@haven_ai/sdk 0.10.0-alpha.0 → 0.11.0-alpha.0

package/dist/{receipt-Cg9a5Seq.d.ts → receipt-CbD8L0WL.d.ts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { aW as RawPaymentParties } from './types-BKgqzvnk.js';
+import { aW as RawPaymentParties } from './types-DKmvjXK6.js';
 
 /**
  * Verifiable payment receipts.

package/dist/{receipt-q7ez8Zb2.d.cts → receipt-_bWCELEH.d.cts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { aW as RawPaymentParties } from './types-BKgqzvnk.cjs';
+import { aW as RawPaymentParties } from './types-DKmvjXK6.cjs';
 
 /**
  * Verifiable payment receipts.

package/dist/test-support.cjs

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 'use strict';
 
-var chunk6LEXYQ7J_cjs = require('./chunk-6LEXYQ7J.cjs');
-var chunkH37YVYZA_cjs = require('./chunk-H37YVYZA.cjs');
+var chunkDXBAN4SN_cjs = require('./chunk-DXBAN4SN.cjs');
+var chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs = require('./chunk-MZKLAHBK.cjs');
 var viem = require('viem');
 var ethers = require('ethers');
 
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ var ZERO_BYTES32 = `0x${"00".repeat(32)}`;
 var ROOT_AUTHORITY = `0x${"ff".repeat(32)}`;
 var DEFAULT_DELEGATOR = "0x98989898989898989898989898989898989898De";
 var DELEGATION_ARRAY_PARAM = [
-  { type: "tuple[]", components: chunkH37YVYZA_cjs.DELEGATION_TUPLE_COMPONENTS }
+  { type: "tuple[]", components: chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.DELEGATION_TUPLE_COMPONENTS }
 ];
 var EXECUTE_ABI = [
   {
@@ -85,16 +85,16 @@ function buildBoundRedeemDelegationsCallData(options) {
     10000n
   );
   return viem.encodeFunctionData({
-    abi: chunkH37YVYZA_cjs.REDEEM_DELEGATIONS_ABI,
+    abi: chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.REDEEM_DELEGATIONS_ABI,
     functionName: "redeemDelegations",
-    args: [[permissionContext], [chunkH37YVYZA_cjs.SINGLE_DEFAULT_MODE], [executionCallData]]
+    args: [[permissionContext], [chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.SINGLE_DEFAULT_MODE], [executionCallData]]
   });
 }
 function buildEmptyPermissionContextRedemption(selfCallCallData) {
   return viem.encodeFunctionData({
-    abi: chunkH37YVYZA_cjs.REDEEM_DELEGATIONS_ABI,
+    abi: chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.REDEEM_DELEGATIONS_ABI,
     functionName: "redeemDelegations",
-    args: [[buildEmptyPermissionContext()], [chunkH37YVYZA_cjs.SINGLE_DEFAULT_MODE], [selfCallCallData]]
+    args: [[buildEmptyPermissionContext()], [chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.SINGLE_DEFAULT_MODE], [selfCallCallData]]
   });
 }
 function buildExecuteCallData(target, value, innerCallData) {
@@ -106,20 +106,20 @@ function buildExecuteCallData(target, value, innerCallData) {
 }
 function buildBoundDirectUserOp(options) {
   const chainId = options.chainId ?? 84532;
-  const sender = options.sender ?? chunkH37YVYZA_cjs.deriveDelegateAccountAddress(options.delegate);
+  const sender = options.sender ?? chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.deriveDelegateAccountAddress(options.delegate);
   const callData = options.callData ?? buildExecuteCallData(
-    options.target ?? chunkH37YVYZA_cjs.DELEGATION_MANAGER,
+    options.target ?? chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.DELEGATION_MANAGER,
     options.value ?? 0n,
     buildBoundRedeemDelegationsCallData({ delegate: sender, delegator: options.delegator })
   );
   const typedData = {
     domain: {
-      name: chunkH37YVYZA_cjs.HYBRID_DELEGATOR_DOMAIN_NAME,
-      version: chunkH37YVYZA_cjs.HYBRID_DELEGATOR_DOMAIN_VERSION,
+      name: chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.HYBRID_DELEGATOR_DOMAIN_NAME,
+      version: chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.HYBRID_DELEGATOR_DOMAIN_VERSION,
       chainId,
       verifyingContract: sender
     },
-    types: { PackedUserOperation: chunkH37YVYZA_cjs.PACKED_USER_OPERATION_FIELDS.map((field) => ({ ...field })) },
+    types: { PackedUserOperation: chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.PACKED_USER_OPERATION_FIELDS.map((field) => ({ ...field })) },
     primaryType: "PackedUserOperation",
