@haven_ai/sdk 0.11.0-alpha.0 → 0.13.0-alpha.0

package/README.md

@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ const response = await haven.payX402Quote(quote)
 const data = await response.json()
 ```
 
-Merchant-verified x402 retries use the official EIP-3009 `exact` scheme on Base USDC (`base` / `eip155:8453`). `haven.fetch()` sends the payment under `PAYMENT-SIGNATURE` (the x402 v2 name), and on the EIP-3009 bridge also under `X-PAYMENT` (v1), so a merchant on either version reads it. **On erc7710 it sends the v2 name ALONE**: that payload is always x402 v2, and its header carries a whole delegation chain, so duplicating it overflows the merchant's header limit and the request is refused with HTTP 431. If you build the retry yourself, follow the same rule. Haven's older tx-hash proof helper remains exported for Haven-native integrations; it is a different payload that happens to have shared the v2 name, and it is not what `haven.fetch()` sends.
+Merchant-verified x402 retries use the x402 `exact` scheme on Base USDC (`base` / `eip155:8453`, or Base Sepolia `eip155:84532`): the EIP-3009 `authorization` payload on the bridge, or a delegation when the merchant's entry carries `extra.assetTransferMethod: 'erc7710'`. `haven.fetch()` sends the payment under `PAYMENT-SIGNATURE` (the x402 v2 name), and on the EIP-3009 bridge also under `X-PAYMENT` (v1), so a merchant on either version reads it. **On erc7710 it sends the v2 name ALONE**: that payload is always x402 v2, and its header carries a whole delegation chain, so duplicating it overflows the merchant's header limit and the request is refused with HTTP 431. If you build the retry yourself, follow the same rule: `x402RetryHeadersFor(paymentHeader)` returns exactly those headers (#3727). Haven's older tx-hash proof helper remains exported for Haven-native integrations; it is a different payload that happens to have shared the v2 name, and it is not what `haven.fetch()` sends.
 
 For standard x402, the `x402-wallet` identity is the agent delegate wallet, because that is the wallet that signs and settles the merchant payment. Integrations that scope access by Haven wallet address should use a Haven-native flow instead of standard merchant x402.
 
@@ -412,6 +412,9 @@ x402 tool-window failures:
    expired funding/quote window → PAYMENT_WINDOW_EXPIRED → re-quote with same idempotency_key
    merchant rejection after funding → MERCHANT_REJECTED_AFTER_FUNDING → haven_sweep_delegate (eip3009 only; erc7710: nothing to sweep, follow the message)
    merchant timeout after funding → MERCHANT_UNRESPONSIVE_AFTER_FUNDING → check_status_later; eip3009: retry once, then haven_sweep_delegate; erc7710: no retry, check status after the window, re-quote only if unsettled
+   funding confirmation unreadable (eip3009, hosted) → FUNDING_CONFIRMATION_UNKNOWN → check_status_later; merchant not called; once funding shows confirmed, complete ONCE (#4470)
+   funding transaction reverted (eip3009, hosted) → FUNDING_REVERTED → stop_and_tell_user; nothing reached the delegate (#4470)
+   no answer to a submit (hosted haven_submit, and haven_settle_mcp_tool's erc7710 settle) → NO_ANSWER_OUTCOME_UNKNOWN → check_status_later; never re-submit, never a new payment (#4470)
 ```
 
 ### `phase` reference
@@ -428,6 +431,8 @@ x402 tool-window failures:
 | `rejected` | The payment was rejected and cannot proceed. | yes |
 | `expired` | Payment expired before completion. | yes |
 | `failed` | Haven could not complete the payment. | yes |
+| `insufficient_funds` | Carried by the `delegation_budget_exceeded` refusal — `403` at prepare, or `502` when the budget ran out by the time the payment was signed — with `nextAction: fund_account_or_raise_allowance`. The budget must be raised, or the period reset, before a new payment can succeed. | yes |
+| `funded_but_unsettled` | The EIP-3009 bridge's funding leg confirmed, but the merchant leg has not settled: either the merchant rejected the retry (`nextAction: sweep_stranded_funds`) or no merchant response was ever recorded (`nextAction: retry_original_x402_request`). Follow `nextAction`. | no |
 | `delivered_unverified` | **#3420: terminal.** The merchant delivered, but the settlement window and the sweep's last attribution chance have both passed with no verified on-chain evidence. Polling cannot change this; the only remedy is reporting a real settlement hash (`haven_report_settlement_evidence`). | yes |
 
