@haven_ai/mcp 0.8.0-alpha.0 → 0.9.0-alpha.0

package/dist/cli.js

@@ -336,7 +336,21 @@ var toolSchemas = {
     compact: z.boolean().optional().describe("true drops challengePayload, selectedPayment and protocolReceiptPayload from each row; omit for the full row.")
   },
   haven_verify_receipt: {
-    receipt: z.unknown()
+    receipt: z.unknown(),
+    // #3723: the spread form — the endpoint's `{ receipt, verification }`
+    // spread as top-level arguments — verifies: `verification` is declared
+    // ACCEPTED-AND-IGNORED (Haven's own self-check, never read). The stdio
+    // z.object would strip it silently anyway; declaring it keeps the schema
+    // identical to the hosted runtime's, where the key must be declared to
+    // pass its strict refusal.
+    verification: z.unknown().optional().describe("accepted and ignored \u2014 verification reads the receipt itself")
+  },
+  // #3723: the signed bundle's read — `{ receipt }` only, settled payments
+  // only. The endpoint's server-side `verification` is deliberately NOT
+  // returned: it is computed on Haven's server, not offline, and an agent
+  // that trusted it would skip haven_verify_receipt.
+  haven_get_receipt: {
+    payment_id: z.string().min(1)
   },
   // #3329: a budget for one task that ends by itself — a short-lived child of
   // the agent's own budget, capped and time-boxed independently of the period
@@ -421,6 +435,8 @@ var toolDescriptions = {
   haven_submit_catalog_entry: composeDescription(toolDescriptions$1.submitCatalogEntry),
   haven_list_receipts: composeDescription(toolDescriptions$1.listReceipts),
   haven_verify_receipt: composeDescription(toolDescriptions$1.verifyReceipt),
+  // #3723: the signed bundle's read, described from the shared fragment.
+  haven_get_receipt: composeDescription(toolDescriptions$1.getReceipt),
   haven_open_task_budget: OPEN_TASK_BUDGET_DESCRIPTION,
   haven_close_task_budget: CLOSE_TASK_BUDGET_DESCRIPTION,
   haven_get_task_budget: GET_TASK_BUDGET_DESCRIPTION,
@@ -767,6 +783,17 @@ function createToolHandlers(haven) {
       const args = objectInput("haven_verify_receipt", input);
       return runTool(async () => verifyPaymentReceipt(args.receipt));
     },
+    // #3723: the signed bundle's home on the local surface. Parsed INSIDE
+    // runTool, so a missing payment_id is a structured INVALID_INPUT failure
+    // rather than a thrown ZodError (the hosted runtime's parseStrict already
+    // answers that way). Returns `{ receipt }` only — the endpoint's
+    // server-side `verification` is not offline evidence, and the agent
+    // verifies with haven_verify_receipt, which reads the bundle unchanged.
+    haven_get_receipt: async (input) => runTool(async () => {
+      const args = objectInput("haven_get_receipt", input);
+      const { receipt } = await haven.getReceipt(args.payment_id);
+      return { receipt };
+    }),
     haven_open_task_budget: async (input) => {
       const args = objectInput("haven_open_task_budget", input);
       return runTool(async () => {
@@ -1050,6 +1077,14 @@ function normalizeError(err) {
       body: err.body
     };
   }
+  if (err instanceof z.ZodError) {
+    return {
+      success: false,
+      code: "INVALID_INPUT",
+      message: err.errors.map((e) => `${e.path.join(".") || "(root)"}: ${e.message}`).join("; "),
+      statusCode: 400
+    };
+  }
   if (err instanceof HavenError) {
     return {
       success: false,
@@ -1278,7 +1313,7 @@ async function resolveHavenClient(options = {}) {
   return { client, credentials };
 }
 var MCP_NAME = "@haven_ai/mcp";
-var MCP_VERSION = "0.8.0-alpha.0";
+var MCP_VERSION = "0.9.0-alpha.0";
 var MCP_INSTRUCTIONS = [
   "Haven local MCP server: signs in-process with the delegate key it holds on",
   "this machine \u2014 the key never leaves this process. Call haven_get_agent",