@haven_ai/sdk 0.1.27-alpha.0 → 0.1.29-alpha.0

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -334,6 +334,13 @@ interface X402Intent {
     network: string;
     /** Haven-authenticated binding over the x402 expected context. */
     expectedAuth: X402ExpectedAuth;
+    /**
+     * #1690: the payer identity Haven bound into the expected context (v3),
+     * relayed VERBATIM to the signer's wire shape. Absent until the backend
+     * flips X402_EMIT_PAYER_CONTEXT.
+     */
+    payerDelegate?: string;
+    payerAgentId?: string;
     /**
      * EIP-712 digest of `signData.typed_data`, present on the delegation rail
      * (#1138). The edge signer needs it to reconstruct the v2 expected-context
@@ -364,6 +371,16 @@ interface X402ExpectedContext {
      * this digest makes Haven's declaration cover the real payload.
      */
     typedDataHash?: string;
+    /**
+     * The DELEGATE ADDRESS this quote was created for (#1690). Present ⇒ the
+     * context is **version 3** and the signer refuses to sign when this is not
+     * its own delegate — the guard that turns "quote as agent A, sign as agent
+     * B" from an on-chain revert three layers later into a named refusal.
+     * Inside the Haven-signed message on purpose: outside it, it is forgeable.
+     */
+    payerDelegate?: string;
+    /** The paying agent's id, for the refusal message's diagnosis (#1690). */
+    payerAgentId?: string;
 }
 interface X402ExpectedAuth {
     /**
@@ -653,6 +670,36 @@ interface HavenPaymentReceipt {
     createdAt: string;
     updatedAt: string;
 }
+/**
+ * How long this SDK waits for an on-chain confirmation before it stops
+ * waiting (#1756).
+ *
+ * Lives here rather than in `client.ts` so the payment-confirmation poller
+ * and the delegate sweep share ONE number instead of forking it. The SDK's
+ * other chain waits are already bounded (`waitForFundingTx` at 30 s), so a
+ * fourth independently chosen literal is exactly the drift this constant
+ * exists to prevent.
+ */
+declare const DEFAULT_CONFIRMATION_TIMEOUT_MS = 90000;
+/**
+ * Whether a sweep transfer was observed to confirm (#1756).
+ *
+ * The distinction is the point: `unconfirmed` means the transfer was
+ * BROADCAST and may still land, which is neither success nor failure. It must
+ * never be collapsed into either — reporting a still-pending transaction as
+ * done, or as failed, are the same defect in opposite directions.
+ */
+type SweepConfirmation = 
+/** A receipt was observed. The funds are in the Safe. */
+'confirmed'
+/**
+ * Broadcast, but no receipt within `DEFAULT_CONFIRMATION_TIMEOUT_MS` (or the
+ * node returned no receipt). The transaction is still in the mempool and may
+ * mine at any time. `txHash` is the broadcast hash — check it on the
+ * explorer before re-running the sweep, and expect a re-run to find nothing
+ * stranded if it has since landed.
+ */
+ | 'unconfirmed';
 /** One transferred asset in a delegate sweep. */
 interface SweepEntry {
     /** 'USDC' or 'ETH' */
@@ -661,10 +708,24 @@ interface SweepEntry {
     amount: string;
     /** Atomic amount swept */
     amountAtomic: string;
-    /** Transaction hash of the sweep transfer */
+    /**
+     * Transaction hash of the sweep transfer.
+     *
+     * The RECEIPT hash when `confirmation` is `confirmed`; the BROADCAST hash
+     * when it is `unconfirmed` — which is the whole reason the sweep returns
+     * instead of throwing on a deadline, since this hash is the only thing that
+     * lets a user recover the transfer by hand (#1756).
+     */
     txHash: string;
     /** Block explorer URL for the tx */
     explorerUrl: string;
+    /**
+     * Did this transfer confirm on-chain within the deadline? (#1756)
+     *
+     * `unconfirmed` entries have MOVED NOTHING YET and may still move. Do not
+     * report a sweep as complete without checking this on every entry.