 The merchant settlement leg of x402 (and the MPP retry) is the agent's own request to the merchant — it does not have a Haven `phase`. The payment is `funding_sent` until the agent retries with the payment header (`PAYMENT-SIGNATURE`, plus `X-PAYMENT` on this bridged path) (x402) or the MPP proof header; from Haven's perspective the payment becomes `executed` only after the agent successfully resumes.
@@ -445,6 +450,8 @@ The merchant settlement leg of x402 (and the MPP retry) is the agent's own reque
 | `retry_original_x402_request` | Haven's funding leg confirmed but no merchant response was ever recorded — most often because the process crashed between the funding confirmation and the merchant retry (a 15-minute grace window applies before this fires; a client-reported merchant rejection instead yields `sweep_stranded_funds`). Call `resumeX402Payment()` with the preserved `resumeState`, or rehydrate it first with `getResumeState(payment_id)`. Do not start a new payment for the same purchase. |
 | `stop_and_tell_user` | Stop retrying and tell the user what happened — the payment failed, was rejected, or (#3420) was delivered but its settlement can no longer be verified. |
 | `request_again_if_user_still_wants_it` | The request expired; ask again only if the user still wants the payment. |
+| `retry_with_explicit_context` | #1307: retry the same tool call, passing `merchant_url`, `tool_name`, `arguments` and `mcp_transport` explicitly — the server had no stored context to rehydrate for this payment id. |
+| `fund_account_or_raise_allowance` | Stop and tell the user the agent's budget must be raised (or its period reset) before a new payment can succeed; it rides on the `delegation_budget_exceeded` refusal. An approval will not fix it. |
 | `payment_window_expired` | The x402 funding/quote window expired. Re-quote the same paid MCP tool call with the same `idempotency_key`, then sign the fresh `payload_hash`. |
 | `sweep_stranded_funds` | A funding leg succeeded but the merchant/protocol leg did not settle. Stop retrying and use `haven_sweep_delegate` to recover stranded delegate funds. |
 
@@ -471,8 +478,10 @@ queue**: the queue-and-approve path belonged to the retired Safe rail, which now
 answers HTTP 410 at every agent-payment entry point.
 
 If an agent requests a payment outside that policy, Haven **declines it before
-any money moves** — during prepare, before anything is written and before the
-agent is asked to sign. `POST /payments` answers `403` when no active delegation
+any money moves** — during prepare, before any payment intent is created and
+before the agent is asked to sign. The one row written is the refusal itself,
+in the `payment_refusals` ledger (#2945, migration 086; written through the
+`refuse()` choke point since #3053). `POST /payments` answers `403` when no active delegation
 authorizes that token and recipient, `403 delegation_budget_exceeded` when the
 remaining period budget cannot cover the amount (#3503; the x402 authorize path
 answers the same), and `502` when the on-chain caveat check rejects a
@@ -609,7 +618,9 @@ For MCP/SSE x402 tools, keep the same MCP session and JSON-RPC payload where the
 merchant requires it: initialize, retain `mcp-session-id`, send the original
 `tools/call`, parse the 402 challenge, wait for the funding leg to confirm if
 the payment is bridged, then resume with the same `payment_id` and retry the
-original `tools/call`, setting BOTH `PAYMENT-SIGNATURE` (x402 v2) and `X-PAYMENT` (v1) to the header. Use a stable `idempotencyKey` for the
+original `tools/call` with the headers `x402RetryHeadersFor(paymentHeader)`
+returns — `PAYMENT-SIGNATURE` (x402 v2), plus `X-PAYMENT` (v1) only on the
+EIP-3009 bridge; erc7710 sends the v2 name alone. Use a stable `idempotencyKey` for the
 user intent so fresh merchant quotes or sessions do not become duplicate Haven
 payments.
 
@@ -666,6 +677,28 @@ treat them as proof of purchase rather than retrying:
 
 See [Idempotency](#idempotency-what-the-key-guarantees-and-what-it-costs).
 