     message: {
       sender,
@@ -130,10 +130,10 @@ function buildBoundDirectUserOp(options) {
       preVerificationGas: "0",
       gasFees: ZERO_BYTES32,
       paymasterAndData: "0x",
-      entryPoint: chunkH37YVYZA_cjs.ENTRY_POINT_V07
+      entryPoint: chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.ENTRY_POINT_V07
     }
   };
-  const payloadHash = chunkH37YVYZA_cjs.packedUserOperationHash(typedData);
+  const payloadHash = chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.packedUserOperationHash(typedData);
   return { typedData, payloadHash, sender };
 }
 function buildSelfCallCallData(sender) {
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ function rebuildDirectUserOpForSender(fixtureTypedData, newSender) {
   const originalCallData = fixtureTypedData.message.callData;
   const { args: executeArgs } = viem.decodeFunctionData({ abi: EXECUTE_ABI, data: originalCallData });
   const execution = executeArgs[0];
-  const { args: redeemArgs } = viem.decodeFunctionData({ abi: chunkH37YVYZA_cjs.REDEEM_DELEGATIONS_ABI, data: execution.callData });
+  const { args: redeemArgs } = viem.decodeFunctionData({ abi: chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.REDEEM_DELEGATIONS_ABI, data: execution.callData });
   const [permissionContexts, modes, executionCallDatas] = redeemArgs;
   const [delegations] = viem.decodeAbiParameters(DELEGATION_ARRAY_PARAM, permissionContexts[0]);
   const adjustedDelegations = delegations.map(
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ function rebuildDirectUserOpForSender(fixtureTypedData, newSender) {
   );
   const adjustedPermissionContext = viem.encodeAbiParameters(DELEGATION_ARRAY_PARAM, [adjustedDelegations]);
   const adjustedRedeemCallData = viem.encodeFunctionData({
-    abi: chunkH37YVYZA_cjs.REDEEM_DELEGATIONS_ABI,
+    abi: chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.REDEEM_DELEGATIONS_ABI,
     functionName: "redeemDelegations",
     args: [[adjustedPermissionContext], modes, executionCallDatas]
   });
@@ -173,13 +173,13 @@ function rebuildDirectUserOpForSender(fixtureTypedData, newSender) {
     domain: { ...fixtureTypedData.domain, verifyingContract: newSender },
     message: { ...fixtureTypedData.message, sender: newSender, callData: adjustedCallData }
   };
-  const payloadHash = chunkH37YVYZA_cjs.packedUserOperationHash(typedData);
+  const payloadHash = chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.packedUserOperationHash(typedData);
   return { typedData, payloadHash };
 }
 function buildFundingLegUserOp(options) {
-  const sender = chunkH37YVYZA_cjs.deriveDelegateAccountAddress(options.delegate);
+  const sender = chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.deriveDelegateAccountAddress(options.delegate);
   const callData = buildExecuteCallData(
-    chunkH37YVYZA_cjs.DELEGATION_MANAGER,
+    chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.DELEGATION_MANAGER,
     0n,
     buildBoundRedeemDelegationsCallData({
       delegate: sender,
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ function delegationDigest(signHash, chainId) {
         viem.keccak256(viem.toBytes("DelegationManager")),
         viem.keccak256(viem.toBytes("1")),
         BigInt(chainId),
-        chunkH37YVYZA_cjs.DELEGATION_MANAGER
+        chunkMZKLAHBK_cjs.DELEGATION_MANAGER
       ]
     )
   );
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ function signedErc7710Receipt(options = {}) {
   const delegate = new ethers.Wallet(options.delegateKey ?? RECEIPT_DELEGATE_KEY);
   const signature = delegate.signingKey.sign(delegationDigest(signHash, chainId)).serialized;
   return {
-    version: chunk6LEXYQ7J_cjs.RECEIPT_VERSION,
+    version: chunkDXBAN4SN_cjs.RECEIPT_VERSION,
     paymentId: options.paymentId ?? "pay_3723",
     payment: {
       token: "USDC",

package/dist/test-support.d.cts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { Address, Hex } from 'viem';
-import { P as PaymentReceipt } from './receipt-q7ez8Zb2.cjs';
-import './types-BKgqzvnk.cjs';
+import { P as PaymentReceipt } from './receipt-_bWCELEH.cjs';
+import './types-DKmvjXK6.cjs';
 