+     */
+    confirmation: SweepConfirmation;
 }
 /** Result of a `sweepDelegate()` call. */
 interface SweepResult {
@@ -676,6 +737,16 @@ interface SweepResult {
     chainId: number;
     /** One entry per transferred asset. Empty when nothing was stranded. */
     transfers: SweepEntry[];
+    /**
+     * True when ANY entry is `unconfirmed` — i.e. the sweep broadcast something
+     * it could not confirm within the deadline (#1756).
+     *
+     * Derived from `transfers`, and present anyway because the consumer most
+     * likely to misread this result is an LLM reading the JSON of the
+     * `haven_sweep_delegate` tool, which will otherwise see a populated
+     * `transfers` array and report the money as recovered.
+     */
+    unconfirmed: boolean;
 }
 type PaymentStateKind = 'payment_intent' | 'approval_request';
 interface AgentPaymentEnumSchema {
@@ -1356,32 +1427,31 @@ declare function buildSweepTypedData(auth: SweepAuthorization): SweepTypedData;
 declare function buildSweepAuthorizationMessage(auth: SweepAuthorization): string;
 
 declare class HavenClient {
-    private readonly apiKey;
     private readonly delegateKey;
-    private readonly baseUrl;
+    private readonly havenApi;
+    private readonly accountReads;
+    private readonly delegateSweep;
     private readonly x402Wallet;
-    private readonly requestTimeout;
-    private readonly merchantTimeout;
+    private readonly merchantTransport;
     private readonly confirmationTimeout;
     private readonly pollingInterval;
     private readonly chainRpcs;
     private readonly inFlightX402;
-    private readonly x402ReceiptCache;
     /**
-     * Setup-time headers configured via `HavenClientConfig.defaultHeaders`.
-     * Read-only after construction — use `withRequestContext` for per-call
-     * scoping so concurrent requests don't race on shared mutable state.
+     * The EIP-3009 funding-leg lifecycle (#1618). The facade holds a reference
+     * and delegates; it does not reimplement any of it.
+     */
+    private readonly fundingLeg;
+    /**
+     * The erc7710 direct-settlement lifecycle (#1619). Separate from the funding
+     * leg on purpose: this scheme has no funding leg to share.
      */
-    private readonly defaultHeaders;
+    private readonly erc7710;
     /**
-     * Async-local store for per-request context (currently: extra headers).
-     * Each `withRequestContext` invocation produces an isolated store, so
-     * overlapping async work — like two MCP tool dispatches in flight at
-     * the same time — see their own headers without stepping on each other.
+     * Merchant delivery and the evidence trail behind it (#1620). Scheme-neutral
+     * on purpose — both settlement schemes finish through the same door.
      */
-    private readonly requestContext;
-    /** Monotonic JSON-RPC id source for the MCP `initialize` handshake. */
-    private mcpRequestId;
+    private readonly merchantCompletion;
     /** Delegate address derived from the private key (if provided) */
     readonly delegateAddress: string | undefined;
     constructor(config: HavenClientConfig);
@@ -1474,8 +1544,6 @@ declare class HavenClient {
      * Get the agent identity tied to this API key.
      */
     getAgent(): Promise<HavenAgent>;
-    private agentInFlight;
-    private fetchAgent;
     /**
      * One-shot "am I ready?" bootstrap: identity + live spend authority + a
      * readiness signal, in a single call. Folds {@link getAgent} and
@@ -1546,7 +1614,6 @@ declare class HavenClient {
     getPostPurchaseAllowanceSummary(paymentId: string): Promise<{
         allowance: PostPurchaseAllowanceSummary | null;
         warnings: AgentPaymentWarning[];
-        /** Same authenticated payment-state read used to resolve the settled token. */
         payment: PaymentStatusResult | null;
     }>;
     /**
@@ -1647,35 +1714,16 @@ declare class HavenClient {
      * Pay a previously inspected x402 quote and retry the exact captured request.
      */
     payX402Quote(quote: X402Quote, options?: X402AuthorizationOptions): Promise<Response>;
-    private authorizeStandardX402;
     /**
      * Pay a merchant through **erc7710 direct settlement** (#1454, epic #1450).