+**Why a `HavenApiError` happened is `err.failureCause`, not only its status
+(#4470).** The status alone misleads in two ways, so two causes are marked
+where the SDK creates the error, and every other error leaves the field
+`undefined`:
+
+- `{ kind: 'no_answer', method }` — the transport got no usable answer: the
+  request timed out (`statusCode` 408), `fetch` threw, or the body was not
+  JSON (`statusCode` 0; a gateway's HTML 502 arrives this way). Whether the
+  call took effect is unknown. A `GET` may be retried; a `POST` should not
+  be — read the payment's status first. A server that answers 408 with a
+  JSON body is an answer and carries no cause.
+- `{ kind: 'deterministic' }` — the SDK refused an answer it cannot use (a
+  missing field, the wrong shape). A retry gets the same answer, whatever the
+  5xx status says. Built with `HavenApiError.deterministic(...)`.
+
+The funding wait before a merchant retry has two typed outcomes, both
+`HavenApiError` subclasses: `FundingConfirmationUnknownError` (status 504;
+the confirmation could not be read in time, so funding may have moved — check
+the payment's status) and `FundingRevertedError` (status 502; the funding
+transaction reverted, nothing reached the delegate). Each carries `txHash`,
+`chainId` and a `fundingErrorCode`.
+
 ## License
 
 MIT

package/dist/{base64-D4VZhgUg.d.ts → base64-C3mJNLYR.d.cts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { Q as AgentNextStep, Z as AgentPaymentNextAction, aM as X402PaymentOption, aL as X402ExpectedContext, X as X402PaymentRequired, I as HavenError, an as HavenSigningError } from './types-DKmvjXK6.js';
+import { Q as AgentNextStep, Z as AgentPaymentNextAction, aP as X402PaymentOption, aO as X402ExpectedContext, X as X402PaymentRequired, I as HavenError, aq as HavenSigningError } from './types-3vUBmumz.cjs';
 import { PaymentRequirements } from 'x402/types';
 import { Hex, Address } from 'viem';
 
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ declare function buildSweepAuthorizationMessage(auth: SweepAuthorization): strin
  * This SDK's own version. Owned by `scripts/release-bump.mjs`, which rewrites
  * it with the package version on every release — never hand-edit it.
  */
-declare const SDK_VERSION = "0.11.0-alpha.0";
+declare const SDK_VERSION = "0.13.0-alpha.0";
 /** The request header every published Haven client sends. */
 declare const HAVEN_CLIENT_HEADER = "X-Haven-Client";
 /** `<package>/<version>` — the value of {@link HAVEN_CLIENT_HEADER}. */
@@ -269,6 +269,14 @@ declare function parseNextTool(literal: string): {
 interface NextStepTarget<TArgs> {
     role: NextToolServerRole;
     validate: (input: unknown) => string | null;
+    /**
+     * #4449: the bare tool name to render, when the target-map key is not it.
+     * One hosted tool that takes several argument shapes is declared once per
+     * shape under `<tool>#<variant>` keys (the signer's `haven_submit#payment`
+     * beside `#task_budget` / `#sub_budget`): the key selects the shape, this
+     * names the tool. Absent → the key IS the name, which is every other target.
+     */
+    name?: string;
     /** Phantom carrier for the argument type; never read at runtime. */
     readonly _args?: TArgs;
 }

package/dist/{base64-DR4Gl8cD.d.cts → base64-CxzIc3KH.d.ts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { Q as AgentNextStep, Z as AgentPaymentNextAction, aM as X402PaymentOption, aL as X402ExpectedContext, X as X402PaymentRequired, I as HavenError, an as HavenSigningError } from './types-DKmvjXK6.cjs';
+import { Q as AgentNextStep, Z as AgentPaymentNextAction, aP as X402PaymentOption, aO as X402ExpectedContext, X as X402PaymentRequired, I as HavenError, aq as HavenSigningError } from './types-3vUBmumz.js';
 import { PaymentRequirements } from 'x402/types';
 import { Hex, Address } from 'viem';
 
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ declare function buildSweepAuthorizationMessage(auth: SweepAuthorization): strin
  * This SDK's own version. Owned by `scripts/release-bump.mjs`, which rewrites
  * it with the package version on every release — never hand-edit it.
  */
-declare const SDK_VERSION = "0.11.0-alpha.0";
+declare const SDK_VERSION = "0.13.0-alpha.0";
 /** The request header every published Haven client sends. */
 declare const HAVEN_CLIENT_HEADER = "X-Haven-Client";
 /** `<package>/<version>` — the value of {@link HAVEN_CLIENT_HEADER}. */
@@ -269,6 +269,14 @@ declare function parseNextTool(literal: string): {
 interface NextStepTarget<TArgs> {
     role: NextToolServerRole;
     validate: (input: unknown) => string | null;
+    /**
+     * #4449: the bare tool name to render, when the target-map key is not it.
+     * One hosted tool that takes several argument shapes is declared once per
+     * shape under `<tool>#<variant>` keys (the signer's `haven_submit#payment`
+     * beside `#task_budget` / `#sub_budget`): the key selects the shape, this
+     * names the tool. Absent → the key IS the name, which is every other target.
+     */
+    name?: string;
     /** Phantom carrier for the argument type; never read at runtime. */
     readonly _args?: TArgs;
 }