 /**
  * #3272 — a real-shaped, BOUND direct-payment `PackedUserOperation` for

package/dist/test-support.d.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { Address, Hex } from 'viem';
-import { P as PaymentReceipt } from './receipt-Cg9a5Seq.js';
-import './types-BKgqzvnk.js';
+import { P as PaymentReceipt } from './receipt-CbD8L0WL.js';
+import './types-DKmvjXK6.js';
 
 /**
  * #3272 — a real-shaped, BOUND direct-payment `PackedUserOperation` for

package/dist/test-support.js

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-import { RECEIPT_VERSION } from './chunk-EWTHDEIW.js';
-import { DELEGATION_TUPLE_COMPONENTS, SINGLE_DEFAULT_MODE, REDEEM_DELEGATIONS_ABI, deriveDelegateAccountAddress, DELEGATION_MANAGER, PACKED_USER_OPERATION_FIELDS, packedUserOperationHash, ENTRY_POINT_V07, HYBRID_DELEGATOR_DOMAIN_VERSION, HYBRID_DELEGATOR_DOMAIN_NAME } from './chunk-TD2PHUYP.js';
+import { RECEIPT_VERSION } from './chunk-34YJQFCM.js';
+import { DELEGATION_TUPLE_COMPONENTS, SINGLE_DEFAULT_MODE, REDEEM_DELEGATIONS_ABI, deriveDelegateAccountAddress, DELEGATION_MANAGER, PACKED_USER_OPERATION_FIELDS, packedUserOperationHash, ENTRY_POINT_V07, HYBRID_DELEGATOR_DOMAIN_VERSION, HYBRID_DELEGATOR_DOMAIN_NAME } from './chunk-I7SL4A6X.js';
 import { keccak256, toBytes, encodeAbiParameters, encodePacked, encodeFunctionData, decodeFunctionData, decodeAbiParameters, hashTypedData, concatHex } from 'viem';
 import { Wallet } from 'ethers';
 