      *
-     * The whole point of this path is what it does NOT do. There is no funding
-     * leg: the merchant redeems a delegation chain and pulls from the treasury
-     * directly, so the delegate EOA never holds the money, no sweep can strand
-     * it, and the #713 reconciliation class does not apply. It is also why this
-     * method is SMALLER than the 3009 path — the backend assembles the merchant
-     * `X-PAYMENT` header in `assembleSettlementPayload`, so the SDK builds no
-     * header locally.
+     * **Nothing has settled when this returns** — that is why it does not return
+     * an `X402Receipt`; the caller still has to retry the merchant with the
+     * header. **MCP callers must pass `options.resourceUrl`**, because an in-band
+     * MCP 402 challenge frequently carries no `resource` object at all.
      *
-     *     authorize (payTo = the MERCHANT) → sign the child → settle → header
-     *
-     * The caller then retries the merchant with that header. **Nothing has
-     * settled when this returns** — that is why it does not return an
-     * `X402Receipt`.
-     *
-     * Requires a delegation-rail account. The backend enforces that
-     * (`validateGenericSchemeRail`), and so does this method, before building a
-     * request the backend would only reject: an error a client can explain is
-     * worth more than a 400 it has to decode.
-     *
-     * **MCP callers must pass `options.resourceUrl`.** An in-band MCP 402
-     * challenge frequently carries no `resource` object at all, so
-     * `paymentRequired.resource?.url` is undefined and the backend answers
-     * "Valid url is required". The QA scenario this path was ported from falls
-     * back to the request URL for exactly that reason — the SDK cannot, because
-     * it never saw the request. Pass it.
+     * Both caveats, and why this scheme has no funding leg, are explained where
+     * the lifecycle lives: `x402-erc7710.ts` (#1619).
      */
     settleX402Erc7710(paymentRequired: X402PaymentRequired, options?: {
         resourceUrl?: string;
@@ -1686,30 +1734,21 @@ declare class HavenClient {
      *
      * Split out because the hosted topology cannot use `settleX402Erc7710()`:
      * that method signs in-process with `delegateKey`, and hosted Haven does not
-     * have one and must not. The hosted MCP server drives these two halves with
-     * the LOCAL signer in between, so the key stays where it belongs and the
-     * request shaping stays in one place rather than being reimplemented.
+     * have one and must not.
      */
     prepareX402Erc7710(paymentRequired: X402PaymentRequired, options?: {
         resourceUrl?: string;
         /**
-         * The account's rail, when the caller has ALREADY read it from
-         * `GET /machine-payments/agent` — passing it skips a duplicate fetch
-         * (#1456: the hosted tool reads the agent for the delegate address
-         * anyway, and #1348 pins that path to exactly one agent round-trip).
-         *
-         * This is an optimisation, not a trust boundary: omit it and the rail is
-         * read here, and either way the backend independently refuses erc7710
-         * from a non-delegation account (`validateGenericSchemeRail`). A caller
-         * that asserted the wrong rail would build a request the backend rejects.
+         * The account's rail, when the caller has ALREADY read it — passing it
+         * skips a duplicate fetch (#1456). An optimisation, not a trust
+         * boundary: the backend independently refuses erc7710 from a
+         * non-delegation account (`validateGenericSchemeRail`).
          */
         delegationRail?: boolean;
         /**
          * #1547: the merchant MCP-tool call this authorization was quoted
          * against, persisted so the settle leg can rehydrate it by payment_id
-         * (#1307) — the same option `createX402Intent` already carries. Without
-         * it an erc7710 settle needs merchant_url/tool_name/arguments
-         * re-threaded, which the guided catalog path (#1305) exists to remove.
+         * (#1307).
          */
         mcpCallContext?: X402McpCallContext;
     }): Promise<{
@@ -1721,9 +1760,8 @@ declare class HavenClient {
      * The SETTLE half (#1456): exchange the signed child for the merchant header.
      *
      * The SDK builds no header on this path — the backend assembles the MetaMask
-     * erc7710 payload in `assembleSettlementPayload`. Whoever produced the
-     * signature (an in-process delegate key, or the local edge signer over the
-     * hosted boundary) is irrelevant here.
