  return stringField(raw.account_address ?? raw.safe_address ?? raw.safeAddress);
+}
+function readAccountAddressEnv(env) {
+  return stringField(env.HAVEN_ACCOUNT_ADDRESS ?? env.HAVEN_WALLET_ADDRESS ?? env.HAVEN_SAFE_ADDRESS);
+}
 function stringField(value) {
   return typeof value === "string" && value.trim() ? value.trim() : void 0;
 }
@@ -1231,7 +1241,7 @@ async function writeAckFile(path, hash) {
   );
 }
 var SIGNER_NAME = "@haven_ai/signer";
-var SIGNER_VERSION = "0.1.36-alpha.0";
+var SIGNER_VERSION = "0.2.0-alpha.0";
 async function resolveEdgeSigner(options = {}) {
   const { signer } = await resolveSignerRuntime(options);
   return signer;
@@ -1270,7 +1280,7 @@ function buildSignerMcpServer(signer, options = {}) {
     audit: {
       auditPath: options.auditPath ?? defaultSigningAuditPath(credentialsPath),
       delegateAddress: signer.delegateAddress,
-      safeAddress: options.credentials?.safeAddress,
+      safeAddress: options.credentials?.accountAddress ?? options.credentials?.safeAddress,
       chainId: options.credentials?.chainId
     },
     // #1263: the payment_id signing path — the ONLY network call this server
@@ -1320,7 +1330,7 @@ async function runSignerConsentGate(signer, credentials, options) {
   return ensureSignerConsent(
     {
       delegateAddress: signer.delegateAddress,
-      safeAddress: credentials?.safeAddress,
+      safeAddress: credentials?.accountAddress ?? credentials?.safeAddress,
       agentId: credentials?.agentId,
       chainId: credentials?.chainId,
       network: credentials?.network,
@@ -1341,6 +1351,6 @@ function toMcpResult(payload) {
   };
 }
 
-export { SIGNER_ACK_ENV, SIGNER_CAPABILITY_KEY, SIGNER_NAME, SIGNER_VERSION, SUPPORTED_SWEEP_BINDING_VERSIONS, SUPPORTED_X402_EXPECTED_VERSIONS, appendSigningAuditEntry, assertSupportedBindingVersion, assertSupportedNodeVersion, assertX402MatchesExpected, buildSignerMcpServer, computeSignerConsentHash, createEdgeSigner, createSigningAuditEntry, createToolHandlers, defaultSigningAuditPath, ensureSignerConsent, hashPayloadForAudit, loadSignerCredentials, renderSignerConsentBlock, resolveEdgeSigner, resolveSignerRuntime, runSignerConsentGate, runSignerStdioServer, signerCapabilityAdvertisement, signerCompatibility, signerInstructions, toolDescriptions, toolSchemas, warnIfCredentialFilePermissive };
+export { SIGNER_ACK_ENV, SIGNER_CAPABILITY_KEY, SIGNER_NAME, SIGNER_VERSION, SUPPORTED_SWEEP_BINDING_VERSIONS, SUPPORTED_X402_EXPECTED_VERSIONS, appendSigningAuditEntry, assertSupportedBindingVersion, assertSupportedNodeVersion, assertX402MatchesExpected, buildSignerMcpServer, computeSignerConsentHash, createEdgeSigner, createSigningAuditEntry, createToolHandlers, defaultSigningAuditPath, ensureSignerConsent, hashPayloadForAudit, loadSignerCredentials, readAccountAddressEnv, readAccountAddressField, renderSignerConsentBlock, resolveEdgeSigner, resolveSignerRuntime, runSignerConsentGate, runSignerStdioServer, signerCapabilityAdvertisement, signerCompatibility, signerInstructions, toolDescriptions, toolSchemas, warnIfCredentialFilePermissive };
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