@haven_ai/sdk 0.2.1-alpha.0 → 0.3.0-alpha.0

package/dist/index.js

@@ -112,12 +112,12 @@ var AgentPaymentNextAction = {
    * the agent's per-token allowance needs to be raised before the payment
    * can succeed. A user approval will not fix this state on its own.
    *
-   * #2908: the wire twin `fund_account_or_raise_allowance`
-   * ({@link AgentPaymentNextActionAccountAlias}) means the same thing; the
-   * server keeps emitting THIS value until #2914. Compare via
-   * {@link canonicalAgentPaymentNextAction}.
+   * #2914: the account-vocabulary spelling, and the only one — the
+   * pre-#2907 `fund_safe_or_raise_allowance` wire value (and the
+   * `AgentPaymentNextActionAccountAlias` seam #2908 added to bridge it) are
+   * retired along with the rest of the #2908 compatibility window.
    */
-  FundSafeOrRaiseAllowance: "fund_safe_or_raise_allowance",
+  FundAccountOrRaiseAllowance: "fund_account_or_raise_allowance",
   /**
    * The delegate wallet may hold funds that were sent from the Safe but never
    * settled to the merchant. The wallet owner should initiate a sweep to
@@ -144,19 +144,6 @@ var AgentPaymentNextAction = {
    */
   AwaitingSettlementEvidence: "awaiting_settlement_evidence"
 };
-var AgentPaymentNextActionAccountAlias = {
-  /** Account-vocabulary twin of `fund_safe_or_raise_allowance`; same meaning. */
-  FundAccountOrRaiseAllowance: "fund_account_or_raise_allowance"
-};
-function canonicalAgentPaymentNextAction(value) {
-  if (value === AgentPaymentNextActionAccountAlias.FundAccountOrRaiseAllowance) {
-    return AgentPaymentNextAction.FundSafeOrRaiseAllowance;
-  }
-  return value;
-}
-function isFundAccountOrRaiseAllowance(value) {
-  return value === AgentPaymentNextAction.FundSafeOrRaiseAllowance || value === AgentPaymentNextActionAccountAlias.FundAccountOrRaiseAllowance;
-}
 var AgentPaymentFailureCode = {
   /** A merchant-authoritative x402 price exceeds the caller's pre-funding max_amount cap. */
   PriceExceedsMax: "PRICE_EXCEEDS_MAX",
@@ -251,7 +238,7 @@ var AgentPaymentNextActionDescriptions = {
   [AgentPaymentNextAction.StopAndTellUser]: "Stop retrying this payment and tell the user what happened.",
   [AgentPaymentNextAction.RequestAgainIfUserStillWantsIt]: "Ask again only if the user still wants the payment after expiry.",
   [AgentPaymentNextAction.PaymentWindowExpired]: "The x402 funding/quote window expired. Re-quote with the same idempotency key before asking the signer to build a merchant payment header again.",
-  [AgentPaymentNextAction.FundSafeOrRaiseAllowance]: "Stop and tell the user that the account needs to be funded or the agent budget raised before the payment can succeed.",
+  [AgentPaymentNextAction.FundAccountOrRaiseAllowance]: "Stop and tell the user that the account needs to be funded or the agent budget raised before the payment can succeed.",
   [AgentPaymentNextAction.RetryWithExplicitContext]: "Retry the same tool call, this time passing merchant_url, tool_name, arguments, and mcp_transport explicitly \u2014 the server had no stored context to rehydrate for this payment id.",
   [AgentPaymentNextAction.SweepStrandedFunds]: "Tell the user that funds may be stranded in the delegate wallet and prompt them to initiate a sweep in Haven to return them to the originating account.",
   [AgentPaymentNextAction.AwaitingSettlementEvidence]: "The settlement window passed with no verified on-chain evidence yet. If you hold the merchant's real settlement transaction hash, report it with haven_report_settlement_evidence. Otherwise, Haven's settlement sweep may still attribute it within about two minutes \u2014 poll getPaymentStatus once more, then tell the user the goods were delivered but unverified if it still shows nothing."