package/dist/{chunk-IKQIIMM6.cjs → chunk-4Z7PKLFD.cjs}

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 'use strict';
 
-var chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs = require('./chunk-MZKLAHBK.cjs');
+var chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs = require('./chunk-LZHCIK7L.cjs');
 var viem = require('viem');
 var crypto = require('crypto');
 var secp256k1 = require('@noble/curves/secp256k1');
 var accounts = require('viem/accounts');
 
 var TYPED_DATA_NOT_ALLOWED = "TYPED_DATA_NOT_ALLOWED";
-var HavenTypedDataRefusedError = class extends chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.HavenSigningError {
+var HavenTypedDataRefusedError = class extends chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.HavenSigningError {
   constructor(message) {
     super(message);
     this.code = TYPED_DATA_NOT_ALLOWED;
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ function assertBoundDirectPaymentUserOp(typedData, delegateAddress) {
       `This signer only signs direct payments on chains the delegation rail has pinned contracts for (${[...DIRECT_PAYMENT_CHAIN_IDS].join(", ")}); this typed data names chain ${String(domain.chainId)}. Refusing.`
     );
   }
-  const ownAccount = chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.deriveDelegateAccountAddress(delegateAddress);
+  const ownAccount = chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.deriveDelegateAccountAddress(delegateAddress);
   const sender = typeof message.sender === "string" ? message.sender : "";
   if (sender.toLowerCase() !== ownAccount.toLowerCase()) {
     throw new HavenTypedDataRefusedError(
@@ -78,9 +78,9 @@ function assertBoundDirectPaymentUserOp(typedData, delegateAddress) {
       "This UserOperation's execute() call does not re-encode to the exact callData bytes (trailing or non-canonical bytes). Refusing."
     );
   }
-  if (decoded.target.toLowerCase() !== chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.DELEGATION_MANAGER.toLowerCase()) {
+  if (decoded.target.toLowerCase() !== chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.DELEGATION_MANAGER.toLowerCase()) {
     throw new HavenTypedDataRefusedError(
-      `This UserOperation's execute() calls ${decoded.target}, not the DelegationManager (${chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.DELEGATION_MANAGER}). A direct payment only ever redeems the agent's own budget delegation \u2014 refusing what looks like a self-call (e.g. transferOwnership, updateSigners, upgradeToAndCall) or a call to an unrelated contract.`
+      `This UserOperation's execute() calls ${decoded.target}, not the DelegationManager (${chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.DELEGATION_MANAGER}). A direct payment only ever redeems the agent's own budget delegation \u2014 refusing what looks like a self-call (e.g. transferOwnership, updateSigners, upgradeToAndCall) or a call to an unrelated contract.`
     );
   }
   if (decoded.value !== 0n) {
@@ -89,20 +89,20 @@ function assertBoundDirectPaymentUserOp(typedData, delegateAddress) {
     );
   }
   try {
-    chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.assertRedeemsOwnBudgetDelegation(decoded.callData, ownAccount);
+    chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.assertRedeemsOwnBudgetDelegation(decoded.callData, ownAccount);
   } catch (err) {
     throw new HavenTypedDataRefusedError(err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err));
   }
 }
 function assertOwnSettlementChild(typedData, expectation, delegateAddress) {
   try {
-    chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.verifySettlementChild(typedData, {