+     * erc7710 payload. Whoever produced the signature (an in-process delegate
+     * key, or the local edge signer over the hosted boundary) is irrelevant.
      */
     submitX402Erc7710(paymentId: string, signature: string): Promise<string>;
     resumeAuthorizedX402(input: ResumeAuthorizedX402Input): Promise<X402Receipt>;
@@ -1752,45 +1790,6 @@ declare class HavenClient {
      * Requires `delegateKey` to be set in the client config.
      */
     fetch(url: string, init?: RequestInit, options?: X402AuthorizationOptions): Promise<Response>;
-    /**
-     * Run the MCP `initialize` handshake against a Streamable-HTTP endpoint and
-     * return the `mcp-session-id` the server assigns.
-     *
-     * Returns `undefined` whenever the endpoint is not actually an MCP server —
-     * a transport/HTTP error, a missing session id, or a JSON-RPC error in the
-     * handshake response — so the caller can fall back to plain x402.
-     */
-    private mcpInitialize;
-    /**
-     * Send the MCP `notifications/initialized` notification that completes the
-     * lifecycle handshake. Best-effort: the session is already established, so a
-     * failed notification must not abort the payment.
-     */
-    private mcpNotifyInitialized;
-    /** Read a single JSON-RPC message from an MCP response (JSON or SSE body). */
-    private readMcpMessage;
-    /** Add the MCP transport headers (session id + SSE Accept) to a request. */
-    private withMcpHeaders;
-    /**
-     * Collapse an MCP SSE response into a plain JSON response carrying the
-     * JSON-RPC `result`, so callers of `fetch()` never see raw SSE framing.
-     * Non-SSE responses pass through untouched.
-     */
-    private surfaceMcpResult;
-    private retryX402Request;
-    /**
-     * #956: capture the merchant's OWN receipt when the paid response carries
-     * one, and report it to Haven so the reporting feed can attach it next to
-     * the Haven-generated payment evidence (#498). Two supported signals on the
-     * paid response:
-     *
-     *   x-receipt-json: base64-encoded JSON receipt document (inline)
-     *   x-receipt-url:  https URL to the receipt document (reference)
-     *
-     * Strictly best-effort: absence is the normal case, and no failure here may
-     * ever affect the completed payment — the response is already paid for.
-     */
-    private reportMerchantReceipt;
     /**
      * Deliver an already-signed x402 payment header to the merchant and return
      * the merchant's response. Used by the hosted MCP server to complete the
@@ -1814,7 +1813,7 @@ declare class HavenClient {
      * and before delivering the X-PAYMENT header, so the merchant's
      * balanceOf(delegate) / transferWithAuthorization verification sees the funded
      * balance — otherwise it rejects with "Payment verification failed". The
-     * SDK's local path already does this (see authorizeStandardX402); the hosted
+     * SDK's local path already does this (see `X402FundingLeg.authorize`); the hosted
      * split flow regressed when the 5→3 collapse removed the incidental
      * inter-call latency that used to mask it.
      *
@@ -1863,16 +1862,6 @@ declare class HavenClient {
      * fallback (re-send the full context explicitly).
      */
     getX402MerchantCallContext(paymentId: string): Promise<X402MerchantCallContext>;
-    private resolveX402MerchantCompletionContext;
-    private resolveX402WalletForMerchantCall;
-    private assertCanResumeX402;
-    private mapX402ReceiptFromAuthorization;
-    private mapX402ReceiptFromStatus;
-    private buildX402Receipt;
-    private createStandardX402Header;
-    private cacheX402Receipt;
-    private recordMerchantRetryRejected;
-    private reportMachinePaymentEvidence;
     /**
      * Wait for a funding tx to be mined with ≥1 confirmation before the
      * merchant retry, eliminating the race where the merchant's
@@ -1882,39 +1871,7 @@ declare class HavenClient {
      * backend has already confirmed on-chain submission and callers accept the
      * small propagation window as a trade-off for not configuring an RPC URL.
      */
-    private waitForFundingTx;
-    /**
-     * Can the delegate EOA still fund an authorization for `amountAtomic`?