@@ -1224,10 +1211,7 @@ function mapPaymentStatusResult(raw) {
     rail: raw.rail,
     status: raw.status,
     phase: raw.phase,
-    // #2908: the account-vocabulary alias collapses onto the canonical value
-    // so every `=== AgentPaymentNextAction.X` downstream keeps working when
-    // the server flips its emit at #2914.
-    nextAction: canonicalAgentPaymentNextAction(raw.next_action),
+    nextAction: raw.next_action,
     amount: raw.amount,
     token: raw.token,
     resourceUrl: raw.resource_url,
@@ -1363,7 +1347,7 @@ function messageForState(label, status, paymentId, nextAction) {
 function paymentStateFromRaw(label, raw) {
   if (!raw.payment_id || !raw.status) return null;
   const phase = raw.phase ?? phaseForStatus(raw.status);
-  const nextAction = canonicalAgentPaymentNextAction(raw.next_action) ?? nextActionForStatus(raw.status);
+  const nextAction = raw.next_action ?? nextActionForStatus(raw.status);
   if (!phase || !nextAction) return null;
   const amount = raw.amount ?? raw.requested ?? "";
   const token = raw.token ?? "";
@@ -1686,20 +1670,6 @@ function verifyPaymentReceipt(receipt, recover = defaultRecover) {
   return { verified: true, recoveredSigner: recovered };
 }
 
-// src/account-naming.ts
-function readAccountAddress(raw) {
-  return raw.account_address ?? raw.safe_address ?? void 0;
-}
-function readAccountId(raw) {
-  return raw.account_id ?? raw.safe_id ?? void 0;
-}
-function accountAddressTwins(address) {
-  return { accountAddress: address, safeAddress: address };
-}
-function readX402ReceiptPayer(raw) {
-  return raw.payer ?? raw.account_address ?? raw.sign_data?.components?.payer_account ?? raw.safe_address ?? raw.sign_data?.components?.safe;
-}
-
 // src/account-reads.ts
 function safeBigInt(value) {
   try {
@@ -1758,10 +1728,13 @@ var AccountReads = class {
     const raw = await this.transport.get("/machine-payments/allowances");
     return {
       agentId: raw.agent_id,
-      // #2908: one mapper, both names, same value — `readAccountAddress`
-      // prefers the server's `account_address` twin and falls back to
-      // `safe_address` for a pre-#2907 server.
-      ...accountAddressTwins(readAccountAddress(raw)),
+      // `account_address` is required on the wire contract, so the declared
+      // type stays `string`; a server that omits it is off-contract and the
+      // cast is the one place that case is allowed through as `undefined`
+      // rather than a fabricated `''` (a present-but-blank address downstream
+      // — the hosted MCP output spreads this object, and the sweep uses it as
+      // a destination).
+      accountAddress: raw.account_address,
       delegateAddress: raw.delegate_address,
       chainId: raw.chain_id,
       allowances: raw.allowances.map((allowance) => ({
@@ -1850,10 +1823,10 @@ var AccountReads = class {
       id: raw.id,
       name: raw.name,
       status: raw.status,
-      // #2908: both camelCase names off whichever snake_case name the server
-      // sent (new first). The hosted MCP's `haven_get_agent` spreads this
-      // object, so this is also the hosted output's dual-emit point.
-      ...accountAddressTwins(readAccountAddress(raw)),
+      // See the comment on `getAllowances` above: `account_address` is
+      // required on the wire contract, so an omission here is off-contract
+      // and comes through as `undefined` rather than a fabricated `''`.