+    chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.verifySettlementChild(typedData, {
       ...expectation,
-      delegatorAccount: chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.deriveDelegateAccountAddress(delegateAddress)
+      delegatorAccount: chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.deriveDelegateAccountAddress(delegateAddress)
     });
   } catch (err) {
     if (err instanceof HavenTypedDataRefusedError) throw err;
-    if (err instanceof chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.HavenSigningError) throw new HavenTypedDataRefusedError(err.message);
+    if (err instanceof chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.HavenSigningError) throw new HavenTypedDataRefusedError(err.message);
     throw new HavenTypedDataRefusedError(
       `Refusing to sign the x402 settlement child: it is malformed (${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}).`
     );
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ function assertFundingLegPaysDelegate(typedData, expected) {
   try {
     const { args: executeArgs } = viem.decodeFunctionData({ abi: EXECUTE_ABI, data: message.callData });
     const inner = executeArgs[0].callData;
-    const { args } = viem.decodeFunctionData({ abi: chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.REDEEM_DELEGATIONS_ABI, data: inner });
+    const { args } = viem.decodeFunctionData({ abi: chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.REDEEM_DELEGATIONS_ABI, data: inner });
     const executions = args[2];
     executionCallData = executions[0];
   } catch {
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ var TRANSFER_WITH_AUTHORIZATION_TYPES = {
 function sweepUsdcAddress(chainId) {
   const address = USDC_ADDRESS_BY_CHAIN[chainId];
   if (!address) {
-    throw new chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.HavenSigningError(
+    throw new chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.HavenSigningError(
       `Sweep is not supported on chain ${chainId}. Supported: ${SWEEPABLE_CHAIN_IDS.join(", ")}.`
     );
   }
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ function sweepUsdcAddress(chainId) {
 function sweepUsdcDomain(chainId) {
   const domain = USDC_EIP712_DOMAIN_BY_CHAIN[chainId];
   if (!domain) {
-    throw new chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.HavenSigningError(
+    throw new chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.HavenSigningError(
       `Sweep is not supported on chain ${chainId}. Supported: ${SWEEPABLE_CHAIN_IDS.join(", ")}.`
     );
   }
@@ -272,12 +272,12 @@ function buildSweepTypedData(auth) {
   const domain = sweepUsdcDomain(auth.chainId);
   const expectedToken = sweepUsdcAddress(auth.chainId);
   if (!sameAddress(auth.token, expectedToken)) {
-    throw new chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.HavenSigningError(
+    throw new chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.HavenSigningError(
       `Sweep token ${auth.token} is not the canonical USDC contract for chain ${auth.chainId}.`
     );
   }
   if (!/^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(auth.nonce)) {
-    throw new chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.HavenSigningError("Sweep nonce must be a 0x-prefixed 32-byte hex string.");
+    throw new chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.HavenSigningError("Sweep nonce must be a 0x-prefixed 32-byte hex string.");
   }
   return {
     domain,
@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ function stableStringify2(value) {
 }
 