package/dist/{types-BKgqzvnk.d.cts → types-DKmvjXK6.d.cts}

@@ -14,9 +14,14 @@
  *    it is a string check. A public host name whose DNS ANSWER points at
  *    private space is NOT blocked here — that needs the resolution-time
  *    checks parked in #3742–#3744 (owner-accepted residual, 2026-10-07).
- *  - Without `merchantEgress`, NOTHING in the SDK changes: no `redirect:
- *    'manual'`, no body capping, no extra refusals. SDK, local-MCP and
- *    embedder callers keep today's behaviour byte for byte.
+ *  - Without `merchantEgress` there is no URL check, no body capping and no
+ *    per-use budget. Redirects are still followed by the transport (#4257),
+ *    under the platform's rules (20 hops, the Fetch spec's method/body
+ *    rewrite), plus the one rule both paths share: a hop to another origin
+ *    carries only the cross-origin header allow-list. A paid request (the
+ *    delivery, or a body with an x402 payment in `_meta`) is never re-sent
+ *    to another origin by a redirect that keeps the body (307/308, or 301/302
+ *    on a method other than POST); any other request follows as before.
  *  - The policy is network policy, not spend control. It never gates a
  *    payment's authority — the on-chain allowance stays the real control
  *    (CASP: off-chain policy is never the spend control).
@@ -48,7 +53,10 @@ interface MerchantEgressPolicy {
     /**
      * How many GET redirects may be followed; EVERY hop is re-asserted against
      * `assertUrl` before it connects. A redirect on any other method is
-     * refused outright. `undefined` = no redirect following.
+     * refused outright. A hop to a different origin carries only the
+     * transport's cross-origin header allow-list (#4244): credentials and other
+     * caller headers stay with the origin they were sent to.
+     * `undefined` = no redirect following.
      */
     maxGetRedirects?: number;
     /** Per-use timeouts (ms). The effective deadline is `min(this, merchantTimeout)`. */
@@ -59,7 +67,14 @@ interface MerchantEgressPolicy {
      */
     responseByteCaps?: Partial<Record<MerchantEgressUse, number>>;
 }
-type MerchantEgressRefusalReason = 'url_not_allowed' | 'redirect_on_non_get' | 'redirect_missing_location' | 'redirect_invalid_location' | 'redirect_budget_exceeded';
+type MerchantEgressRefusalReason = 'url_not_allowed' | 'redirect_on_non_get' | 'redirect_missing_location' | 'redirect_invalid_location' | 'redirect_budget_exceeded'
+/**
+ * #4257: a redirect that keeps the body (307/308, or 301/302 on a method
+ * other than POST) would re-send it to another origin. Under a
+ * policy (GET only) this is unreachable; without one it fires for a paid
+ * delivery, or a body carrying an x402 payment in `_meta`.
+ */
+ | 'redirect_cross_origin_body';
 declare const MERCHANT_EGRESS_REFUSED_CODE = "MERCHANT_EGRESS_REFUSED";
 /**
  * The policy refused a merchant request. `beforeRequest` is true when the
@@ -73,7 +88,27 @@ declare class MerchantEgressRefusedError extends HavenError {
     readonly url: string;
     readonly refusal: MerchantEgressRefusalReason;
     readonly beforeRequest: boolean;
-    constructor(message: string, url: string, refusal: MerchantEgressRefusalReason, beforeRequest: boolean);
+    /** #4257: the redirect status that was not followed, when a redirect was refused. */
+    readonly redirectStatus?: number;
+    /**
+     * #4257: set only when `url` IS the redirect target (a cross-origin body
+     * re-send, a spent hop budget, a hop `assertUrl` refused). A refusal that
+     * stopped at the answering URL itself (a non-GET redirect, a missing or
+     * unresolvable Location) leaves it unset, and `url` is that answering URL.
+     */
+    readonly redirectTarget?: string;
+    /**
+     * #4257: set when the refusal interrupted a PAID delivery and the local
+     * completion has re-thrown it with the payment it belongs to — the funded,
+     * undelivered state, never "nothing happened".
+     */
+    readonly settlementScheme?: 'eip3009' | 'erc7710';
+    constructor(message: string, url: string, refusal: MerchantEgressRefusalReason, beforeRequest: boolean, extra?: {
+        redirectStatus?: number;
+        redirectTarget?: string;
+        paymentId?: string;
+        settlementScheme?: 'eip3009' | 'erc7710';
+    });
 }
 declare const MERCHANT_EGRESS_RESPONSE_CAP_CODE = "MERCHANT_EGRESS_RESPONSE_CAP";
 /**
@@ -1107,9 +1142,9 @@ interface HavenSubBudgetCloseSignData {
 /** #3506: `POST /sub-budgets/:id/close`. */
 interface CloseSubBudgetResult {
     subBudget: HavenSubBudget;
-    /** `closed` on a trivial close (never signed, or already expired); absent when a close signature is pending. */
+    /** `closed` on a trivial close (never signed, or `open` and already expired) or when the chain already shows it disabled; absent when a close signature is pending. */
     status?: 'closed';
-    /** Present only when the close needed a signature (a live child). */
+    /** Present only when the close needed a signature (a live child, or any `closing` row — #3923). */
     signData?: HavenSubBudgetCloseSignData;
     nextAction?: string;
 }
@@ -1145,6 +1180,8 @@ interface HavenTaskBudget {
     status: HavenTaskBudgetStatus;
     expiresAt: number;
     isExpired: boolean;
+    /** #3922: camelCase `is_live`; absent when the backend predates it (presence preserved). */
+    isLive?: boolean;
     createdAt: string;
     openedAt: string | null;
     closedAt: string | null;
@@ -1793,6 +1830,22 @@ declare const AgentPaymentWarningCode: {
      * settlement can no longer land at all.
      */
     readonly SettlementUnconfirmed: "SETTLEMENT_UNCONFIRMED";
+    /**
+     * #3967: the quote-time budget pre-check decided the quoted amount does NOT
+     * fit the agent's remaining delegation budget — the same server-side compare
+     * the payment path runs before funding. Travels beside
+     * `budget_check.sufficient: false` and, on `haven_quote_x402`,
+     * `safe_to_continue: false` with no prefilled cap. The on-chain policy
+     * remains the actual gate either way.
+     */
+    readonly QuoteExceedsRemainingBudget: "QUOTE_EXCEEDS_REMAINING_BUDGET";
+    /**
+     * #3967: the MERCHANT reported a denial on one of its x402 payment options —
+     * a known denial key (starting with `issuanceDenied`) in `accepts[].extra`.
+     * Strictly informational: it flips neither `safe_to_continue` nor
+     * `expected_settleable`; the agent should surface it to the user.
+     */
+    readonly MerchantReportedDenial: "MERCHANT_REPORTED_DENIAL";
 };
 type AgentPaymentWarningCode = (typeof AgentPaymentWarningCode)[keyof typeof AgentPaymentWarningCode];
 interface AgentPaymentWarning {
@@ -2053,9 +2106,11 @@ interface HavenCatalogEntry {
      * (the operator vouches for the listing; the catalog refresh probe still
      * checks the endpoint, see `verifiedPayable`). `ingestion` = submitted
      * through the Verified Payable Directory and passed domain-ownership proof
-     * plus the read-only quote probe.
+     * plus the read-only quote probe. `bazaar` = written by the x402 Bazaar
+     * discovery cron (#4245): seller-chosen name and description, no operator
+     * review, no ownership proof.
      */
-    source: 'operator' | 'ingestion';
+    source: 'operator' | 'ingestion' | 'bazaar';
     /** True only for `ingestion` entries — the one ownership claim. See the epic's trust claim (never merchant honesty or quality). */
     domainVerified: boolean;
     /**