+      accountAddress: raw.account_address,
       delegateAddress: raw.delegate_address,
       chainId: raw.chain_id,
       executionRail: raw.execution_rail === "delegation" ? "delegation" : "legacy"
@@ -2185,6 +2158,13 @@ function assertCanResumeX402(status, paymentRequired, option) {
     );
   }
 }
+
+// src/account-naming.ts
+function readX402ReceiptPayer(raw) {
+  return raw.payer ?? raw.account_address ?? raw.sign_data?.components?.payer_account;
+}
+
+// src/x402-funding-leg.ts
 var X402FundingLeg = class {
   delegateKey;
   delegateAddress;
@@ -4210,13 +4190,13 @@ var toolDescriptions = {
     summary: "Pay an inspected x402 quote. The delegate key signs locally; Haven only validates and relays signed, on-chain-constrained payment transactions.",
     selectionGuidance: "Do not use this for read-only allowance, budget, spend-limit, remaining-amount, reset-period, or what-can-I-spend questions; use the allowance lookup tool instead.",
     behavior: "Signs the payment locally and returns the merchant response. Settlement is either direct account-to-merchant with no funding leg, or a bridge that first redeems the agent's budget delegation to fund the delegate wallet for an EIP-3009 authorization. A payment outside the on-chain budget is declined before any money moves; nothing is queued for a human to approve later.",
-    nextActionGuidance: "Preserve the returned resume_state \u2014 it identifies this payment if you need to ask about it later. This tool performs the merchant retry itself, so do not wait on a signal while the call is in flight. If the process crashes after this call and a later haven_get_payment_status reports nextAction=retry_original_x402_request, Haven's funding leg confirmed but no merchant response was ever recorded \u2014 call the resume tool with the preserved resume_state or payment_id instead of paying again. If the response carries phase=insufficient_funds and nextAction=fund_safe_or_raise_allowance (or fund_account_or_raise_allowance), the payment cannot be retried until the account is funded or the agent budget raised \u2014 stop and tell the user the shortfall reported on the response."
+    nextActionGuidance: "Preserve the returned resume_state \u2014 it identifies this payment if you need to ask about it later. This tool performs the merchant retry itself, so do not wait on a signal while the call is in flight. If the process crashes after this call and a later haven_get_payment_status reports nextAction=retry_original_x402_request, Haven's funding leg confirmed but no merchant response was ever recorded \u2014 call the resume tool with the preserved resume_state or payment_id instead of paying again. If the response carries phase=insufficient_funds and nextAction=fund_account_or_raise_allowance, the payment cannot be retried until the account is funded or the agent budget raised \u2014 stop and tell the user the shortfall reported on the response."
   },
   payX402OneShot: {
     summary: "Fetch an x402 paid HTTP resource in a single call. Handles the full probe -> pay -> retry round trip and returns the merchant response.",
     selectionGuidance: "Prefer this over the quote+pay split when the agent just wants the paid resource and does not need to inspect the price first. If you already have a quote from haven_quote_x402, use haven_pay_x402_quote instead. Do not use for read-only allowance, budget, spend-limit, remaining-amount, reset-period, or what-can-I-spend questions; use the allowance lookup tool instead.",
     behavior: "Calls the URL, parses any HTTP 402 x402 challenge, signs the payment locally, then retries the original request with the signed payment header (sent under PAYMENT-SIGNATURE, plus the legacy X-PAYMENT on the EIP-3009 path only) and returns the merchant response. Settlement is either direct account-to-merchant with no funding leg, or a bridge that first redeems the agent's budget delegation to fund the delegate wallet for an EIP-3009 authorization. A payment outside the on-chain budget is declined before any money moves; nothing is queued for a human to approve later. If the resource returns a non-402 status, returns it unchanged without contacting Haven.",
-    nextActionGuidance: "Preserve the returned resume_state or paymentId \u2014 either identifies this payment if you need to ask about it later. This tool performs the merchant retry itself, so do not wait on a signal while the call is in flight. If the process crashes after this call and a later haven_get_payment_status reports nextAction=retry_original_x402_request, Haven's funding leg confirmed but no merchant response was ever recorded \u2014 call the resume tool with the preserved resume_state or payment_id instead of paying again. If the response carries phase=insufficient_funds and nextAction=fund_safe_or_raise_allowance (or fund_account_or_raise_allowance), the payment cannot be retried until the account is funded or the agent budget raised \u2014 stop and tell the user the shortfall reported on the response."