 // src/client-identity.ts
-var SDK_VERSION = "0.11.0-alpha.0";
+var SDK_VERSION = "0.13.0-alpha.0";
 var HAVEN_CLIENT_HEADER = "X-Haven-Client";
 function havenClientIdentity(pkg, version) {
   return `${pkg}/${version}`;
@@ -815,7 +815,7 @@ function addressFromKey(privateKey) {
   try {
     return accounts.privateKeyToAddress(`0x${hexBytes(privateKey, 32, "private key")}`);
   } catch (err) {
-    throw new chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.HavenSigningError(
+    throw new chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.HavenSigningError(
       `Invalid private key: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`
     );
   }
@@ -829,7 +829,7 @@ function signHash(privateKey, hash) {
       yParity: recovery
     });
   } catch (err) {
-    throw new chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.HavenSigningError(
+    throw new chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.HavenSigningError(
       `Failed to sign hash: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`
     );
   }
@@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ var TAX_DECLARATION_TYPES = {
 var X_TAX_DECLARATION_HEADER = "X-Tax-Declaration";
 function validateContent(content) {
   if (typeof content !== "object" || content === null || Array.isArray(content)) {
-    throw new chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.HavenSigningError("Tax declaration content must be an object.");
+    throw new chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.HavenSigningError("Tax declaration content must be an object.");
   }
   const record = content;
   for (const field of ["principalId", "principalAttributionHash"]) {
@@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ function taxPrincipalId(network, delegateAddress) {
   if (network.startsWith("eip155:")) {
     return `did:pkh:${network}:${delegateAddress}`;
   }
-  const chainId = chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.chainIdForNetwork(network);
+  const chainId = chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.chainIdForNetwork(network);
   if (chainId === void 0) {
     throw new TaxDeclarationRefusedError(
       `The accepted payment option's network '${network}' is not a CAIP-2 eip155 chain this SDK can name; refusing to build a tax principal without the settlement network.`
@@ -963,12 +963,12 @@ function addressFromKeyForTax(delegateKey) {
   try {
     return addressFromKey(delegateKey);
   } catch (err) {
-    throw new chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.HavenSigningError(
+    throw new chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.HavenSigningError(
       `Invalid delegate key for tax declaration signing: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`
     );
   }
 }
-var TaxDeclarationRefusedError = class extends chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.HavenSigningError {
+var TaxDeclarationRefusedError = class extends chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.HavenSigningError {
   code = "TAX_DECLARATION_REFUSED";
   constructor(message) {
     super(message);
@@ -1027,11 +1027,12 @@ function createNextStepBuilder(targets) {
     if (problem) {
       return { ...base, next_tool_omitted_reason: `next_arguments do not parse under ${i.nextTool}: ${problem}` };
     }
+    const name = target.name ?? i.nextTool;
     return {
       ...base,
-      next_tool: renderNextTool(target.role, i.nextTool),
+      next_tool: renderNextTool(target.role, name),
       next_tool_server: NEXT_TOOL_SERVER_NAMES[target.role],
-      next_tool_name: i.nextTool,
+      next_tool_name: name,
       next_tool_server_role: target.role,
       next_arguments: i.nextArguments
     };
@@ -1124,10 +1125,10 @@ function assertOwnTaskChild(typedData, expected, delegateAddress, now = Date.now
   if (td?.primaryType !== "Delegation") {
     refuseTaskChild("it is not a Delegation payload", `primaryType was '${String(td?.primaryType)}'.`);
   }
-  if (!same(td.domain?.verifyingContract, chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.DELEGATION_MANAGER)) {
+  if (!same(td.domain?.verifyingContract, chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.DELEGATION_MANAGER)) {
     refuseTaskChild(
       "the EIP-712 domain names an unknown DelegationManager",
-      `Expected ${chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.DELEGATION_MANAGER}, got ${td.domain?.verifyingContract}.`
+      `Expected ${chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.DELEGATION_MANAGER}, got ${td.domain?.verifyingContract}.`
     );
   }
   if (td.domain?.name !== DELEGATION_DOMAIN_NAME || td.domain?.version !== DELEGATION_DOMAIN_VERSION) {
@@ -1155,7 +1156,7 @@ function assertOwnTaskChild(typedData, expected, delegateAddress, now = Date.now
       `Expected chain ${expected.chainId}; the child says ${td.domain?.chainId}.`
     );
   }
-  const ownAccount = chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.deriveDelegateAccountAddress(delegateAddress);
+  const ownAccount = chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.deriveDelegateAccountAddress(delegateAddress);
   const delegator = td.message?.delegator;
   if (typeof delegator !== "string" || !same(delegator, ownAccount)) {
     refuseTaskChild(
@@ -1174,7 +1175,7 @@ function assertOwnTaskChild(typedData, expected, delegateAddress, now = Date.now
   if (typeof authority !== "string" || !/^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(authority)) {
     refuseTaskChild("its authority is not a 32-byte delegation hash", `Got ${String(authority)}.`);
   }