-     *
-     * #1521: the only question that separates a legitimate resume (funding
-     * confirmed, merchant never paid — the delegate still holds the money) from
-     * a replayed settled payment (funding confirmed, merchant paid, delegate
-     * spent). The intent's own `status: 'confirmed'` is identical in both.
-     *
-     * The balance is asked of the CHAIN rather than of Haven's bookkeeping on
-     * purpose: the merchant-settlement evidence record is written by this SDK
-     * *after* the merchant call, so a client that dies between the two leaves
-     * the backend believing the merchant was never paid — the exact case the
-     * discriminator has to get right. The chain cannot be behind in that way.
-     *
-     * Returns `null` — never a guess — when `chainRpcs` has no entry for the
-     * chain or the read fails. Callers must treat that as "unverifiable", not
-     * as "funded".
-     */
-    private delegateCanFund;
     private throwIfNonSignableAuthorizationState;
-    private throwPaymentStateError;
-    private paymentStateFromRaw;
-    private x402PayerAddress;
-    private snapshotX402Request;
-    private snapshotRequestBody;
-    private requestInitFromSnapshot;
-    private withX402Wallet;
-    private buildX402Quote;
-    private detectX402McpTransport;
-    private buildX402ResumeState;
-    private attachResumeState;
-    private attachX402ResumeState;
     /**
      * Execute a tool call by name and input.
      *
@@ -1928,24 +1885,8 @@ declare class HavenClient {
      * ```
      */
     executeTool(toolName: string, input: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<Record<string, unknown>>;
-    private toolX402PaymentRequired;
-    private x402ToolReceipt;
-    private toolError;
     private post;
     private get;
-    /**
-     * #1300: every MERCHANT-facing fetch goes through here. Haven API calls
-     * have always been bounded (request() below); the merchant probes/retries
-     * called globalThis.fetch bare, so a slow-loris merchant could hold a tool
-     * call open forever. A caller-supplied signal still applies (combined via
-     * AbortSignal.any); a timeout abort surfaces as a clear HavenApiError 504
-     * naming the URL rather than a bare AbortError.
-     */
-    private merchantFetch;
-    private request;
-    private mapPaymentResult;
-    private mapPaymentStatusResult;
-    private mapPaymentReceipt;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2146,7 +2087,7 @@ declare const toolDescriptions: {
         readonly summary: "Sweep stranded USDC and/or ETH from the delegate wallet back to the originating Safe.";
         readonly selectionGuidance: string;
         readonly behavior: string;
-        readonly nextActionGuidance: "If transfers is non-empty, confirm the amounts with the user. No further action required — funds are on their way back to the Safe.";
+        readonly nextActionGuidance: string;
     };
     readonly send: {
         readonly summary: "Send ETH or USDC directly from the agent's Haven wallet to a recipient address.";
@@ -2546,4 +2487,4 @@ declare function discoverMerchantMcpUrl(inputUrl: string): Promise<string | null
 /** Trailing-slash/percent-case echoes compare equal; unparseable never does. */
 declare function sameUrl(a: string, b: string): boolean;
 