+    nextActionGuidance: "Preserve the returned resume_state or paymentId \u2014 either identifies this payment if you need to ask about it later. This tool performs the merchant retry itself, so do not wait on a signal while the call is in flight. If the process crashes after this call and a later haven_get_payment_status reports nextAction=retry_original_x402_request, Haven's funding leg confirmed but no merchant response was ever recorded \u2014 call the resume tool with the preserved resume_state or payment_id instead of paying again. If the response carries phase=insufficient_funds and nextAction=fund_account_or_raise_allowance, the payment cannot be retried until the account is funded or the agent budget raised \u2014 stop and tell the user the shortfall reported on the response."
   },
   resumeX402: {
     summary: "Resume an x402 payment whose Haven-side authorization already succeeded but whose merchant retry did not complete.",
@@ -4240,7 +4220,7 @@ var toolDescriptions = {
   getAgent: {
     summary: "Return the authenticated agent identity AND its live spend authority in one call: Haven wallet, delegate, chain, raw status, spend_authority_readiness, and per-token remaining allowance (atomic + human-readable). The recommended first call in a new session to confirm who you are and whether Haven will let you spend right now.",
     selectionGuidance: "Use this as the one-shot orientation/bootstrap at the start of a session, or whenever you need to confirm identity together with whether the agent can spend right now. For a detailed per-token breakdown (configured vs spent vs reset window) use haven_get_allowances.",
-    behavior: `Reads identity plus the live spend-authority snapshot in one shot \u2014 the agent's active on-chain budget delegation. spend_authority_readiness (readiness is a deprecated alias, same value) is "ready" when at least one token has remaining spend authority, "needs_approval" when the agent is active but has none, and "revoked" when the credential is not active. It covers hosted identity + on-chain spend authority ONLY \u2014 the hosted server cannot see the LOCAL signer, so "ready" does not mean the signer can start; verify the signer with a signer tool call or connect --doctor. An over-budget payment is declined before any money moves: there is no approval queue, so ask the owner to grant or raise the budget in Haven rather than waiting for an approval. allowances[] carries remainingAtomic and remainingDisplay per token. Identity fields: id, name, status, accountAddress (safeAddress: deprecated alias, same value), delegateAddress, chainId.`,
+    behavior: `Reads identity plus the live spend-authority snapshot in one shot \u2014 the agent's active on-chain budget delegation. spend_authority_readiness (readiness is a deprecated alias, same value) is "ready" when at least one token has remaining spend authority, "needs_approval" when the agent is active but has none, and "revoked" when the credential is not active. It covers hosted identity + on-chain spend authority ONLY \u2014 the hosted server cannot see the LOCAL signer, so "ready" does not mean the signer can start; verify the signer with a signer tool call or connect --doctor. An over-budget payment is declined before any money moves: there is no approval queue, so ask the owner to grant or raise the budget in Haven rather than waiting for an approval. allowances[] carries remainingAtomic and remainingDisplay per token. Identity fields: id, name, status, accountAddress, delegateAddress, chainId.`,