package/dist/{types-BKgqzvnk.d.ts → types-DKmvjXK6.d.ts}

@@ -14,9 +14,14 @@
  *    it is a string check. A public host name whose DNS ANSWER points at
  *    private space is NOT blocked here — that needs the resolution-time
  *    checks parked in #3742–#3744 (owner-accepted residual, 2026-10-07).
- *  - Without `merchantEgress`, NOTHING in the SDK changes: no `redirect:
- *    'manual'`, no body capping, no extra refusals. SDK, local-MCP and
- *    embedder callers keep today's behaviour byte for byte.
+ *  - Without `merchantEgress` there is no URL check, no body capping and no
+ *    per-use budget. Redirects are still followed by the transport (#4257),
+ *    under the platform's rules (20 hops, the Fetch spec's method/body
+ *    rewrite), plus the one rule both paths share: a hop to another origin
+ *    carries only the cross-origin header allow-list. A paid request (the
+ *    delivery, or a body with an x402 payment in `_meta`) is never re-sent
+ *    to another origin by a redirect that keeps the body (307/308, or 301/302
+ *    on a method other than POST); any other request follows as before.
  *  - The policy is network policy, not spend control. It never gates a
  *    payment's authority — the on-chain allowance stays the real control
  *    (CASP: off-chain policy is never the spend control).
@@ -48,7 +53,10 @@ interface MerchantEgressPolicy {
     /**
      * How many GET redirects may be followed; EVERY hop is re-asserted against
      * `assertUrl` before it connects. A redirect on any other method is
-     * refused outright. `undefined` = no redirect following.
+     * refused outright. A hop to a different origin carries only the
+     * transport's cross-origin header allow-list (#4244): credentials and other
+     * caller headers stay with the origin they were sent to.
+     * `undefined` = no redirect following.
      */
     maxGetRedirects?: number;
     /** Per-use timeouts (ms). The effective deadline is `min(this, merchantTimeout)`. */
@@ -59,7 +67,14 @@ interface MerchantEgressPolicy {
      */
     responseByteCaps?: Partial<Record<MerchantEgressUse, number>>;
 }
-type MerchantEgressRefusalReason = 'url_not_allowed' | 'redirect_on_non_get' | 'redirect_missing_location' | 'redirect_invalid_location' | 'redirect_budget_exceeded';
+type MerchantEgressRefusalReason = 'url_not_allowed' | 'redirect_on_non_get' | 'redirect_missing_location' | 'redirect_invalid_location' | 'redirect_budget_exceeded'
+/**
+ * #4257: a redirect that keeps the body (307/308, or 301/302 on a method
+ * other than POST) would re-send it to another origin. Under a
+ * policy (GET only) this is unreachable; without one it fires for a paid
+ * delivery, or a body carrying an x402 payment in `_meta`.
+ */
+ | 'redirect_cross_origin_body';
 declare const MERCHANT_EGRESS_REFUSED_CODE = "MERCHANT_EGRESS_REFUSED";
 /**
  * The policy refused a merchant request. `beforeRequest` is true when the
@@ -73,7 +88,27 @@ declare class MerchantEgressRefusedError extends HavenError {
     readonly url: string;
     readonly refusal: MerchantEgressRefusalReason;
     readonly beforeRequest: boolean;
-    constructor(message: string, url: string, refusal: MerchantEgressRefusalReason, beforeRequest: boolean);
+    /** #4257: the redirect status that was not followed, when a redirect was refused. */
+    readonly redirectStatus?: number;
+    /**
+     * #4257: set only when `url` IS the redirect target (a cross-origin body
+     * re-send, a spent hop budget, a hop `assertUrl` refused). A refusal that
+     * stopped at the answering URL itself (a non-GET redirect, a missing or
+     * unresolvable Location) leaves it unset, and `url` is that answering URL.
+     */
+    readonly redirectTarget?: string;
+    /**
+     * #4257: set when the refusal interrupted a PAID delivery and the local
+     * completion has re-thrown it with the payment it belongs to — the funded,