-export { AGENT_PAYMENT_FAILURE_CODE_VALUES, AGENT_PAYMENT_NEXT_ACTION_VALUES, AGENT_PAYMENT_PHASE_VALUES, AGENT_PAYMENT_RAIL_VALUES, type AgentNextStep, type AgentPaymentEnumSchema, AgentPaymentFailureCode, AgentPaymentFailureCodeDescriptions, AgentPaymentFailureCodeSchema, AgentPaymentNextAction, AgentPaymentNextActionDescriptions, AgentPaymentNextActionSchema, AgentPaymentPhase, AgentPaymentPhaseDescriptions, AgentPaymentPhaseSchema, AgentPaymentRail, AgentPaymentRailDescriptions, AgentPaymentRailSchema, type AgentPaymentSummary, type AgentPaymentWarning, AgentPaymentWarningCode, type AgentPurchaseSummary, type ClaudeTool, DISCOVERY_MAX_BYTES, ERC7710_ASSET_TRANSFER_METHOD, HAVEN_MINIMUM_NODE_VERSION, HAVEN_SKILL_BODY_MD, HAVEN_SKILL_MD, type HavenAgent, type HavenAgentAllowanceSummary, type HavenAgentReadiness, type HavenAgentSummary, type HavenAllowance, type HavenAllowanceSummary, HavenApiError, type HavenCatalogEntry, HavenClient, type HavenClientConfig, HavenError, type HavenPaymentReceipt, HavenPaymentStateError, HavenSigningError, HavenTimeoutError, HavenUnsupportedSignerVersionError, MERCHANT_DISCOVERY_PATHS, type MachinePaymentRail, MerchantTimeoutError, type OpenAITool, type PaymentFee, type PaymentIntent, type PaymentNextAction, type PaymentPhase, type PaymentReceipt, type PaymentRequest, type PaymentResult, type PaymentResumeState, type PaymentStatus, type PaymentStatusResult, type PendingApproval, type PostPurchaseAllowanceSummary, RECEIPT_VERSION, type ReceiptVerification, type ResumeAuthorizedX402Input, type ResumeX402PaymentInput, SIGNER_UPDATE_FALLBACK, SKILL_FOLDER_NAME, SWEEP_BASE_CHAIN_ID, SWEEP_BASE_SEPOLIA_CHAIN_ID, SWEEP_BASE_SEPOLIA_USDC_ADDRESS, SWEEP_BASE_USDC_ADDRESS, type SharedToolKey, type SignData, SignerRefusalCode, type SweepAuthorization, type SweepEip712Domain, type SweepEntry, type SweepExpectedAuth, type SweepPreparation, type SweepPrepareResponse, type SweepResult, type SweepSubmitResponse, type SweepSubmitResult, type SweepTypedData, TRANSFER_WITH_AUTHORIZATION_TYPES, type ToolDescription, type UnsupportedNodeVersionMessageOptions, X402AlreadySettledError, type X402AuthorizationOptions, type X402Erc7710Settlement, type X402ExpectedAuth, type X402ExpectedContext, type X402Intent, type X402McpCallContext, type X402McpTransport, type X402MerchantCallContext, type X402PaymentHeaderContext, X402PaymentHeaderValidationError, type X402PaymentOption, type X402PaymentRequired, type X402Quote, type X402Receipt, type X402RequestSnapshot, type X402ResumeState, type X402SchemeSelection, X402UnexpectedStatusError, X402_MAX_AUTHORIZATION_WINDOW_SECONDS, X402_SETTLEMENT_FORWARD_MARGIN_SECONDS, addressFromKey, buildSweepAuthorizationMessage, buildSweepTypedData, buildX402ExpectedMessage, compareNodeVersions, composeDescription, decodeBase64Json, decodeBase64Utf8, discoverMerchantMcpUrl, encodeBase64Json, encodeBase64Utf8, encodePaymentProof, havenTools, isErc7710Option, isSupportedNodeVersion, isSweepableChain, normalizePaymentRequired, parsePaymentRequired, parsePaymentRequiredResponse, resolveTokenFromAddress, sameUrl, selectErc7710PaymentOption, selectPaymentOption, selectStandardPaymentOption, selectX402SettlementScheme, signHash, signUserOpTypedDataForDelegation, sweepUsdcAddress, sweepUsdcDomain, toStandardPaymentRequirements, toolDescriptions, unsupportedNodeVersionMessage, validateStandardX402PaymentHeader, verifyPaymentReceipt, verifySignature, x402AssetTransferMethod, x402AuthorizationAmount, x402FacilitatorAddresses };