-  if (authority.toLowerCase() === chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.ROOT_AUTHORITY) {
+  if (authority.toLowerCase() === chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.ROOT_AUTHORITY) {
     refuseTaskChild(
       "it is a ROOT delegation, not a re-delegation of the agent budget",
       "A task budget always chains under the agent budget delegation."
@@ -1187,7 +1188,7 @@ function assertOwnTaskChild(typedData, expected, delegateAddress, now = Date.now
     );
   }
   const caveats = td.message?.caveats ?? [];
-  const transfer = findCaveat(caveats, chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.CAVEAT_ENFORCERS.erc20TransferAmount);
+  const transfer = findCaveat(caveats, chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.CAVEAT_ENFORCERS.erc20TransferAmount);
   if (!transfer) {
     refuseTaskChild(
       "it has no ERC-20 transfer-amount caveat",
@@ -1205,7 +1206,7 @@ function assertOwnTaskChild(typedData, expected, delegateAddress, now = Date.now
       `Expected ${expected.maxAmountAtomic}; the child allows ${amount.toString()}.`
     );
   }
-  const timestamp = findCaveat(caveats, chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.CAVEAT_ENFORCERS.timestamp);
+  const timestamp = findCaveat(caveats, chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.CAVEAT_ENFORCERS.timestamp);
   if (!timestamp) {
     refuseTaskChild("it never expires", "A task-budget child without a timestamp caveat is open-ended.");
   }
@@ -1226,7 +1227,7 @@ function assertOwnTaskChild(typedData, expected, delegateAddress, now = Date.now
       `Expected ${expected.expiresAt}; the child says ${beforeThreshold}.`
     );
   }
-  const calldata = findCaveat(caveats, chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.CAVEAT_ENFORCERS.allowedCalldata);
+  const calldata = findCaveat(caveats, chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.CAVEAT_ENFORCERS.allowedCalldata);
   if (expected.recipientAddress) {
     if (!calldata) {
       refuseTaskChild(
@@ -1263,7 +1264,7 @@ var DISABLE_DELEGATION_ABI = [
   {
     type: "function",
     name: "disableDelegation",
-    inputs: [{ name: "delegation", type: "tuple", components: chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.DELEGATION_TUPLE_COMPONENTS }],
+    inputs: [{ name: "delegation", type: "tuple", components: chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.DELEGATION_TUPLE_COMPONENTS }],
     outputs: [],
     stateMutability: "nonpayable"
   }
@@ -1282,7 +1283,7 @@ function assertOwnTaskBudgetCloseUserOp(typedData, expected, delegateAddress) {
       `This signer only signs a task-budget close on chains the delegation rail has pinned contracts for (${[...DIRECT_PAYMENT_CHAIN_IDS].join(", ")}); this typed data names chain ${String(domain.chainId)}. Refusing.`
     );
   }
-  const ownAccount = chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.deriveDelegateAccountAddress(delegateAddress);
+  const ownAccount = chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.deriveDelegateAccountAddress(delegateAddress);
   const sender = typeof message.sender === "string" ? message.sender : "";
   if (sender.toLowerCase() !== ownAccount.toLowerCase()) {
     throw new HavenTypedDataRefusedError(
@@ -1305,9 +1306,9 @@ function assertOwnTaskBudgetCloseUserOp(typedData, expected, delegateAddress) {
       "This close UserOperation's execute() call does not re-encode to the exact callData bytes (trailing or non-canonical bytes). Refusing."
     );
   }
-  if (decoded.target.toLowerCase() !== chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.DELEGATION_MANAGER.toLowerCase()) {
+  if (decoded.target.toLowerCase() !== chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.DELEGATION_MANAGER.toLowerCase()) {
     throw new HavenTypedDataRefusedError(
-      `This close UserOperation's execute() calls ${decoded.target}, not the DelegationManager (${chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.DELEGATION_MANAGER}). Refusing what looks like a self-call or a call to an unrelated contract.`
+      `This close UserOperation's execute() calls ${decoded.target}, not the DelegationManager (${chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.DELEGATION_MANAGER}). Refusing what looks like a self-call or a call to an unrelated contract.`
     );
   }
   if (decoded.value !== 0n) {
@@ -1344,7 +1345,7 @@ function assertOwnTaskBudgetCloseUserOp(typedData, expected, delegateAddress) {
       `This close UserOperation disables a delegation granted to ${delegation.delegate}, not this signer's own account (${ownAccount}) \u2014 a task-budget child is always self-delegated. Refusing.`
     );
   }
-  if (delegation.authority.toLowerCase() === chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.ROOT_AUTHORITY) {
+  if (delegation.authority.toLowerCase() === chunkLZHCIK7L_cjs.ROOT_AUTHORITY) {
     throw new HavenTypedDataRefusedError(
       "This close UserOperation disables a ROOT delegation, not a re-delegation of the agent budget. A task-budget child always chains under the agent budget delegation. Refusing."
     );
@@ -1477,5 +1478,5 @@ exports.x402PaymentHeaderNamesFor = x402PaymentHeaderNamesFor;
 exports.x402PaymentHeaderNamesSent = x402PaymentHeaderNamesSent;
 exports.x402RetryHeadersFor = x402RetryHeadersFor;
 exports.x402V2PaymentEnvelope = x402V2PaymentEnvelope;
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-IKQIIMM6.cjs.map
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-IKQIIMM6.cjs.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-4Z7PKLFD.cjs.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-4Z7PKLFD.cjs.map