+     * undelivered state, never "nothing happened".
+     */
+    readonly settlementScheme?: 'eip3009' | 'erc7710';
+    constructor(message: string, url: string, refusal: MerchantEgressRefusalReason, beforeRequest: boolean, extra?: {
+        redirectStatus?: number;
+        redirectTarget?: string;
+        paymentId?: string;
+        settlementScheme?: 'eip3009' | 'erc7710';
+    });
 }
 declare const MERCHANT_EGRESS_RESPONSE_CAP_CODE = "MERCHANT_EGRESS_RESPONSE_CAP";
 /**
@@ -1107,9 +1142,9 @@ interface HavenSubBudgetCloseSignData {
 /** #3506: `POST /sub-budgets/:id/close`. */
 interface CloseSubBudgetResult {
     subBudget: HavenSubBudget;
-    /** `closed` on a trivial close (never signed, or already expired); absent when a close signature is pending. */
+    /** `closed` on a trivial close (never signed, or `open` and already expired) or when the chain already shows it disabled; absent when a close signature is pending. */
     status?: 'closed';
-    /** Present only when the close needed a signature (a live child). */
+    /** Present only when the close needed a signature (a live child, or any `closing` row — #3923). */
     signData?: HavenSubBudgetCloseSignData;
     nextAction?: string;
 }
@@ -1145,6 +1180,8 @@ interface HavenTaskBudget {
     status: HavenTaskBudgetStatus;
     expiresAt: number;
     isExpired: boolean;
+    /** #3922: camelCase `is_live`; absent when the backend predates it (presence preserved). */
+    isLive?: boolean;
     createdAt: string;
     openedAt: string | null;
     closedAt: string | null;
@@ -1793,6 +1830,22 @@ declare const AgentPaymentWarningCode: {
      * settlement can no longer land at all.
      */
     readonly SettlementUnconfirmed: "SETTLEMENT_UNCONFIRMED";
+    /**
+     * #3967: the quote-time budget pre-check decided the quoted amount does NOT
+     * fit the agent's remaining delegation budget — the same server-side compare
+     * the payment path runs before funding. Travels beside
+     * `budget_check.sufficient: false` and, on `haven_quote_x402`,
+     * `safe_to_continue: false` with no prefilled cap. The on-chain policy
+     * remains the actual gate either way.
+     */
+    readonly QuoteExceedsRemainingBudget: "QUOTE_EXCEEDS_REMAINING_BUDGET";
+    /**
+     * #3967: the MERCHANT reported a denial on one of its x402 payment options —
+     * a known denial key (starting with `issuanceDenied`) in `accepts[].extra`.
+     * Strictly informational: it flips neither `safe_to_continue` nor
+     * `expected_settleable`; the agent should surface it to the user.
+     */
+    readonly MerchantReportedDenial: "MERCHANT_REPORTED_DENIAL";
 };
 type AgentPaymentWarningCode = (typeof AgentPaymentWarningCode)[keyof typeof AgentPaymentWarningCode];
 interface AgentPaymentWarning {
@@ -2053,9 +2106,11 @@ interface HavenCatalogEntry {
      * (the operator vouches for the listing; the catalog refresh probe still
      * checks the endpoint, see `verifiedPayable`). `ingestion` = submitted
      * through the Verified Payable Directory and passed domain-ownership proof
-     * plus the read-only quote probe.
+     * plus the read-only quote probe. `bazaar` = written by the x402 Bazaar
+     * discovery cron (#4245): seller-chosen name and description, no operator
+     * review, no ownership proof.
      */
-    source: 'operator' | 'ingestion';
+    source: 'operator' | 'ingestion' | 'bazaar';
     /** True only for `ingestion` entries — the one ownership claim. See the epic's trust claim (never merchant honesty or quality). */
     domainVerified: boolean;
     /**

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@haven_ai/sdk",
-  "version": "0.10.0-alpha.0",
+  "version": "0.11.0-alpha.0",
   "description": "TypeScript SDK for Haven — give AI agents budgeted, non-custodial payment ability. Pay x402 (HTTP 402) APIs in USDC within on-chain-enforced spending limits; the agent never holds funds or keys.",
   "engines": {
     "node": ">=22"