+export { AGENT_PAYMENT_FAILURE_CODE_VALUES, AGENT_PAYMENT_NEXT_ACTION_VALUES, AGENT_PAYMENT_PHASE_VALUES, AGENT_PAYMENT_RAIL_VALUES, type AgentNextStep, type AgentPaymentEnumSchema, AgentPaymentFailureCode, AgentPaymentFailureCodeDescriptions, AgentPaymentFailureCodeSchema, AgentPaymentNextAction, AgentPaymentNextActionDescriptions, AgentPaymentNextActionSchema, AgentPaymentPhase, AgentPaymentPhaseDescriptions, AgentPaymentPhaseSchema, AgentPaymentRail, AgentPaymentRailDescriptions, AgentPaymentRailSchema, type AgentPaymentSummary, type AgentPaymentWarning, AgentPaymentWarningCode, type AgentPurchaseSummary, type ClaudeTool, DEFAULT_CONFIRMATION_TIMEOUT_MS, DISCOVERY_MAX_BYTES, ERC7710_ASSET_TRANSFER_METHOD, HAVEN_MINIMUM_NODE_VERSION, HAVEN_SKILL_BODY_MD, HAVEN_SKILL_MD, type HavenAgent, type HavenAgentAllowanceSummary, type HavenAgentReadiness, type HavenAgentSummary, type HavenAllowance, type HavenAllowanceSummary, HavenApiError, type HavenCatalogEntry, HavenClient, type HavenClientConfig, HavenError, type HavenPaymentReceipt, HavenPaymentStateError, HavenSigningError, HavenTimeoutError, HavenUnsupportedSignerVersionError, MERCHANT_DISCOVERY_PATHS, type MachinePaymentRail, MerchantTimeoutError, type OpenAITool, type PaymentFee, type PaymentIntent, type PaymentNextAction, type PaymentPhase, type PaymentReceipt, type PaymentRequest, type PaymentResult, type PaymentResumeState, type PaymentStatus, type PaymentStatusResult, type PendingApproval, type PostPurchaseAllowanceSummary, RECEIPT_VERSION, type ReceiptVerification, type ResumeAuthorizedX402Input, type ResumeX402PaymentInput, SIGNER_UPDATE_FALLBACK, SKILL_FOLDER_NAME, SWEEP_BASE_CHAIN_ID, SWEEP_BASE_SEPOLIA_CHAIN_ID, SWEEP_BASE_SEPOLIA_USDC_ADDRESS, SWEEP_BASE_USDC_ADDRESS, type SharedToolKey, type SignData, SignerRefusalCode, type SweepAuthorization, type SweepConfirmation, type SweepEip712Domain, type SweepEntry, type SweepExpectedAuth, type SweepPreparation, type SweepPrepareResponse, type SweepResult, type SweepSubmitResponse, type SweepSubmitResult, type SweepTypedData, TRANSFER_WITH_AUTHORIZATION_TYPES, type ToolDescription, type UnsupportedNodeVersionMessageOptions, X402AlreadySettledError, type X402AuthorizationOptions, type X402Erc7710Settlement, type X402ExpectedAuth, type X402ExpectedContext, type X402Intent, type X402McpCallContext, type X402McpTransport, type X402MerchantCallContext, type X402PaymentHeaderContext, X402PaymentHeaderValidationError, type X402PaymentOption, type X402PaymentRequired, type X402Quote, type X402Receipt, type X402RequestSnapshot, type X402ResumeState, type X402SchemeSelection, X402UnexpectedStatusError, X402_MAX_AUTHORIZATION_WINDOW_SECONDS, X402_SETTLEMENT_FORWARD_MARGIN_SECONDS, addressFromKey, buildSweepAuthorizationMessage, buildSweepTypedData, buildX402ExpectedMessage, compareNodeVersions, composeDescription, decodeBase64Json, decodeBase64Utf8, discoverMerchantMcpUrl, encodeBase64Json, encodeBase64Utf8, encodePaymentProof, havenTools, isErc7710Option, isSupportedNodeVersion, isSweepableChain, normalizePaymentRequired, parsePaymentRequired, parsePaymentRequiredResponse, resolveTokenFromAddress, sameUrl, selectErc7710PaymentOption, selectPaymentOption, selectStandardPaymentOption, selectX402SettlementScheme, signHash, signUserOpTypedDataForDelegation, sweepUsdcAddress, sweepUsdcDomain, toStandardPaymentRequirements, toolDescriptions, unsupportedNodeVersionMessage, validateStandardX402PaymentHeader, verifyPaymentReceipt, verifySignature, x402AssetTransferMethod, x402AuthorizationAmount, x402FacilitatorAddresses };