     nextActionGuidance: ""
   },
   getAllowances: {
@@ -5027,6 +5007,6 @@ function sameUrl(a, b) {
   }
 }
 
-export { AGENT_APPROVAL_RELAY_JSON_SENTENCE, AGENT_APPROVAL_RELAY_PROSE_SENTENCE, AGENT_COMMAND_MODIFICATION_SENTENCE, AGENT_JSON_MODE_SENTENCE, AGENT_LOCAL_KEY_SENTENCE, AGENT_NETWORK_ACCESS_SENTENCE, AGENT_ONBOARDING_PROMPT, AGENT_PAYMENT_FAILURE_CODE_VALUES, AGENT_PAYMENT_NEXT_ACTION_VALUES, AGENT_PAYMENT_PHASE_VALUES, AGENT_PAYMENT_RAIL_VALUES, AGENT_README_SECTION_MD, AGENT_SECRET_HYGIENE_SENTENCE, AGENT_WIRING_COLLISION_RELAY_SENTENCE, AgentPaymentFailureCode, AgentPaymentFailureCodeDescriptions, AgentPaymentFailureCodeSchema, AgentPaymentNextAction, AgentPaymentNextActionAccountAlias, AgentPaymentNextActionDescriptions, AgentPaymentNextActionSchema, AgentPaymentPhase, AgentPaymentPhaseDescriptions, AgentPaymentPhaseSchema, AgentPaymentRail, AgentPaymentRailDescriptions, AgentPaymentRailSchema, AgentPaymentWarningCode, CONNECTOR_PACKAGE_NAME, DEFAULT_CONFIRMATION_TIMEOUT_MS, DISCOVERY_MAX_BYTES, ERC7710_ASSET_TRANSFER_METHOD, HAVEN_AGENT_RUNBOOK_MD, HAVEN_CONNECTOR_CHANNEL, HAVEN_MINIMUM_NODE_VERSION, HAVEN_SKILL_BODY_MD, HAVEN_SKILL_MD, HavenApiError, HavenClient, HavenError, HavenPaymentStateError, HavenSigningError, HavenTimeoutError, HavenUnsupportedSignerVersionError, HavenZeroSettlementHashError, MERCHANT_DISCOVERY_PATHS, MerchantTimeoutError, RECEIPT_VERSION, SIGNER_UPDATE_FALLBACK, SKILL_FOLDER_NAME, SWEEP_BASE_CHAIN_ID, SWEEP_BASE_SEPOLIA_CHAIN_ID, SWEEP_BASE_SEPOLIA_USDC_ADDRESS, SWEEP_BASE_USDC_ADDRESS, SignerRefusalCode, TRANSFER_WITH_AUTHORIZATION_TYPES, X402AlreadySettledError, X402PaymentHeaderValidationError, X402UnexpectedStatusError, X402_LEGACY_PAYMENT_HEADER_NAME, X402_MAX_AUTHORIZATION_WINDOW_SECONDS, X402_PAYMENT_HEADER_NAME, X402_PAYMENT_HEADER_NAMES_SENT, X402_PAYMENT_REQUIRED_HEADER_NAME, X402_PAYMENT_RESPONSE_HEADER_NAME, X402_SETTLEMENT_FORWARD_MARGIN_SECONDS, accountAddressTwins, addressFromKey, buildSweepAuthorizationMessage, buildSweepTypedData, buildX402ExpectedMessage, canonicalAgentPaymentNextAction, compareNodeVersions, composeDescription, connectorRerunCommand, connectorSpec, decodeBase64Json, decodeBase64Utf8, discoverMerchantMcpUrl, encodeBase64Json, encodeBase64Utf8, encodePaymentProof, havenTools, isConnectorChannel, isErc7710Option, isFundAccountOrRaiseAllowance, isSupportedNodeVersion, isSweepableChain, isZeroSettlementTxHash, normalizePaymentRequired, parsePaymentRequired, parsePaymentRequiredResponse, readAccountAddress, readAccountId, readX402ReceiptPayer, resolveConnectorChannel, resolveTokenFromAddress, sameUrl, selectErc7710PaymentOption, selectPaymentOption, selectStandardPaymentOption, selectX402SettlementScheme, signHash, signUserOpTypedDataForDelegation, signerUpdateFallback, sweepUsdcAddress, sweepUsdcDomain, toStandardPaymentRequirements, toolDescriptions, unsupportedNodeVersionMessage, validateStandardX402PaymentHeader, verifyPaymentReceipt, verifySignature, x402AssetTransferMethod, x402AuthorizationAmount, x402FacilitatorAddresses, x402V2PaymentEnvelope };
+export { AGENT_APPROVAL_RELAY_JSON_SENTENCE, AGENT_APPROVAL_RELAY_PROSE_SENTENCE, AGENT_COMMAND_MODIFICATION_SENTENCE, AGENT_JSON_MODE_SENTENCE, AGENT_LOCAL_KEY_SENTENCE, AGENT_NETWORK_ACCESS_SENTENCE, AGENT_ONBOARDING_PROMPT, AGENT_PAYMENT_FAILURE_CODE_VALUES, AGENT_PAYMENT_NEXT_ACTION_VALUES, AGENT_PAYMENT_PHASE_VALUES, AGENT_PAYMENT_RAIL_VALUES, AGENT_README_SECTION_MD, AGENT_SECRET_HYGIENE_SENTENCE, AGENT_WIRING_COLLISION_RELAY_SENTENCE, AgentPaymentFailureCode, AgentPaymentFailureCodeDescriptions, AgentPaymentFailureCodeSchema, AgentPaymentNextAction, AgentPaymentNextActionDescriptions, AgentPaymentNextActionSchema, AgentPaymentPhase, AgentPaymentPhaseDescriptions, AgentPaymentPhaseSchema, AgentPaymentRail, AgentPaymentRailDescriptions, AgentPaymentRailSchema, AgentPaymentWarningCode, CONNECTOR_PACKAGE_NAME, DEFAULT_CONFIRMATION_TIMEOUT_MS, DISCOVERY_MAX_BYTES, ERC7710_ASSET_TRANSFER_METHOD, HAVEN_AGENT_RUNBOOK_MD, HAVEN_CONNECTOR_CHANNEL, HAVEN_MINIMUM_NODE_VERSION, HAVEN_SKILL_BODY_MD, HAVEN_SKILL_MD, HavenApiError, HavenClient, HavenError, HavenPaymentStateError, HavenSigningError, HavenTimeoutError, HavenUnsupportedSignerVersionError, HavenZeroSettlementHashError, MERCHANT_DISCOVERY_PATHS, MerchantTimeoutError, RECEIPT_VERSION, SIGNER_UPDATE_FALLBACK, SKILL_FOLDER_NAME, SWEEP_BASE_CHAIN_ID, SWEEP_BASE_SEPOLIA_CHAIN_ID, SWEEP_BASE_SEPOLIA_USDC_ADDRESS, SWEEP_BASE_USDC_ADDRESS, SignerRefusalCode, TRANSFER_WITH_AUTHORIZATION_TYPES, X402AlreadySettledError, X402PaymentHeaderValidationError, X402UnexpectedStatusError, X402_LEGACY_PAYMENT_HEADER_NAME, X402_MAX_AUTHORIZATION_WINDOW_SECONDS, X402_PAYMENT_HEADER_NAME, X402_PAYMENT_HEADER_NAMES_SENT, X402_PAYMENT_REQUIRED_HEADER_NAME, X402_PAYMENT_RESPONSE_HEADER_NAME, X402_SETTLEMENT_FORWARD_MARGIN_SECONDS, addressFromKey, buildSweepAuthorizationMessage, buildSweepTypedData, buildX402ExpectedMessage, compareNodeVersions, composeDescription, connectorRerunCommand, connectorSpec, decodeBase64Json, decodeBase64Utf8, discoverMerchantMcpUrl, encodeBase64Json, encodeBase64Utf8, encodePaymentProof, havenTools, isConnectorChannel, isErc7710Option, isSupportedNodeVersion, isSweepableChain, isZeroSettlementTxHash, normalizePaymentRequired, parsePaymentRequired, parsePaymentRequiredResponse, readX402ReceiptPayer, resolveConnectorChannel, resolveTokenFromAddress, sameUrl, selectErc7710PaymentOption, selectPaymentOption, selectStandardPaymentOption, selectX402SettlementScheme, signHash, signUserOpTypedDataForDelegation, signerUpdateFallback, sweepUsdcAddress, sweepUsdcDomain, toStandardPaymentRequirements, toolDescriptions, unsupportedNodeVersionMessage, validateStandardX402PaymentHeader, verifyPaymentReceipt, verifySignature, x402AssetTransferMethod, x402AuthorizationAmount, x402FacilitatorAddresses, x402V2PaymentEnvelope };
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